'Fundamental constitutional truths' : the constitutional jurisprudence of Justice Deane, 1982-1995 by Roberts, Heather Jan
  THESES SIS/LIBRARY        TELEPHONE: +61 2 6125 4631 
R.G. MENZIES LIBRARY BUILDING NO:2      FACSIMILE:  +61 2 6125 4063 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY      EMAIL: library.theses@anu.edu.au 
CANBERRA ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USE OF THESES 
 
 
This copy is supplied for purposes 
of private study and research only. 
Passages from the thesis may not be  
copied or closely paraphrased without the  
written consent of the author. 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSllY 
'Fundamental Constitutional Truths' 
The constitutional jurisprudence of Justice Deane, 
1982-1995 
A thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy of 
The Australian National University 
September 2007 
Heather Jan Roberts 
ANU College of Law 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I have had the very good fortune to undertake my research at the ANU College 
of Law. The generosity, encouragement, patience and good humour of my 
colleagues has been unfailing. You know who you are, and your many acts of 
kindness are too numerous to mention. Thank you. Thanks also to the support 
of my family and friends, especially for knowing when not to ask 'how's the 
thesis going?' and for the many cups of tea along the way. 
Particular thanks are due to the constitutional law 'team' at the ANU. Dr Fiona 
Wheeler first inspired my interest in constitutional law as an undergraduate. 
Then, as now, her generosity knows no bounds. She has tirelessly read every 
draft, offering penetrating insights, guidance and continual encouragement. 
Thank you for agreeing to be my mentor and principal supervisor through this 
journey. 
Professor Michael Coper was chair of my supervisory panel during the project, 
amidst his many responsibilities as Dean of the College. His enthusiasm for my 
research topic and clear focus on the 'big picture' of the project has been of 
enormous assistance. Professor Leslie Zines offered insightful comments on 
chapters of this thesis, and I am grateful for our many discussions, as I am for 
the input of Amelia Simpson and James Stellios on my research and teaching. 
Since her appointment as Director of the Centre for International and Public 
Law at the ANU, Professor Kim Rubenstein has been a constant supporter of 
early career researchers at the ANU. I am particularly fortunate that Kim has 
also had a long-standing interest in the jurisprudence of Deane. Thank you Kim 
for our many chats and for reading chapters of the thesis whilst on a plane to 
Canada and on leave in Melbourne. 
There are three people whose wisdom and friendship both inspired me to 
commence this research, and guided me through the process. My debt to 
Dr Fiona Wheeler as supervisor has been mentioned. She may not remember, 
ii 
however, that it was during a conversation with her in late 1998 that I first 
became interested in the constitutional vision of Deane. Not once through the 
'process' of this PhD did I regret this conversation. 
The late Professor Phillipa Weeks was an esteemed teacher while I was an 
undergraduate at the ANU. After graduation she invited me to tutor in 
Property Law. Had it not been for her faith in my teaching ability, in a subject 
that had not been my best, I may not have found my way back to academic 
research. For this, for her friendship and the inspiration of her life, cut far too 
short, I will be forever grateful. 
Finally, to Rado. For everything. 
iii 
ABSTRACT 
Justice Deane was a member of the High Court from 1982 until 1995. This thesis 
examines Deane's constitutional jurisprudence during this period and argues 
that his decisions were permeated by themes and principles forming a coherent 
vision of the Constitution and its interpretation. Although voiced most fully in 
Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times (1994) 182 CLR 104, Deane's 
constitutional vision was evident from his earliest High Court decisions. 
Central to Deane's constitutional philosophy was his concept of 'the people'. 
Deane regarded 'the people' as the source of legal authority of the Constitution, 
and the Constitution as ultimately concerned with their governance and 
protection. Although Deane recognised the importance of representative 
democracy as a fundamental commitment of the Constitution, it was the Court, 
and judicial process, that for Deane was the most important guarantee of 
individual liberty. Consistent with this understanding of the role of the Court, 
Deane's jurisprudence favoured rights-sensitive interpretations of the 
Constitution's text, including the development of a number of innovative, and 
controversial, implied constitutional rights. These features of Deane's 
constitutional jurisprudence, matched with his reliance on broad and flexible 
interpretive principles in constitutional interpretation, challenged orthodox 
assumptions of the legitimate limits on judicial review in the Australian 
constitutional system. 
In the years since Deane's departure from the Court the concept of 'the people' 
as the source of the Constitution's authority has gained wide acceptance. Few 
have also accepted Deane's bold vision of the Court's duty to protect the 
fundamental rights of 'the people' from legislative interference. Until this 
aspect of Deane's constitutional vision is adopted, some of his more 
controversial interpretations of the Constitution are unlikely to gain the 
acceptance of a majority of the Court. However, much of Deane's jurisprudence 
displays his reliance on his distinctive concept of 'the people' to support the 
application of both established principles of constitutional interpretation and a 
iv 
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number of innovative interpretive principles to derive moderate conclusions on 
the meaning and effect of the Constitution. For this reason, Deane's 
jurisprudence contains many fresh and compelling answers to questions 
regarding the meaning of the Constitution in contemporary Australia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At his swearing-in as a Justice of the High Court of Australia, in July 1982 
Deane1 said: 
The source of law and of judicial power in a true political democracy such as 
Australia is the people themselves; the governed: the strong and the weak, the 
rich and the poor, the good and the bad: 'all manner of people.' As the 
Australian Constitution itself makes clear, the Federation, in pursuance of 
which this Court was established, was not a federation between the States of 
the Commonwealth. It was a federation between the peoples of the States. 
Under that Federation, the grant of judicial power by the people was subject to 
what I see as fundamental constitutional guarantees, namely, that the power 
granted must primarily be exercised by an independent judiciary and that those 
exercising the power must act judicially.2 
A glance across Deane's constitutional jurisprudence reveals the presence of 
'the people', 'equality' and guarantees flowing from the separation of federal 
judicial power as themes in many of Deane's most controversial decisions. 
Deane's jurisprudence also displayed his consistent commitment to the judicial 
protection of the rights and interests of the disadvantaged and vulnerable in 
Australian society, including the 'weak', the 'poor' and 'the bad'.3 Three months 
before his retirement from the Court, Deane confirmed the significance of these 
topics in his constitutional philosophy. Observers of his jurisprudence, Deane 
reflected, would see 'two constant themes': 
One is ... that the source of all authority is the people as a whole. The other is 
something related to that, and that is the intrinsic equality of all people.4 
1 In this thesis, Deane J is referred to as 'Deane'. 
2 Transcript of the Ceremonial Sitting of the Occasion of the Swearing-in of the Honourable Mr 
Justice Deane as a Justice of the High Court of Australia at Canberra, Tuesday 27 July 1982, 17-
18. 
3 As Governor-General, Deane would relate his concern for the disadvantaged to his Christian 
faith. For example, at the launch of 'Visions of Rottenberry Hill' at the Australian Centre for 
Christianity and Culture, in Canberra, Deane said: 
there is no ambiguity about the constant relevance of the Christian message that the 
ultimate test of the worth of each of us as individuals and of all of us as a nation is how 
we have treated and treat the most disadvantaged and vulnerable of our fellow human 
beings. 
Quoted in Sir William Deane, Directions: A Vision for Australia (2002) 87. It is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to do more than note that it is likely that Deane's faith informed his commitment 
to the protection of the disadvantaged in his constitutional jurisprudence. 
4 Deane, quoted in Tony Stephens, Sir William Deane: The Things that Matter (2002) 94 (emphasis 
added). See also Malcolm Farr, 'Last Past the Post', Daily Telegraph-Mirror (Sydney), 23 August 
1995, 11. 
1 
This thesis explores the principles and values which infuse Deane's 
constitutional jurisprudence and the persuasiveness of his vision of the 
Constitution. 
Although twenty-five years have passed since Deane's swearing-in as a Justice 
of the Court, an examination of his jurisprudence has contemporary 
significance. Deane was a particularly controversial member of the Mason 
Court; a Court itself regarded as having 'revolutionised' the nature of judicial 
review in Australia.5 For example, Deane's decisions in cases such as Mabo v 
Queensland (No 2),6 Leeth v Commonwealth7 and the implied freedom of political 
communication cases8 have been lightening-rods for criticism of the 'activism' 
of the Mason Court.9 An analysis of Deane's constitutional philosophy locates 
these, and other key decisions, within the broader context of his High Court 
constitutional decisions. Analysis of this kind is essential if descriptions of 
Deane's judicial contribution are to move beyond the 'activist' label attached 
most frequently to his implied rights decisions of the 1990s. In addition, 
through its assessment of the persuasiveness of Deane's constitutional 
jurisprudence, this thesis provides a different perspective on decisions that 
continue to frame debate on the 'proper' role of the Court in the interpretation 
of the Australian Constitution.10 
2 
The remainder of this introduction outlines the framework for this examination 
of Deane's constitutional vision. It begins with an overview of the debate 
stimulated by the Mason Court regarding the appropriate role of the Court in 
constitutional interpretation. It then outlines the criteria employed in this thesis 
to assess the persuasiveness of Deane's constitutional jurisprudence. Finally, it 
5 The Mason Court's 'revolutionising' effect is examined in Jason L Pierce, Inside the Mason Court 
Revolution: The High Court of Australia Transformed (2006). 
6 (1992) 175 CLR 1 ('Mabo (No 2)'). 
7 (1992) 174 CLR455. ('Leeth'). 
8 These five cases were: Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177CLR106 
(' ACTV'); Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 ('Nationwide News'); Theophanous v 
Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104 ('Theophanous'); Stephens v West Australian 
Newspapers Limited ('Stephens') (1994) 182 CLR 211; and, Cunliffe v Commonwealth (1994) 182 CLR 
272 ('Cunliffe'). 
9 For a recent example, see Janet Albrechtsen, 'Inside Judges' Secret World', The Weekend 
Australian (Sydney), 14 July 2007, 21. 
10 See further Andrew Lynch, 'The Once and Future Court? A Review of Jason L Pierce, Inside 
the Mason Court Revolution: The High Court of Australia Transformed' (2007) 28 Federal Law Review 
145, 146-7. 
concludes with an overview of the research methodology and structure of this 
thesis. 
A Deane's jurisprudence in context: legalism, 
realism and the Mason Court's 'activism' 
3 
When Deane was appointed to the Court in 1982, the most influential statement 
on the 'proper way'11 to interpret the Constitution was the Engineers' Case. 12 
There the Court described its 'manifest duty' in constitutional interpretation as 
that of giving effect to 'the words of the compact' according to their 'ordinary' 
or 'literal' meaning.13 That meaning was to be found by 'pure legal 
construction', applying the 'settled rules114 of statutory construction. 
In the Engineers' Case, the Court applied these principles to reject two 
constitutional doctrines adopted by the Griffith Court, the reserved powers and 
intergovernmental immunities doctrines.15 Infused with a commitment to 
preserving the federal balance between the Commonwealth and the States, the 
doctrine of intergovernmental immunities required that the Commonwealth 
and the States could not be subject to laws made by the other level of 
government. The reserved powers doctrine required that in construing the 
grants of Commonwealth legislative power under s 51 the Court should bear in 
mind that the Constitution impliedly reserved the unenumerated powers to the 
States.16 The Court in the Engineers' Case rejected these doctrines on the basis 
that they applied: 
an interpretation of the Constitution depending on an implication which is 
formed on a vague, individual conception of the spirit of the compact ... 
11 Haig Patapan, Judging Democracy: The New Politics of the High Court of Australia (2000) 10. 
12 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28CLR129 ('Engineers' 
Case'). 
13 Ibid 142. For a discussion of 'literalism', and its place within theories of constitutional 
interpretation, see, for example, Sir Anthony Mason, 'The Interpretation of a Constitution in a 
Modem Liberal Democracy' in Charles Sampford and Kim Preston (eds), Interpreting 
Constitutions: Theories, Principles and Institutions (1996) 13, 16 and Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional 
Interpretation and a Theory of Evolutionary Originalism' (1999) 27 Federal Law Review 323. 
14 Engineers' Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 143. 
15 See D'Emden v Pedder (1904) 1 CLR 91 and Huddart Parker and Co v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330. 
16 See discussion in Keven Booker and Arthur Glass, 'The Engineers Case' in HP Lee and George 
Winterton (eds), Australian Constitutional Landmarks (2003) 34, 35. 
arrived at by the Court on the opinions of the Judges as to hopes and 
expectations respecting vague external conditions.17 
4 
A further consequence of the Court's emphasis on 'legal' reasoning in the 
interpretation of the Constitution in the Engineers' Case was its support for a 
'judicial philosophy designed to underpin parliamentary supremacy.'18 In the 
Engineers' Case the Court accepted a deferential attitude towards Parliament's 
decision-making.19 Distinguishing between legitimate legal and political roles, 
the Court also emphasised that it was to Parliament, and the democratic 
process, that 'the people' should turn for the protection of their interests.20 Thus, 
the Court argued: 
If it be conceivable that the representatives of the people of Australia as a whole 
would ever proceed to use their national powers to injure the people of 
Australia considered sectionally, it is certainly within the power of the people 
themselves to resent and reverse what may be done. No protection of this Court 
in such a case is necessary or proper.21 
As Galligan has observed, the 'genius' of the Engineers' Case was as both a 
'technical method and a public rhetoric'.22 This method 'disguised' the 
inherently political nature of the Court's judicial review function, by claiming 
that legal reasoning was immune from political and personal values.23 It also 
'disguised' the nationalising effect of a literalist interpretive method when 
applied to a Constitution under which Commonwealth heads of power are 
expressly enumerated.24 
Sir Owen Dixon's 'strict and complete legalism' solidified the emphasis of the 
Engineers' Case on the established principles of 'legal reasoning' as a guide to 
17 Engineers' Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 145. 
18 George Williams, 'Engineers and Implied Rights' in Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), 
How Many Cheers for Engineers (1997) 105, 106. 
19 See Stephen Gageler, 'Foundations of Australian Federalism and the Role of Judicial Review' 
(1987) 17 Federal Law Review 162. Gageler's analysis of the Engineers' Case is discussed in Keven 
Booker and Arthur Glass, 'The Engineers Case' in HP Lee and George Winterton (eds), 
Australian Constitutional Landmarks (2003) 34, 52. 
20 George Williams described this philosophy, matched with its commitment to textualism, as 
the 'twin symbolism' of the Engineers' Case. George Williams, 'Engineers and Implied Rights' in 
Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), How Many Cheers for Engineers (1997) 105, 107. 
21 Engineers' Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 152. 
22 Brian Galligan, 'The Australian High Court's Role in Institutional Maintenance and 
Development' in Charles Sampford and Kim Preston (eds), Interpreting Constitutions (1996) 
184, 201. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
constitutional interpretation. 25 Dixon J's decision in Melbourne Corporation v 
Commonwealth confirmed that his approach went beyond the interpretation of 
the text alone, to include the drawing of implications from 'the very frame of 
the Constitution'. 26 However, according to Dixon only by 'strict and complete 
legalism' could the Court 'maintain the confidence of all parties in Federal 
conflicts.'27 
5 
Sir Owen Dixon's extra-curial speeches also confirmed two foundational 
principles of his vision of the Constitution and its interpretation. First, in his 
view the Constitution was 'not a supreme law purporting to obtain its legal 
force from the direct expression of the people's inherent authority to constitute 
a government.'28 Rather, the Constitution was properly regarded as 'a statute of 
the British Parliament enacted in the exercise of its legal sovereignty over the 
law everywhere in the King's Dominions.'29 The form of the Constitution was 
itself a reminder of its Imperial heritage.30 Second, Sir Owen Dixon famously 
remarked extra-curially on the Constitution's silence on the topic of individual 
rights, stating: 
We did not adopt the Bill of Rights or transcribe the Fourteenth Amendment. It 
is, as it appears to me, a striking difference. It goes deep in legal thinking.31 
This 'striking difference' flowed from a faith in parliamentary democracy, and 
the common law, as the true source of the protection of individual liberty.32 
These principles informed Sir-bwenDixon' sunderstandTnioTthebasic nature ______ ---
of the Constitution, and its interpretation. 
25 'Swearing-in of Sir Owen Dixon as Chief Justice' (1952) 85 CLR xi, xiv. That is not to suggest 
that Engineers' literalism and Sir Owen Dixon's legalism are synonymous, only that underlying 
both approaches was the principle that the Constitution's meaning is to be found by 
interpreting its text, in context, according to established legal method. 
26 (1947) 47 CLR 1, 83 ('Melbourne Corporation Case'). Note also Dixon J's earlier remarks on the 
legitimacy of constitutional implications in West v Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1937) 56 CLR 
657, 681 and Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29, 85. 
27 'Swearing-in of Sir Owen Dixon as Chief Justice' (1952) 85 CLR xi, xi. 
28 Sir Owen Dixon, 'The Law and the Constitution' (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Review 590, 597. 
29 Ibid. 
30 This fact was emphasised by Lindell in his seminal article G. J. Lindell, 'Why is Australia's 
Constitution Binding? The Reasons in 1900 and Now, and the Effect of Independence' (1986) 16 
Federal Law Review 29, 30. 
31 Sir Owen Dixon, 'Concerning Judicial Method' (1956) 29 Australian Law Journal 468, 469. 
32 On the attitudes of the framers in this regard, see further John Williams, 'The Emergence of 
the Commonwealth Constitution' in HP Lee and George Winterton (eds), Australian 
Constitutional Landmarks (2003) 1, 22-7. 
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Sir Owen Dixon's 'strict and complete legalism' continues to exercise 
considerable influence on the 'Australian legal psyche' .33 However, by the time 
of Deane's retirement from the Court in November 1995, legalism's status as the 
sole legitimate approach to judicial review had been extensively challenged.34 
For example, in a paper presented before his elevation to Chief Justice, Sir 
Anthony Mason stated extra-curially that: 
it is impossible to interpret any instrument, let alone a constitution, divorced 
from values .... The ever present danger is that 'strict and com]?lete legalism' 
will be a cloak for undisclosed and unidentified policy values. 
Sir Anthony therefore urged that, to the extent that values were taken into 
account in legal reasoning, they must be 'acknowledged and should be accepted 
community values' rather than the 'mere personal values' of the individual 
judge.36 
As is well known, in 1992 in Mabo (No 2) and Dietrich v The Queen37 the Court 
famously, and controversially, referred to 'community values' in the 
development of the common law. These cases spoke to the politically sensitive 
subjects of native title and the role of legal aid in the conduct of a fair criminal 
trial. The Court's decisions were committed to fairness in the treatment of the 
disadvantaged and vulnerable in Australian society. In their striking, and much 
criticised, judgment in Mabo (No 2), Deane and Gaudron JJ went further than 
...... ±he rest.oLtheCourt, controversially'. apportioningsham@'3~ for pa.st .injustices 
perpetrated on Indigenous Australians. However, in both outcome and 
33 Michael Kirby, 'Judicial Activism? A Riposte to the Counter-Reformation' (2004) 24 Australian 
Bar Review 219, 221. For a recent defence of legalism, see John Dyson Heydon, 'Judicial Activism 
and the Death of the Rule of Law' (2003) 23 Australian Bar Review 110. 
34 See discussion in Sir Anthony Mason, 'The Interpretation of a Constitution in a Modern 
Liberal Democracy' in Charles Sampford and Kim Preston (eds), Interpreting Constitutions: 
Theories, Principles and Institutions (1996) 13, 13. On the particular contribution of Murphy J to 
this change in interpretive methodology, see Tony Blackshield, 'Lionel Murphy and Judicial 
Method' in Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), Justice Lionel Murphy: Influential or Merely 
Prescient? (1997) 224. 
35 Sir Anthony Mason, 'The Role of a Constitutional Court in a Federation: A Comparison of the 
Australian and the United States Experience' (1986) 16 Federal Law Review l, 5. Sir Gerard 
Brennan observed with like effect that 'the rhetoric based on strict and complete legalism 
masked the truth of the judicial method': Sir Gerard Brennan,' A Critique of Criticism' (1993) 19 
Monash University Law Review 213, 213. 
36 Mason, above n 35, 5 (emphasis added). The Mason Court's openness on the nature of judicial 
reasoning was mirrored by an increase in the extra-curial speeches of members of the Court in 
this period, although not by Deane. See further discussion below n 96. 
37 (1992) 177 CLR 292 ('Dietrich'). 
38 Haig Patapan, Judging Democracy: The New Politics of the High Court of Australia (2000) 125. 
Pata pan's remarks related particularly to statements made by Deane and Gaudron JJ at 
Mabo (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 104, 109. 
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reasoning, the Court's decisions in Mabo (No 2) and Dietrich were representative 
of the Mason Court's movement from under the protective cloak of legalism 
into the realm of legal realism, and, for some commentators, into the heartland 
of legal 'activism' .39 
A further development during the Mason Court era was the Court's 
explanation of the legitimacy of the Constitution. Under Sir Owen Dixon's 
vision, the Constitution derived its authority from its status as an Act of 
Imperial Parliament. As his swearing-in speech attested, Deane was firmly of 
the view that the Constitution's legitimacy resided in 'the people', as the 'source 
of law' in the Australian constitutional system.40 Twelve years later, in 
Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Deane elaborated on this point, explaining 
that: 
The present legitimacy of the Constitution as the compact and highest law of 
our nation lies exclusively in the original adoption (by referenda) and 
subsequent maintenance (by acquiescence) of its provisions by the people.41 
A number of practical and doctrinal limitations attend Deane's identification of 
'the people' as legal sovereigns. The effect of these limitations on the legitimacy 
of Deane's constitutional philosophy is a recurring question in this thesis. 
Despite these limitations, however, a majority of the Mason Court judges,42 and 
a number of current Justices of the High Court,43 have acknowledged that legal 
_ .. so.vereigntymust-nowbesaidto.r€side--with-th.e-Australian-people.---·---
39 For example, Pierce observed that the language of Deane and Gaudron JJ' s reasons in Mabo 
(No 2) 'angered many of [his] informants because Australian judges historically avoided writing 
in moralizing tones'. One of Pierce's informants reflected that Deane and Gaudron JJ' s 
judgment was 'over the top - way over. That wasn't logical thinking. It was anger, emotion. 
Judges don't write that way!' Quoted in Jason L Pierce, Inside the Mason Court Revolution: The 
High Court of Australia Transformed (2006) 69. 
40 Justice Keith Mason observed extra-curially that Deane's swearing-in speech 'would have 
surprised' Sir Owen Dixon: Keith Mason, 'Citizenship' in Cheryl Saunders (ed) Courts of Final 
Jurisdiction: The Mason Court in Australia (1996) 35, 36. 
41 (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171 ('Theophanous'). 
42 See, for example, ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 137-8 (Mason CJ); Nationwide News (1992) 177 
CLR 1, 70-2 (Deane and Toohey JJ); and McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140, 230 
(McHugh J). See also 'Swearing-in of Sir Gerard Brennan as Chief Justice' (1995) 183 CLR ix, x. 
The similarity between the swearing-in speeches of Deane and Brennan CJ was observed in 
'Justices for All', Sun Herald (Sydney), 27August1995, 22. 
43 See, for example, Michael D. Kirby, 'Deakin: Popular Sovereignty and the True Foundation of 
the Australian Constitution' (1996) 3 Deakin Law Review 129 and Murray Gleeson, The Rule of 
Law and the Constitution (2000) 6. Evans reflects on the significance of these statements, and 
those of the Mason Court judges listed above n 42: Simon Evans, 'Why is the Constitution 
Binding? Authority, Obligation and the Role of the People' (2004) 25 Adelaide Law Review 103, 
106-8. 
This challenge to the foundational assumption of the Australian Constitution 
during the Mason Court era stimulated discussion of the range of theories and 
principles of interpretation that might be applicable in the Australian context. 
Through his High Court jurisprudence, Deane was a prominent contributor to, 
and catalyst for, this debate. For example, Deane's famous 'living force' theory, 
articulated in Theophanous, applied an evolutionary approach to constitutional 
interpretation, and emphatically rejected the role of the framers' intentions in 
constitutional interpretation.44 Deane's theory invigorated debate on the 
legitimacy of 'originalist' and 'non-originalist' approaches to constitutional 
interpretation, and the limits of an evolutionary approach consistent with the 
power vested in 'the people' to amend the Constitution by referenda under 
s 128.45 
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Deane also adopted a broad approach to the derivation of constitutional 
implications, described in this thesis as Deane's 'fundamental concepts' 
reasoning. Under this approach, constitutional implications, including broad 
constitutional rights, could be derived from the Constitution's underlying 
doctrines of government or common law rights that were manifested by the 
text.46 This approach raised questions of the limits of the Court's power to 
protect the fundamental rights of 'the people' in a constitutional system lacking 
a formal Bill of Rights. A final and distinctive interpretive principle utilised by 
-- - - - -- ---- -- Qeaneinhis eonst-itutionaljurisprudence was proportionafityanalysis1through------ --
which the Court weighed policy considerations and the impact of legislation on 
individual rights. Deane applied these three signature interpretive principles to 
increase the judicial protection of 'the people' under the Constitution. For 
Deane, this outcome was a consequence of his belief that the Constitution's 
'central thesis' was the principle that all governmental power flowed from 'the 
people' and must be exercised for their benefit.47 
44 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171. 
45 See, for example, Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 'Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation' (1997) 25 
Federal Law Review 1 and Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Interpretation and a Theory of 
Evolutionary Originalism' (1999) 27 Federal Law Review 323. On the 'taxonomy' between 
originalist and non-originalist theories, and for a recent assessment of Deane's theory see John 
Dyson Heydon, 'Theories of Constitutional Interpretation: A Taxonomy' (2007) Winter Bar News 
12. 
46 Ironically, this approach was best summarised by Deane in his joint judgment with Toohey J 
in Nationwide News (1992) 177 CLR l, 69-70. 
47 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 180. 
Deane was not alone in the Mason Court era in envisioning the Court's role in 
constitutional interpretation as extending to the protection of 'the people'. For 
example, Sir Anthony Mason observed extra-curially that the Australian 
democratic process involved more than an 'exclusive emphasis on 
parliamentary supremacy and majority will.'48 Instead it involved: 
9 
A notion of responsible government which respects the fundamental rights and 
dignity of the individual and calls for the observance of procedural fairness in 
matters affecting the individual.49 
In 1992, amidst the debate sparked by Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth50 and Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills,51 Justice John Toohey 
remarked in his controversial extra-curial paper that: 
the will which judicial review may frustrate is that of a current majority of 
members of the legislature, which does not necessarily coincide with the will of 
a majority of citizens. Hence when judicial review occurs pursuant to a written 
constitution which was adopted and can be amended by means reflective of the 
popular will, it may be regarded as not even anti-majoritarian.52 
For Deane also, the Constitution guaranteed more than a system of majoritarian 
democracy. Thus, as he had signalled in his swearing-in speech, Deane's 
decisions reveal an understanding of the Constitution as an instrument 
designed to protect the sovereign people - 'all manner of people' - through the 
judicial enforcement of individual rights . 
.... _!ll~~e,and()_fu~_r,chang~f)_ ip.th~ .. ~C>Ql't'_s_111e_the>ci_Cl.!!cilt$yi?_i9g9f it$ r9l~-~~r~ ·- ___ _ 
given dramatic effect in 1992. In that year, the Court delivered judgment in 
Mabo (No 2), Leeth, ACTV, Nationwide News and Dietrich.53 As Lynch has 
observed, the strength of responses to the Mason Court decisions (from its 
'passionate supporters' to 'fierce detractors') continues to frame debate on the 
'proper' role of the court in constitutional interpretation.54 As this range of 
responses applied equally, and at times particularly, to Deane's reasoning, this 
debate informs contemporary evaluations of Deane's constitutional 
jurisprudence. Indeed, the debate surrounding the free speech cases is 
48 Sir Anthony Mason, 'Future Directions in Australian Law' (1987) 13 Monash University Law 
Review 149, 163. 
49 Ibid. 
50 (1992) 177 CLR 106. 
51 (1992) 177 CLR 1. 
52 John Toohey,' A Government of Laws, and Not of Men?' (1993) 4 Public Law Review 158, 172. 
53 A list of the key constitutional cases of 1992 is contained in Appendix A. 
54 Andrew Lynch, 'The Once and Future Court? A Review of Jason L Pierce, Inside the Mason 
Court Revolution: The High Court of Australia Transformed' (2007) 28 Federal Law Review 145, 146-7. 
particularly significant as this thesis demonstrates that the trends exhibited in 
Deane's reasoning in his free speech cases are present throughout his 
jurisprudence. 
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A unique snapshot of the varied responses to the Court's free speech cases was 
a collection of commentaries published in the 1994 Sydney Law Review 
Symposium titled 'Constitutional Rights for Australia?'55 For example, at one 
end of the spectrum, Detmold wrote of the free speech cases, and Deane and 
Toohey JJ's decision in Leeth, with 'unqualified enthusiasm'.56 Detmold 
regarded these cases as signalling the Court's 'new constitutional law', 
premised on the concept of 'the people' as 'owners' of the Constitution.57 These 
cases, Detmold argued, were welcome innovations in Australian constitutional 
law, providing the Australian people with 'everything that a written Bill of 
Rights could give us.'58 However, the possibility that these cases might signal 
the emergence of an implied bill of rights was a cause for serious concern 
amongst other participants of the Symposium. Fraser, for instance, feared that 
the free speech cases enabled the Court to strike down legislation on the basis of 
idiosyncratic, and paternalistic, concepts of justice and fairness, inconsistent 
with the democratic commitment of the Constitution.59 Falling between these 
positions, commentators such as Zines responded to the free speech cases with 
cautious optimism, recognising the legitimacy of an implied freedom of 
·· ·· · political communicationirra-moderate--form.-However, · .Zines-also wa.medthat----·-
the Court's interpretive approach, particularly its reliance on the concept of 
popular sovereignty, could conceivably open a 'Pandora's box of implied rights 
and freedoms,'60 heavily influenced by the judge's 'personal philosophy'. 
The varied responses of these commentators to the Court's free speech cases 
reinforces the point that an evaluation of Deane's constitutional jurisprudence 
will depend on the theory of judicial review against which Deane's decisions 
are assessed. In a recent extra-curial commentary on 'judicial activism', Justice 
55 'Symposium: Constitutional Rights for Australia?' (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review. 
56 Wojciech Sadurski, 'Foreword' (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 145, 145 commenting on M.J. 
Detmold, 'The New Constitutional Law' (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 228. 
57 M.J. Detmold above n 56, 248. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Andrew Fraser, 'False Hopes: Implied Rights and Popular Sovereignty in the Australian 
Constitution' (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 213. 
60 Leslie Zines, 'A Judicially Created Bill of Rights?' (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 166, 177. 
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Michael Kirby remarked that without clear identification of standards or 
criteria, assessments of judicial reasoning can result in purely 'visceral reactions 
to particular outcomes.'61 Debate of this nature devalues the contribution of 
jurists, including Deane, to Australian constitutional theory and offers little 
insight into the nature and legitimacy of their constitutional philosophy. It is 
therefore vital to identify at the outset of this discussion the criteria for 
evaluating Deane's constitutional jurisprudence. 
B Criteria for evaluating Deane's 
jurisprudence 
As Justice Michael Kirby acknowledged, identifying the criteria against which a 
judge's jurisprudence and interpretive philosophy is to be assessed is no easy 
task.62 One approach can be to isolate a single comparator, a benchmark theory 
or principle of constitutional interpretation. The 'literalism' of the Engineers' 
Case could provide such standard. In 1996, for example, McHugh J framed his 
stinging critique of Deane and Toohey JJ's reasoning in Nationwide News as 
illegitimate 'top-down reasoning' that was inconsistent with the principle in the 
Engineers' Case.63 The hold of the Engineers' Case in Australian constitutional 
theory would ensure that such a comparison was both fair (as Deane himself 
· frequently embraced the-principleinthe Engin~ers'Case in-hl:s)urtsprudence)-- .... ----· 
and relevant (as the principle continues to guide the Court in its approach to 
constitutional interpretation). However, utilising the Engineers' Case, or any 
other identified theory or principle of constitutional interpretation as the 
benchmark or comparator in this thesis presents three descriptive and 
analytical challenges. 
The first challenge is that of labelling a judge's constitutional philosophy.64 For 
example, Justice Keith Mason observed extra-curially that 'top-down reasoning' 
61 Michael Kirby, 'Judicial Activism? A Riposte to the Counter-Reformation' (2004) 24 Australian 
Bar Review 219, 231. 
62 Ibid. 
63 McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186CLR140, 231-2 ('McGinty'). 
64 This was a concern raised by Saunders in her evaluation of the constitutional philosophy of 
Gaudron J: Cheryl Saunders, 'Interpreting the Constitution' (2004) 15 Public Law Review 289, 291. 
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as an approach to constitutional interpretation has 'become a term of abuse.'65 
In such circumstances, as Saunders reflected, theories of constitutional 
interpretation can be utilised as 'weapons ... [in] an ideological war.'66 As 
Deane has been labelled as an 'activist' judge on an 'activist' Court,67 critiquing 
Deane's approach against the standard of the Engineers' Case may perpetuate 
this unhelpful characterisation of Deane's constitutional jurisprudence. 
The second challenge is that of description. McHugh and Heydon JJ have 
highlighted difficulties in the taxonomy of constitutional theory. In Eastman v 
The Queen, for example, McHugh J raised the issue of the correct classification of 
the approach of the Court in the Engineers' Case, highlighting the nuances of 
meaning encompassed within the theories of 'textualism' and 'literalism'.68 In 
his 2007 Sir Maurice Byers Lecture, Justice Dyson Heydon also explored extra-
curially the 'difficult task' of classifying those theories of constitutional 
interpretation that explore 'the relationship between the meanings of 
constitutional words and the times at which the search for those meanings is 
conducted.'69 Before a single theory of constitutional interpretation may be 
utilised as the foundation for evaluating Deane's constitutional jurisprudence, 
the nuances of that theory would first have to be carefully identified.70 As 
Saunders indicated, however, without detailed explanation and qualification, a 
comparator theory may be 'too simplistic' to be of value.71 At the other extreme, 
-·· --however, toodoseadefinitionofth~-1proper' theory of interpretationremoves - ------
the value of comparison in articulating the distinctiveness of Deane's 
constitutional vision. Identifying a comparator theory with this degree of 
precise-generality would also divert attention from Deane's constitutional 
vision, the subject of this thesis, into the larger disputes of constitutional theory. 
65 Keith Mason, 'What is Wrong with Top-Down Legal Reasoning?' (2004) 78 Australian Law 
Journal 574, 574. 
66 Cheryl Saunders, 'Interpreting the Constitution' (2004) 15 Public Law Review 289, 291. 
67 See, for example, the many references to Deane in the interviews conducted by Pierce of 
Australian judges and high ranking legal officers in Jason L Pierce, Inside the Mason Court 
Revolution: The High Court of Australia Transformed (2006) 204-6. 
68 Eastman v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 1, 47. 
69 John Dyson Heydon, 'Theories of Constitutional Interpretation: A Taxonomy' (2007) Winter 
Bar News 12, 12. 
7° Compare, for example, Zines' discussion of the variety of methods and outcomes reached by 
the Court in its overt application of 'legalism': Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution 
(4th ed, 1997) 424-33. 
71 Cheryl Saunders, above n 66, 291 
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The final challenge associated with establishing a single comparator theory for 
this study of Deane's constitutional philosophy is normative. The purpose of 
this thesis is both to explore the recurring themes and threads of Deane's 
jurisprudence, and to assess the persuasiveness of his vision. Consistent with 
this purpose, examining Deane's constitutional jurisprudence against an 
identified constitutional theory, or set of principles, will not achieve this result 
unless it is first accepted that that theory provides the only 'proper' approach to 
constitutional interpretation. However, as Chief Justice Murray Gleeson 
observed, extra-curially, there is 'no single problem of interpretation raised by 
the Commonwealth Constitution; and there is no single solution.172 For this 
reason, this thesis employs a series of criteria identifying key attributes or 
qualities of judicial reasoning as its framework for assessing Deane's 
constitutional jurisprudence. 
Although the qualities of 'proper' judicial reasoning are themselves matters of 
dispute, as Coper has acknowledged, a number of propositions may now be 
taken to 'command common consent' concerning the nature of judicial 
reasoning.73 These propositions assist in distancing the debate over Deane's 
constitutional jurisprudence from the 'ideological war'74 and the 'visceral'75 
responses that his decisions may excite. Coper's four propositions are: 
1. that it is unhelpful to assert that final appellate courts, such as the High 
·· Court.1 do-not make law;- ---
2. that in making law within the confines of judicial process the High 
Court's decisions are rarely compelled by authoritative legal materials 
but involve hard choices between competing principles and their 
underlying policy considerations; 
3. that the need for certainty and stability is an important, but not the only 
relevant, policy consideration; and 
72 Murray Gleeson, 'Foreword' in Michael White and Aladin Rahemtula (eds), Queensland Judges 
on the High Court (2003) vii, ix. See also, Gummow J's observation that '[q]uestions of 
construction of the Constitution are not to be answered by the adoption and application of any 
particular, all-embracing and revelatory theory or doctrine of interpretation.' SGH Limited v 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 210 CLR 51, 75. 
73 Michael Coper, 'Concern About Judicial Method' (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 
554, 572. 
74 Cheryl Saunders, 'Interpreting the Constitution' (2004) 15 Public Law Review 289, 291. 
75 Michael Kirby, 'Judicial Activism? A Riposte to the Counter-Reformation' (2004) 24 Australian 
Bar Review 219, 231. 
4. that in weighing these competing considerations, judges may honestly 
and reasonably, with no lack of probity, differ.76 
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Although not specific to constitutional interpretation, Coper's four propositions 
provide a useful starting point for an evaluation of Deane's constitutional 
jurisprudence. These propositions recognise that the text of the Constitution 
may not always compel a single answer to constitutional meaning. The Court 
may therefore legitimately turn to precedent and history, as well as policy, to 
assist it in its task. However, Coper's propositions also recognise that judicial 
choice is not unlimited. Consistent with the separation of powers effected by 
the Constitution, proper judicial reasoning requires that the tools and principles 
the Court utilises in divining constitutional meaning are 'standards, 
touchstones or reference points' independent of the personal values of the 
decision-maker.77 
Against this 'common ground', what qualities distinguish compelling answers 
to the interpretation of the Constitution? In his discussion of the development 
of a jurisprudence of constitutional rights in Australia and the United Kingdom, 
Allan observed that principled judicial interpretation in this direction requires: 
imagination as well as rigorous analysis, judicial creativity as well as 
appropriate deference to government and Parliament on matters within their 
proper, legally defined, competences.78 
Allan's normative argument, that the constitutional protection of rights and 
freedoms should be extended, may be disputed. However, his proposition that 
innovation in constitutional interpretation must be accompanied by a high 
standard of 'rigorous analysis' and 'appropriate deference', provides two 
criteria against which Deane's constitutional jurisprudence, renowned for its 
innovation and imagination, can be assessed.79 
76 These four propositions, with minor modification for tense and format, are taken directly 
from Michael Coper, 'Concern About Judicial Method' (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law 
Review 554, 572. 
77 Ibid 567. 
78 TRS Allan, 'The Common Law as Constitution: Fundamental Rights and First Principles' in 
Cheryl Saunders (ed) Courts of Final Jurisdiction: The Mason Court in Australia (1996) 146, 166. 
79 Compare Allan's criteria with Justice Michael Kirby's observation of the tension between 'the 
creative role of the contemporary judge - especially in higher appellate courts - and the ever 
present need that such creativity be tethered to a legal rule - one based on legal principle and 
policy as well as the already stated rules of existing authority.' Michael Kirby, 'Judicial 
Activism? A Riposte to the Counter-Reformation' (2004) 24 Australian Bar Review 219, 220. 
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The first criterion, 'rigorous analysis', scrutinises the manner in which the Court 
identifies constitutional meaning in a particular case. It examines the clarity, 
precision and accuracy of the Court's analysis of the text, and its use of external 
sources, such as precedent, history and policy.8° For example, considered 
analysis of the Convention Debates as a tool in constitutional interpretation 
recognises that, although a potentially rich historical resource, the Debates may 
offer limited, or inconsistent, insights into the meaning of a particular 
constitutional provision. In addition, as commentators such as Coper and 
Saunders have indicated, 'there is much to be said' for the proposition that 
judicial choice in constitutional interpretation should be explicit. In this way, 
'rigorous analysis' requires openness in the identification, balancing and 
application of policy considerations.81 A further consideration is the consistency 
and coherence with which principles of interpretation are applied to resolve the 
meaning of the Constitution. Although it may be accepted that one 
constitutional theory or method may not be appropriate across all aspects of the 
Constitution,82 inconsistent use of such principles may indicate that the Court 
was motivated by 'whatever approach produces a desired outcome.'83 Such 
reasoning is inconsistent with the 'confines of judicial process' and displays a 
lack of 'rigorous analysis.'84 
The second criterion, 'appropriate deference', examines the consequences of an 
interpretation of the Constitution for the relationship between, and roles of, the 
Court and Parliament. This criterion recognises that constitutional 
interpretation is not only restrained by the limits of language or logic. The High 
Court interprets the Constitution within a legal system premised on the 
separation of powers. The legitimacy of constitutional interpretation therefore 
depends on the Court's respect for the limits of its role. As foreshadowed in the 
80 See, to like effect, Justice Michael Kirby's reliance on legal authority, legal principle and legal 
policy to guide judicial choice. Ibid 219. Kirby pursued this topic at length in his 2003 Hamlyn 
Lectures, published as Michael Kirby, Judicial Activism: Authority, Principle and Policy in the 
Judicial Method (2004). 
81 Cheryl Saunders, 'Interpreting the Constitution' (2004) 15 Public Law Review 289, 292. 
Compare Coper, who did, however, acknowledge that openness would not be universally 
accepted as an attribute for proper legal reasoning: Michael Coper, 'Concern About Judicial 
Method' (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 554, 572-3. 
82 Compare above n 72. 
83 Cheng v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 248, 81 (Kirby J). 
84 Compare Michael Coper, above n 81, 572. 
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context of the 1994 Symposium, definitions of' appropriate deference' will 
clearly vary. However, it may be agreed that 'appropriate deference' is a matter 
of substance, not of 'form', and so will not be satisfied merely by the ritual 
invocation of the virtues of 'legalism' in constitutional analysis. Rather, the 
Court's assessment of the validity of legislation must be made in the context of 
a genuine consideration of the intentions and policy objectives of Parliament 
and recognition of the limits of the judicial power to scrutinise legislative 
decision-making. 
Applying these criteria, this thesis argues that Deane's constitutional 
jurisprudence was unified by common themes and methods (particularly his 
three signature interpretive principles) and informed by his vision of the role of 
'the people'. In cases such as Leeth, where Deane and Toohey JJ's implication of 
an equality guarantee rested heavily on the concept of 'the people', Deane's 
reasoning failed to display a compelling analysis of text, history or principle 
sufficient to support the extensive transfer of power to the Court to 'censor'85 
the legislature. This does not mean, however, that Deane's reliance on 'the 
people' throughout his jurisprudence lacks a legitimate or compelling 
foundation. Rather, through his jurisprudence, the persuasiveness of Deane's 
application of his three signature interpretive principles ('fundamental 
concepts', 'living force' and proportionality reasoning) varies, influenced by 
factors including Deane's reliance on the Constitution's text and the grounding 
of his reasoning in history, precedent and principle. These variations reinforce 
that Deane's contribution to Australian constitutional law, and the insight of his 
constitutional vision, should be assessed by reference to his thirteen years of 
service on the High Court, not simply the iconic rights cases of 1992. 
C Methodology and structure of this thesis 
While a member of the High Court, Deane participated in over 120 decisions in 
which he commented on the meaning of the Constitution.86 As undisputed 
expressions of Deane's constitutional vision, his single judgments are the 
85 Leslie Zines, 'A Judicially Created Bill of Rights?' (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 166, 182. 
86 Deane's constitutional cases are listed in Appendix C. 
primary focus of this thesis. Nevertheless, Deane's joint reasons in Leeth, 
Nationwide News, ACTV, Cheatle v The Queen87 and Grollo v Palmer88 are 
particularly important decisions of this period. The significance of these 
decisions, and a number of other joint judgments, are addressed in this thesis, 
as is the challenge posed by extracting Deane's vision from joint judgments. 
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Deane's thoughts on the nature of the Constitution did not begin with his 
swearing-in as a Justice of the High Court in 1982. Deane was a member of the 
New South Wales Bar between 1957 and 1977. He gave advice in matters 
relating to the 1975 constitutional crisis and appeared in major High Court 
challenges such as the Seas and Submerged Lands Case. 89 In this period, Deane 
also delivered a commentary on a paper presented by Gareth Evans at the 
'Australian Lawyers and Social Change' conference in 1974.90 In addition, as a 
member of the Federal Court, between 1977 and 1982, Deane delivered 
judgments in a number of important constitutional cases.91 However, the 
decision to focus on Deane's High Court jurisprudence in this thesis has been 
carefully made. In an interview with Stephens, Deane explained his 
understanding of his different roles as a Federal Court and High Court judge: 
The general view in the legal profession would be that I was a lawyer's lawyer 
on the Federal Court and went through a seachange when I was appointed to 
the High Court. There is a bit of truth in that. The function of a Supreme Court 
or Federal Court judge is different to that of a High Court judge. You don't 
regard it as your function to do anything other than apply the law. Your task is 
to try to ascertain what the law is . ... To some extent, that involves trying to 
guess what the High Court would hold the law to be .... On the High Court, the 
question of what the law should be is likely to be more relevant than on the 
Supreme Court or the Federal Court.92 
In light of these views, Deane's High Court decisions may be regarded as 
reflecting his most open and direct thoughts on the meaning of the 
87 (1993) 177 CLR 541. 
88 (1995) 184 CLR 348. 
89 New South Wales v Commonwealth ('Seas and Submerged Lands Case') (1975) 135 CLR 337. 
90 W.P. Deane, 'Commentary' in A.O. Hambly and J.L. Goldring (eds), Australian Lawyers and 
Social Change: Proceedings of a Seminar held at The Faculty of Law, The Australian National 
University, 23-25 August 1974 (1976) 76. 
91 See, for example, Re Ku-Ring-Cai Co-operative Building Society (No 12) Ltd (1978) 22 ALR 621 
and Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577. Deane was also briefly 
a member of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. 
92 Deane, quoted in Tony Stephens, Sir William Deane: The Things that Matter (2002) 45-6 
(emphasis added). 
18 
Constitution. The significance of Deane's work at the Bar and his Federal Court 
decisions must await a broader work on Deane's life story.93 
An interesting feature of Deane's time on the High Court was the growth in 
extra-curial remarks published by its serving members; a phenomenon that 
accelerated during the Mason Court era.94 In such publications judges may feel 
at liberty to reflect at large on the current state of the law, including the 
meaning of the Constitution, without the restrictions of the facts of a particular 
case.95 Although Deane embraced many of the jurisprudential changes brought 
about by the Mason Court, Deane was notable in his extra-curial silence. At a 
press conference in 1995 announcing his retirement from the Court to take up 
vice-regal office, Deane candidly explained: 
I've taken the view ... that for me, the best way of performing my judicial 
functions was to confine what I had to say in my jud~ments, and quite frankly I 
found writing the judgments quite often exhausting. 6 
The absence of extra-curial publications by Deane increases the significance of 
an analysis of the constitutional philosophy that emerges through his High 
Court decisions. 
This examination of Deane's constitutional jurisprudence is in six chapters. The 
first two chapters of this thesis explore aspects of Deane's vision of Australian 
federalism. Chapter 1 begins with Deane's broad and dynamic approach to 
defining Commonwealth legislative power in his decisions on ss Sl(xx), (xxix) 
and (xxxv). The focus of this chapter is on Deane's decisions in three cases: 
Commonwealth v Tasmania ('Tasmanian Dam Case');97 New South Wales v 
Commonwealth ('Incorporation Case')98 and Re Federated Storemen and Packers 
93 For (some) biographical discussion see: Rosalind Atherton, Tony Blackshield, Bruce Kercher 
and Cameron Stewart, 'Deane, William Patrick' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George 
Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (2001) 195 and Tony 
Stephens, Sir William Deane: The Things that Matter (2002). 
94 For an overview of this phenomenon, see James Thomson, 'Extra-judicial Writings of the 
Justices' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion 
to the High Court of Australia (2001) 265. 
95 Note, in particular, John Toohey,' A Government of Laws, and Not of Men?' (1993) 4 Public 
Law Review 158. See further discussion below chapter 5n119. 
96 Deane, quoted in Peter Charlton, 'Clear Views from the Top', Brisbane Courier Mail (Brisbane), 
23 August 1995, 15. 
97 (1983) 158 CLR 1. 
98 (1990) 169 CLR 482. 
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Union of Australia; Ex parte Wooldumpers (Victoria) Limited.99 These cases are 
particularly insightful illustrations of Deane's reliance on a range of interpretive 
tools, including the role of precedent and policy. This chapter also introduces 
two of Deane's signature interpretive principles, each tied to his understanding 
of the role of 'the people': proportionality reasoning; and one component of his 
'living force' theory, that is, Deane's explanation of the role of the framers, and 
the Convention Debates, in constitutional interpretation. Deane's use of these 
tools reflected a distinctive stream in his reasoning in both his s 51 decisions 
and his wider constitutional jurisprudence. 
Chapter 2 continues the discussion of Deane's federal vision by drawing 
together his views on an unusual mix of constitutional provisions and 
implications. This chapter explores Deane's decisions on ss 90 and 109, and the 
implications he drew from the nature of the Federation in R v Duncan; Ex parte 
Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd;100 Queensland Electricity Commission v 
Commonwealth;101 and Breavington v Godleman.102 Through this discussion, 
Deane's commitment to equality and the influence of his understanding of the 
constitutional significance of 'the people of Australia', as distinct from the 
people of the States, begins to emerge. This chapter also introduces the third of 
Deane's signature interpretive principles, his 'fundamental concepts' reasoning. 
The cases explored in this chapter display Deane's derivation of constitutional 
implications limiting the legislative power of the Commonwealth and of the 
States from the nature of Australian federalism and its connection to 'the 
people'. Against this pattern of consistency and coherence, however, was 
Deane's variety in the treatment of precedent: defending 'fundamental 
constitutional truth'103 rather than adhering to precedent in the context of s 118 
while accepting the demands of precedent over the correct, or preferable, 
interpretation of s 90. 
Chapter 3 turns from intergovernmental relationships to the separation of 
federal judicial power guaranteed by Ch III of the Constitution. This topic 
99 (1989) 166 CLR 311 ('Wooldumpers'). 
100 (1983) 158 CLR535 ('Duncan'). 
101 (1985) 159 CLR 192 ('QEC'). 
102 (1988) 169 CLR41 ('Breavington'). 
103 Stevens v Head (1993) 176 CLR 433, 461 (emphasis added). 
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contains a particularly rich collection of Deane's decisions. This chapter argues 
that Deane's distinctive interpretation of the separation of powers principle, 
particularly his implication of a core of individual rights, flows from his 
conviction that the Constitution's 'most important'104 guarantee of individual 
liberty was the requirement that only Ch III courts may exercise federal judicial 
power. Although the allied principle - that federal courts may not exercise non-
judicial power - was not one to which Deane devoted considerable attention, 
his decisions in this context displayed an underlying assumption that judges, as 
individuals, were inherently well-suited to protect individual liberties, through 
their 'professional experience and cast of mind.'105 This assumption underlies 
Deane's commitment to the judicial protection of the rights of 'the people' 
under the Constitution throughout his constitutional jurisprudence. 
One of Deane's most famous statements on the Australian Constitution's 
commitment to the protection of individual rights was his declaration in Street v 
Queensland Bar Association that it was 'misleading or deceptive' to suggest that the 
Constitution 'contains no bill of rights.'106 This statement provides the 
framework for a discussion in chapter 4 of Deane's approach to the 
Constitution's express rights. This chapter examines Deane's decisions on three 
express rights, ss 80, 51(xxxi) and 117 and argues that Deane employed similar 
principles and methods to interpret each provision in a manner that extended 
the reach of those guarantees. However, this chapter also explores Deane's 
recognition that ss 51(xxxi) and 117 were not absolute guarantees and examines 
how Deane balanced those rights against competing social and community 
interests. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the manner in which 
Deane used the Constitution's express rights to support his implication of broad 
constitutional guarantees. 
Chapters 5 and 6 examine Deane's reasoning in Leeth and the five free speech 
cases, ACTV, Nationwide News, Theophanous, Cunliffe and Stephens. These 
chapters demonstrate that in these controversial decisions Deane applied 
principles of interpretation well-established in his jurisprudence. Deane derived 
104 Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461, 521 (emphasis added) ('Street'). 
105 Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348, 367 (Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson, and Toohey JJ) 
(emphasis added). 
106 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 521 (emphasis added). 
both guarantees by applying his 'fundamental concepts' reasoning. Across 
these cases, Deane emphasised the role of 'the people' and the Court's duty to 
imply guarantees to protect them from interference by Parliament. 
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Deane and Toohey JJ's implication of a constitutional guarantee of legal 
equality in Leeth, examined in chapter 5, was described by Kirk as 'the most 
radical constitutional case in the Court's history.'107 Deane and Toohey JJ's 
reasoning clearly manifested the 'two constant themes' Deane identified as 
representing his values, and his jurisprudence, at his press conference in 1995: 
the sovereignty of 'the people', and their inherent equality.108 Despite the 
significance of Leeth as a marker of Deane's constitutional vision, chapter 5 
argues that Leeth was one of Deane's least compelling constitutional decisions. 
Ironically, this was because Deane's concept of 'the people' was, of itself, an 
insufficient foundation for a guarantee of the scope derived by Deane and 
Toohey JJ. 
Deane's free speech cases, explored in the final chapter of this thesis, also 
demonstrated the pervasive influence of Deane's concept of 'the people' and his 
commitment to the judicial protection of minority rights. Although Deane's 
analysis in the free speech cases was at times perfunctory, much of his 
reasoning in this context remains of value in the development of the Court's 
approach to constitutional interpretation. For example, Deane's articulation of a 
'living force' theory in Theophanous utilised the concept of the legal sovereignty 
of 'the people' to explain the continuing role of history in an evolutionary 
interpretive theory. These cases were also particularly significant in the 
development of Deane's jurisprudence as it was in this context that Deane 
explicitly linked his three key interpretive principles - 'living force', 
'fundamental concepts' and proportionality reasoning - to the sovereignty of 
'the people'. The free speech cases therefore present the logical point at which 
to reflect on the internal consistency and coherence of Deane's constitutional 
107 Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Implications (II): Doctrines of Equality and Democracy' (2001) 
25 Melbourne University Law Review 24, 24. See also Sir Anthony Mason's description of Deane 
and Toohey JJ's decision in Leeth as the 'high water mark reached in the effort to imply human 
rights in the Australian Constitution': Anthony Mason, 'The Role of the Judiciary in Developing 
Human Rights in Australian Law' in David Kinley (ed) Human Rights in Australian Law (1998) 
26, 42. 
108 Malcolm Farr, 'Last Past the Post', Daily Telegraph-Mirror (Sydney), 23August1995, 11. 
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philosophy and his contribution to Australian constitutional thought. From this 
foundation, an assessment of the persuasiveness of Deane's constitutional 
vision can be made. 
Chapter 1 FEDERALISM (I): FRAMING 
COMMONWEALTH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS 
THROUGHS51 
Introduction 
In Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills Deane and Toohey JJ explained that three 
'general doctrines of government ... underlie the Constitution and are 
implemented by its provisions.'1 Federalism was the first of these doctrines and 
one of the 'fundamental concepts' that pervaded and informed Deane's 
constitutional jurisprudence. This is the first of two chapters exploring Deane's 
vision of federalism under the Constitution. This chapter examines the 
principles and values shaping Deane's approach to the interpretation of 
Commonwealth legislative power under s 51 of the Constitution. The next 
chapter considers aspects of the fiscal relationship between the Commonwealth 
and the States, and Deane's approach to implications affecting the legal 
relationships between the Commonwealth and the States, and amongst the 
States. These chapters argue that Deane's federal jurisprudence was informed 
by his understanding of the nature of the Constitution as the compact of 'the 
people', that is, as designed to ultimately serve the interests of 'the people of 
Australia', not the entities of government it created. 
Deane's High Court decisions displayed a strong commitment to expanding 
Commonwealth power through a flexible and broad interpretation of s 51.2 In 
this regard, Deane quickly found himself as a member of a majority of the 
judges on the High Court, most often alongside Mason, Murphy and 
Brennan JJ. For example, in his first year on the Court, Deane extended the 
reach of the corporations power in cases such as State Superannuation Board v 
1 Nationwide News (1992) 177 CLR 1, 69-70. 
2 A list of Deane's decisions on s 51 is contained in Appendix B. 
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Trade Practices Commission,3 Fencott v Muller,4 and most notably in his judgment 
in the Tasmanian Dam Case.5 Likewise, in R v Duncan; Ex parte Australian Iron and 
Steel Pty Ltd,6 and R v Coldham; Ex parte Australian Social Welfare Union,7 two 
decisions handed down in 1983, Deane adopted an approach to s 51(xxxv) 
significantly expanding the Commonwealth's power over industrial relations. 
The majority decisions in these cases, and others expanding Commonwealth 
legislative power during Deane's time on the High Court, were frequently 
criticised for their impact on the 'federal balance' between the Commonwealth 
and the States.8 For instance, Sir Daryl Dawson, speaking extra-curially three 
months after the decision in the Tasmanian Dam Case, reflected on the 'major 
overhaul' of the Constitution and federal relations effected by the Court's 
interpretation of s 51.9 In his view: 
Notwithstanding the careful division of legislative ... power between the States 
and the Commonwealth which the Constitution apparently makes, there are 
now few significant limits upon Commonwealth legislative ... powers.10 
The picture emerging from Deane's decision-making, however, was of a judge 
not concerned with the creep of Commonwealth legislative power or the impact 
of this expansion on State interests. Rather, Deane's decisions in this field 
emphasised the benefits to the nation, and the people of the nation, of an 
extension of Commonwealth legislative power. 
In order to highlight the key elements of Deane's understanding of the federal 
division of legislative power, this chapter focuses on three discrete aspects of 
Deane's s 51 jurisprudence. Part 1 explores the Commonwealth's power with 
3 (1982) 150 CLR 282. 
4 (1982) 152 CLR 570. 
5 (1983) 158 CLR 1. 
6 (1983) 158 CLR 535. 
7 (1983) 153 CLR297. 
8 See, in particular, the reasoning of Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ in the Tasmanian Dam Case, 
discussed below at n 38. 
9 Sir Daryl's Southey Memorial Lecture, published as Sir Daryl Dawson, 'The Constitution -
Major Overhaul or Simple Tune-up?' (1984) 14 Melbourne University Law Review 353. Although 
not a head of power examined in this thesis, Sir Daryl's remarks in his Southey Lecture drew 
foarticular attention to the Court's expansive interpretation of s 51(xxi) in this period. Ibid 360-1. 
0 Ibid 355. Sir Harry Gibbs also repeated his criticisms of the majority reasons in the Tasmanian 
Dam Case after his retirement from the Court. See Sir Harry Gibbs, 'The Decline of Federalism?' 
(1994) 18 University of Queensland Law Journal 1 and Harry Gibbs, 'External Affairs Power: A 
Critical Analysis' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), The Oxford 
Companion to the High Court of Australia (2001) 264. 
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respect to the implementation of treaties under s 51(xxix). Part 2 considers 
Deane's answer to the question of whether the Commonwealth has power with 
respect to the incorporation of trading and financial corporations under 
s 51(xx). Finally, part 3 examines the scope of the Commonwealth's power with 
respect to the 'prevention' of interstate industrial disputes under s 5l(xxxv). 
These areas of Deane's s 51 jurisprudence have been selected for discussion 
because they illustrate his tendency to gives 51 a broad construction,11 and 
because each embodies significant points of difference between Deane's 
reasoning and that of the other members of the Court. In addition, these topics 
provide striking examples of Deane's attitude towards four interpretive tools in 
the construction of s 51: 
1. precedent, particularly Deane's use of the Engineers' Case to support his 
extension of Commonwealth legislative power; 
2. policy, and Deane's assessment of contemporary national interests in 
expanding the reach of Commonwealth power under s 51; 
3. proportionality reasoning, as a means for Deane to limit the impact of 
Commonwealth legislative power on individual rights; and, 
4. the Convention Debates, and Deane's reliance on 'the people' to explain 
his rejection of a place for the framers' subjective intentions in 
constitutional interpretation. 
The assessment of Deane's use of these tools in this chapter lays the foundation 
for comparisons in later chapters with Deane's reasoning in other areas of his 
constitutional jurisprudence. 
As foreshadowed, this chapter argues that in the context of s 51, from an early 
stage of his High Court decision-making, Deane turned to 'the people' to 
support important components of his interpretive approach. There are a 
number of ways in which 'the people' could have influenced Deane's 
conception of Australian federalism, and s 51 in particular. For example, 
federalism can be perceived as establishing a system of checks and balances, 
separating power vertically and thereby protecting individual liberties by 
11 Note, however, the limitations that Deane's proportionality test imposed on the 
Commonwealth's power to implement treaties under s Sl(xxix). Deane's proportionality test is 
discussed below n 66. 
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decentralising power.12 Federalism may also be regarded as reinforcing 
democratic participation in governance, with 'the people' electing 
representatives at both the national and State levels.13 Speaking extra-curially, 
Sir Daryl Dawson also highlighted that respect for 'the people' -their choice of 
a federal system in 1901, and their power to change that system through s 128-
should encourage judicial reticence to 'alter' the federal division of legislative 
power under the Constitution.14 
The decisions of Deane examined in this chapter, and the next, indicate that his 
understanding of the relationship between 'the people' and the federal system 
was not influenced by these considerations. Instead, Deane utilised 'the people', 
viewed by him as 'the people of Australia',15 to support an expansion of national 
power, tempered by an increased role for the Court in balancing the national 
interest against the protection of individual liberties. However, a question for 
consideration in these chapters is, if reliance on 'the people' can support 
different concepts of federalism, how compelling is this aspect of Deane's 
constitutional philosophy? 
A Part 1: The Implementation of Treaties 
under the External Affairs Power 
Section 51(xxix) of the Constitution grants the Commonwealth Parliament 
power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the 
Commonwealth with respect to 'external affairs'. This part explores aspects of 
Deane's understanding of the Commonwealth's legislative power to implement 
12 See Stokes' analysis of the purpose and function of federalism, and his assessment of the place 
of the people, and their rights, under the Australian federal system: Michael Stokes, 
'Federalism, Responsible Government and the Protection of Private Rights: A New 
Interpretation of the Limits of the Legislative powers of the Commonwealth' (1986) 16 Federal 
Law Review 135, 153. See also Kirby J's description of federalism and federal balance as an 
essential guarantee of liberty in contemporary society in XYZ v Commonwealth (2006) 227 ALR 
495, 535 and New South Wales v Commonwealth ('Workchoices Case') (2006) 231ALR1, 150-1. 
13 Brian Galligan and Cliff Walsh,' Australian Federalism Yes or No' in Gregory Craven (ed) 
Australian Federation (1992) 193, 196. 
14 Sir Daryl Dawson, 'The Constitution - Major Overhaul or Simple Tune-up?' (1984) 14 
Melbourne University Law Review 353, 365. 
15 Stevens v Head (1993) 176 CLR 433, 460 (emphasis added). 
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international treaties and agreements under this head of power.16 As 
Blackshield and Williams observe, this has been '[b ]y far the most controversial 
question concerning s Sl(xxix)',17 and it is for this reason, and the richness of 
this topic as a source of Deane's understanding of the principles of 
constitutional interpretation, that this aspect of s Sl(xxix) has been selected for 
analysis.18 The key case in this field, and arguably the most politically 
controversial case handed down by the Gibbs Court, was the Tasmanian Dam 
Case. This landmark case was decided in 1983, within a year of Deane's 
appointment to the Court.19 In it, Deane set out the essence of his approach to 
this aspect of s Sl(xxix); an approach he solidified in his 1988 decision of 
Richardson v Forestry Commission. 20 The importance of Deane's reasoning in the 
Tasmanian Dam Case for this and later chapters makes it necessary to outline 
briefly the nature of the dispute in this case. 
1 The Tasmanian Dam Case litigation 
The Tasmanian Dam Case was the culmination of an intense political conflict 
between the State of Tasmania and the Commonwealth.21 In recognition of this 
politically charged atmosphere, the Court took the unusual step of prefacing its 
decision with a 'Statement', in which it emphasised that the Court's exclusive 
concern lay with the legality, not desirability, of the legislative scheme.22 
16 This part does not explore all components of the treaty implementation aspect of s 51(xxix). 
For instance, the question of whether the Commonwealth may implement only treaty 
obligations, or whether the power is triggered by the existence of non-binding 
recommendations, is not examined here. For a discussion of this issue see, Leslie Zines, The High 
Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) 280-6. 
17 Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary 
and Materials (4th ed, 2006) 904. On the Court's approach to other aspects of this head of power 
see ibid Chapter 19. 
18 A list of Deane's decisions on s 51(xxix), including and beyond the treaty implementation 
aspect, is contained in Appendix B. 
19 Deane was appointed to the Court on 27 July 1982. The decision in the Tasmanian Dam Case 
was handed down on 1July1983. 
20 (1988) 164 CLR 261 ('Richardson'). Deane described his judgment in Richardson as 'repeat[ing], 
in a slight expanded form' what he wrote in the Tasmanian Dam Case. Ibid 311. 
21 Much has been written on the Tasmanian Dam Case. For commentary on the background to the 
case, and the Court's decision, see, for example, Tony Blackshield, 'Tasmanian Dam Case' in 
Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High 
Court of Australia (2001) 658 and Leslie Zines, 'The Tasmanian Dam Case' in H.P. Lee and George 
Winterton (eds), Australian Constitutional Landmarks (2003) 262. 
22 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 58-9. On the significance of the Court's rhetoric in this 
Statement see Michael Coper, Encounters with the Australian Constitution (1987) 37-8 and Brian 
Galligan, Politics of the High Court (1987) 242-5. 
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The conflict had been triggered by the State's proposed construction of a hydro-
electric dam on the Gordon River below the Franklin River, in Tasmania's 
south-west region ('the Dam'). As a result of lobbying by environmental 
groups, the construction of the Dam became a central issue in the 1983 national 
election campaign. The Hawke-Labor opposition promised to utilise 
Commonwealth legislative power ands 109 to prevent the construction of the 
Dam. In contrast, the Liberal Party's policy of 'new Federalism'23 committed the 
Commonwealth to respecting State autonomy over local policy issues. 
The Labor party was successful at the national polls,24 and quickly enacted a 
legislative package designed to prevent construction of the Dam. Deane 
described the legislation as a complex 'entanglement of provisions',25 reliant on 
a suite of Commonwealth legislative powers. Its purpose was to maximise the 
chance that at least one provision would survive the inevitable legal challenge. 
This technique ultimately proved effective as a majority of the Court upheld 
sufficient elements of the scheme to prevent the Dam's construction. 
One of the heads of power relied on by the Commonwealth was s Sl(xxix).26 In 
1981 sites in Tasmania, including the Dam site, had been nominated by the 
Commonwealth (ironically, at the request of Tasmania) for listing on the World 
Heritage List under the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural 
and Natural Heritage ('the Convention'). The Convention, among other things, 
required State Parties, that is, the Commonwealth, to identify, preserve and 
protect cultural and natural heritage belonging to that State. The 
23 See Patrick Weller, Malcolm Fraser PM: A Study in Prime Ministerial Power (1989) 307-11. 
24 However, as Zines observed, the acute federal issues were reflected in the electoral polls, as 
the Labor party failed to win a single Tasmanian seat in the House of Representatives in the 
1983 election. Leslie Zines, 'The Tasmanian Dam Case' in H.P. Lee and George Winterton (eds), 
Australian Constitutional Landmarks (2003) 262, 265. 
25 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 250. 
26 Other heads of power included the corporations power (s 51(xx)), race power (51(xxvi)) and 
the implied nationhood power. Deane's understanding of s 51(xx) is explored further in part 2 
of this chapter. Some of Deane's remarks regarding the treatment of Indigenous Australians, in 
the context of his discussion of s 51(xxvi), are relevant to the later discussion of Leeth in 
chapter 5. For an examination of the Court's treatment of the issues under s 51(xxvi) and the 
implied nationhood power in the Tasmanian Dam Case see, for example, G. J. Lindell, 'The 
Corporations and Races Powers' (1984) 14 Federal Law Review 219 and Cheryl Saunders, 'The 
National Implied Power and Implied Restrictions on Commonwealth Power' (1984) 14 Federal 
Law Review 267. 
Commonwealth sought to rely on its obligations under this Convention to 
prohibit the construction of the Dam. 
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Section 6 of the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983 (Cth) ('the Act') 
empowered the Governor-General to issue a proclamation over 'identified 
property' in circumstances where the protection of the property by Australia 
was a matter of international obligation by reason of the Convention, or 
otherwise. Section 9(1)(a) to (g) of the Act prohibited a spectrum of activities in 
relation to proclaimed land, including the Dam site, unless the consent of the 
responsible federal Minister had been obtained. Prohibited activities ranged 
from major works such as excavations, drilling, constructing or demolishing 
structures, to smaller acts such as damaging vegetation. Section 9(1)(h) made it 
unlawful for a person to perform an act which had been proscribed for the 
purposes of that paragraph in relation to particular property, without the prior 
consent of the Minister. Regulations made under that section prohibited acts 
undertaken for the purposes of constructing a dam on the site.27 
Section 69 of the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1975 (Cth) also 
purported to authorise the Governor-General to make regulations giving effect 
to a range of international conventions. Regulation (l)(a) of the World Heritage 
(Western Tasmania Wilderness) Regulations (Cth) prohibited the construction of a 
dam on the site. Regulations (l)(b) to (g) prohibited a range of other activities 
mirroring s 9(1)(a) to (g) of the Act. 
In separate judgments, Mason and Murphy JJ upheld s 9 of the Act in its 
entirety. Brennan and Deane JJ, however, upheld only s 9(1)(h). Deane's 
reasoning fused both wide and narrow visions of s Sl(xxix). Deane held, like 
Mason and Murphy JJ, that the external affairs power authorised the domestic 
implementation of any bona fide treaty obligation. Simultaneously, Deane 
imposed a significant conformity limitation, requiring the Commonwealth's 
legislation to be a proportionate means of implementing that treaty obligation. 
The following discussion examines how Deane justified and applied this 
approach to the treaty implementation aspect of s Sl(xxix). 
27 See Reg 4(2)(a) to (c) of the World Heritage Properties Conservation Regulations 1983 (Cth). 
2 When is a law that domestically implements a 
treaty a law with respect to 'external affairs'? 
According to Deane, s Sl(xxix) empowered the Commonwealth to implement 
bona fide international treaties, without the additional requirement that the 
treaty itself relate to a subject of 'international concern'. For Deane, two key 
factors supported this broad understanding of s Sl(xxix): first, his 
understanding of the settled principles of constitutional interpretation and 
precedent; and second, policy considerations. 
(a) Principles of interpretation and precedent 
30 
Deane opened his judgment in the Tasmanian Dam Case by emphasising that the 
correct interpretation of the Constitution, which he concluded was giving 
s Sl(xxix) a broad construction, must be determined exclusively by the 
application of 'legal method and legal principle.'28 Deane's reasoning on s Sl(xxix) 
commenced, uncontroversially, with what he would later describe as the 
'compelling reasoning of the Engineers' Case.'29 Thus Deane argued forcefully in 
the Tasmanian Dam Case that the scope of s Sl(xxix): 
is not to be limited by reference to notions of legislative powers being reserved 
to the States. Nor is it to be limited by the notion that to give the words 
conferring the power their full effect would imperil the balance between the 
Commonwealth and the States which was achieved by the distribution of 
legislative powers contained in the Constitution.30 
Accordingly, like Mason, Murphy and Brennan JJ, Deane held that 'federal 
balance' considerations were not grounds for restricting the scope of 
s Sl(xxix).31 
28 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 250 (emphasis added). Similarly, see Deane's 
disclaimer at the conclusion of his reasons in Richardson that the function of the Court was 
'confined to determining the legal questions', by reference to 'general principles of constitutional 
law': Richardson (1988) 164 CLR 261, 320 (emphasis added). 
29 Richardson (1988) 164 CLR 261, 307 (emphasis added) citing Engineers' Case (1920) 28 CLR 129. 
30 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR l, 254 (emphasis added). See also Richardson (1988) 164 
CLR 261, 307. 
31 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 129(MasonJ};169-70 (Murphy J); 220-1 (Brennan J); 
254-5 (Deane J). 
31 
The relevance of concepts of 'federal balance' to constitutional interpretation, 
particularly in the context of s Sl(xxix), had been raised prior to the Tasmanian 
Dam Case, in Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen.32 In Koowarta the Court faced the 
question of whether legislation implementing the obligations of the 
Commonwealth under the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination was supported by s Sl(xxix). There, Gibbs CJ, 
Aicl<ln, Wilson and Stephen JJ had held that considerations of 'federal balance', 
and in particular the scope for s Sl(xxix) to extend the legislative power of the 
Commonwealth, should play a role in the Court's interpretation of the head of 
power. 
Gibbs CJ, for example, argued in Koowarta that a broad approach to s Sl(xxix) 
would have the effect that: 
The distribution of powers made by the Constitution could in time be completely 
obliterated; there would be no field of power which the Commonwealth could 
not invade, and the federal balance achieved by the Constitution could be 
entirely destroyed.3 
Wilson J likewise emphasised that a broad approach to s Sl(xxix) would 'leave 
the existence of the States as constitutional units intact but it would deny to 
them any significant legislative role in the federation.'34 Accordingly, they held, 
with Aickin J agreeing with Gibbs CJ, that for a law implementing a treaty 
obligation domestically to be supported bys Sl(xxix) the law must itself relate 
to a subject matter of 'international character'.35 
Stephen J shared the concerns of Gibbs CJ, Aickin and Wilson JJ that an 
expansive interpretation of s Sl(xxix) was contrary to the nature of the 
Federation established under the Constitution.36 For his part, however, 
Stephen J imposed a lesser restriction on the Commonwealth, holding that laws 
implementing obligations in treaties of 'especial concern to the relationship 
between Australia and that other country' or of 'general international concern' 
would be matters of 'external affairs' supported bys Sl(xxix).37 Although 
32 (1982) 153 CLR 168 ('Koowarta'). 
33 Koowarta (1982) 153 CLR 168, 198 (emphasis added). 
34 Ibid 252. 
35 Ibid 201 (Gibbs CJ); 251 (Wilson J). 
36 Ibid 216. 
37 Ibid 216-7. 
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continuing to voice their 'federal balance' concerns in the Tasmanian Dam Case, 38 
Gibbs CJ and Wilson J, joined by Dawson J, considered themselves constrained 
by precedent to adopt Stephen J's 'international concern' test in the Tasmanian 
Dam Case.39 
In the Tasmanian Dam Case Deane emphatically rejected the relevance of 'federal 
balance' considerations to the interpretation of s 51(xxix). Two aspects of 
Deane's analysis are of particular interest in articulating his attitude towards 
precedent and his understanding of the settled principles of constitutional 
interpretation. The first was Deane's treatment of the Court's contemporary 
decisions in his reasoning. Somewhat unusually, Deane's analysis of the case 
law on s 51(xxix) did not include detailed discussion of Koowarta. In fact, only 
Murphy J in the Tasmanian Dam Case treated Koowarta to less detailed 
examination than Deane.40 Deane's reasoning drew instead on R v Burgess; Ex 
parte Henry,41 a decision of the Court in 1936. Deane argued that that case 
established that the Commonwealth could give effect to any agreement 
'binding on the Commonwealth in relation to other countries whatever the 
subject-matter of the agreement may be.'42 In Deane's view, 
nothing in the judgments [of Koowarta] ... causes me to modify my acceptance 
of, and agreement with, the views expressed by a majority of the Court in 
Burgess' Case.43 
Through this approach Deane was able to weave a deft course in his analysis: 
adopting the view of s 5l(xxix) that he favoured and by-passing the 
conundrums of Koowarta,44 while still demonstrating a deferential attitude 
38 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 100 (Gibbs CJ); 197 (Wilson J). 
39 Ibid 101 (Gibbs CJ); 197 (Wilson J); and 306-7 (Dawson J). Freed from the constraints of 
precedent, Sir Harry Gibbs indicated after his retirement from the Court that both the majority 
view in the Tasmanian Dam Case, and Stephen's 'international concern' test, should be rejected. 
Instead, he affirmed, as the 'better view', thats 51(xxix) enabled the Commonwealth to give 
effect to an international agreement domestically only if the law had the 'character' of an 
external affair. Harry Gibbs, 'External Affairs Power: A Critical Analysis' in Tony Blackshield, 
Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia 
(2001) 264, 264. 
40 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 170. 
41 (1936) 55 CLR 608. 
42 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 258. 
43 Ibid. 
44 On 'The Prickly Problem of Precedent' posed by Koowarta, see Michael Coper, Encounters with 
the Australian Constitution (1987) 41-3. 
towards precedent and the values of certainty and predictability in 
constitutional interpretation that such deference embodied.45 
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Second, Deane's decisions in the Tasmanian Dam Case and Richardson confirmed 
his understanding of the important place of the Engineers' Case in constitutional 
interpretation. In the Tasmanian Dam Case and Richardson Deane turned to the 
Engineers' Case as the starting point in his analysis. As foreshadowed, given the 
historic hold of the Engineers' Case on Australian constitutional theory, Deane's 
reference to the Engineers' Case in 1983 was not surprising. Indeed, it would 
have been more striking had Deane not referred to the Engineers' Case in his 
analysis in the Tasmanian Dam Case. However, as one of the charges levelled 
against Deane's later implied rights decisions was that his methodology strayed 
from the principle in the Engineers' Case, 46 it was significant that in his decisions 
on the reach of s 5l(xxix) Deane located his interpretive approach within the 
paradigm of the Engineers' Case. 
In the Tasmanian Dam Case and Richardson Deane embraced what Galligan has 
described as the 'technical method and public rhetoric' of the Engineers' Case.47 
Thus Deane emphasised that the Court's task in interpreting s 51 required that 
the language of the text be given: 
its full effect and is not to be limited by reference to preconceptions of the extent 
of the residue of legislative powers retained by the States or by the notion that 
to give the words comprising that grant their full effect would somehow imperil 
the constitutional balance between the Commonwealth and the States.48 
Under this approach, 'federal balance' considerations were regarded by Deane 
as illegitimate, vague conceptions, analogous to reserved powers reasoning.49 
Such concepts therefore had no place in determining the scope of 
45 See, for example, Sir Anthony Mason's extra-curial reflections that a judge's decision to 
adhere to, or depart from, precedent required the balancing of 'the need for continuity, 
consistency and predictability against the competing need for justice, flexibility and rationality.' 
Sir Anthony Mason, 'The Use and Abuse of Precedent' (1988) 4 Australian Bar Review 93, 111. 
46 See, for example, the critique of McHugh J inMcGinty (1996) 186 CLR 140, 231-2. 
47 Brian Galligan, 'The Australian High Court's Role in Institutional Maintenance and 
Development' in Charles Sampford and Kim Preston (eds), Interpreting Constitutions (1996) 184, 
201. 
48 Richardson (1988) 164 CLR 261, 307 (emphasis added). 
49 Although note Zines' observation that the majority judges in the Tasmanian Dam Case did not 
address the distinction drawn by Gibbs CJ and the minority judges between the reserved 
powers doctrine generally and the special issue of the position of the external affairs power and 
treaties to overcome the nature of the 'Federal Commonwealth' under the Constitution: Leslie 
Zines, The High Court and the Constitution W" ed, 1997) 283. 
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Commonwealth legislative power under s 51. This is not to suggest that Deane 
considered the federal nature of the Constitution wholly irrelevant in 
constitutional interpretation. In the Tasmanian Dam Case, Deane recognised that 
the federal structure of the Constitution played a part in constitutional 
interpretation through the principle in the Melbourne Corporation Case.50 
However, Deane's judgment in the Tasmanian Dam Case and Richardson 
indicated that the federal nature of the Constitution did not intrude into his 
understanding of the meaning of the Commonwealth power with respect to 
'external affairs' under s 51(xxix). 
Deane's reasoning in the Tasmanian Dam Case and Richardson also employed the 
'traditional disclaimers of apolitical legalism'51 that distinguished the Court's 
vision of its role in the Engineers' Case. For example, Deane emphasised that the 
Court's task was to resolve the 'question of law', through the application of 
'legal method and legal principle',52 without consideration whether the 
Commonwealth's measures were 'desirable'.53 Deane's rejection of the 
'international concern' test also manifested his commitment to limit the Court's 
role to consideration of 'legal' questions. Under Stephen J's 'international 
concern' test, the Court was required to scrutinise the subject matter of an 
international treaty, and to consider the level of international engagement with 
particular subject matters. In contrast, Deane deferred the question of whether 
the treaty related to matters of 'international concern' to Parliament and the 
Executive.54 Thus, under Deane's test, and that of Mason, Brennan and 
Murphy JJ, the Court's focus was instead on the 'question of law', that is, 
whether the treaty by its terms imposed an 'obligation' on the Commonwealth 
of sufficient specificity to support domestic implementation. However, it is a 
question for later discussion whether Deane's deference to Parliament and the 
Executive, and his ostensible embrace of legalism in constitutional 
50 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 254 examining Melbourne Corporation Case {1947) 74 
CLR 31. Deane's approach to this implication is discussed in chapter below n 133. 
51 Brian Galligan, Politics of the High Court (1987) 242. 
52 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR l, 250. 
53 Richardson (1988) 164 CLR 261, 320 (emphasis added). 
54 Mason J also expressed a concern to limit the Court's engagement with these political 
questions in Koowarta (1982) 153 CLR 168, 229 and Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 125. 
See also Zines' critique of Stephen J's test in Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution 
(4th ed, 1997) 285. 
interpretation in this aspect of his reasoning, stood in conflict with Deane's 
willingness to strictly scrutinise Parliament through his proportionality test.ss 
(b) Considerations of policy 
35 
The second key component of Deane's reasoning in the Tasmanian Dam Case in 
support of a broad understanding of s 51(xxix) was his assessment of policy 
considerations.s6 For example, Deane was swayed by Murphy J's assessment 
that Australia would become an 'international cripple157 if the Commonwealth 
was denied broad power under s 51(xxix). Later in his judgment, Deane also 
acknowledged that a broad approach to s 51(xxix) was necessary as: 
the responsible conduct of external affairs in today's world will, on occasion, require 
observance of the spirit as well as the letter of international agreements, 
compliance with recommendations of international agencies and pursuit of 
international objectives which cannot be measured in terms of binding 
obligation. 58 
This passage demonstrated Deane's willingness to allow national interest to 
influence the Court's construction of s 51 heads of power. However, as Zines 
has remarked, Deane's reference to national interest was not textually 
mandated: reliance on either national interest or federalism in constitutional 
reasoning involved 'implications and assumptions' by the Court.s9 
What is significant for this discussion of Deane's concept of federal 
relationships and s 51 was not that Deane relied on such considerations, as 
indeed each member of the Court in the Tasmanian Dam Case utilised concepts 
of nationalism or federalism to support their reasoning. Instead, the significance 
of this aspect of Deane's reasoning in the Tasmanian Dam Case lies in his choice 
of nationalism over federalism as the relevant implication or assumption 
55 See further below n 66. 
56 The role of policy in the Court's reasoning in the Tasmanian Dam Case is explored in Michael 
Coper, 'The High Court and the World of Policy' (1984) 14 Federal Law Review 294. 
57 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 262 (Deane J). Although Deane placed this phrase in 
quotation marks he did not attribute it to Murphy J. For Murphy J's use of the phrase see 
Koowarta (1982) 153 CLR 168, 241 citing New South Wales v Commonwealth ('Seas and Submerged 
Lands Case') (1975) 135 CLR 337, 503. 
58 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 258-9 (emphasis added). 
59 Leslie Zines, 'The State of Constitutional Interpretation' (1984) 14 Federal Law Review 277, 284. 
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supporting his analysis in that case.6° Chapter 2 explores other illustrations of 
national interest as a theme in Deane's constitutional jurisprudence and argues 
that Deane's preference is reinforced by his concept of the legal sovereignty of 
'the people' of Australia. 
The above quotation from Deane's judgment in the Tasmanian Dam Case also 
demonstrated his willingness to interpret the Constitution in a manner 
consistent with contemporary realities - the needs of' today's world' .61 This 
concern was also illustrated by Deane's response to an argument thats Sl(xxix) 
should be interpreted narrowly based on the framers' intentions regarding the 
practical operation of the Australian Federation. In light of the debate that 
would later arise over the role of the framers in constitutional interpretation, 
Deane's response to this argument is significant. First, Deane argued in the 
Tasmanian Dam Case that he could 'discern little legal force in that submission.'62 
Second, Deane further stated that, in his view, the assessment of the historical 
record advanced in favour of a narrow interpretation of s Sl(xxix) was 'unduly 
harsh in its assessment of the foresight of the architects of our nation.'63 In the 
Tasmanian Dam Case Deane therefore advanced his own account of the framers' 
views, claiming that Sir Henry Parkes had recognised 'as a basic object of the 
proposed federation' that it should be capable of engaging in the international 
stage 'with uncrippled power'.64 According to Deane, Parkes recognised that a 
broad grant of power to the Commonwealth was essential to the success of the 
newly created nation. This aspect of Deane's judgment in the Tasmanian Dam 
Case represented one of his earliest comments on the role of the framers in 
constitutional interpretation. The effect of these remarks in the Tasmanian Dam 
Case appears to be twofold. First, Deane asserted that the framers' intentions 
were not determinative of constitutional meaning. Second, Deane indicated that 
the framers' intentions were not uniform, and so could support a variety of 
60 See also Deane's statement, one month after the Tasmanian Dam Case, that the grants of 
legislative power to the Commonwealth 'were considered necessary and proper for the purposes of 
the nation that would be formed by, and would develop under, the federation.' Duncan (1983) 158 CLR 
535, 589-90 (emphasis added). Aspects of Deane's analysis in this case are explored in part 1 of 
chapter2. 
61 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 258 (emphasis added). 
62 Ibid 255. Mason J also rejected the proposition that the Constitution must conform 'to 
expectations held in 1900': Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR l, 126. On Mason J's argument 
see further Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) 283-4. 
63 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 255. 
64 Ibid citing Sir Henry Parkes in Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian 
Convention (1891), 14. 
meanings of the Constitution. This two-pronged attack on the use of the 
Convention Debates, and the framers' intentions, in constitutional 
interpretation was a distinctive feature of Deane's reasoning throughout his 
High Court decisions.65 
3 Deane's use of proportionality reasoning to 
limits 51(xxix) 
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According to Deane, the accepted test for determining when a law could be 
characterised as falling within this aspect of s 51(xxix) was whether the law was 
'capable of being reasonably considered to be appropriate and adapted to' giving effect 
to treaty obligations.66 As Selway demonstrated, this test was well established 
prior to the Tasmanian Dam Case.67 Deane's innovation in the Tasmanian Dam 
Case was the introduction of the language of 'reasonable proportionality', a 
concept drawn from European law, into the characterisation test.68 Thus Deane 
argued that for a law implementing treaty obligations to be supported by 
s Sl(xxix) it must evince: 
a reasonable proportionality between the designated purpose or object and the 
means which the law embodies for achieving or procuring it.69 
This test clearly required the Court to examine the relationship between the 
legislative means and ends.70 The role of proportionality reasoning as a theme 
in Deane's constitutional decision-making is an important topic in this thesis, 
extending beyond his application of the test in the context of s 51(xxix). The 
65 See, for example, Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR482, 511. Deane's attitude towards the 
framers' intentions is explored below n 156. 
66 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 259 (emphasis added). See also Richardson (1988) 164 
CLR 261, 311. 
67 Brad Selway, 'The Rise and Rise of the Reasonable Proportionality Test in Public Law' 
(1996) 7 Public Law Review 212. See also Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Guarantees, 
Characterisation and the Concept of Proportionality' (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review 
1, 27-31. 
68 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR l, 260 (emphasis added). On the European origins of 
'proportionality' analysis, see Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Guarantees, Characterisation and the 
Concept of Proportionality' (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review l, 2. 
69 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 260 (emphasis added). 
70 As to the basic inquiry in proportionality analysis between means and ends, see Jeremy Kirk, 
'Constitutional Guarantees, Characterisation and the Concept of Proportionality' (1997) 21 
Melbourne University Law Review 1, 2. Note that in 1996 Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh 
and Gummow JJ, in a joint judgment, commented that the term 'proportion suggests a 
comparative relation of one thing to another as respects magnitude, quantity or degree' and so 
the test of 'reasonable proportionality ... appears to restate the basic question': Victoria v 
Commonwealth ('Industrial Relations Case') (1996) 187 CLR 416, 488. 
following section focuses on Deane's application of the test in the Tasmanian 
Dam Case and Richardson and the insights it offers into Deane's understanding 
of the judicial role in this context. 
(a) Deane's proportionality reasoning in the Tasmanian 
Dam Case 
38 
In the Tasmanian Dam Case, Deane provided an 'extravagant example171 of a law 
that would fail his reasonable proportionality test. In his example, Australia 
was a party to a Convention requiring that all steps be taken to safeguard 
against the spread of an obscure sheep disease. The Commonwealth enacted a 
law requiring the slaughter of all sheep in Australia, even though no incidence 
of the disease had yet occurred in Australia. Clearly this was a' drastic' or 
'extreme course'72 undertaken by Parliament to fulfil its treaty obligations. 
Deane concluded that: 
The absence of any reasonable proportionality between the law and the 
purpose of discharging the obligation under the convention would preclude 
characterization as a law with respect to external affairs notwithstanding that 
Tweedledee might, 'contrariwise', perceive logic in the proposition that the most 
effective way of preventing the spread of any disease among sheep would be 
the elimination of all sheep.73 
Deane's decision to punctuate his 'extravagant example' with an allusion to 
Tweedledee's 'contrariwise' logic was itself a distinguishing feature of his 
judgment.74 It seems that Deane's understanding of the 'legal method and legal 
principle,'75 applicable in constitutional cases, encompassed allusion to Lewis 
Carroll's Through the Looking Glass.76 
71 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 260. 
72 R v Foster (1949) 79 CLR 43, 96-7 cited in Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 261. 
73 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 260 (emphasis added). Deane's reference to 
'Tweedledee' and 'contrariwise' logic was an allusion to Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in 
Wonderland & Through the Looking Glass (1960) 158. 
74 The Tasmanian Dam Case was not Deane's only allusion to literature in his constitutional 
jurisprudence. See also Deane's reference to George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four and Hans 
Christian Anderson's story of the Emperor's New Clothes in University of Wollongong v Metwally 
(1984) 158 CLR 447, 476-8. 
75 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158CLR1, 250. Note also the Court's 'Statement' at the beginning 
of the case that the issues involved were 'strictly legal questions': Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 
158 CLR 1, 58-9. 
76 See Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland & Through the Looking Glass (1960) 158. In 
this story Tweedledum and Tweedledee battled over a 'new rattle', during which all before 
them - people, trees and the rattle itself - were damaged. Alice perceived the battle was over a 
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Deane applied his proportionality test in the Tasmanian Dam Case to hold 
invalid much of the Commonwealth's legislative scheme. In Deane's view, 
while the scheme would accomplish its goal, the legislation cast its net too 
wide, effectively preventing any 'real development or improvement of land.'77 
In particular, Deane perceived that the wide prohibitions, applying 
automatically to the identified property regardless of the nature of the land or 
its proposed use, meant that there was no necessary relationship between the 
purpose of the law and the means chosen by Parliament to give effect to it.78 
Section 6(2) of the Act and Regulations 9(1)(h) and 9(2), however, were of a 
different class. Because these provisions prevented particular damage or 
destruction of particular property, they were 'reasonably proportionate' to the 
implementation of the Commonwealth's treaty obligations and so sustainable 
under the external affairs power.79 
Kirk has identified three levels of analysis arising in proportionality reasoning.80 
The first is an assessment of the suitability of the law, that is, whether the law is 
a rational means of achieving Parliament's desired end. Second is necessity 
analysis, in which the Court asks whether an alternative, less drastic or 
onerous, means was available to Parliament to achieve its ends. Finally, 
balancing analysis sees the Court compare the weight or value of the 
Parliament's purpose against the interests affected by the law. Of the three 
levels, suitability analysis is the least strict assessment of the relationship 
between the means and ends of the law. However, at each level the Court can 
apply the tests with a varying degree of intensity or 'margin of appreciation'.81 
By its level of analysis, and the intensity of its application, the Court 
demonstrates different degrees of deference to Parliament's assessment of the 
means by which to achieve its purpose. 
trivial matter. In this way, the context of Tweedledee's 'contrariwise' logic itself illustrates a 
disproportionate means to achieve Tweedledum and Tweedledee's goal. 
77 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR l, 266. 
78 Ibid 266-7. 
79 Ibid 267. Kirk referred to legislation being 'tailored' to the treaty obligations in Jeremy Kirk, 
'Constitutional Guarantees, Characterisation and the Concept of Proportionality' (1997) 21 
Melbourne University Law Review 1, 31. 
8° Kirk, above n 79, 5-9. 
81 Ibid 5, 54. Brennan J adopted the language of a 'margin of appreciation' in his proportionality 
analysis in ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 159. 
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In the Tasmanian Dam Case Deane applied the strictest of Kirk's standards of 
review. Deane assessed the suitability and necessity of the legislation and then 
balanced the burden of the legislative freeze on development against the 
environmental and heritage objectives of the Commonwealth under its 
obligations under the Convention. Deane's willingness to strictly scrutinise the 
choices made by Parliament in the implementation of the Convention was 
exposed more clearly in Richardson. 
(b) Clarification and conundrums in Richardson 
Richardson involved a challenge to further legislation enacted under s Sl(xxix) 
in reliance on the Convention. Section 16 of the Lemonthyme and Southern Forests 
(Commission of Inquiry) Act 1987 (Cth)82 imposed a 'freeze' on prescribed land, 
which was designed to allow the Commonwealth time to assess the heritage 
value of land in Tasmania. In this period, land-owners were prevented from 
engaging in a range of activities, such as logging, constructing roads or tracks, 
carrying out excavation works, and doing any other prescribed act capable of 
adversely affecting the protected area. In addition, s 16(3) of the Lemonthyme Act 
made it unlawful for land-owners to fail to take 'reasonable steps' to prevent 
prohibited acts occurring on their property. 
All members of the Court in Richardson held that the relevant test was whether 
the law was reasonably capable of being seen as appropriate and adapted to the 
implementation of the Commonwealth's treaty obligations.83 On the facts, 
Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ, with Deane and 
Gaudron JJ dissenting in separate judgments, held that it was within 
Parliament's power to conclude that the Lemonthyme Act in its entirety was a 
reasonable means of preserving the land until a determination of its status 
under the World Heritage Convention was made.84 Thus for the majority 
judges, it was for Parliament to balance the adverse impact on land-owners 
82 Henceforth the 'Lemonthyme Act'. 
83 Richardson (1988) 164 CLR 261, 289 (Mason CJ and Brennan J); 303 (Wilson J); 311 (Deane J); 
336 (Toohey J); 342 (Gaudron J). Dawson J, however, emphasised that this was the test of the 
majority in Tasmanian Dam Case, and indicated his general dissatisfaction with the breadth of 
their approach: ibid 324-8. 
84 Ibid 291-2 (Mason CJ and Brennan J); 303-4 (Wilson J); 328 (Dawson J); 336-7 (Toohey J). 
against the fulfilment of the Commonwealth's treaty obligations and the 
ensuing environmental benefits. 
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By contrast, Deane's reasoning in Richardson again evinced a willingness to 
engage in strict scrutiny of legislative choices. Deane attempted to deflect 
criticism on this basis by emphasising that his test was 'less stringent'Bs than the 
'appropriate and adapted' test that had been applied in earlier cases. Also, as 
discussed above, Deane asserted that 'general principles of constitutional law', 
and questions of law rather than political considerations, decided the case.B6 
Through these statements, Deane sought to establish his deference to 
Parliament's political determinations and locate his reasoning within the 
protective framework of 'apolitical legalism'.B7 However, the strictness of 
Deane's application of proportionality reasoning tells a different story. 
Deane's analysis in Richardson applied both necessity and balancing levels of 
Kirk's proportionality analysis. According to Deane only s 16(1)(a), prohibiting 
the felling of trees for the purposes of forestry operations, was valid.BB This 
measure, Deane argued, was reasonably to be regarded as necessary for the 
fulfilment of the Commonwealth's treaty obligations to protect natural heritage. 
However, the bulk of the prohibitions in the Lemonthyme Act were not 
proportionate to this objective. For example, Deane noted that some activities, 
such as the construction of a fire break, were prohibited even if conducted for 
the purpose of protecting the heritage value of the land.B9 Particularly 
significant was Deane's emphasis on the onerous obligations on land-owners; 
an interference with ordinary property rights that he held could not be justified 
on the basis of the particular environmental objectives of the Parliament alone.90 
This determination stood in contrast with the analysis of the majority judges, 
who held that it was for Parliament, not the Court, to balance the interests of 
individual property owners against its interest in implementing the treaty 
85 Ibid 312. 
86 Ibid 320. 
87 Brian Galligan, Politics of the High Court (1987) 242. 
88 Richardson (1988) 164 CLR 261, 319. Gaudron J held that on the basis of the information before 
the Court the Lemon thyme Act afforded 'general environmental protection' rather than 
protection 'of the qualities and features which may be of outstanding universal value' and so 
the Act was not proportionate to the Commonwealth's treaty obligations. Ibid 346-9. 
89 Ibid 316-8. 
90 Ibid 315-6. 
obligations of the Commonwealth.91 In this way, Richardson illustrated the 
influence of 'the people' on Deane's approach to constitutional interpretation, 
the first examined to this point in this thesis. This aspect of Deane's reasoning 
was punctuated by one key passage in his judgment in Richardson, a passage 
meriting further discussion. 
(i) 'The people', proportionality and federal relationships 
Deane emphasised the role of 'the people' in his reasoning in Richardson by 
arguing that: 
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Insignificant though those areas may be in the overall perspective from 
Canberra, their owners, few though they may be, are citizens whose lives and 
property are beyond the reach of the Parliament except to the extent authorized 
by a relevant grant of Commonwealth legislative power. Yet there was no effort 
by the Commonwealth to justify the application of the protective regime, with 
all its stringency, to those privately owned areas of freehold land.92 
This passage evinced Deane's belief that Parliament had given insufficient 
weight to the individual rights affected by the law.93 This was confirmed for 
Deane by the fact that the Commonwealth had been unable to demonstrate to 
the Court that it had investigated the impact of its regime on individual land-
owners.94 Deane noted that this information had been available to the 
Commonwealth, with the inference being that the Commonwealth was 
uninterested in the impact of the law on individuals.95 Thus, the interests of the 
'few' Tasmanian land-owners had been sacrificed to the Commonwealth 
Parliament's pursuit of policy objectives; objectives it had deemed to be in the 
interests of Australia, and the Australian people as a whole. 
It is useful at this time to compare the place of individual rights in Deane's 
reasoning in the Tasmanian Dam Case and Richardson against his treatment of the 
91 See in particular, ibid 304 (Wilson J); 327-8 (Dawson J). 
92 Ibid 316. 
93 Compare Deane's analysis with the reasoning of Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ in Davis v 
Commonwealth, also decided in 1988, where the concept of reasonable proportionality was 
utilised in the context of the incidental power of the Commonwealth. There, the impact of the 
Commonwealth's measures on traditional common law rights was significant for Mason CJ, 
Deane and Gaudron JJ' s assessment of the validity of the measures, found to be 'grossly 
disproportionate to the need to protect the commemoration' of the bicentenary of European 
settlement in Australia. See Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 100. 
94 Richardson (1988) 164 CLR 261, 316. 
95 Ibid. 
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'federal balance' arguments. Both proportionality analysis and 'federal balance' 
principles are mechanisms for limiting the Commonwealth's power under 
s 51(xxix), but only the former was favourably received by Deane. Deane 
confirmed his rejection of the 'federal balance' arguments at the outset of his 
judgment in Richardson, emphatically declaring that it was 'now more than half 
a century' since the Court recognised that s 51 heads of legislative power must 
not be confined by concerns that giving s 51 its 'full effect would somehow 
imperil the constitutional balance between the Commonwealth and the States.'96 
Following his reference to the Engineers' Case, Deane argued thats 51 grants of 
power were not to be considered in a 'vacuum' but within their 'constitutional 
context'.97 That context, according to Deane, was the Constitution's 
commitment to judicial review: 
It is to this Court that the people have entrusted the ultimate responsibility of 
determining whether a law which the Parliament has purported to impose 
comes within the scope of the legislative powers which they have conferred upon 
the Parliament.98 
The link Deane made in this passage between 'the people' and his concept of 
judicial review was an important and recurring element of his constitutional 
philosophy.99 In this discussion of Deane's approach to s 51(xxix), the 
significance of this passage lies in connection Deane made between the 
sovereignty of 'the people' and his consideration of the impact of the law on the 
interests of 'the people' through his proportionality reasoning. It was therefore 
'the people' and judicial review, rather than the federal division of power, that 
Deane regarded as the context for the interpretation of s 51. 
Commentators such as Detmold and Kirk have suggested, however, that 
'federal balance' reasoning may in fact be evident in Deane's reasoning in 
Richardson through his proportionality test.100 This argument rests on the 
following statement by Deane: 
96 Ibid 307. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid (emphasis added). 
99 See in particular Deane's justification of the use of strict proportionality analysis in the context 
of the implied freedom of political communication, discussed further below chapter 6 n 150. 
100 M. J. Detmold, 'Australian law: Federal Movement' (1991) 13 Sydney Law Review 31, 58. See 
also Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Guarantees, Characterisation and the Concept of 
Proportionality' (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review l, 36. 
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no real effort [was] made to confine the prohibitions of the overall protective 
regime, with the overriding of the ordinary rights of citizens and the ordinary 
jurisdiction of the State of Tasmania which it would involve, to activities which it 
might reasonably be thought represented some real actual or potential threat to 
what might properly be seen, for the purposes of the Convention, as natural or 
cultural heritage.101 
Kirk and Detmold suggest that this passage evinced a concern by Deane to 
protect the 'predetermined notions of appropriate state powers', a concept 
which lies at the heart of 'federal balance' reasoning.102 However, this 
assessment of Deane's reasoning in Richardson appears to take his single phrase 
- 'ordinary jurisdiction of the State of Tasmania' - out of context. The point 
Deane sought to make in this section of his judgment in Richardson was that 
interference with individual liberties was not permitted except as authorised 
under s 51. Only those laws that were a reasonably proportionate means of 
achieving Parliament's objective were valid under s Sl(xxix). Viewed in this 
context, Deane's brief reference to the States does not detract from his 
assessment that it was because of the undue intrusion by Parliament on 
individual rights that the legislation was invalid. Rather Richardson illustrated 
Deane's preference for judicial process as the means of protecting individual 
rights - the rights of the 'few' - from the interests of the majority of 'the people' 
as expressed by Parliament. 
Deane had signalled his interest in the judicial protection of 'the people' as early 
as his swearing-in speech, where he confirmed that the source of law, and all 
governmental power, resided in 'the people'.103 Subsequent chapters argue that 
the pattern of Deane's decision-making priorto 1988 confirms Deane's 
sensitivity towards 'the people' and the judicial protection of their interests 
from interference by Parliament or the Executive. To take one example, in A v 
Hayden in 1984, Deane expressed a deeply sceptical view of the Government, 
stating that: 
These five cases illustrate the abiding wisdom of the biblical injunction a_painst 
putting one's 'trust in men in power': Psalms 146:3 Jerusalem Bible, p.927.10 
101 Richardson (1988) 164 CLR 261, 317 (emphasis added). 
102 Kirk, above n 100, 36. 
103 Transcript of the Ceremonial Sitting of the Occasion of the Swearing-in of the Honourable Mr 
Justice Deane as a Justice of the High Court of Australia at Canberra, Tuesday 27 July 1982, 17-
18. 
104 Av Hayden (1984) 156 CLR532, 592 (emphasis added). 
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This statement was a remarkably open criticism by a federal judge of the federal 
Executive, displaying a deep distrust of those wielding governmental power. It 
was noted in the introduction to this thesis that during the Mason Court era 
members of the Court acknowledged that the Australian constitutional system 
embraced a commitment to more than simple majoritarianism.105 Under this 
vision of the Australian democratic system, an increased level of scrutiny of 
legislative measures may be expected, particularly with to respect the impact of 
a law on minority interests. However, even accepting the correctness of that 
vision, and the appropriateness of the Court's interpretation of the Constitution 
consistent with that vision, Deane's analysis in Richardson may be overly strict. 
Under the conformity test established in Richardson, the Court's task was to 
assess whether the legislation was 'reasonably' appropriate and adapted, 
displaying a degree of deference to legislative decision-making. Despite 
Deane's endorsement of that approach, his application of proportionality 
analysis in Richardson may be seen to move beyond the application of 
'established constitutional principle', to engage in a 'political' analysis of the 
appropriateness of the legislation. 
4 Deane's vision of the Court's role ins 51(xxix)-
final observations 
In summary, Deane's decisions in the Tasmanian Dam Case and Richardson 
demonstrated a wide understanding of the Commonwealth legislative power 
with respect to 'external affairs', rejecting the need to restrict legislative power 
by reference to 'federal balance' considerations. At the same time, however, 
Deane imposed a conformity test which empowered the Court to assess the 
extent to which the impact of the legislation on individual rights was 
reasonably proportionate to the legislature's objective. The combination of these 
elements in Deane's understanding of s 51(xxix) demonstrates two themes in 
Deane's vision of federal relationships under the Constitution. First, Deane was 
unconcerned by the centralisation of legislative power, and its effects on the 
dynamics of the Australian Federation. Second, Deane preferred the Court, and 
105 See discussion in the introduction above, text accompanying n 48. 
judicial process, rather than the federal division of legislative power, as a 
vehicle for the protection of individual liberties from interference. 
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Deane's decisions in this field also illustrate the application of a number of 
interpretive tools that are of significance in charting the development of his 
approach to constitutional interpretation. For example, Deane's decision in the 
Tasmanian Dam Case suggests that he was sceptical of the utility of reference to 
the Convention Debates as an aid in constitutional interpretation. In addition, 
proportionality reasoning emerged after the Tasmanian Dam Case and Richardson 
was a pervasive tool in Deane's jurisprudence, resting on his wider 
understanding of the Court's duty to protect 'the people' and to interpret the 
Constitution in a manner consistent with contemporary context. His application 
of that principle also suggested that Deane was willing to engage in extensive 
scrutiny of Parliament. That vision of the Court's role in relation to Parliament 
sat uncomfortably with his overt reliance on the legalism of the Engineers' Case 
to support his interpretation of s 51. 
Deane's blending of reliance on established legal principles, and innovative 
interpretive techniques, particularly in his reference to the framers in his 
reasons in the Tasmanian Dam Case and Richardson, were also apparent in his 
decision in Incorporation Case. This decision was one of Deane's most famous 
dissenting decisions and is examined in the next part of this chapter. 
B Part 2: Section 51(xx) and the issue of 
incorporation 
Section 51(xx) provides that the Commonwealth has power with respect to: 
Foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the 
limits of the Commonwealth. 
The emergence of corporations as key players across many areas of Australian 
life has meant that the ambit of this power has significant consequences for the 
'federal balance' between the regulatory power of the Commonwealth and the 
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States.106 Prior to the Incorporation Case of 1990, Deane's examination of s Sl(xx) 
dealt with two key issues: what is a 'trading or financial corporation'; and, what 
activities of such corporations can the Commonwealth regulate?107 
Deane had examined one aspect of the first question while still a member of the 
Federal Court. In Re Ku-Ring-Cai Co-operative Building Society (No 12) Ltd, Deane 
provided an expansive description of a 'financial corporation' as including non-
profit organisations 'dealing in finance'.108 This description was subsequently 
affirmed by the High Court in State Superannuation Board v Trade Practices 
Commission in the joint judgment of Mason, Murphy and Deane JJ.109 In State 
Superannuation Board, and later in the Tasmanian Dam Case, these three judges 
argued that a corporation was a 'trading or financial' corporation under s Sl(xx) 
if its trading or financial activities were a significant and substantial aspect of 
the corporation's current activities.110 These judges rejected the narrower view 
favoured by Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ thats Sl(xx) required the trading 
or financial activities of the corporation to be its primary or dominant 
undertaking.111 It was on this basis that in the Tasmanian Dam Case Mason, 
Murphy, Brennan and Deane JJ found that the Hydro Electric Commission, a 
public body charged with the production and supply of electricity to the State, 
was a trading corporation.112 
Deane's appointment to the High Court also coincided with the ascendency of 
an expansive answer to the question of which activities of as Sl(xx) corporation 
the Commonwealth could regulate. In the Tasmanian Dam Case, Gibbs CJ, 
106 Note particularly the recent debate over the Court's extension of s 51(xx) in New South Wales 
v Commonwealth ('Workchoices Case') (2006) 231ALR1. 
107 For a discussion of these issues, and Deane's jurisprudence in this context, see for example, 
G. J. Lindell, 'The Corporations and Races Powers' (1984) 14 Federal Law Review 219; Geoffrey 
Kennett, 'Constitutional Interpretation in the Corporations Case' (1990) 19 Federal Law Review 223 
and Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) chapter 5. 
108 (1978) 22 ALR 621, 642. Zines has observed that the concept of 'financial corporation' was 
'well described' by Deane in this decision: Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4th 
ed, 1997) 89. 
109 (1982) 150 CLR 282, 305. 
110 Ibid 305-6 (Mason, Murphy and Deane JJ) and Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 155-7 
(Mason J); 179 (Murphy J); 272 (Deane J). 
111 State Superannuation Board v Trade Practices Commission (1982) 150 CLR 282, 305 (Mason, 
Murphy and Deane JJ). Compare, Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 116-7 (Gibbs CJ). 
Wilson and Dawson JJ found it unnecessary to decide this issue in the Tasmanian Dam Case, 
although Dawson J indicated that he would have agreed with the view of Gibbs CJ: ibid 207. 
112 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 155-7 (Mason J); 159 (Murphy J); 240 (Brennan J); 292-3 
(Deane J). 
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Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane JJ concluded thats 51(xx) authorised the 
Commonwealth to regulate the trading activities of trading corporations, and 
activities carried out for the purposes of trade.113 Mason, Murphy and Deane JJ 
were willing to extends 51(xx) still further, to regulate the activities of trading 
corporations.114 
Deane argued in the Tasmanian Dam Case thats 51(xx) was an important plenary 
power bestowed on the Commonwealth, one that, consistent with language and 
principle, must be construed 'expansively rather than pedantically'.115 For this 
reason, Deane concluded thats 51(xx) could not be confined to permit the 
Commonwealth to regulate only the trading activities of trading corporations. 
Deane acknowledged that policy considerations confirmed a broad 
interpretation of this head of Commonwealth legislative power, stating that: 
No one with knowledge of the political and other non-trading activities of 
trading corporations in and since the days of the East India Company would 
suggest that the non-trading activities of trading corporations are any less 
appropriate to be placed under the legislative control of a national government 
than are their trading activities.116 
In this vein Deane argued that it was not 'realistic' for the trading and financial 
activities of corporations to be 'compartmentalized and isolated' from their 
non-trading activities.117 Although Deane observed that a law framed 'no 
corporation shall' will not necessarily be valid, he regarded s 51(xx) as broad 
enough to permit the Commonwealth to regulate all the activities of a trading 
corporation.118 
Against this steady expansion of s Sl(xx), the majority decision in the 
Incorporation Case 'came as a surprise'.119 The case concerned Commonwealth 
legislation designed to encourage economic activity by creating a uniform 
national regulatory regime for companies and securities, including provision 
for the incorporation of 'trading and financial corporations'. The question 
113 Ibid 119 (Gibbs CJ); 148 (Mason J); 179 (Murphy J); 240-1 (Brennan J); 269-71 (Deane J). 
114 Ibid 148-9 (Mason J); 179 (Murphy J); 269-70 (Deane J). 
115 Ibid 269. 
116 Ibid 269-70 (emphasis added). 
117 Ibid 270 (emphasis added). 
118 Ibid 272. 
119 G.J. Lindell, 'Recent Developments in the Judicial Interpretation of the Australian 
Constitution' in Geoffrey Lindell (ed) Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (1994) 
1, 6. 
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before the Court was whether the words 'formed within the limits of the 
Commonwealth' denied the Commonwealth power with respect to the creation 
of 'trading and financial' corporations. 
Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, in a joint 
judgment, held thats 5l(xx) could not support a Commonwealth law with 
respect to incorporation. The majority argued that three factors supported their 
conclusion: text, precedent and history. First, according to the majority, on its 
'plain meaning', s 51(xx) granted the Commonwealth power with respect to 
'formed' corporations, that is, those corporations already in existence.120 Second, 
the majority claimed that the Court's reasoning in Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v 
Moorehead was authority for the proposition thats 51(xx) did not grant the 
Commonwealth power to incorporate trading and financial corporations.121 
Finally, the majority argued that history, including drafts of the Constitution 
and the Convention Debates, confirmed thats 51(xx) was not a power with 
respect to the incorporation of trading and financial corporations.122 
Deane, in a passionate dissent, rejected each stage of the majority's analysis. For 
Deane, the text of s 51(xx) was analogous to the lighthouses power ins 51(vii). 
Thus, he argued, the power with respect to constitutional corporations in 
s 51(xx) included the power to create trading and financial corporations. The 
persuasiveness of Deane's analogy has been questioned.123 However, as Kennett 
has argued, the diametrically opposed grammatical analysis of the majority and 
Deane reinforced that the words of s 51(xx) are ambiguous.124 Thus, a 
compelling analysis of the meaning s 51(xx) must depend on sources beyond 
the text, including precedent, policy and history. Deane's analysis of each of 
these tools in the Incorporation Case offered significant insights into Deane's 
constitutional philosophy. 
120 Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR 482, 498. 
121 (1909) 8 CLR 330 ('Huddart'). 
122 Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR 482, 501-3. 
123 See Geoffrey Kennett, 'Constitutional Interpretation in the Corporations Case' (1990) 19 Federal 
Law Review 223, 231-2 and Dennis Rose, 'Judicial Reasonings and Responsibilities in 
Constitutional Cases' (1994) 20 Monash University Law Review 195, 197. 
124 Kennett, above n 123, 233. 
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1 Principles of interpretation and precedent 
Deane commenced his judgment in the Incorporation Case with a statement of 
the principles of construction governing the interpretation of s 51. Deane 
emphasised that it was 'the words - and those words alone1125 which controlled 
the meaning of s 51(xx). This statement resonated with Sir Owen Dixon's 
invocation of' strict and complete legalism' as the appropriate legal principle 
governing constitutional interpretation.126 Deane's remarks were made in the 
context of arguments thats 5l(xx) should be read narrowly, with reference to 
the Convention Debates and the allegedly negative consequences of a broad 
interpretation of the head of power. In this context, reliance on the 'settled 
principle' of the Engineers' Case was a powerful rhetorical device through which 
to challenge the reasoning of a joint judgment of six members of the Court. 
Deane's decision in the Incorporation Case thus provided another illustration, 
seven years after the Tasmanian Dam Case, of Deane's reliance on the Engineers' 
Case and the plain meaning of the constitutional text to support his broad 
construction of s 51. However, the pattern of Deane's jurisprudence, and his 
reasoning in the Incorporation Case, indicated that Deane frequently looked 
beyond the 'words alone', to his understanding of the Constitution's 
'fundamental concepts', contemporary context and policy considerations to 
inform the interpretation of the Constitution. 
Deane's opening remarks in the Incorporation Case, relying on 'the words' of the 
constitutional text, also suggested a significant twist in Deane's understanding 
of the 'settled principle' of the Engineers' Case. Deane explained that the Court 
looked to 'the words' of the Constitution, because those words 'constitute the 
compact made between the people of this country when, by referenda, they ... 
"agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth."1127 
Following the Engineers' Case, it had been settled principle that the authority of 
the Constitution, and the principles governing its interpretation, had at their 
foundation a respect for parliamentary supremacy and a belief that the 
125 Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR 482, 504 (emphasis added). 
126 'Swearing-in of Sir Owen Dixon as Chief Justice' (1952) 85 CLR xi, xiv. 
127 Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR 482, 504 (emphasis added). 
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authority of the Constitution rested in its status as an Act of Imperial 
Parliament.128 In the above passage, however, Deane referred to the compact of 
'the people'; a reference resonating with his swearing-in speech that the source 
of law under the Constitution was 'the people' .129 In the Incorporation Case 
Deane therefore utilised 'the people' to reinforce an interpretation of the text of 
the Constitution freed from the 'assumptions' of the framers regarding 'federal 
balance' considerations. This interpretive principle was reinforced by Deane 
later in his judgment in his adamant rejection of reliance on the subjective 
intentions of the framers as a tool in constitutional interpretation.U0 
Deane's emphasis on the 'settled principles' of the Engineers' Case in his 
judgment in the Incorporation Case supported his rejection of the majority's 
analysis of the case law on s 51(xx). In Huddart the Court had intimated that the 
Commonwealth's power under s 51(xx) did not extend to the incorporation of 
'trading and financial corporations'.131 The Court in the Incorporation Case 
acknowledged that the 'reserved powers' doctrine heavily influenced the 
reasoning of the Court in that case.132 In the Incorporation Case, however, the 
majority judges relied on the authority of Huddart, on the basis that its 
conclusion on the reach of s 5l(xx) could be seen as deriving from 'purely 
textual considerations' divorced from these discredited principles of 
constitutional interpretation.133 For Deane, however, reliance on Huddart 
introduced reserved powers reasoning by the backdoor; reasoning which, in the 
Tasmanian Dam Case and Richardson Deane had forcefully rejected as having no 
relevance to the task of construing s 51 heads of power.134 With greater force 
and more colourful imagery than his decisions on s 51(xxix), Deane claimed 
128 See, for example, Sir Owen Dixon, 'The Law and the Constitution' (1935) 51 Law Quarterly 
Review 590, 597. See discussion above n 28. 
129 Prior to the Incorporation Case in 1990 Deane had expressed this principle in a number of 
cases. See, for example, Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd (No 1) (1985) 159 CLR 351, 442 
and Breavington (1988) 169 CLR41, 132. 
130 See further below n 146. 
131 For further discussion of the Court's reasoning in Huddart see Geoffrey Kennett, 
'Constitutional Interpretation in the Corporations Case' (1990) 19 Federal Law Review 223, 235-7. 
132 Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR 482, 499 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron 
and McHugh JJ); 506-11 (Deane J). 
133 Ibid 499. 
134 See discussion above text accompanying chapter 1 n 50 and n 96. 
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that any reference to the Huddart decision required the case to be 'disinterred and 
selectively dissected'. 135 
2 Policy considerations in constitutional 
interpretation 
A further disagreement between Deane and the majority judges in the 
Incorporation Case lay in their assessment of the policy consequences of the 
legislation, and what Deane described as the question of 'convenience'.136 
According to Deane, the majority judgment was influenced by the 
consideration that 'it would be productive of difficulty and inconvenience' to 
construes 5l(xx) as conferring power to incorporate only corporations of a 
'trading and financial' character.137 Ass 51(xx) was not a power with respect to 
all corporations, there was some weight to the majority's concern regarding the 
administrative complications associated with rules for incorporation that apply 
only to corporations of a specified character.138 However, Deane forcefully 
rejected the majority's analysis on two grounds. 
First, Deane argued that the majority's analysis of the practical effect of s 51(xx) 
'assumes an unduly restrictive connotation' of 'trading and financial' 
corporations.139 As the overview of Deane's approach to s 51 (xx) at the outset of 
this part indicated, Deane took a broad view of the meaning of 'trading or 
financial' corporations. Deane therefore considered that the exclusion of the 
special classes of corporations from the definition of constitutional corporations 
would 'not seriously impair'140 the Commonwealth's power to design a national 
corporations law. 
135 Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR 482, 506 (emphasis added). Deane famously repeated this 
morbid imagery when he rejected a 'dead hands' theory of construction of the Constitution in 
Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171. 
136 Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR 482, 511. This was the second of two 'subsidiary' arguments 
addressed by Deane at the conclusion of his judgment. The first was the majority's reliance on 
the framers' intentions. 
137 Ibid 511. 
138 Geoffrey Kennett, 'Constitutional Interpretation in the Corporations Case' (1990) 19 Federal 
Law Review 223, 227-30 and Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) 103-4. 
139 Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR 482, 511. Kennett has observed that the majority's reference 
to convenience was linked to the framers' intentions and therefore 'hardly compelling.' Kennett 
above n 138, 230. 
140 Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR482, 512. 
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Second, Deane offered a 'more complete answer' to this argument. Deane 
reasoned that there was 'no legal justification' for denying the scope of the 
power on the basis of the supposed inconvenience of the resulting legislation.141 
This answer appeared to rest on a separation of powers analysis. According to 
Deane, the question of the potential inconvenience of the legislation was a 
consideration that might be seen by the Parliament as 'calling for restraint in the 
exercise of the legislative power.1142 However, it was for Parliament to consider 
the desirability or prudence of its legislative regime, while the Court's task was 
to examine whether the law fell within what Deane described as the 'plenary 
grant of legislative power' to the Commonwealth.143 In this way, in the 
Incorporation Case Deane again drew attention to the distinction between the 
roles of the Parliament and the Court in the Australian constitutional system. 
It may be asked, however, whether Deane's commitment to judicial deference 
in the Incorporation Case was a substantial one. Deane had emphasised the 
distinction between the legal and political roles with some force in his 
reasoning in the Tasmanian Dam Case and Richardson. However, Deane's 
understanding of the Court's role in 'legal' analysis in those cases did not 
preclude his reference to the needs of the nation in 'today's world'144 in support 
of his broad interpretation of the Commonwealth's legislative power to 
implement treaties. Similarly, Deane's application of proportionality analysis 
allowed him to strictly scrutinise the necessity of Parliament's course of action, 
particularly where the legislation adversely affected individual rights. 
In his reasoning in the Incorporation Case, Deane revealed his support of the 
policy objectives of the legislation. Thus Deane stated that it 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. 
is plain that ... the advantages of such national companies legislation with 
respect to such corporations seem to me overwhelmingly to outweigh the 
alleged inconvenience.145 
143 Deane therefore referred to issues of the potential inconvenience of the legislation as 
considerations that might be seen by the Parliament as 'calling for restraint in the exercise of the 
legislative power.' Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR 482, 512. 
144 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR l, 258. 
145 Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR 482, 512. For a sceptical analysis of this argument see Ian M 
Ramsay, 'Company Law and the Economics of Federalism' (1990) 19 Federal Law Review 169. On 
the inconvenience effected by the majority's decision in the Incorporation Case, see Kirby J's 
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With this statement, Deane confirmed his preference for national, uniform, 
regulatory solutions, over the diversity of State based regimes. As Deane 
supported the objective of the legislation in the Incorporation Case, and regarded 
any inconvenience as clearly proportionate to the pursuit of that objective, 
Deane's commitment to judicial deference was not put to the test in this case. 
3 The framers in constitutional interpretation 
The final element of Deane's analysis in the Incorporation Case which remains to 
be discussed was his analysis of the relevance of the framers' intentions to the 
interpretation of s Sl(xx). Deane's examination of the Convention Debates in the 
Incorporation Case represented both a significant point of difference between his 
approach and that of the majority judges and an illustration of his treatment of 
what would become an important topic in his constitutional jurisprudence. 
Before turning to Deane's remarks, however, some background regarding the 
Court's views on the relevance of the Convention Debates in Australian 
constitutional interpretation prior to the Incorporation Case is required.146 
(a) Opening the Debates - Cole v Whitfield 
Prior to 1988 and the decision of Cole v Whitfield,147 the Court had imposed a 
'self-denying ordinance1148 on the use of the Convention Debates in 
constitutional interpretation. This restriction was tied to Engineers' literalism, 
and the Court's assessment of its obligation to derive the meaning of the 
Constitution 'according to its own terms'.149 Cole officially lifted the embargo on 
the use of the Debates, at least in part.150 
lament regarding the 'grotesque complications' that flowed from the 'narrow' majority decision: 
R v Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535, 564. 
146 Much has been written on this topic. See, for example the various scholarly contributions to 
Gregory Craven, (ed) The Convention Debates 1891-1898: Commentaries, Indicies and Guide (1986). 
147 (1988) 165 CLR 360 ('Cole'). 
148 Michael Kirby, 'Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent: a Form of Ancestor 
Worship?' (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review l, 9. 
149 Engineers' Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 142. 
15° Kirk observed that the rule in Cole was not a novel interpretive principle, but had restated the 
approach of Griffith CJ in Municipal Council of Sydney v Commonwealth (1904) 1 CLR 208, 213-4. 
The rule of reference in Cole, 'hypnotically simple'151 in its terms, stated that 
reference to the Convention Debates: 
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may be made, not for the purpose of substituting for the meaning of the words 
used the scope and effect - if such could be established - which the founding 
fathers subjectively intended the section to have, but for the purpose of 
identifying the contemporary meaning of the language used, the subject to which 
that language was directed and the nature and objectives of the movement 
towards federation from which the compact of the Constitution finally 
emerged.152 
In this passage the Court attempted to restrict the influence of' original intent' 
in constitutional interpretation while recognising the value of the Debates as an 
important resource of Australian constitutional history.153 
The Cole rule has been criticised as endorsing a false dichotomy between an 
objective reference to the Debates and reliance on the intentions of the framers. 
For instance, Schoff has gathered an extensive list of examples where members 
of the Court, while ostensibly applying the Cole rule, slipped from reliance 
upon the objective intentions of the framers into a consideration of the framers' 
subjective intentions.154 The majority's reliance on the Convention Debates in 
the Incorporation Case appears itself to illustrate the fine line drawn by the Cole 
rule.155 In the Incorporation Case the joint judgment turned to the Debates for the 
purpose of ascertaining the 'subject to which the paragraph was directed.'156 To 
this end the majority judges cited Sir Samuel Griffith as evincing that 'the 
draftsmen of the provision did not contemplate' that the Commonwealth's 
power under s 51(xx) would extend to incorporation.157 The consequence of this 
Even so, the legitimising of the Court's reference to the Convention Debates was a 'significant 
breakthrough' in Cole: Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Interpretation and a Theory of Evolutionary 
Originalism' (1999) 27 Federal Law Review 323, 329. 
151 See Paul Schoff, 'The High Court and History: It Still Hasn't Found(ed) What It's Looking 
For' (1994) 5 Public Law Review 253, 254. 
152 Cole (1988) 165 CLR 360, 385 (emphasis added). 
153 As a sample of the works exploring the degree to which original intent should influence 
constitutional interpretation, contemporaneous to the decision in the Incorporation Case, see 
Greg Craven, 'Original Intent and the Australian Constitution: Coming Soon to a Court Near 
You?' (1990) 1 Public Law Review 166 and Sir Daryl Dawson, 'Intention and the Constitution: 
Whose Intent?' (1990) 6 Australian Bar Review 93. 
154 Paul Schoff, above n 151, especially 261-66. See also Kennett's observation that 'some of the 
uses for historical material in Cole v Whitfield are, with respect, not really distinguishable from 
the project of effectuating the founders' intentions': Geoffrey Kennett, 'Constitutional 
Interpretation in the Corporations Case' (1990) 19 Federal Law Review 223, 239. 
155 See discussion in Paul Schoff above n 151, 264-5 and Geoffrey Kennett above n 154, 240. 
156 Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR 482, 501. 
157 Ibid 502. 
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analysis was that the majority could restrict the scope of s 51(xx) without 
threatening the general trend in s 51 jurisprudence favouring the expansion of 
Commonwealth power.158 However, as Kennett argues, the majority judges' 
inquiry was directed towards the power the delegates considered that s 51(xx) 
should confer.159 This inquiry appears to cross the line into an assessment of 
what the 'founding fathers subjectively intended'160 for the section. 
How did Deane respond to the relevance of the Convention Debates to 
constitutional interpretation? 
In Cole, and Port McDonnell Professional Fishermen's Association v South 
Australia, 161 Deane participated in unanimous joint judgments of the Court 
defining and applying the Cole rule.162 Accordingly, Deane can be regarded as 
endorsing the basic premise of the Cole rule: that historical texts can be used to 
ascertain historical meaning, but that the subjective intentions of the framers are 
irrelevant in constitutional interpretation. This thesis argues that despite 
Deane's hyperbolic statements in Theophanous regarding the 'dead hands' of the 
framers, 163 Deane was consistent in his adherence to this basic premise of the 
rule in Cole.164 Deane's reasoning in Breavington v Godleman, 165 the Incorporation 
Case166 and Theophanous167 evinced his distinctive rationale for the exclusion of 
the framers' subjective intentions from constitutional interpretation based on 
his understanding of the role of 'the people' as legal sovereigns. It was this 
rationale that marked the difference in approach in the Incorporation Case 
between Deane and the majority judgment. 
158 In this way, the majority may have been acting as 'result-oriented historians.' See further the 
use of this critique in the context of United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the 
Constitution in Scott Douglas Gerber, First Principles: the Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas (1999) 
153. 
159 Geoffrey Kennett, 'Constitutional Interpretation in the Corporations Case' (1990) 19 Federal 
Law Review 223, 240. 
16° Cole (1988) 165 CLR 360, 385 (emphasis added). 
161 (1989) 168 CLR 340. 
162 See also the joint judgment of Brennan, Deane and Toohey JJ, citing the Cole rule, in Capital 
Duplicators (No 1) (1992) 177 CLR 248, 274. 
163 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171. 
164 This assessment of Deane's attitude towards the role of historical meaning appears at odds 
with Heydon J's extra-curial classification of Deane's theory in John Dyson Heydon, 'Theories 
of Constitutional Interpretation: A Taxonomy' (2007) Winter Bar News 12, 20-2. 
165 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 132-3. 
166 Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR 482, 511. 
167 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171. 
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(b) iThe people' and the framers in the Incorporation Case 
In the Incorporation Case Deane rejected the argument that the intentions of the 
framers supported a narrow construction of s Sl(xx), denying the 
Commonwealth the power to incorporate trading and financial corporations. 
Deane's answer was in two parts, mirroring his earlier remarks regarding the 
role of the framers' intentions in the interpretation of s Sl(xxix) in the Tasmanian 
Dam Case. 168 
(i) Deane's particular answer - the credibility of the Debates 
First, Deane attacked the credibility of the interpretation of the historical record 
advanced by the majority judges. Thus Deane in the Incorporation Case 
emphasised that the 'few brief references in the Convention Debates are far 
from compelling' and 'contrary [to] statements in early authority'.169 
Consequently Deane argued that the Convention Debates provide 
unconvincing testaments to the purpose of the head of power.170 These remarks 
mirrored Deane's earlier rebuttal of an argument based on the Convention 
Debates in Breavington.171 In Breavington it had been argued that the delegates at 
the Constitutional Conventions supported a narrow understanding of the 
operation of s 118. Deane, however, forcefully rejected that argument in 
Breavington on two 'particular'172 grounds: first, that the Debates were not a 
credible source, as only one reference to the topic could be found;173 and second, 
that the meaning attributed to the Debates was inconsistent with contemporary 
commentary by Inglis Clark and Higgins on the meaning of s 118.174 These 
aspects of Deane's analysis in the Incorporation Case and Breavington forcefully 
illustrated that, at best, the Cole rule prescribed only when reference to the 
168 Compare Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 255. See discussion above n 62. 
169 Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR 482, 511. Kennett agreed with Deane's assessment of the 
historical record: Geoffrey Kennett, 'Constitutional Interpretation in the Corporations Case' 
(1990) 19 Federal Law Review 223, 238-9. Lindell also agreed that it was 'very doubtful as to what 
was intended by the framers': G.J. Lindell, 'Recent Developments in the Judicial Interpretation 
of the Australian Constitution' in Geoffrey Lindell (ed) Future Directions in Australian 
Constitutional Law (1994) 1, 7. 
170 Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR 482, 511. 
171 Deane's decision in Breavington is examined below chapter 2 part 3. 
172 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 133. 
173 See 1897 Adelaide Convention, 20 April, 1897, 1004-5 (Mr Barton). 
174 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 133. 
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Debates was permitted; it did not prescribe the weight the Court should attach 
to history in solving a particular interpretive question. In both Breavington and 
the Incorporation Case Deane made a compelling argument that the Convention 
Debates did not themselves provide unequivocal support for restricting the 
meaning of ss 118 or 51(xx). 
(ii) Deane's fundamental' answer - 'the people' and the 
subjective intentions of the framers 
Second, in the Incorporation Case Deane offered 'a more fundamental'175 reason 
for rejecting the majority's use of the Debates. Thus Deane argued in the 
Incorporation Case that: 
it is not permissible to constrict the effect of the words which were adopted by 
the people as the compact of a nation by reference to the intentions or 
understanding of those who participated in or observed the Convention 
Debates (see Breavington v Godleman).176 
Although Deane described the argument relying on the framers' intentions as 
'subsidiary'177 in the scheme of the majority's analysis in the Incorporation Case, 
Deane's concern regarding the role of the framers' intentions in constitutional 
interpretation was signalled at the outset of his reasons. As mentioned 
previously, Deane opened his reasons by emphasising that it was the words of 
the Constitution 'and those words alone' that constituted the 'compact made between 
the people of this country.1178 Thus Deane argued that if those words granted the 
Commonwealth power to incorporate 'trading and financial corporations': 
it is simply not to the point that some one or more of the changing participants 
in Convention Committees or Debates or some parliamentarian, civil servant or 
draftsman on another side of the world intended or understood that the words 
of the national compact would bear some different or narrower meaning.179 
175 Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR 482, 511. In Breavington Deane described his application of 
the Cole rule as his 'general' answer for rejecting use of the Debates to narrow the meaning of 
s 118: Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 132. 
176 Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR 482, 511 (emphasis added) citing Breavington (1988) 169 
CLR 41, 131-3. 
177 Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR482, 511. 
178 Ibid 504 (emphasis added). 
179 Ibid. 
In Deane's view, the role of 'the people' in forming the national compact 
therefore rendered the subjective intentions of the framers irrelevant to the 
Court's task in constitutional interpretation.180 
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The citation by Deane in the Incorporation Case to Breavington was also 
significant. In Breavington Deane had endorsed the Cole rule as permitting the 
Court to rely on the Debates to ascertain the history and subject matter of the 
constitutional text.181 However, Deane continued in Breavington that, 'one 
cannot ... otherwise rely upon the Convention Debates'182 to identify the actual 
intentions of the framers. This was because: 
It would be an affront to the genius of the framers of the Australian 
Constitution and subversive of the procedures by which Federation was achieved by 
the Australian people to constrict the meaning and effect of the words of the 
Constitution by reference to passing comments made by delegates in the course 
of such discussion.183 
From this passage, and Deane's reliance upon it in the Incorporation Case, it 
appeared that Deane did not reject either the relevance of historical meaning in 
constitutional interpretation or the use of the Convention Debates as a tool in 
locating that meaning. Instead, Deane's concern lay with ensuring that the 
Court gave effect to the intentions of 'the people' as legal sovereigns. 
As Deane explained in the Incorporation Case, the Constitution was a compact 
'made between the people', that is, through the assent of 'the people' at 
referenda. This, Deane later explained in Theophanous, was one part of the 
explanation of the current legal force of the Constitution.184 Deane's restriction 
on the use of the Convention Debates in constitutional interpretation flowed 
from his commitment to give effect to the intentions of the sovereign people. 
The fact that by contemporary standards the Constitution did not gain the 
180 As Kennett emphasised, this reasoning would also render irrelevant the intention of the 
Imperial Parliament: Geoffrey Kennett, 'Constitutional Interpretation in the Corporations Case' 
(1990) 19 Federal Law Review 223, 241. See also Justice Dyson Heydon's extra-curial reflections on 
this consequence of Deane's 'living force' analysis in John Dyson Heydon, 'Theories of 
Constitutional Interpretation: A Taxonomy' (2007) Winter Bar News 12, 20. 
181 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 132-3. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid 133 (emphasis added). 
184 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171. Deane argued in Theophanous that the legal force of the 
Constitution also depended on the contemporary acquiescence of 'the people' to the Australian 
constitutional system. 
assent of all the people, 185 does not affect the persuasiveness of this aspect of 
Deane's reasoning. Rather, the crucial fact for Deane's analysis was that the 
intentions of 'the people' could not be subverted by reliance on the subjective 
intentions of a number of their representatives at the Constitutional 
Conventions. 
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Kennett has suggested that the Incorporation Case evinced a fundamental 
division in the Court between the approaches of Deane and the majority 
towards the role of the Convention Debates in constitutional interpretation.186 
Kennett considered that Deane in the Incorporation Case implicitly rejected Cole, 
and the role of historical meaning in constitutional interpretation.187 Although 
Deane does not expressly endorse Cole in the Incorporation Case, there is nothing 
beyond the more forceful tone of this decision to suggest that Deane's approach 
to history and constitutional interpretation had changed from his earlier 
decision in Breavington.188 Indeed, the general answer Deane offered in the 
Incorporation Case was in similar terms to his earlier decision in Breavington. In 
addition, by citing Breavington in his reasons in the Incorporation Case Deane 
indirectly incorporated his explicit endorsement of the Cole rule in that earlier 
case.189 Thus a preferable interpretation of Deane's decision in the Incorporation 
Case is that it confirmed his belief that the role of 'the people' as sovereign 
provided the rationale for distinguishing between valid references to the 
historical meaning of words in the Debates, and invalid reliance on the 
subjective intentions of the framers. 
Ironically, the most explicit statement by Deane of the relationship between his 
concept of 'the people' and the Cole rule, and the continuing relevance of 
history in his interpretive theory, came not in his judgments but in a comment 
directed to counsel during oral argument. In 1993, during argument in Capital 
Duplicators Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory (No 2), Deane remarked: 
185 See, for example, the discussion of the role of women in the movement towards Federation in 
Deborah Cass and Kim Rubenstein, 'Representation/ s of Women in the Australian 
Constitutional System' (1995) 17 Adelaide Law Review 3, 27-30. 
186 Geoffrey Kennett, 'Constitutional Interpretation in the Corporations Case' (1990) 19 Federal 
Law Review 223, 240-2. 
187 Ibid. 
188 See also Deane's intervening decision endorsing Cole in Wooldumpers discussed below in 
raart 3 of this chapter. 
89 Incorporation Case ( 1990) 169 CLR 482, 511. 
61 
is not this resort to the Federation Debates getting quite out of control? I mean, 
the people of this country did not know what was said in the heat of debate in those 
Convention Debates. They knew what the history before Federation was. But the way 
we are beginning to parse and analyse these passing comments, some of which 
do little credit to the people who made them on any appraisal, really is 
beginning to reduce this Court, or divert this Court, I would think, from its 
proper function of ascertaining what the people of the Country meant when they 
adopted the Constitution. 190 
In this passage, despite palpable frustration with the arguments of counsel 
directing the Court to the Convention Debates, Deane did not reject outright the 
relevance of the Debates to the task of constitutional interpretation. Rather 
Deane expressed concerns regarding the reliability of the 'passing comments' of 
the framers - a phrase Deane had employed five years earlier in his decision in 
Breavington.191 During argument in Capital Duplicators (No 2) in 1993, Deane 
emphasised that the Court's ultimate task in constitutional interpretation was to 
ascertain what 'the people ... meant' when they adopted the Constitution. This 
explained why Deane believed that the Debates may be utilised as an 
interpretative tool: as evidence of what Cole described as the 'contemporary 
meaning' of the text, or the movement towards Federation, that is, as evidence 
of aspects of the 'history before Federation' that could be known by 'the 
people'. Such references to the Debates, however, were to be distinguished 
from the idiosyncratic statements of the framers - their subjective intentions 
regarding the text and its operation - that were outside the knowledge of the 
people in 1900. In this way, Deane's approach offered a principled and clear 
explanation of the legitimate uses of the Convention Debates, supporting the 
rule in Cole by reference to the ultimate touchstone in constitutional 
interpretation, role of 'the people' as legal sovereigns. 
Applying Deane's approach to the argument in the Incorporation Case, the 
reference by the majority to the statements by a number of framers regarding 
the purpose of s Sl(xx) may properly be considered to be reliance on 'passing 
comments' made 'in the heat of debate'.192 These remarks by the delegates may 
19° Capital Duplicators Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory (No 2), Transcript of Argument, 
21April1993, 158 (emphasis added). Schoff cited part of these remarks by Deane as evincing 'a 
measure of judicial disaffection with historical argument': Paul Schoff, 'The High Court and 
History: It Still Hasn't Found(ed) What It's Looking For' (1994) 5 Public Law Review 253, 272. 
191 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 133 (emphasis added). 
192 Capital Duplicators Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory (No 2), Transcript of Argument, 
21April1993, 158. 
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not be regarded as representing the knowledge or intentions of 'the people' 
concerning the regulation of corporations, and the purpose of granting 
Commonwealth legislative power over 'trading and financial' corporations. 
Deane's rejection of the majority's reliance on the framers' intentions in the 
Incorporation Case therefore had considerable force, grounded on his 
understanding of the intentions of 'the people', not their representatives, as the 
touchstone of constitutional interpretation. 
The next part examines Deane's interpretation of aspects of s 51(xxxv). In a 
decision in 1989, in Wooldumpers,193 Deane turned to the Convention Debates to 
support his argument that the nature of industrial disputation made it 
appropriate for the 'prevention' limb to be extended as a potential source of 
Commonwealth power. As in the Incorporation Case, Deane's reasoning in 
Wooldumpers evinced his vision of the 'national compact,1194 the importance of 
national solutions to issues facing contemporary Australians, and the 
significance of the language of the grant of power under s 51 as a starting point 
for constitutional interpretation. 
C Part 3: The 'prevention' limb of the 
industrial relations power 
Section 5l(xxxv) grants the Commonwealth power with respect to: 
Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial 
disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State. 
It is trite to say that this head of power is not a plenary industrial relations 
power.195 Rather, the terms 'conciliation and arbitration', 'industrial dispute' 
and the requirement that the dispute be interstate have been interpreted by the 
193 (1989) 166 CLR 311. 
194 Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR 482, 504 (emphasis added). 
195 As Creighton and Stewart remark, this head of power was drafted in a manner that both 
denied the Commonwealth comprehensive power over industrial law and compelled the form 
of federal regulation. Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (4th ed, 2005) 84. For a 
discussion of the restriction the language of this power has imposed on Commonwealth 
legislative policy see generally Bill Ford, 'Labour Relations Law' in Tony Blackshield, Michael 
Coper and George Williams (eds), Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (2001) 412. 
Court to limit the Commonwealth's capacity to establish a comprehensive 
industrial relations regime.196 
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Deane's time on the bench, however, coincided with a period of expansion of 
this head of power. For example, the term 'industrial dispute' was interpreted 
prior to 1982 as containing three requirements: first, that the parties to the 
dispute stood in an industrial relationship; second, that the parties were 
engaged in an industry; and third, that the dispute related to an industrial 
matter.197 However, in R v Coldham; Ex parte Australian Social Welfare Union, in 
1983, the Court altered this narrow, formalistic, and long-standing, 
interpretation of the concept of 'industrial dispute'.198 In this 'landmark1199 case, 
the Court unanimously said that 'the words' industrial dispute' are not a 
technical or legal expression.'200 Rather, the words must be given their 'popular 
meaning', that is, the meaning they would convey to the person 'in the street.'201 
The Court's reasoning in Coldham rested heavily on the principle of 
interpretation endorsed infumbunna Coal Mine N.L v Victorian Coal Miners' 
Association.202 There, O'Connor J emphasised that when construing the words in 
s 51: 
[I]t must be remembered that we are interpreting a Constitution broad and 
general in its terms, intended to apply to the varying conditions which the 
development of our community must involve.203 
Applying this principle in Coldham, the Court held thats Sl(xxxv) must be 
interpreted consistent with: 
196 See further: Tina Crisafulli, 'Conciliation and Arbitration' in Tony Blackshield, Michael 
Coper and George Williams (eds), Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (2001) 126. The 
restrictions of s 51(xxxv) have led the Commonwealth to look to other heads of power through 
which to impose national regulatory systems over employment and employment conditions. 
See the Court's recent response to the Commonwealth's use of s 51(xx) to legislate on 
employment issues in New South Wales v Commonwealth ('Workchoices Case') (2006) 231 ALR 1. 
197 Peter Hanks, Constitutional Law in Australia (2nd ed, 1996) 379. 
198 (1983) 153 CLR 297 ('Coldham'). This case was selected by Justice Michael McHugh in his 
extra-curial examination of the High Court's judicial method as one of thirteen illustrations of 
the High Court extending or changing the law in Michael McHugh, 'The Law-Making Function 
of the Judicial Process. Part 1' (1988) 62 Australian Law Journal 15, 24. 
199 Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (4th ed, 2005) 84. 
20° Coldham (1983) 153 CLR 297, 312. 
201 Ibid. 
202 (1908) 6 CLR 309. 
203 Ibid 367-8. 
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the high object for which it was unquestionably designed - the prevention and 
settlement by conciliation and arbitration of industrial disputes which could 
not be remedied by any action taken by a single State or its tribunals.204 
Thus a broad approach to s Sl(xxxv) saw the Court relax the requirement that a 
dispute occur in an 'industry' and involve an industrial 'matter', and hold that 
the Commonwealth had jurisdiction over the settlement of disputes involving 
social workers.205 
In cases such as Coldham, however, the Court's examination of s Sl(xxxv) arose 
in the context of the Commonwealth's power with respect to the 'settlement' of 
such disputes. This part examines Deane's novel attempt to utilise the 
'prevention' limb of s Sl(xxxv) to expand the Commonwealth's power over 
industrial relations, and to reduce the formalistic mechanisms that had been 
devised to overcome the requirement that a dispute be 'interstate' in character. 
The detail of Deane's thoughts on this topic came in his 1989 decision in 
Wooldumpers. 
1 The dispute in Wooldumpers 
Wooldumpers concerned the powers of the Industrial Relations Commission, 
established under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth), to reinstate a 
dismissed employee. The issue was whether the dispute satisfied this Act's 
threshold jurisdictional requirement that an industrial dispute extend beyond 
the limits of any one State.206 The Union claimed that the dismissal satisfied this 
requirement because it fell within the ambit of an existing 'paper dispute'. A 
paper dispute is a 'legal fiction' in which an employee representative body 
serves a 'log of claims' on an employer representative body in another state (or 
204 Coldham (1983) 153 CLR 297, 314. 
205 See further commentary in Peter Hanks, Constitutional Law in Australia (2nd ed, 1996) 380. On 
the Court's expansion of the concept of an 'industrial matter' see Tony Blackshield and George 
Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and Materials (4th ed, 2006) 1021-
6. 
206 Sees 4(1) of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) which in tum reflected the terms of 
s Sl(xxxv). Deane regarded the Commission's jurisdiction as more limited than s Sl(xxxv) 
allowed: Wooldumpers (1989) 166 CLR 311, 327-8. This view was also expressed in O'Toole v 
Charles David Pty Ltd (1991) 171CLR232, 288 (Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
vice versa).207 This mechanism generates an interstate aspect to any matter 
falling within the ambit of the log of claims.208 
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The High Court in Wooldumpers unanimously rejected the Union's argument 
that the dismissal fell within the ambit of the log of claims and consequently 
held that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to determine the dispute.209 The 
nature of the challenge in Wooldumpers made it possible for the Court to limit its 
decision to a determination of the ambit of the existing log of claims. This was 
the approach taken by five Justices: Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ in a joint 
judgment, and Brennan and Gaudron JJ each in single decisions. Mason CJ and 
Deane, however, made the novel suggestion that if the Commonwealth utilised 
its power under s 51(xxxv) to enact laws with respect to the prevention of 
interstate industrial disputes it might be unnecessary to rely on paper disputes 
to manufacture or escalate industrial unrest from an intrastate to the interstate 
level.210 However, Mason CJ ultimately considered that the facts in Wooldumpers 
made it an unsuitable vehicle in which to examine this aspect of s Sl(xxxv).211 
Accordingly Mason CJ's remarks lack the detail, and intensity, of those of 
Deane.212 
2 Deane's reasoning in Wooldumpers 
In 2006 Blackshield and Williams described Deane's decision in Wooldumpers as 
the 'boldest pronouncement'213 on the potential reach of s 51(xxxv). Consistent 
207 See the recent discussion of 'paper disputes' in New South Wales v Commonwealth (AKA 
Workplace Relations Challenge) [2006] HCATrans 215, 4 May 2006 (Callinan J). See also Bill Ford, 
'Labour Relations Law' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), Oxford 
Companion to the High Court of Australia (2001) 412. 
208 See further Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: 
Commentary and Materials (4th ed, 2006) 1037-44. 
209 For a detailed examination of the facts and analysis of the judgments on this topic see 
Rosemary J Owens, 'Re Federated Storemen and Packers Union of Australia; Ex Parte 
Wooldumpers (Victoria) Ltd' (1989) 17 Melbourne University Law Review 318. 
210 Wooldumpers (1989) 166 CLR 311, 320-21 (Mason CJ); 327 (Deane J). Note also Deane's fleeting 
remarks on the 'prevention' limb in Duncan (1983) 158 CLR 535, 592. 
211 Wooldumpers (1989) 166 CLR 311, 320-21. 
212 This is not to suggest that Mason CJ's judgment in Wooldumpers lacked lyrical quality. For 
example, Mason CJ described the artificiality of the paper dispute mechanism as a contrived 
iurisdictional talisman' designed to sustain the life of the dispute. Ibid 319. 
13 George Williams, Labour Law and the Constitution (1998) 48. See, to like effect, Tony 
Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and 
Materials (4th ed, 2006) 1030. 
with his emphasis on the language of the text in the Tasmanian Dam Case and 
the Incorporation Case, in Wooldumpers Deane asked rhetorically why, if 'the 
Constitution means what it says',214 the Commonwealth's power should be 
regarded as exclusively with respect to the 'settlement' of interstate disputes. 
Rather, Deane observed of s Sl(xxxv): 
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Its emphasis is as much upon conciliation and arbitration for the 'prevention' of 
inter-State 'industrial disputes' in the abstract as it is upon conciliation and 
arbitration for the 'settlement' of particular identified inter-State 'industrial 
disputes' which have actually broken out.215 
Thus Deane concluded that the section empowered the Commonwealth to 
make laws to resolve existing interstate disputes and to take action 'before the 
actual threshold of dispute' was reached or before a dispute assumed an 
interstate character. 216 
Deane's approach to s Sl(xxxv) was striking for its potential to expand 
Commonwealth regulatory control over industrial relations.217 Since 1910, and 
the decision of Australian Boot Trade Employees' Federation v Whybrow & Co,218 the 
Court had held that before arbitration could occur, the parties and subject 
matter of a specific interstate industrial dispute must be ascertained.219 This 
interpretation of the requirements of s Sl(xxxv) had two adverse consequences 
for the conduct of industrial relations and the powers of the federal 
Commission; consequences which could be removed under Deane's new vision 
for s Sl(xxxv). 
First, the Court's decision in Whybrow had stimulated the practice of 'paper 
disputes', whereby a distinct industrial dispute between identified parties 
spanning the boundaries of a State was manufactured by the service of logs of 
claims.220 This was a practice that attracted the ire of Deane in Wooldumpers. He 
214 Wooldumpers (1989) 166 CLR 311, 328 (emphasis added). 
215 Ibid 327 (emphasis added). 
216 Ibid. 
217 However, in light of the Court's recent extension of s 51(xx) in the Workchoices Case, Deane's 
broad view of s 51(xxxv) may not be utilised by the Commonwealth as a source of power over 
industrial matters. 
218 (1910) 11 CLR 11 ('Whybrow'). 
219 See further Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (4th ed, 2005) 89. 
220 The Court has accepted that paper disputes satisfied the requirements of s 51(xxxv) because a 
'dispute' for the purposes of this head of power was defined as extending to a 'disagreement, 
difference or dissidence': Metal Trades Employers Association v Amalgamated Engineering Union 
(1935) 54 CLR 387, 429. 
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considered it counter-intuitive that under a system designed for the settlement 
of disputes, a precondition for entry into the Commonwealth system was the 
escalation of a dispute.221 Under Deane's new vision for s 51(xxxv), however, 
this limitation on Commonwealth power could be removed. 
Second, the Whybrow doctrine, and its focus on identifiable parties to a dispute, 
had denied the Commission jurisdiction to make common rule awards, that is, 
awards binding on all persons engaged in a particular industry. However, the 
joint judgment of Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ in O'Toole v Charles David Pty 
Ltd222 in 1991 intimated the possible removal of this limitation by emphasising 
what Deane had described in Wooldumpers as the Commonwealth's power to 
'prevent' disputes, 'in the abstract'.223 At issue in O'Toole was the validity of s 60 
of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, a privative clause which purported to 
render awards made by the Commission 'final and conclusive' and immune 
from challenge on the basis that they lacked constitutional foundation.224 The 
Court in O'Toole held that the section did not immunise an award from 
challenge on the basis that it exceeded Commonwealth legislative power under 
s 51(xxxv). However, Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ conceded that the 
Commonwealth could restrict legal challenge to awards made by the 
Commission. This was because s 51(xxxv) was a power for the 'conciliation and 
arbitration for the prevention of interstate industrial disputes in the abstract.'225 
Thus, they argued, the Commission could take reasonable measures to ensure 
that awards were not themselves 'an open-ended possible source of aggravated 
interstate industrial dispute.'226 On this basis, provided 'adequate' procedures 
were available to challenge the validity of the awards, Deane, Gaudron and 
McHugh JJ held that a provision such ass 60 could be considered 'necessary 
221 Wooldumpers (1989) 166 CLR 311, 328. 
222 (1991) 171CLR232 ('O'Toole'). 
223 Wooldumpers (1989) 166 CLR 311, 327. 
224 For an overview of the Court's attitude towards privative clauses, see Ian Holloway, 
'Privative Clauses' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George Williams {eds), The Oxford 
Companion to the High Court of Australia (2001) 559. 
225 O'Toole (1991) 171 CLR 232, 288 (emphasis added). 
226 Ibid 290. See, in a similar vein, the remarks of Deane and Toohey JJ in Nationwide News that 
s 51(xxxv) extended to powers and immunities that were reasonably capable of being seen as 
appropriate and adapted to enabling or enhancing the functions of the Industrial Relations 
Commission. This, they suggested, could include the protection of the reputation of the 
Commission. Nationwide News (1992) 177 CLR 1, 68-9. 
and incidental to the effective exercise and discharge' of the Commission's 
powers.227 
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As in the Tasmanian Dam Case and the Incorporation Case, Deane's extension of 
the Commonwealth's power in Wooldumpers was notable for its lack of concern 
that his interpretation of s Sl(xxxv) might detrimentally impact the 'federal 
balance.' Nor did Deane explore the possibility that employees or employers 
might benefit from access to a diversity of industrial relations systems, or 
systems not tied to the vehicle of conciliation and arbitration as required by 
s Sl(xxxv).228 Instead, Deane's reasoning in Wooldumpers focused on his 
perception of the benefits to the Australian community of an early resolution, 
nationally based, industrial relations regime.229 Thus, Deane argued that it was 
necessary for the Commonwealth to have power to be proactive in the 
resolution of industrial disputation and to be able to settle and prevent disputes 
'in the abstract.' This was particularly important, Deane reasoned, in light of the 
nature of modern industrial relations, that is, the ease of modern 
communication, the 'close interaction and interdependence' between employees 
and employers at the national level, and the emergence of national 
representative bodies.230 These characteristics of contemporary Australian 
industrial relations supported Deane's conclusion thats Sl(xxxv) must be 
interpreted as extending the Commonwealth's power to legislate with respect 
to the settlement and prevention of industrial disputes. 
3 The Convention Debates in Wooldumpers 
Deane turned to the Convention Debates to support his broad construction of 
s Sl(xxxv) in Wooldumpers. Although seldom regarded as iconic in Deane's 
constitutional jurisprudence, Wooldumpers should therefore be regarded as an 
227 O'Toole (1991) 171 CLR 232, 290-2. 
228 Compare Kirby J's analysis in the Workchoices Case that the requirement of interstateness 
under s 51(xxxv) was an important constitutional guarantee, contributing to diversity and 
experimentation in industrial regulation: New South Wales v Commonwealth ('Workchoices Case') 
(2006) 231 ALR 1, 118. 
229 In relation to Deane's commitment to the benefits of tribunals empowered to resolve 
industrial disputes in a comprehensive manner, see also the discussion below in chapter 2, 
~art 1, of Deane's decision in Duncan (1983) 158 CLR 535. 
30 Wooldumpers (1989) 166 CLR 311, 328. 
important signal of the place of the framers and historical meaning in his 
interpretive philosophy. 
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Deane introduced his reference to the Convention Debates in Wooldumpers by 
citing Cole as authority for the proposition that the Court may utilise the 
Debates to isolate the contemporary meaning of the language used and the 
subject to which it was addressed.231 Deane then quoted extensively from 
various delegates of the 1891and1897 Conventions.232 These quotations, 
including two separate statements by Higgins at the Adelaide and Melbourne 
Conventions, addressed the nature of industrial disputation prior to 
Federation.233 The delegates remarked on the character of recent industrial 
disputes, indicating that such disputes invariably could not be contained, and 
spread quickly to become inter-colonial affairs. In these quotations, the 
delegates drew attention (as did Deane in his analysis of the nature of modern 
industrial relations) to the role that representative employee and employer 
bodies played in facilitating the spread of disputes across colonial borders.234 
Deane's use of the Debates in Wooldumpers clearly involved ascribing a level of 
intention to those framers he cited in his judgment. Amongst the statements by 
the delegates describing the character of industrial disputes at Federation were 
reflections on the desirability of establishing a national system to ensure that 
industrial disputation was resolved quickly, before it escalated beyond the local 
arena.235 Such statements clearly reflected the delegates' views on the necessity 
of a level of central control and their views on the intended reach of s 5l(xxxv). 
By utilising these statements, Deane inescapably drew on the subjective 
intentions of some of the framers in support of his argument.236 
It may be argued, however, that Deane's use of Convention Debates in 
Wooldumpers was consistent with his understanding of the rule in Cole. The 
statements Deane cited from the Convention Debates in Wooldumpers referred 
231 Ibid 329 citing Cole (1988) 165 CLR 360, 385-6. 
232 Wooldumpers (1989) 166 CLR 311, 329-30. 
233 Ibid. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Compare Kennett's commentary on the blurred line in the use of the Debates in the 
Incorporation Case, Geoffrey Kennett, 'Constitutional Interpretation in the Corporations Case' 
(1990) 19 Federal Law Review 223, 240. 
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to the nature of industrial disputation prior to Federation, and might as readily 
have been published in contemporary newspapers.237 It was for this 
contemporary commentary on the nature of industrial disputes prior to 
Federation, rather than for the views of the framers on the appropriate reach of 
s 5l(xxxv), that Deane turned to the Debates in Wooldumpers. Although, 
somewhat unusually, Deane did not refer to 'the people' in his judgment in 
Wooldumpers, his approach was arguably consistent with his later statement 
during argument in Capital Duplicators (No 2) that the Court's role in 
constitutional interpretation was to ascertain 'what the people of the Country meant 
when they adopted the Constitution' in 1901.238 Deane's use of history in this way 
in Wooldumpers confirmed that, despite the vivid metaphors of judgments such 
as Theophanous, 239 it cannot be said that Deane was uniformly sceptical of the 
relevance of the Debates in constitutional interpretation, or fearful that any 
reference to the voice of the framers must automatically subvert the intentions 
of 'the people'. 
Despite these insights from Wooldumpers, significant questions regarding the 
role of history in Deane's constitutional jurisprudence remained unanswered. 
For example, it appeared from Deane's reasoning in the Incorporation Case and 
Wooldumpers that he turned to historical meaning when it extended or 
expanded the reach of s 51. In neither case did Deane permit history to be used 
'to constrict the meaning and effect of the words of the Constitution. 1240 Was this 
an additional requirement of Deane's rule of reference, or a product of the 
factual issues in dispute in the cases examined to this point in this thesis? Or 
does this suggest that Deane turned to history only when it supported his 
preferred analysis of constitutional questions? Another question unanswered in 
Wooldumpers was how Deane would respond to tension between historical and 
contemporary meaning. Such analysis was unnecessary in Wooldumpers as, on 
Deane's interpretation, both history and the nature of contemporary industrial 
disputes supported the extension of s 51(xxxv). Deane's understanding of the 
237 It may be for this reason that Deane did not question the accuracy and reliability of the 
Convention Debates as a resource in Wooldumpers. Contrast Deane's description of the Debates 
as containing only a few, and 'passing comments', by the framers on s 118 in Breavington (1988) 
169 CLR 41, 133. 
238 Capital Duplicators Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory (No 2), Transcript of Argument, 
21April1993, 158 (emphasis added). 
239 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171. 
240 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 133. 
role of historical meaning, and its place within his 'living force' theory, is an 
important topic for further discussion in this thesis. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored examples of Deane's s 51 jurisprudence and his 
extension of the reach of Commonwealth legislative power. In the decisions 
under review, Deane turned to the authority of the Engineers' Case and his 
understanding of national interest, convenience, and contemporary social 
context as relevant to the interpretive exercise. For Deane, his recognition in 
Nationwide News that 'federalism' was a fundamental doctrine of the 
Constitution,241 did not lead him to adopt interpretations of s 51 sensitive to 
'federal balance' considerations. 
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There were three distinctive features of Deane's decisions examined in this 
chapter, each related to his vision of the role of 'the people' in constitutional 
interpretation. First, in the Tasmanian Dam Case, the Incorporation Case and 
Wooldumpers Deane extended Commonwealth legislative power further than a 
majority of the Court.242 In each case, Deane was heavily influenced by his 
assessment of the benefits to the Australian community of a broad 
Commonwealth power with respect to external affairs, and national regulatory 
control of industrial relations and over trading and financial corporations, and 
their incorporation. Second, Deane advanced an innovative, and principled, 
foundation for the rule of reference to the Convention Debates established by 
the Court in Cole. That rule was premised on Deane's recognition that 'the 
people', not the framers, were legal sovereigns. Finally, Deane limited the reach 
of s 51(xxix) through the imposition of a strict conformity test. His introduction, 
and application, of 'proportionality' analysis in this context reflected Deane's 
understanding of the Court's duty to protect 'all manner of people' under the 
Constitution. 
241 Nationwide News (1992) 177 CLR 1, 69-70. 
242 As will be seen in chapters 4 and 5, Deane's willingness to extends 51 was mirrored by a 
corresponding willingness to increase the express and implied protection offered by the 
Constitution to individual rights. 
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Chapter 2 continues this discussion of Deane's federal vision, with a focus on 
his understanding of how 'the people' reinforced his preference for national 
solutions over 'federal balance' considerations and underpinned his approach 
to constitutional implication. 
Chapter 2 FEDERALISM (II): LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE 
FEDERATION BEYOND S 51 
Introduction 
This chapter continues the work of chapter 1 by delving further into Deane's 
vision of Australian federalism. Of interest in this chapter is Deane's approach 
to a mix of constitutional provisions and implications, which he saw as 
influencing the legal and economic relationship between the Commonwealth 
and the States, and the legal relationship between the States.1 
This chapter is in three parts. Part 1 considers Deane's decisions in R v Duncan; 
Ex parte Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltrf and University of Wollongong v 
Metwally;3 decisions highlighting key elements of Deane's federal vision and 
aspects of his understanding of the Court's role in drawing constitutional 
implications. Part 2 examines Deane's approach to s 90 and the 
Commonwealth's exclusive power to impose excise duties. Part 3 examines two 
implications that Deane held could be derived from the nature of the 
Constitution and the Federation it established. The first implication examined 
in this final part is Deane's approach to the principle in the Melbourne 
Corporation Case and the scope of the constitutional implication limiting the 
Commonwealth's power to enact laws that burden or discriminate against a 
States. The second is Deane's solution to national choice of law dilemmas, 
derived from the nature of the Constitution and manifested by a range of 
provisions, including s 118. Deane first articulated this implication in 
1 This focus means that Deane's attitude towards the constitutional place of the Territories, and 
the people of the Territories, is left largely unexplored in this chapter. For a glimpse of Deane's 
approach to this question see the joint judgment of Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ in Capital 
Duplicators (No 1) (1992) 177 CLR 248 and the commentary on that case and Breavington (1988) 
169 CLR 41 in Graham Nicholson, 'The Concept of "One Australia" in Constitutional Law and 
the Place of Territories' (1997) 25 Federal Law Review 281. 
2 (1983) 158 CLR535. 
3 (1984) 158 CLR 447. (' Metwally'). 
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Breavington in 1988, a case which, as chapter 1 has demonstrated, was rich with 
insights into Deane's distinctive vision of the Constitution and its 
interpretation. 
This chapter brings together an unusual group of cases, and subject matters of 
greater diversity than chapter 1. However, Deane's decision-making in these 
cases displayed an internal consistency and revealed recurring themes and 
threads; themes also featuring prominently in Deane's s 51 jurisprudence. This 
consistency was not surprising, for the coherence and distinctiveness of Deane's 
analysis stemmed from his understanding of the role of 'the people' as the 
source of the Constitution's legitimacy. However, it was in the cases examined 
in this chapter, rather than in his s 51 jurisprudence, that Deane more fully 
articulated the connection between his concept of 'the people' and his vision of 
Australian federalism. 
A Part 1: Deane's iconic judgments in 
Duncan and Metwally 
1 Duncan 
At issue in Duncan was the validity of an attempt by the Commonwealth and 
New South Wales to establish a single arbitral tribunal for the settlement of 
industrial disputes in the coal industry of that State. The Coal Industry Tribunal 
was vested with power jointly by the Commonwealth (pursuant to s 51(xxxv)) 
and New South Wales to exercise jurisdiction over disputes in the coal industry 
lying exclusively within the State, and those extending beyond its borders. This 
arbitral power was thought to be beyond that which either legislature, acting 
independently, could confer. 
The Court held unanimously that the Constitution presented no obstacle to 
both legislatures consenting to the joint vesting of power in a single tribunal. 
Of interest in this chapter is how Deane reached the conclusion that the 
Constitution permitted the Commonwealth and New South Wales legislatures 
to vest powers in a single Tribunal in the furtherance of their common 
regulatory goal.4 
(a) Deane's reasoning in Duncan 
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According to Deane, 'two general propositions' supported the joint vesting of 
powers by the Commonwealth and New South Wales in the Tribunal. First, 
Deane observed that co-operation was a 'positive objective' of the Constitution.5 
Second, the Constitution should not be construed as giving rise to a lacuna in 
legislative power.6 These propositions were derived by Deane from 'the terms of 
the Australian Constitution and from the nature of the federation which it 
embodies.'7 
This part focuses on Deane's understanding of the first proposition, that is, the 
distinctiveness of Deane's claim that co-operation was a fundamental objective 
of the Constitution. However, Deane's introductory remarks to his second 
proposition are also worthy of note as they reinforce early connections between 
key concepts in his constitutional thought. In this context, Deane remarked: 
The Constitution of Australia was established not pursuant to any compact 
between the Australian Colonies but, as the preamble of the Constitution 
emphatically declares, pursuant to the agreement of 'the people' of those Colonies.8 
Deane followed this statement by remarking that the heads of power conferred 
on the Commonwealth Parliament were those which were thought 'necessary' 
for the nation that was formed by, and would develop under, the Constitution.9 
In this way, Deane's judgment juxtaposed the recognition of the formative role 
of 'the people' with a broad interpretation of the Commonwealth's heads of 
legislative power under s 51. 
4 Deane's reasoning in Duncan also raised the possibility that the Commonwealth's power 
under s 51(xxxv) to 'prevent' industrial disputes might include the power to take measures to 
resolve intrastate disputes, including in the coal industry. Deane's views on the 'prevention' 
limb of s 51(xxxv), more fully articulated in Wooldumpers, have been discussed above chapter 1 
part 3. 
Duncan (1983) 158 CLR 535, 589 (emphasis added). 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid (emphasis added). 
8 Ibid (emphasis added). 
9 Ibid (emphasis added). See above chapter 1n60. 
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Given that Deane's understanding of 'the people' was an important thread in 
his jurisprudence, it is unfortunate that he did not pursue this line of reasoning 
in Duncan further. However, three points emerge from this passage. First, 
Deane's remarks in Duncan were virtually identical to his reflections in his 
swearing-in speech. Thus, in July 1982, at his swearing-in and in September 
1983, in Duncan, Deane emphasised that the compact of the Constitution was 
made between 'the people', not the artificial entities of government (whether 
'States' or 'Colonies'). Second, Deane's reference to 'the people' in Duncan 
demonstrated that he regarded 'the people', and their role in the formation of 
the Constitution, as relevant to the Court's task in interpreting the Constitution. 
Chapter 1 has argued that Deane utilised his concept of the sovereignty of 'the 
people' as the foundation of his rule of reference to the Convention Debates. In 
Duncan, through this passage, Deane linked his vision of the sovereignty of 'the 
people' to the resolution of questions regarding the distribution, and sharing, of 
legislative power in the Australian Federation.10 Third, Deane was distinctive in 
Duncan in emphasising the role of 'the people' in his judgment. Deane's 
consistent and distinctive use of 'the people' in his analysis of the nature of 
Australian federalism are characteristic features of Deane's decisions examined 
in this chapter. 
The most famous aspect of Deane's decision in Duncan was his claim that co-
operation was a 'positive objective' of the Constitution. As mentioned above, each 
member of the Court held that the tribunal established under the joint 
legislative scheme was valid. However, Deane offered an unusual degree of 
encouragement to the Commonwealth and State legislatures to engage in co-
operative schemes. For instance, Gibbs CJ remarked in Duncan that: 
The Constitution effects a division of powers between the Commonwealth and 
the States but nowhere forbids the Commonwealth and the States to exercise 
their respective powers in such a way that each is complementary to the other. 
There is no express provision in the Constitution, and no principle of 
constitutional law, that would prevent the Commonwealth and the States from 
acting in co-operation.11 
10 However, Deane's reference to the preamble in Duncan was not examined in McKenna, 
Simpson and Williams's exploration of the use of the preamble in constitutional interpretation: 
Mark McKenna, Amelia Simpson and George Williams, 'First Words: The Preamble To The 
Australian Constitution' (2001) University of New South Wales Law Journal 28. 
11 Duncan (1983) 158 CLR 535, 552. See also Gibbs CJ's earlier remarks, again expressed in the 
negative, that 'the Constitution was certainly not intended to inhibit co-operation between the 
Commonwealth and the States in their respective agencies': R v Humby; Ex Parte Rooney (1973) 
129 CLR 231, 240 (emphasis added). Gibbs CJ's remarks are discussed in G.J. Lindell, 'Recent 
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Brennan J similarly described the Court's inquiry as directed at whether the 
legislative scheme faced a' constitutional impediment.'12 Deane also observed 
that co-operation was 'in no way antithetic to the provisions of the 
Constitution.'13 Deane agreed that there was no 'general constitutional barrier' 
precluding concurrent legislation of the Commonwealth and the States 
establishing a joint administrative tribunal.14 
However, in contrast to the rest of the Court, Deane took the further step of 
asserting that co-operation was a 'positive objective' of the Constitution. In light 
of Deane's later reliance on the 'general doctrines of government', symbolised 
by his statements in Nationwide News,15 it was significant that in one of his 
earliest decisions, in 1983, Deane was willing to frame his reasoning in terms of 
the broad underlying themes and principles of the Constitution. There are 
many possible explanations of this point of difference between Deane and the 
rest of the Court. For example, other members of the Court may have been 
concerned to limit the breadth of their remarks in Duncan, or reticent to engage 
with the role of deeper theoretical issues in the interpretation of the Australian 
Constitution. Alternatively, the other members of the Court may not have 
embraced co-operation as an objective or value underpinning the Australian 
federal system, nor shared Deane's wider vision of the nature of constitutions. 
For whatever reason, Deane was the only judge to adopt co-operation as the 
paradigm of the Australian Constitution in such enthusiastic terms. 
Deane's reasoning was also unique in its attempt to justify co-operation as the 
model of federalism envisaged in the Constitution. Deane's analysis on this 
question was contained entirely in the following passage: 
The existence of a constitutional objective of Commonwealth/State co-
operation may, on occasion, be obscured by the fact that cases in this court in 
relation to the constitutional scope of legislative powers are commonly 
concerned with the resolution of competing legislative claims of the 
Commonwealth and one or more of the States. It is, however, unnecessary to do 
Developments in the Judicial Interpretation of the Australian Constitution' in Geoffrey Lindell 
(ed) Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (1994) l, 40. 
12 Duncan (1983) 158 CLR 535, 583. Note also Mason J's observation the co-operative legislative 
action must not 'contravene the Constitution.' Ibid 563. 
13 Ibid 589 (emphasis added). 
14 Ibid. 
15 Nationwide News (1992) 177 CLR 1, 69. 
more than refer to the provisions of s Sl(xxxiii), (xxxiv), (xxxvii) and (xxxviii) 
and of Ch V of the Constitution to demonstrate the existence of such a 
constitutional objective.16 
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This passage demonstrated two important aspects of Deane's reasoning in 
Duncan, each intersecting with decisions and themes explored in other chapters 
of this thesis. The first was the significance of Deane's choice of co-operative 
federalism over other theories of federalism, and the consistency of this choice 
within his constitutional jurisprudence. The second was Duncan's insights into 
Deane's interpretive technique, specifically his understanding that co-operative 
federalism was a 'fundamental concept' of the Constitution which was 
manifested by, rather than confined by, the provisions of the text. 
(b) Deane's federal vision in Duncan 
Deane did not define with precision his understanding of co-operative 
federalism in Duncan, nor in any later decision. However, Deane's conclusion in 
Duncan that the Commonwealth and States could exercise their powers 
concurrently was a significant indicator of his understanding of the nature of 
Australian federalism.17 Deane's decision in Duncan clearly rejected a vision of 
the Australian federal system as requiring an immutable division of power 
between the Commonwealth and the States along vertical lines. In his reasons, 
Deane did not ignore the fact that historically much disputation had come 
before the Court regarding the boundaries of Commonwealth and State 
power.18 However, in contrast to Gibbs CJ, Deane's analysis did not dwell on 
the fact that the Constitution effected 'a division of powers between the 
Commonwealth and the States.119 Rather, Deane's conclusion in Duncan rejected 
a vision of the Australian Constitution that insisted on a strict division of 
responsibility amongst and between the Commonwealth and the States. 
Instead, Deane's conclusion on the validity of the legislative scheme implicitly 
16 Duncan (1983) 158 CLR 535, 589 {emphasis added). This passage was cited with approval by 
Brennan CJ and Toohey Jin Gould v Brown (1998) 193 CLR 346, 374. 
17 Compare McConvill and Smith's discussion of the concurrent exercise of power by the 
Commonwealth and States as the distinguishing feature of co-operative federalism: James 
McConvill and Darryl Smith, 'Interpretation and Cooperative Federalism: Bond v R from a 
Constitutional Perspective' (2001) 29 Federal Law Review 75, 75. 
18 Duncan (1983) 158 CLR 535, 589. 
19 Ibid 552 (Gibbs CJ). 
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aligned the essence of the compact of 'the people', its 'positive objective' of co-
operation, with proactive and comprehensive solutions to pressing social issues 
by agreement and joint action between the Commonwealth and the States.20 
Deane's reasoning in Duncan was consistent with his adamant rejection of 
'federal balance' arguments in relation to s Sl(xxix) or Sl(xx), and the 
preference he expressed in a number of cases for national solutions to social 
problems. For example, chapter 1 has canvassed Deane's assessment of the 
benefits of a national corporations regime in the Incorporation Case and his 
expansion of Commonwealth legislative power over industrial relations 
through the 'prevention' limb of s Sl(xxxv) in Wooldumpers. Not in these 
contexts, nor in Duncan, did Deane voice a concern that a joint legislative 
scheme, or the expansion of Commonwealth legislative power, threatened the 
foundations of the Constitution or the Australian Federation. Nor did Deane 
suggest that precluding co-operation between the levels of government was an 
important element in the protection of individual rights, by reinforcing 
institutional breaks on the concentration of governmental power.21 Instead, in 
Duncan, Deane advanced an interpretation of the Constitution that facilitated 
the cohesive solutions to the issues facing contemporary Australians, via co-
operation between the Commonwealth and the States.22 
(c) Deane's 'fundamental concepts' reasoning in Duncan 
Deane's reasoning in Duncan revolved around his understanding of the 
'positive objective' of co-operation, that is, the 'fundamental concept' of 
federalism under the Australian Constitution. Despite his engagement with 
broad constitutional values in Duncan, Deane was the only member of the 
Court to place significant emphasis on the constitutional text. Thus, in the 
passage quoted above, Deane listed the grants of Commonwealth legislative 
20 Ibid 589-92. 
21 Compare, for example, Kirby J's vision of federalism in XYZ v Commonwealth (2006) 227 ALR 
495, 535 and New South Wales v Commonwealth ('Workchoices Case') (2006) 231ALR1, 150-1. 
22 Interestingly, through his observations on the 'prevention' limb of s 51(xxxv), Duncan also 
suggested Deane's openness to the pursuit of a uniform Commonwealth solution to disputes in 
the coal industry: Duncan (1983) 158 CLR 535, 592. 
power under ss Sl(xxxii) and (xxxiv) as illustrative of co-operation as the 
'positive objective' of the Constitution.23 
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Deane's method of analysis in Duncan epitomised what is described in this 
thesis as his 'fundamental concepts' reasoning. Under this approach Deane saw 
elements of the text as manifesting the underlying doctrines of the Constitution, 
in this case, the constitutional doctrine of 'co-operative' federalism.24 Thus 
Deane regarded his list of provisions as sufficient to 'demonstrate the existence' 
of that doctrine.25 However, Deane did not turn to his list of provisions in 
Duncan to derive his answer to the validity of the co-operative legislative 
scheme. Instead, Deane looked beyond the language of the text to the 
Constitution's underlying values and principles, its 'positive objective', as the 
framework for his analysis. 
Although the sections cited by Deane in Duncan facilitate co-operation between 
the institutions of government, they do not unequivocally support Deane's 
proposition that co-operation was the underlying objective of the Constitution.26 
If the interpretive maxim expressio unius were applied to Deane's list, a different 
construction can be reached: these provisions could equally be regarded as the 
exclusive mechanisms by which Parliaments can combine their legislative 
power. Applying expressio unius would therefore lead to a different concept of 
Australian federalism.27 Deane's reasoning implicitly rejected the expressio unius 
maxim, as it regarded the text as manifesting, not limiting, the Constitution's 
underlying values and principles.28 However, he did not avert to the possibility 
that the text of the Constitution could support a contrary vision of federalism. 
Thus Deane's reasoning in Duncan proceeded 'from' an embrace of the 
23 Ibid 589. 
24 See further discussion in Graeme Hill, 'Revisiting Wakim and Hughes: the Distinct Demands of 
Federalism' (2002) 13 Public Law Review 205, 219, fn 122. 
25 Duncan (1983) 158 CLR 535, 589. 
26 Hill, above n 24, 219. 
27 See further ibid 219, fn 122. This alternative vision of federalism was labelled 'co-ordinate 
federalism' by Hill in his commentary. 
28 In Leeth, Deane and Toohey JJ were forceful in their rejection of the expressio unius principle in 
the context of 'fundamental concepts' reasoning: Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 485. The rejection of 
expressio unius is essential if a 'fundamental concepts' interpretive approach such as that 
advanced by Deane in Leeth and Duncan is to be sustained. 
principle of 'co-operation' as the Constitution's 'fundamental concept', but 
provided only limited argument 'for' that interpretation of the Constitution.29 
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As will be seen, Deane applied his 'fundamental concepts' reasoning 
throughout his jurisprudence, from this early illustration in Duncan to some of 
his final, and most controversial, decisions on the implied freedom of political 
communication in 1994.30 As applied in his free speech cases, Deane's 
'fundamental concept's reasoning was subject to forceful rebuke. Thus in 
McGinty McHugh J said: 
I cannot accept, as Deane and Toohey JJ held in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills, 
that a constitutional implication can arise from a particular doctrine that 
'underlies the Constitution' .... Top-down reasoning is not a legitimate method 
of interpreting the Constitution ... after the decision of this Court in the 
Engineers' Case, the Court had consistently held, prior to Nationwide News and 
Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth, that it is not legitimate to 
construe the Constitution by reference to political principles or theories that are 
not anchored in the text of the Constitution or are not necessary implications 
from its structure.31 
McHugh J may have been thinking of Deane's decision in Duncan when he 
warned against the use of' co-operative federalism' as a tool in constitutional 
interpretation in Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally.32 In Wakim a majority of the Court, 
including McHugh J, held invalid the key provisions of the co-operative 
legislative scheme permitting the cross-vesting of State and Territory 
jurisdiction in Commonwealth Courts, on the basis that under Ch III of the 
Constitution federal courts had not been given power to exercise State 
jurisdiction.33 McHugh J observed in Wakim that the parties drew support from 
'co-operative federalism.' He responded, however, that: 
29 Compare Hill's analysis of the Court's reasoning in Wakim (1999) 198 CLR 511 in Graeme Hill, 
'Revisiting Wakim and Hughes: the Distinct Demands of Federalism' (2002) 13 Public Law Review 
205, 226. 
30 The similarity between Deane's reasoning in Duncan and his joint judgment with Toohey JJ in 
Leeth is examined by Hill: ibid 219, fn 122. In contrast, in his extensive examination of 
constitutional implications, Kirk does not refer to Duncan as an illustration of the 'inductive' 
reasoning approach epitomised by Deane and Toohey JJ in Leeth: Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional 
Implications (I): Nature, Legitimacy, Classification, Examples' (2000) 24 Melbourne University 
Law Review 645, 662-3. 
31 McGinty (1996) 186 CLR 140, 231-2 (citations omitted). 
32 (1999) 198 CLR 511 ('Wakim'). 
33 Wakim has been the subject of considerable academic critique. See, for example, Graeme Hill, 
above n 29 and George Williams, 'Cooperative federalism and the Revival of the Corporations 
Law: Wakim and Beyond' (2002) 20 Company and Securities Law Journal 160. 
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co-operative federalism is not a constitutional term. It is a political slogan, not a 
criterion of constitutional validity or power .... Behind its invocation in the 
present cases lies a good deal of loose thinking.34 
McHugh J did not explicitly criticise Deane's decision in Duncan as an 
illustration of such 'loose thinking' or as displaying 'top-down reasoning.' This 
is somewhat surprising. Duncan and Nationwide News clearly demonstrated 
Deane reasoning 'top-down': reasoning 'from'35 his understanding of a broad 
theory of governance that was manifested in, but not limited by, the text of the 
Constitution. Given the force of McHugh J's direct criticism of Deane and 
Toohey JJ's analysis in other cases, why did McHugh J not display the same 
disquiet regarding Deane's reasoning in Duncan? 
One reason why Deane's analysis in Duncan escaped direct criticism from 
McHugh J may be the fact that Deane in Duncan adopted a deferential attitude 
towards the Australian Parliaments. Chapter 6 argues that at the heart of 
McHugh J's criticism of top-down reasoning lies a concern regarding the degree 
of choice exercised by the Court under that interpretive approach, and its 
impact on the relationship between the Court and Parliament. Deane's decision 
in Duncan undoubtedly chooses between co-operative and co-ordinate models of 
federalism. As the Court was required to declare the legitimacy of the co-
operative legislative scheme, such a choice was inevitable. However, in Duncan, 
Deane's adoption of co-operative federalism reinforced the expression of the 
will of 'the people' of both the nation, through the federal Parliament, and of 
New South Wales. 
The coincidence between Deane's 'fundamental concepts' reasoning in Duncan 
and an attitude of judicial deference to the legislature has two significant 
consequences for his reasoning in Duncan. First, by exhibiting deference to the 
legislatures, Deane's innovation in Duncan may be immunised from allegations 
of illegitimate judicial activism. Although the text of the Constitution is not 
unambiguous, Deane's conclusion facilitated a functional solution to 
contemporary social issues, which also accorded with the will of 'the people' 
expressed through two legislative bodies. Second, and ironically, Deane's 
34 Wakim (1999) 198 CLR 511, 556 (emphasis added). 
35 Graeme Hill, 'Revisiting Wakim and Hughes: the Distinct Demands of Federalism' (2002) 13 
Public Law Review 205, 226. 
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display of deference in Duncan isolated his reasoning from the rest of his 
jurisprudence. Thus, with the exception of Duncan, Deane utilised 'fundamental 
concepts' reasoning to impose limits on parliamentary supremacy and to 
strengthen the judicial protection of the rights of 'the people'. This rights-
sensitive approach to constitutional interpretation was particularly apparent in 
his reasoning in Metwally, a case decided a year after Duncan. 
2 Metwally 
On 22November1984, the Court delivered its fascinating and controversial 
decision in Metwally. This case arose from a racial discrimination action 
launched by Metwally against the University of Wollongong under the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW). A year earlier, the Court in Viskauskas v Niland36 
had found Pt II of this Act, dealing with racial discrimination, inoperative by 
virtue of s 109 of the Constitution on the basis that it was inconsistent with the 
Commonwealth's Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).37 Section 109 is a 
mechanism for resolving the dilemma of inconsistency between laws of the 
Commonwealth and the States, providing that: 
When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the 
latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be 
invalid. 
After Viskauskas the Commonwealth enacted the Racial Discrimination 
Amendment Act 1983 (Cth). Section 3 of this Act provided that the 
Commonwealth's intention was not, nor had it been, to exclude the operation of 
State legislation in this field. The issue for the Court in Metwally was whether 
the Commonwealth's law could revive the State law by retrospectively 
removing the basis of the inconsistency between the two laws. 
Gibbs CJ, Murphy, Brennan and Deane JJ held that s 109 of the Constitution 
restricted the Commonwealth's ability to achieve this object. In separate 
reasons, the majority judges emphasised thats 109 rendered a State law 
36 (1983) 153 CLR 280 ('Viskauskas'). 
37 This finding flowed from the Court's application of the 'cover the field' test for inconsistency. 
See discussion in H.P. Lee, 'Retrospective Amendment of Federal Laws and the Inconsistency 
Doctrine in Australia' (1985) 15 Federal Law Review 335, 338-9. 
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immediately inoperative upon the enactment of an inconsistent Commonwealth 
law.38 This operation could not be ousted by a drafting mechanism of the 
Commonwealth Parliament.39 As a consequence, the Court reasoned thats 109, 
a section on its face affirming the status of the Commonwealth as the supreme 
legislative body in the Federation, effected a qualification on Commonwealth 
legislative power.40 
For Deane, this understanding of s 109 flowed from his vision of the section, 
and the Constitution generally, as protective of the rights of the Australian 
people. This thesis argues that although Deane's vision was central to his 
constitutional philosophy, doctrinal and logical difficulties attend some of 
Deane's applications of that vision across his High Court decisions. Metwally 
was an illustration of Deane's ambitious, and ultimately unpersuasive, 
application of this vision. The following discussion explores the impact of 
Deane's people-based approach on his understanding of federal relationships, 
and examines some of the particular difficulties associated with recasting s 109 
as a constitutional guarantee against the effect of some retrospective laws.41 
(a) Deane's reasoning in Metwally 
It was one of the striking features of Deane's jurisprudence that within two 
years of his appointment to the Court, in cases as different as Duncan and 
Metwally, Deane demonstrated his willingness both to engage with the 
underlying doctrines and concepts of the Constitution and to mark out a 
distinctive interpretive principle that placed these concepts explicitly at the 
centre of his reasoning. The key passage of Deane's reasoning in Metwally, 
evoking the sentiments of his swearing-in speech, was Deane's statement that: 
the Australian federation was and is a union of people and ... whatever may be 
their immediate operation, the provisions of the Constitution should properly 
be viewed as ultimately concerned with the governance and protection of the 
38 Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447, 457 (Gibbs CJ); 469 (Murphy J); 473-4 (Brennan J); 478 (Deane J). 
39 Ibid 457 (Gibbs CJ); 469 (Murphy J); 474 (Brennan]); 479 (Deane J). But note the proviso in 
Deane's judgment regarding a combined course of action by the Commonwealth and the State 
legislatures, discussed below at n 51. 
40 Zines reflects on this 'somewhat ironical' interpretation of the majority judges inMetwally in 
Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution W" ed, 1997) 411. 
41 The larger question, whether the constitutional concept of 'the people' is itself sufficient to 
support the implication of broad constitutional rights is discussed below in chapter 5 part 2. 
people from whom the artificial entities called the Commonwealth and States 
derive their authority.42 
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For Deane, this vision of 'the people', and their connection to the Constitution, 
supported the implication of constitutional guarantees limiting Parliament's 
power to affect the rights and freedoms of 'the people'. 
Applying this vision to the interpretation of s 109, Deane reasoned that 
properly understood, s 109 was: 
not concerned merely to resolve disputes between the Commonwealth and a 
State as to the validity of their competing claims to govern the conduct of 
individuals in a particular area of legislative power. It serves the equally 
important function of protecting the individual from the injustice of being 
subjected to the requirements of valid and inconsistent laws of Commonwealth 
and State Parliaments on the same subject.43 
Thus, although the text of s 109 did not itself identify how the section was to 
operate in relation to retrospective laws, Deane reasoned that the provision 
must be given an interpretation consistent with its purpose as a guarantee of 
individual liberties. As a provision designed to protect 'the people' from the 
demands of multiple and inconsistent laws,44 Deane held that the s 109 operated 
with temporal effect, and could not be undone by Commonwealth legislation 
that declared its intention had never been to 'cover the field' on the topic of 
racial discrimination. 
How convincing is Deane's vision of s 109 as an important guarantee of 
individual liberty? 
(b) Section 109 as a rule of law guarantee 
On any interpretation, s 109 operates for the benefit of 'the people', by 
establishing a mechanism to ensure that they were not subject to the demands 
inconsistent laws of the Commonwealth and the States. Thus Mason J, who 
strenuously disagreed with Deane's interpretation of s 109 as a provision 
protecting the individual from retrospective laws, acknowledged that by virtue 
42 Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447, 476-7. 
43 Ibid 477. 
44 Compare Deane's description of ss 109 and 118 in Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 521-2. 
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of its ordinary operations 109 'necessarily' affected rights by rendering invalid 
an inconsistent State law.45 To this extent, therefore, Deane's later descriptions 
of s 109 as effecting an important rule of law guarantee are compelling.46 
Deane's recognition thats 109 must be interpreted consistently with the role of 
the section as a guarantee of individual liberty also reinforced the Court's 
approach to determining the existence of an inconsistency. Prior to 1984, the 
Court had affirmed that s 109 did not only operate when it was impossible to 
obey the commands of both the Commonwealth and State law.47 Rather, the 
provision was activated when there was a conflict between the intentions of the 
two legislatures.48 Deane's vision of the s 109 reinforced that the section should 
be applied by reference to substance, not form, and the guarantee should not be 
defeated merely by creative legislative drafting. 
However, Deane's vision of s 109 significantly extended the guarantee beyond 
this interpretation of the section's rights-purpose. The essence of his reasoning 
in Metwally was the recognition that, ifs 109 was an important constitutional 
guarantee, the provision must operate to ensure that 'the people' were able to 
ascertain which law they were required to obey, at the time they set about 
complying with those commands. Accordingly, to allow the Commonwealth to 
revive with retrospective effect a State law was inconsistent with the 
substantive protection afforded by the section. However, this analysis appears 
to be an argument in favour of a general injunction against retrospective 
legislation.49 Certainly the tenor of Deane's subsequent decisions, particularly in 
Polyukhovich, suggests that Deane was inclined against such laws, and derived 
constitutional limitations restricting the Parliament's power to enact such laws 
whenever possible. However there are significant difficulties with Deane's 
understanding of s 109 as encompassing a limitation on Commonwealth 
retrospective laws. 
45 Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447, 463. 
46 See Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 521-2. 
47 For an overview of the Court's approach to s 109, see Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, Federal 
Constitutional Law: A Contemporary View (2nd ed, 2006) 221-31. 
48 See discussion in H.P. Lee, 'Retrospective Amendment of Federal Laws and the Inconsistency 
Doctrine in Australia' (1985) 15 Federal Law Review 335, 338-9. 
49 As Zines reflects, the majority decisions are 'difficult to understand from the viewpoint of 
pure logic' once it is accepted that the Commonwealth can enact retrospective law. Leslie Zines, 
The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) 411. 
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(c) Section 109 and retrospective laws: conundrums 
Deane explained thats 109 prevented a State law from being revived with 
retrospective effect. However, he recognised in Metwally that the Constitution 
did not impose a limit on the Parliament's power to enact retrospective 
legislation.5° Consistent with this view, Deane acknowledged in Metwally that 
'in combination' the Commonwealth and the State could remove the hurdle 
imposed bys 109.51 This could be done by the combined effect of two 
retrospective laws: an enactment of a retrospective Commonwealth law 
proclaiming its intention not to cover the field and a retrospective State law re-
enacting its legislation.52 If, as Deane acknowledged in Metwally, the 
Commonwealth and the State, 'in combination', can avoid the operation of 
s 109, surely the extended operation of the section effects a guarantee of form 
rather than substance? In Duncan Deane had heartily endorsed the principle of 
co-operation between the legislatures in the Federation, but recognised that this 
co-operation was subject to the operation of constitutional guarantees.53 Ifs 109 
was a guarantee in substance, co-operation should not enable the legislatures to 
avoid its effects. In these circumstances, Deane's extension of the operation of 
s 109 to secure a 'guarantee' against certain retrospective federal legislation was 
not compelling. It offered only limited practical benefits to the individual, while 
simultaneously imposing unnecessary and impractical burdens on the 
legislature. 
A comparison between Deane's reasoning in Duncan and Metwally underscores 
a further limitation of his analysis in the latter case. As foreshadowed, in 
Duncan Deane's 'fundamental concepts' reasoning reinforced the principle of 
parliamentary supremacy. The facts of Metwally itself acutely highlighted that 
Deane's interpretation of s 109 was not the only way in which the provision 
could be regarded as operating for the benefit of 'the people'. In Metwally, the 
State and Commonwealth Parliaments had enacted anti-discrimination 
50 Metwally (1984) 158 CLR447, 479-80. 
51 Ibid 480. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Duncan (1983) 158 CLR 535, 589. 
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legislation, legislation clearly designed to protect the rights of 'the people'. 
Through its amending legislation, the Commonwealth had attempted to ensure 
that people like Metwally gained the benefit of the State legislation. Thus an 
interpretation of s 109 as supporting the principle of parliamentary supremacy, 
on the facts of Metwally, resulted in a significant guarantee of the rights of 'the 
people'. 
Deane's reasoning in Metwally rejected the possibility that the interests of 'the 
people' could be served by the people's representatives in this way. Instead, in 
Metwally Deane affirmed that in his view, 'the people' were best served through 
the implication of judicially-enforceable constitutional guarantees, in that case, 
through limiting Parliament's ability to revive the State law with retrospective 
effect. In 1984, Deane's vision of 'the people', and the manner in which their 
interests were protected under the Constitution, challenged the paradigm of the 
Australian constitutional system. Mason J's judgment contained the strong 
statement against Deane's vision of s 109. Mason J argued that 
the object of s 109, no more and no less, is to establish the supremacy of 
Commonwealth law where there is a conflict between a Commonwealth law 
and a State law. 54 
Mason continued, rejecting Deane's interpretive principle, stating that the 
section was 'not a source of individual rights and immunities': 
Nor is the section a source of protection to the individual against the unfairness 
and injustice of a retrospective law. That is a matter which lies quite outside the 
focus of the provision. In these circumstances to distil from s 109 an 
unexpressed fetter upon Commonwealth legislative power is to twist the 
section from its true meaning and stand it upon its head.ss 
As foreshadowed in the introduction to this thesis, by the time of his retirement, 
Mason had indicated his belief that majoritarian democracy was itself 
insufficient to protect individual rights in Australia.56 Further, in ACTV in 1992, 
Mason CJ recognised that 'the people' were legal sovereigns.57 In this context, 
Mason J's criticism of Deane's people-based interpretation in Metwally was 
particularly telling. In 1984, and, again in Polyukhovich in 1991, Mason J reacted 
strongly against Deane's analysis that recognition of the role of 'the people' as 
54 Metwally (1984) 158 CLR447, 463. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Sir Anthony Mason, 'Future Directions in Australian Law' (1987) 13 Monash University Law 
Review 149, 163. See discussion above chapter 1 n 48. 
57 ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 137-8 (Mason CJ). 
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legal sovereigns required the implication of guarantees limiting the power to 
enact retrospective laws.58 Mason J's response in Metwally reinforced that a 
recognition of the role of 'the people' in the Constitution did not compel an 
interpretive principle of the form embraced by Deane. The limitations of the 
ability of Deane's concept of 'the people' to support, as the sole or significant 
factor, the implication of broad constitutional guarantees is discussed further in 
chapter 5. 
For present purposes, it is sufficient to observe that the practical hurdles 
attending Deane's interpretation of s 109 render his conclusion in Metwally 
unconvincing. This view of Metwally does not, however, prevent Deane's 
interpretive principle, based on 'the people', from guiding the Court in the 
interpretation of the Constitution. Part 2 of this chapter explores another early 
example of Deane interpreting the Constitution, specifically s 90, through the 
prism of 'the people'. Deane's vision of s 90 as serving a rights-purpose 
provides valuable insights into the interpretation of this section, the meaning of 
which has deeply divided the Court. 
B Part 2: Section 90 and the economic 
relationship between the Commonwealth and 
the States 
It is trite to say that the States are largely dependent on the Commonwealth for 
the necessary funds to perform their responsibilities. This phenomenon, often 
described as 'vertical fiscal imbalance', was facilitated by a series of High Court 
decisions.59 For instance, in 1908 the High Court held that, consistent withs 94 
of the Constitution, the Commonwealth could utilise trusts to retain 'surplus' 
revenue for its future needs rather than distributing that surplus to the States.60 
The 'uniform tax cases' in 1942 and 1957 also allowed the Commonwealth to 
58 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 540. 
59 Coper describes the High Court as delivering 'Four Body Blows' against the States, resulting 
in the precarious financial position of the States: Michael Coper, Encounters with the Australian 
Constitution (1987) 206. 
60 New South Wales v Commonwealth ('Surplus Revenue Case') (1908) 7 CLR 179. See further, Coper, 
n 59, 207. 
gain control of income taxation through the operation of contingent grants to 
the States under s 96. 
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In this context, indirect taxation is one of the few remaining sources of revenue 
for the States. However, s 90 of the Constitution provides that the 
Commonwealth shall have exclusive power to impose 'duties of customs and of 
excise.' The breadth of this prohibition accordingly has a great impact on the 
States' financial independence. Much therefore depends on the definition of a 
'duty of excise' adopted by the Court. On this issue, however, the Court has 
traditionally been fiercely divided on the key questions surrounding s 90, that 
is: is an 'excise duty' a tax on goods at the moment of production or 
manufacture, or does it extend to sales and consumption taxes? Must there be a 
direct relationship between the tax and the quantity of goods? Does the Court 
assess the relationship on the terms of the law or by reference to its substantive 
effect? 61 
Deane's only single judgment on s 90 was in Hematite Petroleum Pty Ltd v 
Victoria, a decision handed down in 1983, one month before Duncan.62 
Commentators have remarked that Hematite evinced a 'rare explicitness' 63 by 
the Court regarding the importance of both purpose and policy in the 
interpretation of s 90. However, prior to Hematite the Court had been divided 
between 'centralist' and 'federal balance' understandings of the nature of 
Australian federal relations, and on the purpose of s 90. These competing 
visions of s 90 were evinced in the majority and minority approaches in 
Hematite. 
Deane's vision of s 90 in Hematite, however, cut across the centralist and federal 
balance perspectives on this section. Deane perceived s 90 as designed to forge 
national cohesion and identity, by means of a substantive guarantee of equality 
and unity of 'the people of the Commonwealth.' The following discussion 
61 For an overview of the Court's approach to these questions see Coper, n 59, 224-42 and Sarah 
Joseph and Melissa Castan, Federal Constitutional Law: A Contemporary View (2nd ed, 2006) 292-
302. 
62 (1983) 151CLR599 ('Hematite'). On the timing of these, and other key Deane decisions, see 
Appendix A. Deane's s 90 decisions are listed in Appendix B. 
63 George Winterton, HP Lee, Arthur Glass and James A Thomson, Australian Federal 
Constitutional Law: Commentary and Materials (2nd ed, 2007) 565. 
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examines Deane's reasoning in Hematite for its insights into his understanding 
of s 90. It also considers what Deane's understanding of the fundamental nature 
of the Constitution, as a compact of 'the people', reveals regarding his approach 
to the economic dynamics of Australian federalism, and the principles that 
should guide the Court in constitutional interpretation. 
1 Hematite 
(a) The dispute in Hematite 
Hematite concerned Victorian legislation imposing a tax in excess of $10 million 
on three pipelines carrying hydrocarbons from Bass Strait to processing plants 
located on the mainland.64 The fee was levied annually on the use of the 
pipeline, rather than assessed by reference to the volume of petroleum products 
that it conveyed. Although the interpretation of s 90 prior to 1983 was by no 
means settled, the Court, commencing with Dennis Hotels Pty Ltd v Victoria,65 
had adopted an exception to s 90 for certain State licence fees.66 However, a 
majority of the Court in Hematite (Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane JJ; 
Gibbs CJ and Wilson J dissenting) held that the Act purported to impose a tax 
that was in substance a duty of excise. Accordingly, the tax was invalid under 
s 90.67 
As discussed in chapter 1, the Tasmanian Dam Case demonstrated that the Gibbs 
Court was divided on the relevance of 'federal balance' considerations to the 
interpretation of s 51.68 In Hematite, the Court, most clearly in the opposing 
judgments of Gibbs CJ and Mason J, also split over the degree to which s 90 
should reflect a 'federal balance' in the economic relationship between the 
Commonwealth and the States. 
64 The challenge was to s 2 of the Pipelines (Fees) Act 1981 (Vic) which amended the Pipelines Act 
1967 (Vic). This legislation increased the size of the annual licence fee by over 1000%. 
65 (1960) 104 CLR 529 ('Dennis Hotels'). 
66 See further discussion in Michael Coper, Encounters with the Australian Constitution (1987) 229. 
67 Dawson J did not sit in Hematite. As Coper indicates, Dawson J appears to have excused 
himself on the basis that he had advised on the legality of the tax while Solicitor-General for 
Victoria. Ibid 238. 
68 See above chapter 1 n 33. 
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In the Tasmanian Dam Case, Gibbs CJ had feared that a broad interpretation of 
s 51 could deprive the States of a meaningful sphere of influence. Similar views 
influenced Gibbs CJ in Hematite to reject a 'wide and loose' construction of 
s 90.69 He considered thats 90 was designed to grant the Commonwealth 
control over tariff policy.70 In Hematite, Gibbs CJ defined a 'duty of excise' 
narrowly, as a tax 'directly related to goods' imposed at a point in their 
production or distribution 'before they reach the hands of the consumer.171 In 
addition, Gibbs CJ argued that the validity of State legislation must be 
determined according to whether its legal effect was the imposition of an excise 
duty.72 
Wilson J shared Gibbs CJ's analysis of the test to be applied, and the result of its 
application in Hematite to find that the Victorian legislation imposed a valid 
licence fee.73 As in the Tasmanian Dam Case,74 Wilson J invoked the rhetoric of 
legalism in support of his analysis, stating that s 90 alone 'defines the limits of 
exclusive legislative power.'75 Thus, s 90: 
provides no authority to the Court to assume the responsibility of determining 
larger questions of fiscal responsibility within the federation; nor, of course, is 
the Court equipped to undertake such a task. Those larger questions must be 
determined, consistently with the Constitution, in the political arena.76 
Gibbs CJ was more open regarding the federal consequences of applying s 90 
by reference to the substantive effect of the law. Thus he warned that such an 
approach could expand the reach of the section to an extent that 'gravely 
hampers the States in the conduct of their financial affairs.'77 
Mason J's analysis in Hematite reflected a different understanding of how 
questions of federalism should influence constitutional interpretation. In 
contrast to Gibbs CJ, Mason J's judgment did not display ostensible concern 
69 Hematite (1983) 151CLR599,618. 
70 Ibid 616. 
71 Ibid 615. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid 623-4. Wilson J also argued that 'it is the nature of a tax and not its economic 
consequences which determines whether it is a duty of excise': ibid 648. 
74 Compare Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 204. 
75 Hematite (1983) 151CLR599,649. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid 618. 
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regarding the impact of a broad interpretation of s 90 on State economic affairs. 
According to Mason J, the purpose of s 90 was to give the Commonwealth a 
'real control over the taxation of commodities' and 'to protect and stimulate 
home production and influence domestic price levels' without State 
interference.78 Mason J therefore defined a 'duty of excise' as a tax 'upon 
commodities to the point of receipt by the consumer.'79 Mason J also rejected the 
need for an 'arithmetical relationship' between the tax and the quantity or value 
of the goods. Rather, it was enough that the tax entered into the 'cost of the 
goods' and was 'reflected in the prices at which the goods are subsequently 
sold.'8° Further, again in contrast to Gibbs CJ, Mason J was adamant that the 
relationship between the tax and the goods must be established on the basis of 
the substantive effect of the law, not its form.81 Accordingly, Mason J concluded 
that the tax in Hematite was not a licence fee, but a tax on a step in the 
production of petroleum products.82 
Both Murphy and Brennan JJ also held the pipeline licence fee in Hematite 
invalid under s 90.83 It was in the context of this divided Court that Deane 
offered his unique perspective on s 90. His reasoning adopted a broad vision of 
the definition of excise, and accepted the importance of an analysis of 
'substance' over 'form' in assessing whether a tax is an excise duty. These 
aspects of his reasoning resonated with the analysis of Mason and Brennan JJ, 
with whom he later joined in judgments.84 However, Deane's approach was 
fused with, and informed by, his distinctive people-focused understanding of 
the purpose of the section. It was through this prism that Deane viewed the 
pipeline fee in Hematite, and concluded that it imposed a tax that was in 
substance a duty of excise. 
78 Ibid 631. 
79 Ibid 628. 
80 Ibid 632. 
81 Ibid 630. 
82 Ibid 634-6. 
83 Ibid 640 (Murphy J); 659 (Brennan J). Murphy J's approach to s 90 has been the subject of 
detailed review in Deborah Z Cass, 'Lionel Murphy and Section 90 of the Australian Economic 
Constitution' in Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), Justice Lionel Murphy: Influential or 
Merely Prescient? (1992) 19. 
84 Note, for example, Deane's joint judgment with Mason Jin Philip Morris (1989) 167 CLR 399 
and Brennan, Deane and Toohey JJ's joint judgment in Capital Duplicators (No 1) (1992) 177 CLR 
248. 
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(b) Deane's people-focused analysis in Hematite 
In what would become a common rhetorical device in his judgments, Deane 
signalled his unique perspective on s 90 with the opening words of his decision 
in Hematite.s5 Thus, emphasising the role of 'the people', Deane stated: 
The compact between the people of the Australian colonies which is embodied in the 
Constitution was for unity in 'one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth.'86 
In Hematite, two years prior to his decision in Metwally, Deane recast the 
purpose of s 90 as a provision for the benefit of 'the people', arguing, s 90: 
cannot properly be seen as part of a merely arbitrary division of legislative 
powers between the Commonwealth and the States. To the contrary, that 
provision - or some other means of ensuring uniformity of excise duties 
throughout Australia- was a necessary ingredient of any acceptable scheme for 
achieving the abolition of internal customs barriers which was an essential 
objective of the Federation and for ensuring that the people of the Commonwealth 
were guaranteed equality as regards the customs and excise duties which they 
were required to bear and the bounties which they were entitled to receive.87 
This statement of the purpose and function of s 90 separated Deane's vision 
from the orthodox theories of s 90. Here, Deane's interest clearly lay beyond 
questions of the legal and financial relationships between the Commonwealth 
and the States.ss Thus Deane's reasoning in Hematite was not focused 
exclusively on questions of the Commonwealth's control over the economy, or 
its interest in tariff policy. Instead, Deane examined the burden of excise and 
customs duties on 'the people' and the ability of s 90 to protect 'the people' 
from State taxes of that description. 
85 Compare, for example, Deane's reference to the compact of 'the people' in his opening 
paragraph in the Incorporation Case, as the basis for rejecting reliance on the subjective intentions 
of the framers. Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR 482, 503-4. More famously, see Deane's 
or,ening passages in Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 521-2. 
8 Hematite (1983) 151 CLR 599, 660 (emphasis added). Compare this statement with the opening 
remarks of Brennan, Deane and Toohey JJ on the effect of s 90 in Capital Duplicators (No 1) (1992) 
177 CLR 248, 274. There Brennan, Deane and Toohey JJ stated: 
The Constitution was enacted to give effect to the agreement reached by the people of New 
South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia 
to unite 'in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth.' 
Ibid (emphasis added). Further similarities between Deane's reasoning in Hematite and that of 
Brennan, Deane and Toohey JJ in Capital Duplicators (No 1) are examined below n 92. 
87 Hematite (1983) 151CLR599, 661-2 (emphasis added). 
88 See further Deane's statement in Street that s 90 was one of a number of provisions that both 
'serve the function of advancing or protecting the liberty, the dignity or the equality of the 
citizen under the Constitution' and 'are also integral parts of the very structure of the federation.' 
Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 522 (emphasis added). 
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It was also highly significant that in 1983, a year after his appointment to the 
Court, in a case dealing with the economics of Australian federalism, Deane 
located the purpose of s 90 in what he would later describe as the 'two constant 
themes'89 of his jurisprudence: the inherent equality of the sovereign people. In 
Hematite, two years prior to Metwally, Deane's vision of 'the people' and their 
role in the Constitution emerged in this passage. Hematite was also one of the 
earliest decisions evincing what Lindell later described as his 'strong and 
abiding concern regarding equality as a constitutional doctrine.'90 The 
importance of equality as a theme in Deane's constitutional jurisprudence is a 
topic pursued in later chapters of this thesis.91 
Deane's vision of the rights-purpose of s 90 found some favour with a number 
of other members of the Court. Thus in 1992, three months after Leeth, Deane's 
vision of s 90 as 'guaranteeing equality' between the people as regards customs 
and excise duties was endorsed by Brennan, Deane and Toohey JJ in their joint 
judgment Capital Duplicators Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory (No 1).92 It is 
significant that it was also these three judges who in Leeth had expressed their 
commitment to the constitutional protection of the equality of 'the people'. In 
contrast to Deane's later ambitious guarantee in Leeth, however, his vision of 
s 90 as designed to benefit 'the people' has some historical support. Coper has 
argued that, although the historical materials are inconclusive regarding the 
purpose of s 90, there is some foundation for regarding s 90 as designed to 
remove disparity in the tax burden between the people of the States, and to 
remove the distortion to the flow of goods that a differential tax burden would 
create.93 In this way, matching history with a recognition of the significance of 
the role of the sovereign people, Deane's vision of s 90 provided a principled 
89 Deane, quoted in Tony Stephens, Sir William Deane: The Things that Matter (2002) 94 (emphasis 
added). 
90 G.J. Lindell, 'Recent Developments in the Judicial Interpretation of the Australian 
Constitution' in Geoffrey Lindell (ed) Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (1994) 1, 
42. 
91 See, in particular, the discussion of Street in chapter 4, and Leeth in chapter 5. Note also the 
role of equality in Deane's reasoning of QEC and Breavington, decisions examined later in this 
chapter. 
92 (1992) 177 CLR 248, 274 (Brennan, Deane and Toohey JJ) ('Capital Duplicators (No 1)') citing 
with approval Hematite (1983) 151CLR599, 661-2. Lindell referred to Brennan, Deane and 
Toohey JJ's endorsement of Deane's views in Hematite on the purpose of s 90 as an illustration 
of the influence of Deane's views on equality: G.J. Lindell, above n 90, 42. 
93 Michael Coper, Encounters with the Australian Constitution (1987) 229. Deane and Toohey JJ's 
reliance on history in Leeth, in the form of the Convention Debates, and status of the common 
law right of equality, is discussed further in chapter 5. 
basis for the embrace of a 'substance over form' approach to the operation of 
the section. This benefit of Deane's approach in Hematite is the next topic for 
discussion. 
(c) 'The people', formalism and the breadth of Deane's 
vision of s 90 
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The Court's decision in Hematite illustrated that acceptance of neither the broad 
nor narrow theory of the purpose of s 90 compelled the choice of a 'substance' 
or 'form' application of s 90. For example, Gibbs CJ rejected Mason J's adoption 
of a substantive application of the meaning of 'excise', on the basis that no 
interpretation of s 90 could secure the Commonwealth real control of the 
economy.94 On the other hand, Murphy J argued forcefully thats 90 must be 
applied by reference to a law's practical effect, even though, on his view, s 90 
performed the narrow function of precluding State taxes discriminating 
between goods produced in and outside of the State.95 
Deane's vision of s 90 in Hematite disentangled a substantive application of s 90 
from the controversial, and unresolved, question of the economic requirements 
of 'federal balance'. This was because Deane saw s 90 as a guarantee of the 
important principles of equality and unity in the new nation. In this context, 
Deane perceived thats 90 could not be seen as concerned with 'matters of form 
rather than substance.'96 A formalist approach must be rejected, argued Deane, 
lest the section: 
confer no more than an illusory protection which a State can destroy by imposing 
what is in substance an excise duty under some other guise.97 
Only a substantive application of s 90 could ensure that this important function 
of s 90 was fulfilled. Once it is accepted that the legal force of the Constitution 
flows, at least in part, from 'the people', not the' artificial entities' of the 
Commonwealth or the States, the argument that provisions of the Constitution 
should not be avoided by the form of words used by the legislature is 
94 Hematite (1983) 151CLR599, 615. 
95 Ibid 638. 
96 Ibid 662 (emphasis added). 
97 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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particularly strong. Thus, under Deane's approach, the Court must assess 
whether a tax was an excise duty by examining its operation, that is, by 
assessing its impact on those 'required to bear' the tax.98 On the facts of 
Hematite, Deane's application of this approach led him to conclude that the $10 
million licence fee was in fact an excise duty. 
The application of Deane's substance over form approach to the facts of 
Hematite also provided an insight into the definition of an' excise' endorsed by 
Deane.99 According to Deane, and the majority judges, the size of the Victorian 
'pipeline licence fee' was a significant factor in its classification as an excise. 
Thus, on their view, it was inevitable that the 'fee' would be incorporated into 
the price of the petroleum products. It was on this basis that the majority judges 
found a 'relationship' between the tax and the goods.100 Thus, even though 
Deane in Hematite declared it unnecessary to rule on a precise definition of 
'excise', 101 his approach clearly tended towards a broad and flexible connection 
between the tax and the goods, not limited to the identification of a 'direct' 
relationship between the goods and the size of the tax. 
Deane's acceptance of a broad definition of excise was confirmed by his later 
joint judgments on this topic. For example, in their decision in Capital 
Duplicators Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory (No 2) Mason CJ, Brennan, 
Deane and McHugh JJ adopted the broad definition of an excise as a tax on 
goods at any point before it reaches the consumer, and applied this test by 
reference to the substance, or practical effect of the law.102 By endorsing this 
approach to s 90, Deane favoured central control of the economy over 'federal 
balance' considerations. This preference mirrored Deane's understanding of the 
principles governing the interpretation of ss Sl(xxix), Sl(xx) and Sl(xxxv). 
98 Ibid. 
99 Interestingly, as Hanks observed, Deane did not engage directly with the debate regarding 
the definition of excise duty in Hematite. Peter Hanks, 'Section 90 of the Commonwealth 
Constitution: Fiscal Federalism or Economic Unity?' (1986) 10 Adelaide Law Review 365, 367. 
100 This conclusion led Dawson Jin a later case to question whether any indirect tax might 
ultimately be classified as an excise. Gosford Meats Pty Ltd v New South Wales (1985) 155 CLR 368, 
413 ('Gosford'). See further the commentary in Michael Coper, Encounters with the Australian 
Constitution (1987) 238. 
101 Hematite (1983) 151 CLR 599, 665. 
102 (1993) 178 CLR 561, 591. Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane and McHugh JJ in this case argued that 
in Hematite, Gosford and Philip Morris Deane had accepted the broad definition of excise. See ibid 
588-589. 
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Against this pattern of reasoning, however, stood Mason CJ and Deane's 
decision in Philip Morris Ltd v Commissioner of Business Franchises (Vic). 103 This 
case contained a number of insights into Deane's attitude towards precedent in 
constitutional cases and his vision of federal dynamics. These aspects of 
Mason CJ and Deane's decision in Philip Morris merit consideration, tempered 
by a recognition of the fact that in this case Deane elected not to produce his 
own judgment, but to deliver a joint judgment with Mason CJ. 
(d) Philip Morris: precedent, policy and fiscal federalism 
Aspects of Deane's approach to precedent in constitutional interpretation were 
examined in chapter 1. In the common law world, the perception of objectivity 
in judicial reasoning is tied to an adherence to, or reasoned departure from, 
precedent. Thus, as Gibbs J famously observed, judges should not interpret the 
Constitution 'as though the pages of the law reports were blank.'104 On the other 
hand, the High Court has recognised that it is not bound by its own decisions, 
particularly when interpreting the Constitution.105 Deane's jurisprudence 
contains illustrations of varied responses to the role of precedent in 
constitutional interpretation. These ranged from Deane's fierce statements of 
the Court's duty to adhere to 'fundamental constitutional truth' over the 
demands of precedent, 106 to his concession of his own views on the preferable 
interpretation of the Constitution in the face of 'clear and settled trend of 
judicial authority.1107 In Philip Morris, however, Mason and Deane JJ adhered to 
what they regarded as unsatisfactory precedent for policy reasons. 
Philip Morris concerned the validity of a State prior period licence fee applied in 
relation to tobacco products. Mason CJ and Deane, with some reluctance, 
103 (1989) 167 CLR 399 ('Philip Morris'). 
104 Queensland v Commonwealth ('Second Territories Senators Case') (1997) 139 CLR 585, 599. For an 
extensive examination of the place of precedent in constitutional interpretation see Andrew 
Lynch, The Impact of Dissenting Opinions upon the Development of Australian Constitutional Law 
(PhD thesis, University of New South Wales, 2005) 
105 The Engineers' Case, for example, establishes a pedigree of dissent that is difficult to ignore in 
the Australian context. See further discussion in Lynch, above n 104, 259. 
106 See, for example, Stevens v Head (1993) 176 CLR 433, 461. See also, Re Nolan; Ex parte Young 
(1991) 172 CLR 460, 480 and Re Tyler; Ex parte Foley (1994) 181CLR18, 34. 
107 Flaherty v Girgis (1986) 162 CLR 574, 610. 
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recognised the continued validity of such licence fees as an exception to s 90.108 
At the same time, however, they were careful to confine the reach of that 
exception strictly to alcohol and tobacco products.109 Before Mason CJ and 
Deane determined the validity of the licence fee, however, an important 
preliminary question had to be decided. Did counsel require the Court's leave 
to reargue the correctness of precedent before the High Court? This question 
came before the Court in Evda Nominees Pty Ltd v Victoria, 110 another s 90 case. 
(i) Evda and the question of leave 
Evda raised the issue of whether a State tax, taking the form of a prior period 
licence fee imposed on tobacco retailers and wholesalers, was an excise duty. 
Counsel sought to reopen the decision of Dennis Hotels claiming that it had been 
challenged, indirectly, by the reasoning of members of the Court in Hematite. 
Gibbs CJ, Mason, Murphy, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ held that the leave 
of the Court was required before counsel may challenge the correctness of a 
past decision of the Court. Deane, however, refused to impose a procedural 
barrier of this nature.111 
Gibbs CJ, during argument, expressed the concern that: 
This Court, of course, has to apply the law. Prima fade, the law is what the 
Court has laid down. It would reduce the operation of the Court, or the 
workings of the Court to an absurdity if it were permissible for counsel to keep 
on challenging settled decisions .... Therefore, there must reside in the Court, a 
power to say whether or not counsel may address full argument to the question 
whether a previous decision is right or wrong.112 
These remarks represented the only indication of the policy concerns that may 
have influenced the majority judges' conclusion in Evda that counsel required 
leave from the Court to challenge precedent.113 
108 Philip Morris (1989) 167 CLR 399, 438. 
109 Ibid. 
110 (1984) 154 CLR 311 ('Evda'). 
111 Ibid 316. 
112 Evda Nominees Pty Ltd v Victoria Transcript of Proceedings, 4 April 1984, 11. 
113 Note however, that in Richardson Dawson J reflected that: 
Considerations of practicality make it necessary that the law should, as far as possible, 
take a consistent course. The constant re-examination of concluded questions is 
incompatible with that aim. That is why this Court has adopted the practice of 
requiring leave to be granted before it will allow a previous decision to be re-argued. 
Richardson (1988) 164 CLR 261, 322 (emphasis added). 
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Deane's statements during oral argument indicated that he shared Gibbs CJ's 
concerns that there should be limitations on the degree to which long-
established authority may be challenged in all cases.114 He also shared the views 
of the rest of the Court that the Evda did not provide an appropriate vehicle for 
reconsidering Dennis Hotels.115 However, Deane did not agree that counsel 
required the consent of the Court to present argument of this nature.116 Deane's 
approach revealed a different perspective to that of the majority judges on the 
role of precedent in constitutional adjudication, and the ability of the Court to 
control challenges to its decisions by counsel.117 
It has been Kirby J, not Deane, who has offered a detailed analysis of these 
issues.118 Sharing Deane's conclusion that a requirement of leave should not be 
imposed, in Brownlee v The Queen Kirby J emphasised the 'party's right' to 
advance arguments challenging authority before the Court.119 According to 
Kirby J, it remains important for the Court to: 
keep the mind open to the possibility that a new context, presenting different 
needs and circumstances and fresh insights, may convince the Court ... that its 
predecessors had adopted an erroneous view of the Constitution.U0 
This emphasis by Kirby Jon 'new content' and 'fresh insights' as a foundation 
for refusing to impose the leave requirement on counsel resonated with 
Kirby J's endorsement in Brownlee v The Queen of a 'living force' theory of 
constitutional interpretation.121 For Deane also, the refusal to endorse the leave 
requirement may have been connected to his acceptance of a 'living force' 
theory of interpretation, famously given voice by Deane a decade after Evda in 
114 Evda Nominees Pty Ltd v Victoria Transcript of Proceedings, 4 April 1984, 31. 
115 Ibid. See also, Evda (1984) 154 CLR 311, 316 (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Murphy, Wilson, Brennan and 
DawsonJJ). 
116 Evda Nominees Pty Ltd v Victoria Transcript of Proceedings, 4 April 1984, 31. 
117 See, to like effect, Philip Morris (1989) 167 CLR 399, 409. 
118 See, for example, Brownlee v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 278, 312-15 and XYZ v Commonwealth 
(2006) 227 ALR 495, 518. 
119 Brownlee v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 278, 314 (emphasis added). 
120 Ibid 314. 
121 Ibid 332-43. See also XYZ v Commonwealth where Kirby J affirmed that his reasons for 
concluding that 'constitutional reargument requires no leave' were identical to those of Deane 
in Evda, and that the settled principles of constitutional interpretation were 'that the 
Constitution is not to be confined to meanings that were held, or to applications that were 
expected, at the time of its adoption in 1900.' XYZ v Commonwealth (2006) 227 ALR 495, 518-20. 
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Theophanous. 122 Unlike Kirby J, however, Deane never expressed a connection 
between these aspects of his jurisprudence. 
Whatever lay behind Deane's approach, in Philip Morris Deane again expressed 
the opinion, contrary to that of six members of the Court, that counsel did not 
require leave from the Court to challenge the correctness of Dennis Hotels. 123 On 
the substantive issues in the case, Mason CJ and Deane accepted that policy 
reasons demanded the continued acceptance of the Court's decisions in Dennis 
Hotels and Dickenson' s Arcade Pty Ltd v T asmania.124 
(ii) Philip Morris and the weight of policy considerations 
In their analysis of the substantive issues in Philip Morris, Mason CJ and Deane 
observed that by the 1980s, responses to the Court's jurisprudence on s 90 had 
reached a similar level of controversy as had s 92 prior to Cole v Whitfield. 125 
Mason CJ and Deane argued that the Dennis Hotels exception led to 'highly 
artificial results', whereby State licence fees based on a prior period, but not a 
current period, were excluded from the operation of s 90.126 However, Mason CJ 
and Deane held that the 'artificial results' of these cases could be 'rationalized' 
in the 'special fields1127 in which they operated, that is, according to the history 
of alcohol and tobacco licensing schemes. On this basis, they continued to 
recognise the validity of a limited State 'franchise fee' exception to s 90 with 
respect to these products.128 The strained exception of tobacco and alcohol 
products recognised by Mason CJ and Deane in Philip Morris reflected an 
unhappy compromise by these judges between competing policy 
considerations. 
122 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171. 
123 Philip Morris (1989) 167 CLR 399, 409. 
124 (1974) 130 CLR 177. 
125 Philip Morris (1989) 167 CLR 399, 433. Their remarks related particularly to the question 
whether s 90 was to be interpreted according to its substantive or legal operation. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid 440. 
128 See, in particular, ibid 438. 
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First, Mason CJ and Deane acknowledged that the precarious financial position 
of the States was a relevant consideration in the interpretation of s 90. They 
explained: 
Financial arrangements which are of great importance to the governments of the 
States and perhaps the economy of the nation have been made for a long time past 
on the faith of these decisions. The power of this Court to overrule its previous 
decisions would not be properly exercised to disturb those arrangements 
unless, in the light of later insights into the true meaning of the Constitution, 
obedience to its terms or the interests of certainty in those arrangements clearly 
demanded that those decisions be reconsidered.129 
Given Deane's later express endorsement of a 'living force' theory, it is 
particularly interesting that in this passage Mason CJ and Deane recognised 
that 'later insights' - that is, contemporary understanding and context- could 
influence a decision to overrule precedent.130 Also, this passage suggested that 
Deane permitted 'federal balance' considerations to intrude into his evaluation 
of the question whether to overrule the Dennis Hotels exception to s 90. This 
reference to 'federal balance' considerations in Philip Morris is particularly 
striking given that both Mason CJ and Deane had argued forcefully in their 
decisions on s 51 that such considerations were irrelevant to constitutional 
interpretation. 
One consequence of Mason CJ and Deane's recognition of a limited exception 
for State licence fees in relation to tobacco and alcohol in Philip Morris was to 
ensure that the stream of cases expanding the definition of excise duty, and the 
operation of s 90, were not reopened. In this way, Mason CJ and Deane 
maintained the Court's broad interpretation of s 90, and its preference for 
national control over federal balance. A further consideration acknowledged by 
Mason CJ and Deane was that the exclusion of these products could be justified 
by virtue of the need to 'protect the public interest in light of the characteristics' 
of those commodities.131 The exception recognised for tobacco and alcohol may 
therefore intersect with Deane's concern to protect the disadvantaged and 
vulnerable in the community, by recognising the social and medical 
consequences attaching to use of those products. It is not clear, however, why a 
129 Ibid 438 (emphasis added) 
13° Compare Kirby J's discussion in Brownlee of the significance of 'new insights' as a factor in 
his decision not to impose a requirement that counsel obtain leave to challenge precedent. See 
above n 120. 
131 Philip Morris (1989) 167 CLR 399, 439. 
recognition of the benefits to 'the people' flowing from licensing regimes in 
respect of alcohol and tobacco must extend to exclude the State prior period 
licence fees from the definition of an excise duty in s 90. 
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The exclusion recognised by Mason CJ and Deane has been justly criticised.132 
The path woven by Mason CJ and Deane between their disapproval of the 
principle in Dennis Hotels and a concession to the financial requirements of the 
State, on the basis of the special status of these products, does not stand as a 
leading example of principled and cohesive reasoning by either judge. This is 
particularly the case for Deane, for his recognition of the exclusion in Philip 
Morris, without an acknowledgment of the impact of that exclusion on 'the 
people', may call into question the strength of Deane's commitment to his 
vision of s 90 as a substantial equality guarantee. 
The next part of this chapter considers how Deane's adherence to 'fundamental 
concepts' reasoning, and his vision of the essential nature of the Federation, was 
reflected in two implications he drew from the nature of the Constitution, and 
the Federation it created. These decisions also provide further examples of 
Deane's understanding of the role of precedent, history and policy, and the 
language of the text, in constitutional interpretation. 
C Part 3: Deane's implications from the 
nature of the Federation in QEC and 
Breavington 
1 Queensland Electricity Commission 
Queensland Electricity Commission v Commonwealth133 concerned a challenge to 
provisions inserted into the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) by the 
Conciliation and Arbitration (Electricity Industry) Act 1985 (Cth). The new 
provisions were designed to expedite the settlement of a dispute involving a 
132 See, for example, Ha v New South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465, 501 (Brennan CJ, McHugh, 
Gummow and Kirby JJ). 
133 (1985) 159 CLR 192. 
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Queensland government authority, the Queensland Electricity Commission 
('QEC'). Under the new provisions, the powers of the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission to reject a dispute and to sit as a single member panel 
were removed in relation to the dispute involving the QEC. In addition, any 
future dispute involving the Queensland electricity industry would be 
governed by new streamlined provisions. The QEC argued that the 
amendments to the Act were invalid, as contrary to the principle in the 
Melbourne Corporation Case. 
Until 2003, and the Court's decision in Austin v Commonwealth, 134 Mason J's 
exposition of two limbs or elements of the Melbourne Corporation Case was 
generally regarded as authoritative.135 According to Mason J, the implication 
had two distinct limbs or elements: 
(1) The prohibition against laws discriminating against the States, or a State; 
and 
(2) The prohibition against laws that operate to destroy or curtail the continued 
existence of the States or their capacity to function as governments.136 
As the amendments in QEC excluded a State governmental body from the 
ordinary application of the Commonwealth's conciliation and arbitration 
regime, the case concerned the validity of a law that discriminated against the 
States.137 On the facts, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ held that the 
legislation was invalid in its entirety. Brennan and Deane JJ, in separate 
judgments, agreed that the Commonwealth's attempt to apply the streamlined 
procedures to all future disputes involving the State authority infringed the 
discrimination limb of the Melbourne Corporation principle. However, Brennan J 
and Deane each held that those aspects of the legislation applying special 
procedures to the dispute involving the QEC were valid. This was because 
s Sl(xxxv) authorised discriminatory laws, that is, laws with the purpose of 
settling a particular industrial dispute.138 
134 (2003) 215 CLR 185. 
135 See, for example, Re Australian Education Union; Ex parte Victoria (1995) 184 CLR 188, 231 
(Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
136 QEC (1985) 159CLR192, 217. Cited with approval in Re Australian Education Union; Ex parte 
Victoria (1995) 184 CLR 188, 231 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
137 QEC (1985) 159 CLR 192, 217-8 (Mason J); 226 (Wilson J); 232 (Brennan J). Dawson J discussed 
the discrimination principle as a species of law that curtailed the capacity of the States to 
function: ibid 261. 
138 Ibid 238-40 (Brennan J); 251-2 (Deane J). 
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Deane's expression of the content of the implication in QEC was essentially the 
same as that of Mason J. However, two distinctive elements of Deane's 
reasoning in QEC emerge against this common background and reinforce 
recurring themes in Deane's constitutional jurisprudence. First, Deane implied 
a limitation on the Commonwealth's legislative power to discriminate against 
the States by utilising his 'fundamental concepts' reasoning. Second, Deane 
referred to 'the people' as part of his analysis of implications governing federal 
relationships under the Constitution. 
(a) Deane's 'fundamental concepts' reasoning 
Just as Deane signalled the key features of his reasoning at the outset of his 
judgment in Hematite, the opening paragraphs of Deane's reasons in his 1985 
decision in QEC expressed the essence of his understanding of the source of the 
implied limitation in that case. In QEC Deane commenced his analysis with a 
summary of the history of Australian constitutional interpretation. This 
involved a consideration of the reserved powers and implied immunities 
doctrines, described by Deane as emerging during the 'infancy of the 
Commonwealth, while national identity and spirit were still at a formative 
stage.'139 Deane then explored the defeat of those approaches in the Engineers' 
Case as the Commonwealth assumed an 'independent ... personality.'140 
However, Deane's reasoned in QEC that the Engineers' Case left intact two 
foundational interpretive principles.141 First, that: 
the written terms of the Constitution were predicated upon and embodied (cf, 
particularly, Constitution ss 106, 107) an assumption of the continued existence 
of the States as viable political entities.142 
Second, Deane argued the Court could derive an implication limiting 
Commonwealth legislative power 'flowing from' the 'assumption', or 
'fundamental concept', of the continued existence of the States.143 
139 Ibid 244 (emphasis added). 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid 245 (emphasis added). 
143 Ibid. 
What was the 'assumption' of the federal system Deane recognised in QEC? 
Deane explained that: 
106 
The Commonwealth, unlike the States, is the creature of the Constitution. Its 
legislative and executive powers are limited to what the Constitution confers. 
Alone, those powers are inadequate to provide more than a truncated part of 
the functions of government. If, without constitutional amendment to fill the 
void, the States were to cease to exist as independent entities, an essential 
element of the substratum of the Federation would be gone.144 
To preserve this 'assumption', Deane argued that the Constitution must include 
an implied restriction on Commonwealth power to ensure that the essential 
building blocks of the Federation continue to exist. This functional assessment 
of the role of the States was also apparent in Deane's analysis of the relevance of 
the Melbourne Corporation principle in the Tasmanian Dam Case. 145 In the 
Tasmanian Dam Case, decided two years before QEC, Deane rejected an 
argument that the substantial interference with State property holdings 
threatened the independent functioning of the State. For Deane, (and likewise 
Mason, Brennan and Murphy JJ), limitations imposed on the use of land by the 
State did not compromise the ability of the State to provide those functions and 
services necessary for governance but not fulfilled at the national level.146 
It was a significant feature of Deane's decision in QEC that he again located his 
analysis, and the derivation of the constitutional implication, within the 
framework of the Engineers' Case. As chapter 1 has examined, Deane had turned 
to a consideration of the Engineers' Case in the Tasmanian Dam Case and the 
Incorporation Case to support his extension of Commonwealth legislative power. 
Deane's reference to the Engineers' Case to legitimise his method of implication, 
that of 'fundamental concepts' reasoning, however, set QEC apart from Deane's 
other implication cases. 
In QEC, Deane was not alone in turning to the broad concept of federalism to 
derive his implied limitation on Commonwealth power. For instance, Gibbs CJ 
emphasised that it was clear 'in principle, and established by authority' that this 
limitation could be derived from the federal nature of the Constitution.147 
144 Ibid 246. 
145 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 280-1. 
146 Ibid 141 (Mason J); 169 (Murphy J); 214-6 (Brennan J); 281 (Deane J). 
147 QEC (1985) 159 CLR 192, 205. 
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Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ each derived the limitation from their 
understanding of the federal system, and the nature and structure of the 
Constitution.148 In contrast, Brennan J derived his implication by closer attention 
to the constitutional text, holding that the limitation was 'necessarily implied by 
s 106 of the Constitution if not from the nature of the federation. 1149 While Deane 
did refer toss 106 and 107 in his judgment,150 the context of his reference makes 
plain that these sections were not critical to his reasoning. Rather, for Deane it 
was 'the nature of the federal system',151 not the demands of s 106, that formed 
the basis of his recognition of an implied restriction on Commonwealth 
legislative power. Deane's approach to constitutional implication in QEC was 
therefore consistent with his reasoning in Duncan, where Deane had reasoned 
that the Constitution's 'positive objective' of co-operation was manifested by 
provisions such as ss Sl(xxxiii), (xxxiv), (xxxvii) and (xxxviii). 
(b) Discrimination, equality and 'the people' 
In a study of Deane's constitutional jurisprudence, QEC is perhaps best known 
for Deane's fleeting remark that a Commonwealth law discriminating against a 
particular State: 
would also be within the preclusive scope of a related, or perhaps comprehensive, 
restraint upon Commonwealth powers which is arguably implicit in the written 
words of the Constitution. That other arguable restraint would arize as an 
implication of the underlying equality of the people of the Commonwealth under the law 
of the Constitution. 152 
David Jackson QC, on behalf of the QEC, had argued that the Constitution 
incorporated a 'broader implication' than the Melbourne Corporation principle. 
He argued that the Constitution contained the implication that the 
Commonwealth was not competent to legislate in a manner that discriminated 
against the 'people of a State.1153 It was this broader implication that Deane 
appeared to adopt in the above passage.154 Chapter 5 explores the connection 
148 Ibid 206 (Gibbs CJ); 212 (Mason J); 222 (Wilson J); 260 (Dawson J). 
149 Ibid 231 (emphasis added). 
150 Ibid 245. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid 247-8 (emphasis added). 
153 Ibid 195. 
154 Jackson QC also appeared in Leeth. On the significance of counsel's arguments in shaping the 
development of constitutional jurisprudence, see the opening remarks of McHugh and Keith 
108 
between Deane's federal implication and the individual guarantee of legal 
equality recognised by Deane and Toohey JJ in Leeth, and the persuasiveness of 
that guarantee. However, two points emerge from the above passage in QEC 
that intersect with the topic of this chapter. 
First, in this passage Deane confirmed his interest in the concepts of 'the people' 
and 'equality' in his constitutional jurisprudence. Although Deane did not 
explore the existence of a broader equality guarantee in QEC, his judgment 
evinced his openness, as early as 1985, towards expanding the constitutional 
protection of equality. It also indicated that questions of the legal relationship 
between the Commonwealth and the States were not, for Deane, divorced from 
his concept of the Constitution as a compact of 'the people'. Combined, Deane's 
references to equality in Hematite and QEC established the ground-work for 
what Lindell later described as Deane's 'strong and abiding concern regarding 
equality as a constitutional doctrine.'155 
Second, this passage sheds light on Deane's attitude towards the Court's 
approach to the derivation of constitutional implications. By leaving open the 
question of Jackson's 'broader implication' in this way, Deane acknowledged 
the possibility of an implication drawn from his understanding of the role of 
'the people' as legal sovereigns. It is true that any contemporary assessment of 
Deane's reasoning in QEC is undoubtedly influenced by an understanding of 
his later recognition of broad implied rights, particularly in the 1990s. However, 
the tenor of Deane's reasons in QEC, and his rights-rich reasoning in Metwally, 
would seem to have offered encouragement to counsel in the 1980s to pursue 
creative arguments based on wide-ranging implications. Deane's openness to 
broad doctrines, and novel arguments regarding the existence of constitutional 
guarantees, confirmed the coherence of Deane's interpretive approach across 
decisions spanning such apparently disparate topics as Hematite, Duncan, 
Metwally, and QEC. 
Mason in their Sir Maurice Byers Memorial Lectures, published as Michael McHugh, 'Does 
Chapter III of the Constitution Protect Substantive as well as Procedural Rights?' (2001) 21 
Australian Bar Review 235 and Keith Mason, 'What is Wrong with Top-Down Legal Reasoning?' 
(2004) 78 Australian Law Journal 574. 
155 G.J. Lindell, 'Recent Developments in the Judicial Interpretation of the Australian 
Constitution' in Geoffrey Lindell (ed) Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (1994) 1, 
42 (emphasis added). 
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The balance of this chapter explores a further illustration of the way in which 
Deane's understanding of 'the people', and his 'fundamental concepts' 
reasoning, shaped his reasoning. In Breavington, in 1988, Deane considered a 
further aspect of the legal relationships between the entities of government in 
the Federation, and demonstrated his commitment to the implication of 
fundamental constitutional guarantees protective of the rights of the people 'of 
Australia'. 
2 Breavington 
Up to this point, this thesis has examined Deane's understanding of the 
relationship, both fiscal and legal, between the Commonwealth and the States. 
This section considers Deane's understanding of aspects of the legal interaction 
between the States, or the States and Territories, and specifically the question of 
choice of law in intranational disputes. In Stevens v Head, Deane remarked that 
this question of choice of law raised a 'fundamental constitutional truth' which 
'lies at the heart of [his] understanding of the structure and working of the 
Constitution.1156 This truth was that the Constitution was 'the compact by which 
the people of Australia united as a single nation' and established a unitary legal 
system.157 The story of Deane and his 'fundamental constitutional truth' began 
in August 1987, during oral argument in Breavington. 
(a) Breavington: an overview 
Breavington involved an action brought in Victoria in respect of personal 
injuries occasioned in the Northern Territory.158 A statutory scheme in the 
Territory limited the recovery of common law damages in that jurisdiction. 
However, in Victoria plaintiffs had access to full common law damages. The 
156 Stevens v Head (1993) 176 CLR 433, 461 (emphasis added). 
157 Ibid 460 (emphasis added). 
158 The facts of Breavington and the structure of Deane's analysis in this case are discussed in: 
Jeremy Kirk, 'Conflicts and Choice of Law within the Australian Constitutional Context' (2003) 
31 Federal Law Review 247, 262-5 and in Graeme Hill and Adrienne Stone, 'The 
Constitutionalisation of the Common Law' (2004) 25 Adelaide Law Review 67, 93-4. 
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case reached the High Court on the assumption that the private international 
law rules, those rules governing conflict of laws between nation states, also 
governed disputes within the Federation.159 The key rule in private 
international law in 1987 was Phillips v Eyre,160 which, in general terms, gave 
preference to the law of the forum court over the law of the place where the tort 
was committed.161 This rule encouraged forum shopping by plaintiffs. 
Prior to Breavington, the Constitution was not thought to have a direct bearing 
on the choice of law rules applicable to legal disputes within the Australian 
Federation.162 However, during oral argument, Deane interrupted Hayne QC to 
suggest that: 
a background question is that the national question has to be approached in the 
context of s 118 of the Constitution. 163 
Deane continued, probing whether the 'correct answer' to the dispute in 
Breavington could necessarily be derived from private international law.164 The 
case was relisted to hear argument on the constitutional issues.165 
When judgment was delivered, members of the Court differed on the role 
played by the Constitution in intranational choice of law issues.166 Deane 
argued in Breavington that the Constitution spoke to the dispute in two ways; 
analysis which was fiercely contested by other members of the Court. Before 
turning to the detail of Deane's reasoning in Breavington, it is useful to set out 
these key points of difference. 
159 On whether this topic is properly seen as 'choice' or 'conflict' of laws, see Stephen Gageler, 
'Private Intra-national law: Choice or Conflict, Common law or Constitution?' (2003) 23 
Australian Bar Review l. 
160 (1870) LR 6 QB 1, adopted in Koop v Bebb (1951) 84 CLR 629. 
161 The rule in Phillips v Eyre is complicated by the so-called 'flexible exception' recognised by 
Lord Wilberforce in Chaplin v Boys [1971] AC 356, 391. 
162 On the interpretation of s 118 prior to Breavington see Jeremy Kirk, 'Conflicts and Choice of 
Law within the Australian Constitutional Context' (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 247, 261-2. 
163 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 46-7 (Deane J during argument) (emphasis added). 
164 Breavington v Godleman, Transcript of Proceedings, 6August1987, 29. 
165 Other questions on which the Court wished to hear further argument included whether the 
choice of law rule to be applied was influenced by s 18 of the State and Territorial Laws and 
Records Recognition Act 1901 (Cth) or by the presence as a party of Telecom, a Commonwealth 
entity. 
166 Breavington raised the issue of the conflict between a Territory and a State law. According to 
Deane, this did not require different analysis: Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 137-8. 
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For Deane, the first issue was the nature of the Federation created by the 
Constitution. While the Colonies were independent entities, with independent 
legal systems, Deane concluded that one of the fundamental assumptions of the 
Constitution was that it was a 'compact between the people' to forge a new nation 
under the Constitution.167 For Deane, this meant that the States could not be 
regarded as independent 'nations', and accordingly the central premise of the 
rule in Phillips v Eyre was incompatible with the Constitution.168 Instead, Deane 
held that the Constitution established a unitary legal system, that is: 
a comprehensive legal system in which the substantive law applicable to 
govern particular facts or circumstances is objective!~ ascertainable or 
predictable and internally consistent or reconcilable. 69 
In a unitary legal system, therefore, only one set of substantive laws could 
apply to a dispute, regardless of the location in the Federation in which an 
action was commenced.170 
In separate judgments, Mason CJ, and Wilson and Gaudron JJ (in a joint 
judgment) also held that the Constitution created a unitary legal system.171 Like 
Deane, they concluded that the rule in Phillips v Eyre was inconsistent with this 
underlying premise of the Australian Constitution. However, three members of 
the Court (Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ) strenuously objected to the vision 
of the Federation as a unitary legal system.172 This was because, for the 
purposes of determining choice of law, the States remained 'mutually 
independent'173 legal systems. 
The second way in which Deane believed that the Constitution spoke to the 
choice of law dispute in Breavington was by mandating the content of the choice 
rule. According to Deane the Constitution required that the substantive law of 
167 Ibid 120 (emphasis added). 
168 Ibid 125, 135. 
169 Ibid 121. 
170 See further, Jeremy Kirk, 'Conflicts and Choice of Law within the Australian Constitutional 
Context' (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 247, 263. The distinction between substantive and 
procedural laws was a contentious issue in the subsequent cases of McKain (1991) 174 CLR 1 
and Stevens v Head (1993) 176 CLR433. 
171 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 78 (Mason CJ), 98 (Wilson and Gaudron JJ). 
172 Ibid 111(BrennanJ);142 (DawsonJ); 166 (Toohey J). See further, Mc.Kain (1991) 174 CLR l, 36 
(Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 
173 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 111 (Brennan J). 
112 
the State with the 'predominant territorial nexus' to the action be applied.174 
Deane derived this rule by implication from the nature of the Constitution, 
specifically, by applying 'fundamental concepts' reasoning. Wilson and 
Gaudron JJ derived a similarly territorially-based rule from the Constitution, 
but sourced their rule in the 'full faith and credit' guarantee of s 118 of the 
Constitution.175 These judges also differed on the degree of flexibility inherent in 
the constitutional rule.176 
Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ rejected this aspect of Deane's 
analysis. They considered that the solution to intranational choice of law was 
not compelled by the Constitution, but instead was to be found in the common 
law, or through the legislative process. The difference between Mason CJ on the 
one hand, and Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ on the other was in the identity 
of the legislature responsible for choice of law rules. Consistent with their 
understanding of the independence of the legal systems of the States, Brennan, 
Dawson and Toohey JJ, most clearly in their later joint judgment (joined also by 
McHugh JJ) in McKain v R W Miller & Company (South Australia) Pty Ltd, 
emphasised that it was the States' right to dictate to their Courts the choice of 
law rules that apply.177 In contrast, Mason CJ, held that that power lay with the 
Commonwealth Parliament, under s Sl(xxv).178 Despite these differences, 
however, the Court in Breavington unanimously held that on the facts of that 
case the Territory law applied to limit the damages available to the plaintiff. 
The question of choice of law between the States in the Australian Federation 
came before Deane on three further occasions, in McKain; Stevens v Head and 
174 Ibid 129. 
175 Ibid 93-100. On the different place of s 118 in the judgments of Deane, and Wilson and 
Gaudron JJ, see below n 200. 
176 Wilson and Gaudron JJ considered that only an 'inflexible rule' would prevent forum 
shopping: ibid 98 and 91 (Wilson and Gaudron JJ). Deane, however, suggested that the Court 
would engage in the 'discretionary weighing' of factors including fairness and justice: Mc Kain 
(1991) 174 CLR 1, 53. For commentary on these differences, and an assessment of the preferable 
rule to apply to intranational choice of law, see the distinct approaches of Jeremy Kirk, 
'Conflicts and Choice of Law within the Australian Constitutional Context' (2003) 31 Federal Law 
Review 247 and James Stellios, 'Choice of Law and the Australian Constitution: Locating the 
Debate' (2005) 33 Federal Law Review 7. 
177 (1991) 174 CLR 1, 36 (Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ) ('McKain)'. On the fact that 
neither s 118, nor the general nature of the Constitution, speaks to the content of the choice of 
law rule, see earlier Breavington (1988) 169 CLR41, 107-8(BrennanJ);150(DawsonJ);164 
(Toohey J). 
178 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 83. 
113 
Goryl v Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd.179 In these cases Deane remained committed 
to his understanding of the constitutional components of choice of law. In 
McKain, however, a change to the composition of the Court had a significant 
effect on the Court's position on this issue. Whereas in Breavington a majority 
had accepted the unitary legal system vision, the departure of Wilson J, and his 
replacement by McHugh J, saw this view relegated to the minority. Thus in 
McKain, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ, in a joint judgment, held 
that the States were mutually independent legal territories, and accordingly the 
private international law rules applied to resolve a choice of law dispute.180 
Only in John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson,181 in 2000, would Deane's vision prevail, 
at least in part. In Pfeiffer the Court affirmed that the States could not be viewed 
as independent nations, or foreign nations, within the Federation.182 However, 
the Court rejected the view that the Constitution itself mandated the application 
of a choice of law rule. Instead, the common law must be made consistent with 
the understanding of the States as units within the federal compact under the 
Constitution.183 There remains lingering controversy regarding the merits of the 
Pfeiffer solution.184 Nevertheless, it was a lasting testimony to Deane's vision 
that, although his understanding of the nature of the Federation and its 
influence on the solution to national choice of law disputes has been contested, 
since his interjection during argument in Breavington the relevance of the 
constitutional context to these disputes has not been denied. 
(b) Deane's constitutional vision in Breavington 
Breavington, and three cases that followed while Deane was a member of the 
Court, are particularly rich sources of insight into Deane's vision of the 
Constitution and its interpretation. For instance, chapter 1 has demonstrated 
that Breavington was an early vehicle for Deane's examination of the role of the 
179 (1994) 179 CLR 463 ('Goryl'). 
180 McKain (1991) 174CLR1, 36 (Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHughJJ). 
181 John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503 ('Pfeiffer'). 
182 Pfeiffer (2000) 203 CLR 503, 534 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); 
550 (Kirby J). 
183 Ibid 528 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); 546 (Kirby J). 
184 See, for example, the critiques of Graeme Hill and Adrienne Stone, 'The Constitutionalisation 
of the Common Law' (2004) 25 Adelaide Law Review 67 and James Stellios, 'Choice of Law and 
the Australian Constitution: Locating the Debate' (2005) 33 Federal Law Review 7. 
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Convention Debates as a tool in constitutional interpretation. This topic was 
also the vehicle one of Deane's 'persistent dissents'.185 Thus, in Stevens v Head, 
Deane, when faced with the decision of the newly formed majority in McKain, 
remarked: 
I am fully conscious of the weight of the considerations which support the view 
that a decision of the Court which still enjoys majority support should be 
treated by an individual member of the Court as being as binding upon him or 
her as it is on the members of every other Australian court. There are, however, 
weighty statements of authority which support the proposition that, in matters 
of fundamental constitutional importance, the members of this Court are 
obliged to adhere to what they see as the requirements of the Constitution of 
which the Court is both a creature and the custodian.186 
Here, in contrast to Philip Morris, Deane placed adherence to the 'correct' 
interpretation of the Constitution over the call of precedent. 
In the context of the present discussion of Deane's federal vision, the 
significance of Breavington lies in three related aspects of his reasoning. First, 
Deane's reliance on 'fundamental concepts' reasoning to derive the 
constitutional solution to intranational choice of law is notable. Second, 
Breavington shed further light on the place of 'the people' in Deane's 
understanding of the nature of the Australian Federation. Third, was the 
importance of Deane's decision that the Constitution, rather than the common 
law or the Parliament, determined the content of the choice of law rule. 
(i) Reasoning from 'fundamental concepts' in Breavington 
In what is now a familiar rhetorical technique in Deane's decisions, Deane 
commenced his decision in Breavington with a statement of the fundamental 
principle guiding the Court's decision in this case.187 Thus he remarked: 
The provisions of the Constitution must be construed in the general context that, 
while the Federation was intended to preserve the existence of the former 
Colonies as States, the compact between the people of those Colonies was to unite in 
185 The term 'persistent dissent' is utilised by Lynch. See Andrew Lynch, The Impact of Dissenting 
Opinions upon the Development of Australian Constitutional Law (PhD thesis, University of New 
South Wales, 2005) 259. 
186 Stevens v Head (1993) 176 CLR 433, 461-2. See discussion in Lynch, above n 185, 270-80. 
187 Compare Deane's opening remarks in Hematite, discussed above n 86, and the Incorporation 
Case, discussed above n 125. The structure of Deane's reasoning in Breavington and the 
Incorporation Case, particularly his treatment of 'extraneous arguments' (including the relevance 
of the framers' intentions), was strikingly similar in these two decisions. 
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one indissoluble Commonwealth under a new system of law to which all within its 
territory ... were thenceforth to be subject.188 
As he did in Duncan, Deane then marshalled aspects of the text that confirmed, 
or manifested, this underlying 'fundamental concept' of the Constitution. In 
Breavington, these were:189 
1. The conferring of original jurisdiction on the High Court and the vesting of 
federal jurisdiction on courts named in Ch III; 190 
2. The doctrine of the separation of federal judicial power embodies the 
'jurisprudential basis of the Constitution', that is, the assumption that laws exist 
independently of the exercise of judicial power. Thus the content of law cannot 
be contingent on the court which hears the action; 191 
3. The existence, and 'pervading influence' of the uniform common law 
throughout the nation;192 
4. The principle, 'at the heart of the legal system embodied in the Constitution' 
and recognised in Metwally that an individual should not be exposed to 'the 
injustice' of being subjected to simultaneously valid but inconsistent laws; 193 
and 
5. The unity deriving from the jurisdiction of the High Court as the final and 
general appellate tribunal for the nation.194 
As in Duncan, Deane repeatedly described these five elements of the text and 
structure of the Constitution as manifesting the 'inference' of the Constitution, 
that is, that the Australian Federation established a unitary system of law.195 The 
language of underlying doctrines 'manifested' by the text and structure of the 
Constitution was later employed in Deane and Toohey JJ in their reasoning in 
Leeth.196 
Deane's reliance on 'fundamental concepts' reasoning to develop his 
implication from his vision of the Constitution as establishing a unitary legal 
188 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 120 (emphasis added). 
189 The stages of Deane's analysis in Breavington, including these five manifestations of his 
'fundamental concepts', are set out in detail in Graeme Hill and Adrienne Stone, 'The 
Constitutionalisation of the Common Law' (2004) 25 Adelaide Law Review 67, 93-4. 
190 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 122. Compare ibid 87 (Wilson and Gaudron JJ). 
191 Ibid 122-3. 
192 Ibid 123. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid 124. 
195 Ibid 121-2. 
196 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 484 (Deane and Toohey JJ). 
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system, rather than reasoning for that proposition is reinforced by Deane's use 
of s 118 in his analysis.197 Section 118 provides that: 
Full faith and credit shall be given, throughout the Commonwealth, to the laws, 
the public Acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of every State. 
As foreshadowed, it had been Deane who first raised with counsel during oral 
argument the significance of s 118 to the issues in the case in Breavington.198 
Drawing an analogy between giving full faith and credit to 'a person's word' 
and a judicial judgment, Deane reasoned that a substantive interpretation of 
s 118 required that the contents of the law be enforceable in another State 
jurisdiction.199 This understanding of s 118 would itself have produced the 
outcome Deane endorsed in Breavington, that is, that the Constitution compelled 
a territorially-based choice of law rule within a unitary legal system. That 
Deane did not take this path in his analysis confirmed his willingness to engage 
with general doctrines of the Constitution. However, and particularly in his 
implied rights cases, this interpretive approach exposed his decisions to the 
criticism that his reasoning departed too far from the text, turning instead to 
vague and individualised assumptions as the foundation for his analysis. 
In form and substance, Deane's analysis commenced with the general doctrines 
of the Constitution rather than the terms of s 118. Deane's reference to s 118 in 
his decision in Breavington occurred at the close of his analysis, reinforcing the 
relative importance of 'fundamental concepts' and specific textual provisions in 
his analysis. Deane argued that the rule he derived from the general nature of 
the Constitution: 
would have been the position under the provisions of the Constitution (in 
particular, ss 106, 107 and 108) even if those provisions had not included s 118. 
The presence of s 118 serves to make that position plain.200 
As foreshadowed in Duncan, Deane's reasoning did not apply the expressio 
unius maxim. Thus the text of the Constitution, such as s 118, did not displace 
or restrict the broad implication of a unitary legal system, and the constitutional 
197 On the difference between reasoning 'from' and 'for' different visions of the Australian 
Federation see Graeme Hill, 'Revisiting Wakim and Hughes: the Distinct Demands of Federalism' 
(2002) 13 Public Law Review 205, 226. 
198 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 46-7 (during argument). 
199 Ibid 129. 
200 Ibid. 
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choice of law rule. Rather, the text merely made 'plain' the result derived from 
Deane's vision of the Australian Federation. 
Deane's distinctive reliance on his 'fundamental concepts' reasoning, rather 
than the content of s 118, was underscored by the different role of s 118 in the 
reasoning of Wilson and Gaudron JJ. Although reaching very similar 
conclusions, Wilson and Gaudron JJ, in contrast to Deane, focused exclusively 
on s 118 as providing the relevant constitutional dimension of the case. Further, 
while Deane commenced dramatically with his reference to the fundamental 
nature of the Constitution, and the place of 'the people', Wilson and Gaudron JJ 
turned to the constitutional context of the case only after a lengthy discussion of 
the case law on private international law rules.201 
(ii) 'The people' and the unitary system of law 
In Deane's judgment in Breavington, and in the subsequent cases on s 118, 'the 
people' feature in his analysis in a number of ways.202 Deane linked the 
existence of a unitary system of law to the intentions of 'the people' in forming 
the Federation. The connection drawn by Deane between 'the people' and the 
unitary system was evinced from the opening passage of his judgment in 
Breavington, when Deane affirmed that the Constitution was the 'compact of the 
people ... to create a new system of law'.203 Significantly, Deane continued in 
Breavington to affirm his understanding of the legal sovereignty of 'the people', 
stating that: 
the Australian people, rather than the past authority of the United Kingdom 
Parliament [offers] a more acceptable contemrcorary explanation of the 
authority of the basic law of the Constitution. 04 
As foreshadowed, Deane had endorsed the principle that legal sovereignty 
resided in 'the people' before Breavington in 1988. For example, in Kirmani v 
Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd (No 1) Deane had queried whether the Statute of 
201 Wilson and Gaudron JJ' s constitutional analysis starts ten pages into their judgment: ibid 93. 
202 Chapter1 has indicated the role of 'the people' in Deane's reasoning in Breavington as an 
explanation of his understanding of the role of the framers' intentions in constitutional 
interpretation. 
203 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 120 (emphasis added). 
204 Ibid 123 (emphasis added). 
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Westminster 1931 (Imp) had effected a significant change in Australian legal 
independence.205 The significance of this passage from Breavington, however, 
lies in Deane's connection between the proposition that sovereignty resides in 
the 'Australian people' and his conclusion that the Constitution effected a 
'single nation with a unitary system of law.'206 Although Deane had prioritised the 
national over the federal in decisions prior to Breavington, in this case Deane 
made explicit the connection between his federal vision, and his understanding 
of 'the people' as the' Australian people.' This vision of 'the people', and their 
role in the Constitution goes some way towards explaining the centralising 
tendencies Deane exhibited in the cases examined in this chapter and chapter 1. 
Although Deane did not examine s 128 in his reasoning in Breavington, Deane 
and Toohey JJ's discussion of that section in Nationwide News suggested that 
Deane saw that provision as reinforcing his vision of 'the people' as 'the people' 
of Australia. In Nationwide News Deane and Toohey JJ remarked that through 
s 128: 
the Constitution reserves to the people of the Commonwealth the ultimate 
power of governmental control. ... While one can point to qualifications and 
exceptions, such as those concerned with the protection of the position of the 
less populous States, the general effect of the Constitution is, ... that ... all 
citizens of the Commonwealth who are not under some special disability are entitled to 
share equally in the exercise of those ultimate powers of governmental control.207 
In this way, Deane and Toohey JJ in Nationwide News argued that through the 
subsequent act of sovereign power, through amending the Constitution, the 
people acted as the 'people of the Commonwealth.' 
However, Deane and Toohey JJ's emphasis on the national components of s 128 
in Nationwide News has not been uniformly endorsed. For example, Gummow J 
in McGinty v Western Australia,2°8 drew particular attention to s 128 as 
supporting a federalised understanding of popular sovereignty. In McGinty the 
Court held that neither the Commonwealth Constitution nor the Western 
205 (1985) 159 CLR 351, 442. 
206 Stevens v Head (1993) 176 CLR 433, 461 (emphasis added). 
207 Nationwide News (1992) 177 CLR 1, 71-2 (emphasis added). 
208 (1996) 186 CLR 140. 
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Australian Constitution contained an implied guarantee of electoral equality.209 
Gummow J assessed that question from the perspective of the federal basis of 
representative government. For example Gummow J cited the role of the Senate 
and the manner of election of federal representatives as establishing an 
important federal component to the principle of representative government as it 
was embodied in the Constitution.210 Most significantly for present purposes, 
however, Gummow J also emphasised that: 
Broad statements as to the reposition of 'sovereignty' in 'the people' of 
Australia, if they are to be given legal rather than popular or political meanin?, 
must be understood in light of the federal considerations contained in s 128.21 
Section 128 indeed imposes many limitations on the ability of 'the people' to 
alter the federal dimensions of the Constitution. For example, Gummow J 
pointed in McGinty to the requirements under s 128 for diminishing 
proportionate representation of a State, or altering the limits of a State.212 In 
addition, Gummow J emphasised the 'negative power' under s 128, permitting 
a majority of electors in three States to block a proposal which is accepted by a 
majority of the nation's electors.213 These requirements impose significant 
limitations on the sovereignty of 'the people of Australia' to influence the 
federal nature of the Constitution. 
These federal limits on the power of 'the people of Australia' under s 128 would 
seem to require attention if support is sought for a unitary legal system from an 
understanding of the constitutional concept of 'the people'. The extra-curial 
writings of Gummow J (writing in support of the unitary legal system concept) 
may indicate that recognition of the federal dimension of the concept of 'the 
people' does not inevitably point against a unitary legal system model.214 
However, as the constitutional text itself does not provide unequivocal support 
for the proposition that 'the people' means 'the people of Australia' in all 
circumstances, Deane's decisions must be regarded as manifesting his decision 
209 For further comment on the significance of this case see Greg Carne, 'Representing 
Democracy or Reinforcing Inequality: Electoral Distribution and McGinty v Western Australia' 
(1997) 25 Federal Law Review 351. 
210 McGinty (1996) 186 CLR 140, 275. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Ibid. 
213 Ibid. 
214 See, for example, WM C Gummow, 'Full Faith and Credit in Three Federations' (1995) 46 
South Carolina Law Review 979. 
to preference 'the people of Australia' over the potential federal limits of the 
concept of 'the people'. 
(iii) 'The people' and the content of Deane's choice of law rule 
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The second way in which Deane turned to 'the people' in Breavington was 
through his comparison betweens 118 ands 109. According to Deane, both 
sections were fundamental guarantees, protecting the citizen from the injustice 
of facing the demands of two valid yet inconsistent legal commands.215 In 
Breavington Deane explicitly incorporated his own previous statements in 
Metwally, in particular, his views that the Federation must be regarded as a 
federation of 'the people', and so the Constitution's terms must be interpreted 
for their benefit.216 
As he had in Metwally, Deane's decision in Breavington emphasised that the 
Constitution served the interests of the citizens by strengthening the judicial 
protection of their rights. Accordingly, Deane regarded the choice of law issue 
as pivotal to the ability of the people to predict the rules and responsibilities 
that would govern a particular set of circumstances. For Deane the 'guarantee' 
of the rule of law under the Constitution, made plain by the terms of s 118, 
required that the Constitution itself hold the answer to the question of what law 
would apply to any given dispute within the Federation.217 
As Mason CJ' s reasoning bears out, however, it was possible to endorse a vision 
of the Australian federal system as incorporating a unitary system of law 
without endorsing Deane's view that the Constitution mandated a territorially-
based the choice of law rule. Under Mason CJ's solution to the choice of law 
dilemma, it was Parliament, rather than the Court (as interpreter of the 
Constitution) that determined the content of the rule. Thus, as in Metwally, 
Mason CJ deferred to the principle of parliamentary supremacy in 
constitutional adjudication, stating that it was: 
215 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 522. 
216 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 123. 
217 Ibid. 
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preferable that Parliament should provide a solution by an exercise of 
legislative power ... than that the Court should spell out a rigid and inflexible 
approach from the language of s 118.218 
Deane's reasoning in both Metwally and Breavington did not display this degree 
of deference. For Deane, the Constitution required that the individual's rule of 
law interest could not be altered by their elected representatives. In Breavington 
Deane reasoned that only a territorially-based rule, fixed by the 'fundamental 
concepts' enshrined in the Constitution, could secure the predictability and 
certainty necessary to protect the people's rights and interests. In this way the 
Court assumed the role of protector of the rights of 'the people'. This is a 
feature of Deane's jurisprudence that extended beyond his rule of law decisions 
in Metwally and Breavington. The legitimacy of Deane's assumption of that role, 
based on Deane's unique concept of the sovereignty of 'the people', is a 
question for consideration in later chapters of this thesis. 
Conclusion 
An examination of Deane's federal jurisprudence reveals a judge committed to 
national more than federal considerations. Where Deane's reasoning departed 
in outcome or tenor from that of other members of the Court in the cases 
considered in this chapter, the source of that difference was invariably Deane's 
understanding of the constitutional significance of 'the people'. 
This chapter has examined two further elements of Deane's understanding of 
federalism and the Constitution. First, the cases in this chapter highlight the 
connection between Deane's preference for national solutions and his vision of 
the 'people of Australia'. Second, Deane's reasoning evinced the role of 
'fundamental concepts' in his interpretive philosophy. Under this approach, 
underlying doctrines were illustrated, demonstrated or manifested by the text, 
and may provide the foundation for constitutional implications. Both elements 
of Deane's decisions in this chapter introduce a significant degree of judicial 
choice into constitutional interpretation, whether by framing the concept of 'the 
218 Ibid 83. 
people' to contain a national element, or articulating of the content of the 
Constitution's 'fundamental concepts'. 
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Deane's reasoning in Metwally, Hematite and Breavington also highlighted the 
strength of Deane's commitment to the judicial protection of the rights of 'the 
people'. The next chapter continues this discussion, exploring Deane's decisions 
on the separation of powers principle. 
Chapter 3 THE SEPARATION OF FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL POWER 
Introduction 
The separation of federal legislative and executive power from judicial power 
has long been acknowledged as a fundamental doctrine upon which the 
Constitution is based.1 This doctrine is reflected in both the structural division 
of federal power in the first three Chapters of the Constitution and in the 
language of s 71, through its vesting of federal judicial power in 'courts'. 
In R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia2 the Court confirmed that 
the separation of federal judicial power under the Constitution had two 
important consequences, or 'limbs'.3 The 'first limb' of the separation doctrine 
was that only 'courts' designated in Ch III may exercise federal judicial power. 
This principle has never been challenged.4 In contrast, the second limb of the 
separation of powers doctrine has been received 'equivocally'.5 The 'second 
limb' precluded a federal court from exercising non-judicial functions.6 Its 
1 New South Wales v Commonwealth ('Wheat Case') (1915) 20 CLR 54, 88 (Isaacs J). Nationwide News 
(1992) 177 CLR l, 70 (Deane and Toohey JJ). For an overview of the development of the doctrine 
in Australian jurisprudence, see Fiona Wheeler, 'Separation of Powers' in Tony Blackshield, 
Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia 
(2001) 618. 
2 (1956) 94 CLR 254 ('Boilermakers' Case'). Affirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney-General of 
the Commonwealth of Australia v The Queen [1957] AC 288. 
3 On the significance of the Boilermakers' Case, and the two limbs of the separation doctrine, see 
Fiona Wheeler, 'The Boilermakers Case' in H. P. Lee and George Winterton (eds), Australian 
Constitutional Landmarks (2003) 160. 
4 The strictness of the application of the first limb of the separation doctrine has been tempered 
slightly by the recognition of a range of exceptions, including for military justice tribunals. The 
Court has also accepted that, within strictly confined limits, federal judicial power can be 
delegated to non-judicial bodies: Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84. Although this was a 
decision in which Deane participated, it is not explored in this thesis. 
5 Peter Gerangelos, 'Interpretational Methodology in Separation of Powers Jurisprudence: the 
Formalist/Functionalist Debate' (2005) 8 Constitutional Law and Policy Review l, 5. See further R v 
Joske; Ex parte Shop Distributive and Allied Employees' Association (1976) 130 CLR 87, 90 (Barwick 
CJ), 102 (Mason J). Note also Sir Anthony Mason, 'A New Perspective on Separation of Powers' 
(1996) 82 Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration l, 5-6. 
6 For commentary this limb, see Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) 
166-70, 212-8. 
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purpose was to immunise the federal judiciary from the influence of 
governmental policy.7 Combined, the two limbs of the separation doctrine 
ensure the independent exercise of judicial power at the federal level; 
guaranteeing a key protection of individual liberty and an important element of 
the rule of law.8 
Part 1 of this chapter examines Deane's implication of rights from the first limb 
of the separation of powers principle. This part isolates three important topics 
from this aspect of Deane's jurisprudence: the guarantee of 'judicial process', 
culminating in Dietrich; the question of Bills of Attainder and retrospective 
criminal laws in Polyukhovich v Commonwealth;9 and Deane's restriction of the 
jurisdiction of military tribunals, consistent with his vision of the right of 
military personnel to be tried for federal offences in Ch III courts, in Re Tracey; 
Ex parte Ryan.10 These cases illustrate Deane's consistent use of his 'fundamental 
concepts' reasoning to strengthen the constitutional protection of individual 
liberties. Despite these similarities, however, these cases also reflect the 
considerable diversity of Deane's jurisprudence: ranging from the modest and 
compelling implication of procedural judicial process guarantees to his 
overreaching and unsustainable guarantee against federal retrospective 
criminal laws in Polyukhovich. 
Part 2 turns to Deane's thoughts on the second limb of the separation doctrine, 
through his identification of the limits of the designated persona exception to 
that limb. In Grollo v Palmer11 the last of three joint judgments given by Deane 
on this topic, Deane participated in a joint majority judgment which upheld the 
7 See discussion in George Winterton, 'The Separation of Judicial Power as an Implied Bill of 
Rights' in G Lindell (ed) Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (1994) 185, 188. Ayres 
provides a fascinating 'behind the scenes' perspective on the Boilermakers' Case, and the purpose 
of the second limb of the separation principle. Note in particular the extract from a letter written 
by Sir Owen Dixon to Lord Simonds discussing the imminent decision by the Privy Council on 
the appeal in the case and expressing Sir Owen's concern that the melding of judicial and non-
judicial power could lead to 'fatal consequences' and undermine the reputation of the judiciary. 
Philip Ayres, Owen Dixon (2003) 255 (emphasis added). 
8 See, for example, Andrew Inglis Clark, 'The Supremacy of the Judiciary under the 
Constitution of the United States, and under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia' (1903) XVII Harvard Law Review l, 19. 
9 (1991) 172 CLR 501 (' Polyukhovich'). 
10 (1989) 166 CLR 501 ('Re Tracey'). This case was the first of a trilogy of cases on the military 
justice exception to the separation of federal judicial power delivered while Deane was a 
member of the Court. The two further cases were Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460 
('Re Nolan') and Re Tyler; Ex parte Foley (1994) 181CLR18 ('Re Tyler'). 
11 (1995) 184 CLR 348 ('Grollo'). 
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use of judges, in their personal capacity, to authorise wire-taps. The Grollo 
decision endorsed a broad exception to the second limb of the separation of 
powers principle, informed by precedent and an assessment of policy 
considerations. At first glance, Deane's designated person exception appeared 
inconsistent with his strict enforcement of the separation of powers principle in 
his military tribunal decisions. As Deane's only decisions on the persona 
designata exception were joint judgments, the question might be asked why 
Deane's understanding of the second limb of the separation of powers doctrine 
warrants more than a passing comment in this thesis, particularly when other 
significant decisions on Ch Ill, such as Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for 
Immigration12 and Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission13 are 
not a focus of this chapter.14 
An explanation of this treatment of the designated person exception in this 
chapter lies in four factors. First, although less certain in its doctrinal 
foundation, the second limb of the separation doctrine remains an established 
element of the Australian separation of powers doctrine. Any discussion of 
Deane and the separation of powers doctrine would be one-sided without a 
consideration of his view of this principle. Deane's decisions on the designated 
person exceptions must therefore be considered. Second, these cases are of 
historical significance as it has been this exception, and the incompatibility 
doctrine developed by Deane and other judges in this area, that has been a 
fertile area in Ch III jurisprudence since Deane's departure from the Court.15 
Third, as a series of three joint judgments, these cases are a reminder of the 
challenges facing the identification of the role of joint judgments as accurate 
signals of an individual judge's constitutional philosophy. Fourth, the Grollo 
joint judgment contained significant reflections on the importance of judicial 
method, and the personal qualities of judges, as guarantees of individual rights. 
This was a view of judges and the judicial process that stood at the heart of 
12 (1992) 176 CLR 1 ('Chu Kheng Lim'). For further examination of this case, and its significance in 
the Mason Court's development of Ch III rights, see George Winterton, 'The Separation of 
Judicial Power as an Implied Bill of Rights' in G Lindell (ed) Future Directions in Australian 
Constitutional Law (1994) 185. 
13 (1995) 183 CLR 245. 
14 Deane's decision in Leeth (with Toohey J) was also an important indicator of his attitude 
towards rights flowing from Ch III. However, the Ch III aspects of Leeth are discussed below in 
chapter 5 as part of the analysis of their reasoning in that case. 
15 See, in particular, Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51. 
126 
Deane's constitutional philosophy. For these reasons, Deane's decisions on the 
second limb of the separation principle are a significant resource regarding 
Deane's constitutional vision. 
A Part 1: Rights implied from the separation 
of powers principle 
Chapter 2 affirmed the significance of Deane's swearing-in speech as a signal of 
his vision of federal relationships, that is, that the Federation was a 'Federation 
of the people not the States'.16 To a greater extent, Deane's swearing-in speech 
also encapsulated the heart of his vision for Ch III as a source of implied rights. 
Thus, in his speech Deane explained that: 
the grant of judicial power by the people was subject to what I see as 
fundamental constitutional guarantees, namely, that the power granted must 
primarily be exercised by an independent judiciary and that those exercising the 
power must act judicially.17 
Deane's High Court jurisprudence bears out this statement, manifesting 
guarantees falling precisely into the two categories outlined in his speech: first, 
a guarantee that federal judicial power will be exercised by' courts'; second, a 
guarantee as to the manner of exercise of that power. 
Deane's guarantee that a Ch III court exercise judicial power 'judicially' was the 
most novel of his two guarantees in 1982.18 Recognised by the Court as a 
constitutional guarantee of natural justice in 1992, it was Deane, along with 
Gaudron J, who consistently propounded this guarantee.19 Deane's early 
16 Transcript of the Ceremonial Sitting of the Occasion of the Swearing-in of the Honourable 
Mr Justice Deane as a Justice of the High Court of Australia at Canberra, Tuesday 27 July 1982, 
18 (emphasis added). 
17 Ibid (emphasis added). 
18 Although note that in 1910, Harrison Moore had suggested that Parliament might be 
prohibited from interfering with judicial administration, including requiring a court 'to act in a 
non-judicial way.' WH Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (2nd ed, 1910) 
323. The early commentaries on Ch III, including that of Moore, are examined in Fiona Wheeler, 
'Original Intent and the Doctrine of Separation of Powers in Australia' (1996) 7 Public Law 
Review 96. 
19 On the development of this guarantee, see, for example: Christine Parker, 'Protection of 
Judicial Process as an Implied Constitutional Principle' (1994) 16 Adelaide Law Review 341; 
Michael McHugh, 'Does Chapter III of the Constitution Protect Substantive as well as 
Procedural Rights?' (2001) 21 Australian Bar Review 235 and Fiona Wheeler, 'The Doctrine of 
Separation of Powers and Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia' (1997) 23 
Monash University Law Review 248. For a contemporary perspective on the influence of Deane 
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decisions in Australian Builders Construction Employees and Builders Labourers' 
Federation v Commonwealth,20 and Hammond v Commonwealth21 and his emotive, 
and unusual, statement issued in Commonwealth v Brian Toohey,22 demonstrate 
both Deane's coherence on the topic of implied rights from Ch III and provide 
the context for evaluating Deane's later Ch III jurisprudence. However, it was 
not until his decision in Polyukhovich, in 1991, that he articulated the principles 
through which his judicial process guarantee was derived. Deane's judgment in 
Polyukhovich therefore provides the starting point for this analysis. 
1 Deane's Judicial Process Guarantee 
(a) 'Fundamental concepts' reasoning and Deane's 
judicial process guarantee 
As in Breavington, Deane's analysis in Polyukhovich commenced with a 
discussion of the 'fundamental concept' at issue in the case.23 Thus Deane did 
not begin by examining precedent or the language of s 71, but rather the 
purpose and function of the separation of powers principle. In Polyukhovich 
Deane quoted extensively from Blackstone's Commentaries to underline the 
traditional understanding of the separation of powers principle as the 'one 
main preservative of the public liberty'. 24 According to Deane, it was upon this 
principle, with its rights-protective purpose, that the Constitution was 
'structured'.25 It is unlikely that other members of the Mason Court would have 
disagreed with this statement of the purpose of the separation of powers in 
Polyukhovich, or Deane's recognition that the separation of federal judicial 
power was implicit in the structure of the Constitution. However, the priority 
and Gaudron JJ in this area see Fiona Wheeler, 'Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in 
the New High Court' (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 205. 
20 (1981) 37 ALR 469 ('BLF'). 
21 (1982) 152 CLR 188 ('Hammond'). 
22 Commonwealth v Brian Toohey (Unreported, High Court of Australia, Deane J, 8 November 
1988). 
23 Compare Deane's opening remarks in Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 120-1. Discussed above 
chapter 2 n 188. 
24 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 606. Deane's discussion of the separation principle in 
Polyukhovich, including his citation from Blackstone, built on his analysis in Re Tracey (1988) 166 
CLR 518, 580. Deane's reasoning in Re Tracey is discussed later in this part. 
25 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 606. With this language, Deane in Re Tracey and in 
Polyukhovich anticipated his later statement that the Constitution was structured upon three 
fundamental doctrines, including the separation of powers principle. See Nationwide News 
(1992) 177 CLR 1, 69-70 (Deane and Toohey JJ). 
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placed by Deane on the purpose of the separation of powers in Polyukhovich had 
a dramatic and distinctive impact on the scope and operation of rights that 
Deane implied from that principle in Polyukhovich, and throughout his Ch III 
jurisprudence. 26 
In Polyukhovich, Deane derived his judicial process guarantee from the first limb 
of the Constitution's separation of powers doctrine.27 After affirming the 
purpose of the separation of powers doctrine as an important guarantee of 
liberty, Deane argued that: 
to construe Ch III of the Constitution as being concerned only with labels and 
as requiring no more than that the repository of judicial power be called a court 
would be to convert it into a mockery, rather than a reflection, of the doctrine of 
separation of powers.28 
According to Deane, if the Court was to give effect to the purpose of the first 
limb of the separation doctrine, federal judicial power must be vested in an 
institution which is a 'court' in substance. Thus, the Constitution's separation of 
powers doctrine required that federal judicial power be exercised by a Court 
according to 'the essential attributes of the curial process.'29 In Polyukhovich, Deane 
referred to the Constitution's protection of the 'traditional judicial procedures, 
remedies and methodology'30 but did not specifically identify the content of 
these 'essential attributes'. 
A significant feature of Deane's analysis in Polyukhovich was that, unlike his 
'fundamental concepts' reasoning in Duncan or Breavington, Deane did not turn 
directly to 'the people' in support of his implication.31 Indeed, with the 
exception of his swearing-in speech, Deane's implication of rights from the first 
limb of the separation principle was notable for its lack of references to 'the 
people'. This distinctive feature of Deane's Ch III jurisprudence may be a 
26 Wheeler has examined the significance of a purposive approach to the separation of powers 
doctrine, and its importance for Deane's implication of judicial process rights from Ch III, in 
Fiona Wheeler, 'The Rise and Rise of Judicial Power under Chapter III of the Constitution: a 
Decade in Overview' (2001) 20 Australian Bar Review 283 and Fiona Wheeler, 'Due Process, 
Judicial Power and Chapter III in the New High Court' (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 205. 
27 See further discussion in Wheeler (2001) above n 26, 250-1 and (2004) above n 26, 209. 
28 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 607 (citation omitted). Deane's use of the language 'mockery' 
in Polyukhovich was evocative his earlier statement that s 80 should not be interpreted as a 
'rotentially mischievous mockery' in Kingswell (1985) 159 CLR 264, 307. 
2 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 607 (emphasis added). 
30 Ibid 607. 
31 Compare Duncan (1983) 158 CLR 535, 589 and Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 120-1. 
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response to the pedigree of rights-sensitive interpretations of the 'fundamental 
concepts' involved in these cases. Unlike the orthodox vision of federalism, the 
separation of federal judicial power had a long tradition as an important rights 
guarantee before Deane's appointment to the Court. Thus, in his Ch III 
jurisprudence Deane may have considered it unnecessary to turn to the 
comparatively untested concept of 'the people' to support his implication of 
constitutional rights from Ch III. 
Deane's use of 'fundamental concepts' reasoning to derive a judicial process 
guarantee was compelling. Deane's judicial process guarantee derived from a 
substantive interpretation of s 71, consistent with the purpose of the first limb 
of the separation principle.32 As Justice Michael McHugh has observed extra-
curially: 
It is, after all, a 'short step' from the constitutional requirement that judicial 
power can only be vested in the courts identified in s 71 to the conclusion that 
Ch III guarantees the procedural rights necessary for the exercise of that power.33 
The logical path to determine the substantive meaning of s 71, and the nature of 
a 'court' was, as Deane reasoned, to turn to the 'general doctrine', or 
'fundamental concept' of the separation principle.34 Further, as Wheeler has 
observed, Deane's approach provided a clear principle for identifying the limits 
of the judicial process guarantee, that is, according to those 'attributes' of a 
Court required to effect the purpose of the separation principle.35 
The strength of Deane's derivation of the judicial process guarantee from the 
first limb of the separation principle is highlighted by comparing the 
approaches of Deane and Gaudron JJ on this topic. Like Deane, Gaudron J was 
a consistent proponent of a constitutional guarantee of judicial process.36 As 
32 See further Fiona Wheeler, 'The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Constitutionally 
Entrenched Due Process in Australia' (1997) 23 Monash University Law Review 248, 254. 
33 Michael McHugh, 'Does Chapter III of the Constitution Protect Substantive as well as 
Procedural Rights?' (2001) 21 Australian Bar Review 235, 238. McHugh's reference to a 'short 
step' was a quotation from Leslie Zines, 'A Judicially Created Bill of Rights?' (1994) 16 Sydney 
Law Review 166, 168. 
34 See discussion in Keith Mason, 'What is Wrong with Top-Down Legal Reasoning?' (2004) 78 
Australian Law Journal 574, 582. 
35 Fiona Wheeler, 'Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the New High Court' (2004) 32 
Federal Law Review 205, 210-11. 
36 For Gaudron J's exploration of the judicial process guarantee during Deane's period on the 
Court, see Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84, 150-2; Re Nolan (1991) 172 CLR 460, 496; 
Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 703-4 and Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 502. Developments in 
Gaudron J's approach after this period are examined in Wheeler, above n 35. 
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Wheeler has indicated, according to Gaudron J the judicial process guarantee 
flowed from the second limb of the separation of powers principle.37 Thus 
Gaudron J argued that the second limb of the separation principle required that 
the Commonwealth could only confer 'judicial power' on a Ch III court. As an 
essential feature of judicial power, the absence of judicial process from the 
exercise of a function meant that such a power was not judicial power, and 
therefore could not be exercised by a Ch III court.38 Under Gaudron J's 
approach, therefore, the Court was required to engage with the difficult 
question of the meaning of 'judicial power' in order to frame the content of her 
judicial process guarantee.39 In contrast, Deane's method of implication avoided 
this task, linking his judicial process guarantee instead to the limb of the 
separation principle that has never been challenged.40 
Given that many of Deane's decisions employing 'fundamental concepts' 
reasoning have been criticised as impermissibly extending the discretion of the 
Court in the interpretation of the Constitution, it is significant that Deane's 
procedural due process guarantee was an aspect of his implied rights 
jurisprudence which has been accepted by the Court.41 Indeed, in the passage 
from Justice Michael McHugh's extra-curial address quoted above, it is 
apparent that a fierce critic of Deane's 'fundamental concepts' reasoning in the 
free speech cases, endorsed Deane's interpretive approach in this context.42 It is 
ironic therefore that this illustration of Deane's compelling application of 
'fundamental concepts' reasoning is found in Polyukhovich, a case that also 
exhibited some of Deane's least persuasive analysis in his attempt to extend 
Ch III protection to prohibit retrospective criminal laws. Before pursuing this 
aspect of Polyukhovich, however, further remarks must be made on the content 
of Deane's judicial process guarantee. The next stage of this discussion returns 
37 Wheeler, above n 35, 210-11. 
38 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 703-4. 
39 See further Wheeler above n 35, 210-11. 
4° Compare Sir Anthony Mason's reflections flowing his retirement from the Court regarding 
the continuing value of the second limb in Sir Anthony Mason, 'A New Perspective on 
Separation of Powers' (1996) 82 Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration 1, 2. 
41 See Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ's suggestion that a procedural due process guarantee, 
a guarantee of 'natural justice', may be derived from Ch III, in Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 470. See 
also Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ's statement that the Constitution guaranteed that judicial 
power may not be exercised 'inconsistent with the essential character of a court or with the 
nature of judicial power.' Chu Kheng Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27. 
42 Michael McHugh, 'Does Chapter III of the Constitution Protect Substantive as well as 
Procedural Rights?' (2001) 21 Australian Bar Review 235, 238. See above n 33. 
to Deane's earliest decisions on the judicial process guarantee, in BLF and 
Hammond. 
(b) 'Essential features': the content of Deane's judicial 
process guarantee 
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Deane's decisions in BLF and Hammond in the 1980s confirm Deane's long 
standing interest in rights implied from Ch III. Indeed, BLF was a decision 
delivered by Deane while a member of the Federal Court. Through their facts, 
these two early cases provide useful illustrations of Deane's vision of the scope 
and operation of his judicial process guarantee. 
(i) BLF and Hammond: the impact of Royal Commissions on 
trials in Courts exercising federal judicial power 
BLF and Hammond arose from urgent applications for injunctions to prevent 
continued investigation by, and public proceedings of, State and Federal Royal 
Commissions. In BLF, deregistration proceedings had been commenced against 
the Builders Labourers' Federation ('BLF') in the Federal Court. 
Simultaneously, a dual Victorian and Commonwealth Royal Commission was 
investigating whether members of the BLF had engaged in unlawful conduct. 
This conduct inevitably had a bearing on the pending deregistration 
proceedings. The BLF argued in the Federal Court, before Bowen CJ, Deane and 
Evatt JJ, that the proceedings of the Royal Commission constituted an 
interference with the exercise of federal judicial power in the deregistration 
proceedings. 
Hammond was heard by the High Court, comprising Gibbs CJ, Mason, Murphy, 
Brennan and Deane JJ, two weeks after Deane's swearing-in as a Justice of that 
Court. Hammond was charged with offences under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) 
relating to the mishandling of meat for export. A Joint Royal Commission had 
also been established to investigate allegations of the mishandling of meat for 
export and human consumption in Victoria. The Commissioner called 
Hammond to give evidence about events and activities which were the subject 
of the federal criminal proceedings. In both instances Deane held that the 
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Commissioners could not proceed in a manner that adversely interfered with 
the exercise of federal judicial power by the Court. Two features of Deane's 
reasoning in these cases are of particular interest. 
First, Deane was the only member of the Court in each case to refer, albeit 
fleetingly, to the role that Ch III, and the separation of powers principle, played 
in limiting the power of the Royal Commissions. In BLF the Commonwealth 
argued that the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) specifically authorised the 
Federal Royal Commission to act in a manner that would ordinarily constitute 
contempt of court. Deane, with whom Bowen CJ and Evatt J concurred, rejected 
this interpretation of the Commonwealth Act, but added: 
If, contrary to my view, the Royal Commissions Act 1902 did purportedly 
authorize a Royal Commissioner to interfere with the course of justice in a 
Ch III court in a manner which would otherwise constitute contempt of court, a 
question would arise as to the legislative competence of the Commonwealth Parliament 
to enact a law having that effect.43 
Thus, in Deane's view, Ch III guaranteed that a Court exercising federal judicial 
power must act 'judicially.' Accordingly, certain aspects of the manner of 
exercise of federal judicial power might be protected from interference by the 
Federal Executive. Although Deane's reasoning in BLF contained no further 
reference to the constitutional protection of judicial process, his comments in 
this passage, made in 1981, mirrored his later remarks at his swearing-in speech 
as a Justice of the High Court. 
Deane confirmed his understanding of the guarantees flowing from the 
Constitution's separation of powers in his dissenting judgment in Hammond. 
Emphasising that the Victorian County Court hearing the federal charges 
against Hammond was exercising federal judicial power pursuant to s 71, 
Deane remarked: 
It is, in my view, clear that neither the Parliament nor the Executive 
Government of the Commonwealth or of a State is competent to prevent or 
prejudice the judicial exercise by a court of part of the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth by the type of interference with the due administration of 
justice in a particular case which would ordinarily constitute contempt.44 
43 BLF (1981) 37 ALR 470, 477 (emphasis added). 
44 Hammond (1982) 152 CLR 188, 205-6. 
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As Zines has noted, Deane's emphasis in BLF and Hammond on whether the 
Royal Commissions constituted an interference with the' due administration of 
justice', provided a 'test for determining the limits on legislative power arising 
from Chapter III.'45 In this way, these early decisions articulated features of the 
guarantee which would later be accepted by other members of the Court in 
cases such as Leeth46 and Chu Kheng Lim.47 
In Hammond Deane was alone in raising s 71 as the source of this limitation on 
legislative and executive power. It is true that Murphy and Brennan JJ in 
Hammond referred to the constitutional dimension to the case. Justice Murphy, 
for instance, developed his thinking on s 80, noting that it would be inconsistent 
with Hammond's right to trial by jury that 'he now be subjected to 
interrogation by the executive government or that his trial be prejudiced in any 
other manner.'48 Brennan J's reference to Ch III was less determinate. Thus 
Brennan J left open the question whether the Constitution would permit 
Parliament to deprive Hammond of his common law privilege against self-
incrimination.49 As in BLF, Deane's emphasis on the separation of powers 
principle ands 71 confirmed the distinctiveness of his vision of Ch III as 
incorporating a judicial process guarantee. 
The second significant feature of Deane's analysis in BLF and Hammond was his 
understanding of the requirements of the fair exercise of federal judicial power. 
The Court in Hammond unanimously held that it was inconsistent with the 
conduct of Hammond's criminal trial for him to be required to give evidence 
before the Royal Commission. However, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Murphy and 
Brennan JJ, held that the continued conduct of the Commission, including the 
publication of its report, did not interfere with the fairness of Hammond's trial. 
Gibbs CJ, for instance, considered the risk to Hammond posed by the 
publication of the Commissioner's report, balanced against the public interest 
45 Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) 204. 
46 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 470. 
47 Chu Kheng Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27. 
48 Hammond (1982) 152 CLR 188, 201. 
49 Ibid 203. Kennett drew attention to Brennan J's judgment in Hammond as a suggested source 
of rights from Ch III, but interestingly does not mention Deane's analysis: Geoffrey Kennett, 
'Individual Rights, the High Court and the Constitution' (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law 
Review 581, 591. However, Deane's analysis is discussed in Leslie Zines, above n 45, 204. 
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served by the investigation, was not sufficiently great to require a delay in the 
release of the Commissioner's report.so 
The difference between Deane's dissenting judgment in Hammond and that of 
the majority judges lay in the importance Deane placed on the separation 
principle.s1 Deane's starting point was his belief that a 'fundamental' element of 
the administration of criminal justice was the principle that a criminal 
defendant will not be subjected to a parallel inquisitorial inquiry related to the 
subject of their trial.s2 Accordingly, Deane argued that 'ordinary considerations 
of justice and fairness's3 required that the Commissioner be restrained from 
further questioning Hammond, and from reporting his findings, until after the 
conclusion of his criminal trial. 
Similarly, in BLF Deane engaged in 'weighing's4 the conflicting public interests. 
In a passage evoking Deane's later views on the importance of Commonwealth 
and State co-operation, in BLF Deane stated that the 'very fact that the Royal 
Commissions were established by co-operative action' between the Commonwealth 
and Victorian governments underlined the significance of the public interest 
protected by the investigations.ss Although Deane acknowledged the 'more 
than ordinarily difficult task's6 required in weighing the conflicting interests in 
BLF, he found that the interests of justice were paramount. As Deane regarded 
the ongoing investigations as an interference with the fairness of the 
deregistration proceedings, Deane ordered that the Commission cease its 
investigation until the finalisation of those proceedings.s7 
Deane's willingness to protect the integrity of the exercise of federal judicial 
power from Executive interference was later dramatically evinced by Deane's 
50 Hammond (1982) 152 CLR 188, 199. 
51 Jbid 205. 
52 1bid 206. 
53 Ibid 208. 
54 BLF (1981) 37 ALR470, 476 (emphasis added). 
55 Ibid (emphasis added). 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
response to the unusual incident arising in 1988 from litigation in 
Commonwealth v Brian Toohey.58 
(ii) Commonwealth v Brian Toohey: Ch III guarantees of open 
court and judicial independence 
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In Commonwealth v Brian Toohey the Commonwealth sought an urgent 
injunction to prevent the publication by the media of a security agent's identity 
and location.59 After the completion of proceedings, Deane was informed that a 
member of the Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department had recorded 
the names of individuals seated in the public gallery. Deane considered that this 
incident was a 'cause for serious concern'60 and called a special sitting of the 
Court. Satisfied by the Commonwealth's explanation of its conduct provided at 
that hearing, Deane decided that no further action against the Commonwealth 
was required. However, he issued a strongly worded statement defending the 
independence of the federal judiciary.61 As may be expected in light of the 
media interest in the original case, combined with the tenor of Deane's remarks, 
Deane's ASIS Secrets Case Statement attracted considerable attention, and 
support, from the media.62 
Deane's ASIS Secrets Case Statement spoke to his constitutional vision on many 
levels. It commenced: 
The Constitution establishes this Court as the ultimate repository of national judicial 
power. As a general rule the Court's exercise of that judicial power is in public 
sittings to which members of the public are admitted as of course and, subject 
to the directions of the Court, as of right. One reason for that approach to the 
exercise of judicial power is that open and public administration of justice by the 
58 Commonwealth v Brian Toohey (Unreported, High Court of Australia, Deane J, 8 November 
1988). 
59 For a more detailed discussion of the events leading to the issue of Deane's statement, and 
partial quotations from that statement see Rebecca Craske, 'Open Court' in Tony Blackshield, 
Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia 
(2001) 511. The orders in this case, and Deane's subsequent statement are reproduced in full in 
'Orders in ASIS Secrets case' (1988) 19 Legal Reporter 6. 
60 'Orders in ASIS Secrets case' (1988) 19 Legal Reporter 6, 6. 
61 Henceforth 'ASIS Secrets Case Statement'. 
62 See, for example, Bronwyn Young, 'Judge calls special sitting over spy case', Australian 
Financial Review 22November1988, 1 and Bronwyn Young, 'Govt forced to apologise over 
name-taking incident', Australian Financial Review 23November1988, 5. Note also the comment 
in the Australian Law Journal, published as 'The Right of Freedom of Public Access to Court 
Hearings' (1989) 63 Australian Law Journal 155. 
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country's final Court is a safeguard of judicial independence and conducive to public 
trust.63 
The concept of 'public trust' in the institutions of government would later 
become a prominent theme in Deane's jurisprudence, particularly in his 
decisions on the implied freedom of political communication.64 
Deane continued his statement by remarking that the interrogation of the public 
regarding their attendance in Court was a 'qualification of that right and could be 
seen as a discouragement of its exercise.' 65 The involvement of the Executive in this 
incident reinforced for Deane: 
the importance of ensuring that the right of members of the public to attend the 
public sittings of the Court be not compromised and that the independence of the 
court from the control of the Executive Government in the exercise of judicial power be 
vigilantly safeguarded and publicly proclaimed.66 
These extracts capture the tone of Deane's statement. Of particular interest for 
present purposes was Deane's reference to the 'right' of public access to the 
Court. In 1988, rights-discourse was seldom used in the context of the 
Australian Constitution.67 However, in that year, in Davis v Commonwealth and 
Richardson Deane had held federal legislation invalid on the basis that it was a 
'disproportionate' interference with traditional common law rights.68 With 
similar tone to his defence of the interests of the 'few' Tasmanian land-owners 
in Richardson, Deane in his ASIS Secrets Case Statement cast the Executive 
branch as both overzealous and intimidating and affirmed the 'right' of 'the 
people' to attend judicial proceedings. 
Deane's ASIS Secrets Case Statement also confirmed, in the strongest terms, 
Deane's commitment to the constitutional protection of the manner of exercise of 
federal judicial power. Although s 15 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) provides 
63 'Orders in ASIS Secrets case' (1988) 19 Legal Reporter 6, 7 (emphasis added). 
64 See further discussion chapter 6 n 57. Note also Finn's reflections on the concept of 'public 
trust' and its relation to the Court's recognition of popular sovereignty in Paul Finn, 'A 
Sovereign People, A Public Trust' in Paul Finn (ed) Essays on Law and Government (1995) 1. 
65 'Orders in ASIS Secrets case' (1988) 19 Legal Reporter 6, 7 (emphasis added). 
66 Ibid (emphasis added). 
67 On the importance of rights discourse, and the developments in the Court's jurisprudence in 
the 1990s, see further Peter Bailey, '"Righting" the Constitution Without a Bill of Rights' (1995) 
23 Federal Law Review 1. 
68 Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 100 (discussed above chapter 1n93) and Richardson 
(1988) 164 CLR 261, 316. 
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that High Court proceedings are ordinarily to be conducted in open court, 
Deane chose to frame his remarks not by reference to this statute but to the 
Constitution. Thus Deane commenced his Statement by acknowledging that the 
High Court is the 'ultimate repository of national judicial power.' A number of 
years after Deane's ASIS Secrets Case Statement, Gaudron and McHugh JJ each 
recognised guarantees of 'open justice' as aspects of their judicial process 
guarantees. 69 Given that Deane did not confirm the existence of a guarantee of 
'open justice' in his decisions on Ch III, his ASIS Secrets Case Statement is an 
important signal that Deane regarded his judicial process guarantee as 
encompassing a 'right' of this nature.70 
In addition, Deane's ASIS Secrets Case Statement confirmed some of the 
mechanisms available to the Court to protect its processes from interference by 
the Executive. Deane's solution to what he regarded as a threat to judicial 
independence had been to call the Executive to answer his concerns in a special 
sitting, and to issue a rebuke. In BLF and Hammond the response of the Court to 
the actual and threatened interference by the Executive with the judicial 
proceedings had been to grant an injunction preventing that conduct. These 
three occurrences illustrated the use of the inherent powers of a court to 
prevent contempt or abuse of process. Given Deane's emphasis in Polyukhovich 
thats 71 be interpreted to ensure that the court was a 'reflection' not a 
'mockery' of the purpose of the separation of powers principle, it seems likely 
that Deane would have regarded these inherent powers as themselves 
constitutionally protected on the basis that they were an 'essential feature' or 
'traditional judicial procedure' of a Ch III 'court.171 
69 Gaudron J recognised a guarantee of 'open and public' proceedings in Re Nolan (1991) 172 
CLR 460, 496. In Grollo McHugh J stated that '[o]pen justice is the hallmark of the common law 
system of justice and is an essential characteristic of the exercise of federal judicial power.' 
Grollo (1995) 184 CLR 348, 379. 
70 On the Constitution's protection of 'open justice' see further Fiona Wheeler, 'The Doctrine of 
Separation of Powers and Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia' (1997) 23 
Monash University Law Review 248, 261-2. 
71 See further Charles Chesterman, 'Contempt: In the Common Law, but not the Civil Law' 
(1997) 46 International And Comparative Law Quarterly 521, 549. Gleeson CJ and Gummow J have 
stated that the Court's contempt powers have their 'source in Ch III of the Constitution': Re 
Colina; Ex parte Torney (1999) 200 CLR 386, 395. See also Kirby J's statement that the Court's 
abuse of process powers 'may ultimately have a constitutional foundation' derived from the 
'implied powers of the integrated Judicature of the Commonwealth to protect its own processes 
from legislative or executive abuse or misuse': Island Maritime Ltd v Filipowski (2006) 226 CLR 
328, 354. 
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Deane's decisions in BLF and Hammond, and his defence of the principle of open 
justice in his ASIS Secrets Case Statement in 1988 were moderate guarantees, 
protecting elements of the exercise of judicial power clearly established as 
characteristics, or powers, of a 'court' in the common law tradition. Given 
Deane's fierce commitment to the protection of 'the people', however, it is not 
surprising that his decisions revealed an increasing tendency to extend 
guarantees flowing from Ch III beyond these core matters. Commentators have 
speculated on the range of court processes and procedures that Deane may 
have found included within the constitutional guarantee.72 While the outer 
limits of Deane's guarantee remain unclear, in 1992, Deane and Gaudron JJ 
confirmed in Dietrich, in separate judgments, that they were willing to extend 
their Ch III guarantees to secure the 'fair' administration of criminal justice in 
the federal system. Although only Deane and Gaudron JJ recognised a 
constitutional right in Dietrich, as foreshadowed in the introduction to this 
thesis the Court's decision was strongly criticised as an illustration of its 
assumption of a 'political' role.73 
(iii) A 'fair trial': Dietrich and the role of the Court 
In Dietrich, the Court considered an argument that the trial of a serious criminal 
offence constituted a miscarriage of justice because the indigent defendant had 
been unable to obtain legal representation. Dietrich contended that he had a 
right to be provided with counsel at public expense, or, alternatively, that his 
trial was unfair because of the absence of representation. All members of the 
Court rejected the principle that an accused had a right to counsel at public 
expense.74 However, a majority of the Court, with Brennan and Dawson JJ 
dissenting, accepted that a trial of a serious offence without counsel would 
ordinarily be unfair, and that, in those circumstances, a Court could then stay 
proceedings.75 
72 See, for example, Christine Parker, 'Protection of Judicial Process as an Implied Constitutional 
Principle' (1994) 16 Adelaide Law Review 341 and Fiona Wheeler, 'The Doctrine of Separation of 
Powers and Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia' (1997) 23 Monash University 
Law Review 248. 
73 See above introduction n 37. 
74 Dietrich (1992) 177 CLR 292, 311 (Mason CJ and McHugh J); 317 (Brennan J); 330 (Deane J); 342 
(Dawson J); 356 (Toohey J); 362-3 ( Gaudron J). 
75 Ibid 311 (Mason CJ and McHugh J); 330-1 (Deane J); 357 (Toohey J); 371 (Gaudron J). 
In Dietrich Deane punctuated his decision with a forceful opening statement, 
reflecting his vision of Ch III. Deane said: 
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The fundamental prescript of the criminal law of this country is that no person 
shall be convicted of a crime except after a fair trial according to law. In so far 
as the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth is concerned, that 
principle is entrenched by the Constitution's requirement of the observance of judicial 
process and fairness that is implicit in the vesting of the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth exclusively in the courts which Ch III of the Constitution 
designates. 76 
In a similar tone, Gaudron J in Dietrich also affirmed that the Constitution's 
guarantee of judicial process entrenched the 'fundamental requirement that a 
trial be fair.' 77 
Deane's judgment in Dietrich bore many similarities to his decision a decade 
earlier in Hammond. In each, Deane could have decided the case without 
reference to Ch III. In Dietrich, for example, Mason CJ, Toohey and McHugh JJ 
framed their reasons in terms of the Court's inherent powers and the common 
law right to a fair trial.78 However, for Deane and Gaudron JJ the guarantees 
contained within the Constitution were intimately connected with the 
resolution of the issues in these cases.79 In addition, in both Hammond and 
Dietrich, Deane affirmed that the Constitution protected the fairness of a 
criminal trial, and his reasoning demonstrated the weight he attached to 
fairness to the accused over wider public interests. That Deane's guarantee 
strengthened the constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants 
confirmed the pattern of Deane's jurisprudence to protect what he described in 
his swearing-in speech as the 'poor', 'weak' and 'bad' amongst the sovereign 
people. 
Arguably, the controversy of Dietrich did not centre on Deane and Gaudron JJ' s 
extension of the Constitution's judicial process guarantee to incorporate the 
76 Ibid 326 (emphasis added). 
77 Ibid 362. 
78 Ibid 311 (Mason CJ and McHugh J); 357 (Toohey J). 
79 Although, as Wheeler observed, it was surprising that Deane and Gaudron JJ did not 
elaborate on the constitutional aspect of the case, given that Dietrich had been charged with a 
serious federal offence: Fiona Wheeler, 'The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and 
Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia' (1997) 23 Monash University Law Review 
248, 265. 
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principle of a fair trial. Five months before Dietrich, Mason CJ, Dawson and 
McHugh JJ in Leeth had acknowledged that the Constitution contained a 
guarantee of natural justice.80 In this context, as Zines has observed, extending 
the guarantee to protect elements of a 'fair trial' was not a significant extension 
of their recognition that the Constitution contained a guarantee that federal 
judicial power must be exercised according to judicial process.81 Thus, Deane's 
reasoning in Dietrich was not criticised because of his extension of implied 
constitutional rights to protect elements of a fair criminal trial.82 Rather, the 
controversy of Dietrich flowed from the fact that, although lacking the power to 
compel the redistribution of public money into legal aid, a majority of the Court 
isolated the provision of legal representation to indigent persons facing trial of 
serious criminal offences as an ordinary element of a 'fair trial'. 
For Brennan and Dawson JJ, in dissent, this conclusion significantly 
overstepped the constitutional duty of the Court. Brennan J, for example, 
emphasised that it was for those who controlled 'the public purse strings' to 
determine the allocation of funding from that limited resource.83 Brennan J did 
not deny that a trial will be 'most fairly conducted' when both sides are 
represented.84 Nor did he deny that the cost of legal representation should be 
born by Australian society as a cost of a 'civilized system of justice' .85 However, 
Brennan J reasoned that the decision to fund legal aid, and the allocation of 
resources between criminal and civil cases, was not a matter for the Courts.86 
Accordingly, Brennan J concluded that the majority's decision effected an 
'unwarranted intrusion into legislative and executive functions.'87 Further, for 
the Court to stay indefinitely criminal proceedings in circumstances where legal 
aid had not been obtained was to fail to exercise the Court's constitutional 
80 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 470 (Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ); 486-7 (Deane and 
Toohey JJ). See also Brennan J's acceptance of this guarantee in Chu Kheng Lim {1992) 176 CLR 1, 
27 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). 
81 Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution {4th ed, 1997) 203. See also Fiona Wheeler, 'The 
Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia' 
(1997) 23 Monash University Law Review 248, 267. 
82 As Zines observes, 'it is difficult to argue that parliament could, consistently with the 
separation of judicial power, require courts to conduct unfair trials.' Leslie Zines, above n 81, 
203. 
83 Dietrich (1992) 177 CLR 292, 323. See also ibid 349 (Dawson J). 
84 Ibid 316. 
85 Ibid 317. 
86 Ibid 323. See also ibid 349-50 (Dawson J). 
87 Ibid. 
duty.ss In this way, Brennan J invoked the separation of powers principle to 
limit, rather than extend, the judicial protection of individual rights. 
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Brennan and Deane JJ's different views on the proper limits of the Court's role 
consistent with the separation of powers principle emerged through a number 
of decisions explored in this thesis. For example, in Richardson, Brennan J was 
cautious in his application of proportionality reasoning, in later cases 
explaining that that test should only be applied when matched with an 
appropriate 'margin of appreciation' to Parliament's decision-making.s9 In 
decisions such as Polyukhovich, Re Tracey and Leeth, decisions handed down 
before Dietrich and considered in later sections of this thesis, Brennan J 
consistently adopted an attitude of greater deference to Parliament than the 
path chosen by Deane. Given that Brennan J in Leeth evinced a strong 
commitment to the protection of the equality of the sovereign people - an issue 
encapsulating the 'two constant themes' of Deane's jurisprudence- the tension 
between Deane and Brennan JJ' s vision of the Court's role is a valuable prism 
through which to explore Deane's jurisprudence. 
Although Brennan and Dawson JJ's passionate dissents exemplify the finely 
balanced issues involved in Dietrich, Deane's reasoning in this case arguably 
satisfied Allan's requirement that innovation in constitutional interpretation, 
particularly in the protection of fundamental individual rights, must be 
matched with both 'rigorous analysis' and 'appropriate deference' to the 
Parliament and Executive arms of government.90 In Dietrich, Deane conceded 
that the Court may be required to refer to 'the underlying notion of fairness' in 
framing the content of a constitutional guarantee of a 'fair trial', and that 
'subjective values and perceptions may intrude into the judicial process.'91 
However, those considerations would be tempered by the fact that in most 
cases the content of the guarantee: 
88 Ibid 324. 
89 See, for example, ACTV (1992) 177CLR106, 159. 
90 TRS Allan, 'The Common Law as Constitution: Fundamental Rights and First Principles' in 
Cheryl Saunders (ed) Courts of Final Jurisdiction: The Mason Court in Australia (1996) 146, 166. 
Although not explicitly applying his criteria to an assessment of Dietrich, Allan endorsed the 
majority decision in that case as 'a fine illustration' of the Court upholding reasoning 
consistently with its duty to uphold the rule of law. Ibid 162-5. 
91 Dietrich (1992) 177 CLR 292, 329. 
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will primarily fall to be determined by the staple processes of legal reasoning, 
namely, induction and deduction from earlier decisions and settled rules and 
practices.92 
Deane's analysis in Dietrich, and his application of the fair trial guarantee, thus 
drew on the 'fundamental concept' of the first limb of the separation of powers 
principle, explored by Deane in cases such as Re Tracey and Polyukhovich, 
informed by the common law method of judicial reasoning. Significantly, 
Deane's reasoning in Dietrich was also responsive the significant policy 
consequences of impact of unfair criminal trial for serious offence.93 Although 
faced with a choice between competing policy considerations, Deane's 
reasoning was supported by his analysis of history, precedent and principle. 
Further, although lacking the deference displayed by Brennan and Dawson JJ to 
Parliament and the Executive, Wheeler's analysis of the consequences of 
Dietrich suggests that Deane's approach nevertheless maintained an 
appropriate level of deference.94 This was because Deane's approach did not 
endorse a constitutional guarantee that legal representation would be provided 
at public expense at the trials of serious criminal offences. Rather, Deane held 
that the Constitution guaranteed that a trial for a serious criminal offence 
would not proceed unfairly. As Wheeler observed, under this guarantee, 
Parliament and the Executive retained significant power, and responsibility, to 
'address (and prevent) many sources of unfairness so as to allow fair trials to 
proceed.'95 How Parliament and the Executive pursued those measures were 
matters within the exclusive determination of those arms of government. The 
fact that under Deane's guarantee the Parliament and the Executive were 
required to take action of this nature, or run the risk of stays in criminal 
proceedings, was, as Deane argued, an inevitable consequence of the criminal 
justice system. 96 
92 Ibid. 
93 See further discussion in Fiona Wheeler, 'The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and 
Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia' (1997) 23 Monash University Law Review 
248, 269. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Dietrich (1992) 177 CLR 292, 330. See further Wheeler, above n 93, 270. 
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This chapter continues by examining Deane's extension of Ch III rights to 
include a constitutional protection from Bills of Attainder and retrospective 
criminal laws in Polyukhovich. As foreshadowed, Deane's reasoning in 
Polyukhovich illustrated both the strength and weaknesses of his 'fundamental 
concepts' approach and confirmed Deane's commitment to increasing the 
Constitution's protection of individual rights, at times at the expense of 
rigorous and principled legal analysis. 
2 Polyukhovich: Ch III, Bills of Attainder and 
retrospective criminal laws 
Polyukhovich challenged the validity of amendments to the Commonwealth's 
War Crimes Act 1945 (Cth).97 These amendments permitted the prosecution of 
Australian residents for 'war crimes' committed in Europe during World 
War II. Initially, the case was argued solely on the basis that the legislation was 
not supported by a head of Commonwealth legislative power. However, during 
oral argument Deane queried whether the War Crimes Act might infringe a 
constitutional implication contained in Ch III by virtue of its retrospective 
operation. 98 The matter was then re argued to permit a challenge to the 
legislation on this additional basis. Deane and Gaudron JJ, in dissent, upheld 
the challenge on this ground. Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ, however, 
fiercely rejected the argument that Ch III imposed, by implication, a limitation 
on the Commonwealth's power to enact retrospective criminal laws. Brennan 
and Toohey JJ did not decide this issue. Brennan J, in dissent, held that the War 
Crimes Act was invalid on the basis that it was not supported by a head of 
power. Toohey J upheld the legislation, observing that even if the Constitution 
imposed a restriction on retrospective criminal laws, the War Crimes Act was 
not relevantly retrospective. Thus, the amendment to the War Crimes Act was 
upheld by a narrow majority of the Court. 
97 War Crimes Act 1945 (Cth) as amended by the War Crimes Amendment Act 1988 (Cth). 
Henceforth the 'War Crimes Act'. For a discussion of the pre-1988 legislation, and the 
motivations behind the amendments see J Thomson, 'Is it a Mess? The High Court and the War 
Crimes Case: External affairs, defence, judicial power and the Australian Constitution' (1992) 22 
University of Western Australia Law Review 197, 199-200. 
98 Polyukhovich v Commonwealth Transcript of Argument, 3September1990, 48. Deane later 
asked whether the legislation would be consistent with 'US notions of due process' and whether 
Parliament could dispense with the requirements of a 'fair trial': ibid 59-60 (emphasis added). 
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Deane's dissenting decision in Polyukhovich was one of his most complex, and, 
in many respects his least compelling. His analysis was in three phases. First, 
Deane commenced with an examination of the purpose of the first limb of the 
separation of powers principle. As foreshadowed, it was on this basis that 
Deane derived his judicial process guarantee. Deane applied the same process 
of reasoning to derive an implied prohibition on federal Bills of Attainder. This 
chapter argues that Deane's application of 'fundamental concepts' reasoning in 
Polyukhovich to derive a constitutional limitation on Bills of Attainder offered a 
principled basis for the implication of this important constitutional guarantee. 
The second stage of Deane's analysis considered the status of retrospective 
criminal laws under Ch III. For the reasons examined below, Deane's analysis 
in this section of his judgment in Polyukhovich was similar to his line of 
reasoning in Metwally. Like Metwally, this section of Deane's analysis in 
Polyukhovich exhibited significant doctrinal, historical and logical limitations, 
rendering his extension of constitutional protection to preclude retrospective 
criminal laws unconvincing. In the final phase of his judgment, Deane 
examined a number of arguments advanced against his interpretation of Ch Ill, 
based on both Australian and American precedent, and the framers' intentions. 
This structure reinforced the similarity between Deane's reasoning in 
Breavington and Polyukhovich and the important place of 'fundamental concepts' 
reasoning in his interpretive philosophy. However, Deane's reference to the 
framers in these cases differed. A question for discussion in this context is 
whether Polyukhovich revealed a divergence or inconsistency in what had 
appeared, from the cases examined in chapter 1, to be Deane's principled 
approach to the role of the framers in constitutional interpretation. 
(a) Bills of Attainder 
Bills of Attainder are legislative judgments of guilt.99 While the United States 
Constitution, in Article 1, contains express prohibitions against the enactment 
of Bills of Attainder, and retrospective criminal laws, the Australian 
99 Allan described the Act of Attainder as 'the cruellest and most blatant violation of the 
separation of powers.' TRS Allan, 'The Common Law as Constitution: Fundamental Rights and 
First Principles' in Cheryl Saunders (ed) Courts of Final Jurisdiction: The Mason Court in Australia 
(1996) 146, 159. 
145 
Constitution lacks equivalent express guarantees. However, six members of the 
Court in Polyukhovich indicated that Ch III prevented the Commonwealth 
enacting a Bill of Attainder.100 This was because legislation of this kind invaded 
the judicial function exclusively vested in Ch III courts under s 71, that of 
determining guilt or innocence. On the facts in Polyukhovich, however, 
Mason CL Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ held that the War Crimes Act was 
not a Bill of Attainder because the Court retained the role of determining 
whether Polyukhovich had engaged in the prohibited conduct. 
Deane's 'fundamental concepts' reasoning offered a persuasive explanation of 
the implication of a guarantee precluding Bills of Attainder. As the above 
discussion of Deane's derivation of a judicial process guarantee has explained, 
in Polyukhovich Deane had reasoned that s 71 was concerned with more than 
mere 'labels' .101 Rather, s 71 incorporated a guarantee that federal judicial power 
be exercised by a Court, acting judicially. '[A]ccordingly', Deane argued, Ch III 
precluded Parliament from usurping the judicial power of the Commonwealth 
by legislation.102 Applying this analysis, a law declaring a person guilty of an 
offence would be invalid as a usurpation of judicial power. Further, as Deane's 
reasoning rested on a purposive approach to the separation of powers principle, 
his guarantee assessed the substance of the law.103 In this way, Deane's 
approach implicitly rejected the narrow definition of Mason CJ, who had 
argued that a Bill of Attainder required the law to specify the offence for which 
the person was deemed guilty and punished.104 Rather, Deane's approach 
would extend to those laws that, in effect, constituted a legislative 
determination of guilt. Deane's reasoning thus significantly extended the 
protection of individual rights through Ch IIt in a manner consistent with the 
language of s 71, informed by the purpose of the separation of powers doctrine. 
Ironically, Deane's compelling derivation of his judicial process guarantee, and 
an implied constitutional prohibition on Bills of Attainder, accentuated the 
100 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 535-6 (Mason CJ); 612 (Deane J); 646-649 (Dawson J); 685-5 
(Toohey J); 706 (GaudronJ); 721 (McHughJ). 
101 Ibid 607. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Fiona Wheeler, 'The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Constitutionally Entrenched Due 
Process in Australia' (1997) 23Monash University Law Review 248, 254. Compare Deane's 
approach with Dawson J's broad and substantive definition of a Bill of Attainder, as a law that 
effected 'a substitution of the judgment of the legislature for that of the courts.' Polyukhovich 
(1991) 172 CLR 501, 647. 
104 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 535. 
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logical and doctrine hurdles facing Deane's conclusion that Ch III prevents the 
Commonwealth enacting retrospective criminal laws. 
(b) Retrospective criminal laws 
Deane's extension of his guarantee in Polyukhovich to include a prohibition of 
federal retrospective criminal laws hinged on his unusual understanding of the 
nature of the judicial function. For Deane, the judicial function in a criminal trial 
was not limited to what Dawson J described in Polyukhovich as an 'inquiry as to 
whether an accused has been guilty of prohibited conduct.'105 Instead, Deane 
argued: 
What lies at the heart of the exclusively judicial function in criminal matters [is] 
the determination of whether the accused person has in fact done an act which 
constituted a criminal contravention of the then applicable law. 106 
It was this temporal element of the judicial function in criminal trials that, 
according to Deane, was usurped by a retrospective criminal law.107 The 
evocative language of Deane's decision, twice describing the determination of 
criminal guilt according to standards applicable at the time of the act as lying at 
the heart of the judicial function, highlighted the depth of his conviction that 
retrospective criminal laws infringed Ch Ill's separation principle.108 
The limitations of Deane's unusual understanding of the judicial function were 
underlined by his differentiation between the consistency of retrospective civil 
and criminal laws with Ch IIl.109 According to Deane, in civil cases the central 
aspect of judicial power was 'the determination of rights and liabilities under 
the law as it exists at the time of the proceedings.1110 However, Deane had indicated 
at the beginning of his judgment that the 'ordinary object' of the judicial 
function was the ascertainment of rights and obligations, including guilt or 
innocence, under the law. How does a retrospective law affect that judicial 
function? As Zines argues, Deane appeared to assert that the essential features 
105 Ibid 647. 
106 Ibid 614 (emphasis added). 
107 Ibid 613. See to like effect the analysis of Gaudron J: ibid 706. 
108 Ibid 613-4. 
109 This point is forcefully made in Leslie Zines, 'A Judicially Created Bill of Rights?' (1994) 16 
Sydney Law Review 166, 171. See also Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution W" ed, 
1997) 211. 
110 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 608 (emphasis added). 
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of a judicial trial were those under a prospective law, but that begged the 
question that was before the Court.111 Without further support, in principle or 
precedent, for Deane's characterisation of the 'heart' of the judicial function, 
and the difference in that function in civil and criminal cases, Deane's extension 
of Ch III guarantees to prohibit retrospective criminal laws was considerably 
weakened. 
A further limitation of Deane's reasoning in Polyukhovich flowed from his 
analysis of the federal implications of retrospective criminal laws. Deane 
remarked in Polyukhovich that: 
the structure of the federation and the paramountcy of the Commonwealth's 
legislative powers with respect to designated subject matters could give rise to 
extraordinary injustice, difficulty and uncertainty if it was within the 
Commonwealth's legislative competence to enact an ex post facto criminal 
law.112 
This passage presented two hurdles to Deane's analysis in Polyukhovich. First, 
Deane appeared to suggest that the 'difficulty' created by retrospective criminal 
laws was a factor telling against their validity. However, chapter 1 has explored 
Deane's forceful argument in the Incorporation Case that there was 'no legal 
justification' for the inconvenience of a Commonwealth law influencing the 
Court's conclusion as to its validity.113 In Polyukhovich either Deane departed 
from his vision of judicial review expressed a year earlier in the Incorporation 
Case, or Deane's focus in Polyukhovich was in fact on the 'extraordinary injustice' 
and 'uncertainty' generated by retrospective criminal laws. Those arguments, 
however, give rise to the second hurdle facing Deane's analysis in the above 
passage. 
The second issue arising from this passage was that Deane failed to explain 
adequately the 'extraordinary injustice' and 'uncertainty' that retrospective 
criminal laws created in a federal system. As Rose has argued, the illustrations 
of 'extraordinary injustice' or 'uncertainty' that Deane provided in his reasons 
in Polyukhovich did not attach peculiarly to retrospective laws in a federation.114 
111 Leslie Zines, 'A Judicially Created Bill of Rights?' (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 166, 171. 
112 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 615 (emphasis added). 
113 Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR 482, 512. 
114 See Dennis Rose, 'Judicial Reasonings and Responsibilities in Constitutional Cases' (1994) 20 
Monash University Law Review 195, 203. 
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For instance, Deane pointed to the possibility that the Commonwealth could 
retrospectively criminalise conduct that was mandatory under a then applicable 
State law. Also, Deane noted that an individual could be exposed to double 
punishment or double jeopardy where State and Commonwealth law 
criminalised specified conduct, but the retrospective Commonwealth law did 
not cover the field.115 As Rose argued, however, in both instances the injustice 
complained of could equally occur under prospective Commonwealth laws.116 
In that context, however, it would be a matter for the Commonwealth 
Parliament to balance the interests and determine the correct and proper 
path.117 Accordingly, Deane's illustrations of 'extraordinary injustice' suggest 
that the deciding question for Deane was whether retrospective criminal laws 
could be unjust, and whether in those circumstances Parliament's power should 
be so limited to protect the interests of the individual.118 
That Deane was particularly concerned by the potential injustice of 
retrospective laws, and would seek to imply limits on Parliament's power to 
enact such laws should not have been a surprise in 1991. Deane's decision in 
Metwally, in 1984, had evocatively expressed his views on the injustice of 
retrospective laws. In Metwally Deane had emphasised that Parliament did not 
have the power to alter the 'temporal effect' of s 109, any more than the 
'Emperor' could declare that he was dressed when, in fact, he had not clothes.119 
Deane's colourful language in Metwally underscored his concern that s 109 not 
be interpreted in a manner that deprived 'the people' the protection offered by 
s 109 from the injustice of being subject to inconsistent legal commands. In 
Breavington, in 1988, Deane had further confirmed that this principle 'lies at the 
heart' of the legal system, and utilised that principle as a platform for his 
conclusion that the Constitution effected a unitary legal system, and mandated 
a territorially-based choice of law rule.120 In this way, Deane's decisions in 
Metwally and Polyukhovich confirmed his commitment to extending the 
115 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 615-6. 
116 Dennis Rose, 'Judicial Reasonings and Responsibilities in Constitutional Cases' (1994) 20 
Monash University Law Review 195, 203. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Deane also referred in Metwally to 'Orwellean notions of doublethink': Metwally (1984) 158 
CLR 447, 476-8. 
120 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 123. 
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Constitution's protection of 'the people' from what Deane perceived to be the 
injustice of retrospective laws. 
(c) Court, Parliament and 'the people' in Polyukhovich 
Deane's analysis in Polyukhovich has been justly criticised.121 Turning on an 
unsatisfactory definition of the judicial function in criminal cases, Deane 
extended the separation of powers doctrine beyond its reasonable limits in 
pursuit of constitutional protection to guard against the perceived injustice of 
retrospective criminal laws. However, the reasoning of Brennan and Toohey JJ 
reflected different paths that were open to Deane to grant protection to 'the 
people' from some forms of these laws. A brief comparison between Deane's 
analysis and that of Brennan and Toohey JJ confirms a number of significant 
assumptions underlying Deane's reasoning in Polyukhovich about the proper 
role of the Court; assumptions which underpin much of Deane's constitutional 
jurisprudence. 
(i) Brennan and Deane JI compared: judicial deference and the 
limits of constitutional guarantees 
Like Deane and Gaudron JJ, Brennan J found the War Crimes Act invalid. As he 
had in Dietrich, Brennan J's approach in Polyukhovich adopted a line of 
reasoning showing greater deference to Parliament than that pursued by 
Deane. Rather than challenge the general proposition, established in R v 
Kidman, 122 that the Commonwealth had the power to enact laws with 
retrospective effect, Brennan concluded that the War Crimes Act could not be 
supported by the defence power. 123 This was because the retrospective 
operation of the War Crimes Act could not be justified as 'reasonably 
appropriate and adapted' to the Commonwealth's peace-time defence.124 
121 See, for example, Dennis Rose, 'Judicial Reasonings and Responsibilities in Constitutional 
Cases' (1994) 20 Monash University Law Review 195, 203 and Leslie Zines, 'A Judicially Created 
Bill of Rights?' (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 166, 171. 
122 (1915) 20 CLR 425. 
123 Brennan J also concluded that the War Crimes Act was not supported by the external affairs 
power. Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR501, 592. 
124 Ibid 593. 
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Brennan J's reasoning therefore balanced the common law's abhorrence of 
retrospective criminal laws while acknowledging that Parliament had the 
power to enact such laws.125 This open assessment of conflicting policy interests 
in Brennan J's reasoning stood in sharp contrast to the approach of Deane, 
which required an artificial definition of the nature of the judicial function in 
order to bring retrospective criminal laws within the protection of Ch III. 
Given Deane's use proportionality reasoning across various subjects in his 
constitutional jurisprudence, Deane's pursuit of a Ch III guarantee over 
proportionality analysis to find the War Crimes Act invalid was significant. In 
this way, Polyukhovich reinforced Deane's preference for strict constitutional 
guarantees, over the flexibility of proportionality reasoning, as the means to 
protect individual rights. This aspect of Deane's approach in Polyukhovich is also 
apparent in his framing of the military justice exception to Ch III, a topic 
considered in the next section of this chapter. 
(ii) Deane and Toohey TT compared: injustice and fandamental 
rights 
Like Brennan and Deane JJ, Toohey J also emphasised the potential injustice of 
retrospective criminal laws. Toohey J's judgment devoted considerable 
attention to the international condemnation of these laws.126 However, Toohey J 
did not decide whether a retrospective criminal law could never offend 
Ch 111.127 This was because of Toohey J's understanding of the nature and effect 
of the War Crimes Act. Two points of interest emerge from this aspect of 
Toohey J's analysis. 
First, Toohey J's reasoning focused on the substance of the War Crimes Act, not 
its form. For Toohey J it was significant that Polyukhovich would not have been 
exposed to punishment for conduct that was not proscribed at the time of the 
125 Kirk observed that Brennan applied the third level of proportionality analysis, balancing 
analysis, in this context: Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Guarantees, Characterisation and the 
Concept of Proportionality' (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review l, 32. 
126 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 689-90. Toohey J's reasoning is discussed further in Leslie 
Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (41h ed, 1997) 211. 
127 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 690. 
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alleged acts.128 Thus, Polyukhovich would suffer no injustice by virtue of the 
retrospective operation of the War Crimes Act. Further, Toohey J recognised that 
a relevant consideration was the degree of alleged 'moral transgression.'129 This 
was because the law's 'principle of non-retroactivity' balanced the interests of 
the individual against the public interest. Both required 'fundamental 
protection'.130 However, sensitivity to the particular unfairness, or lack of 
unfairness, to Polyukhovich, and the balancing of competing social interests 
were lacking from Deane's analysis. Indeed, Deane's analysis concluded with 
an emphatic statement that the 'enormity of the acts of barbarism' committed 
during World War II must not cloud the inquiry in Polyukhovich, which was, the 
nature of the judicial function under the War Crimes Act.131 
Second, Toohey J's reasons contained his famous statement that: 
Whether a court may declare a statute to be invalid because it is unjust is a 
question that goes to the very heart of the relationship between the courts and 
Parliament.132 
Because of his conclusion that the War Crimes Act effected no injustice on 
Polyukhovich, Toohey J observed that this question did not arise on the facts of 
the case.133 In contrast to Toohey J, Deane did not squarely raise, or answer, the 
question whether fundamental rights were protected from legislative 
interference under the Constitution. Even in Leeth, a decision containing 
Deane's greatest engagement with the question of rights flowing from 'the 
people', Deane and Toohey JJ purported to tie their implication to the text and 
underlying doctrines of the Constitution. That Deane reasoned in Polyukhovich 
by reference to Ch III, rather than addressing the wider question acknowledged 
by Toohey J, suggests that Deane preferred to reason from the framework of the 
well-established principle of the separation of powers rather than concepts of 
'fundamental rights'. This was so despite the fact that Deane's reliance on the 
separation principle required him to adopt an unusual, and unpersuasive, 
definition of the judicial function. 
128 Ibid 676. 
129 Ibid 689-90. 
130 Ibid 689. 
131 Ibid 631. 
132 Ibid 687. 
133 Ibid. 
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(d) The issue of 'the framers' in Polyukhovich 
A final aspect of Deane's analysis in Polyukhovich warranting attention was his 
reference to the framers.134 It had been argued in Polyukhovich that the absence 
in the Australian Constitution of an express guarantee against retrospective 
criminal laws 'was deliberate' and should therefore preclude an implication 
limiting Commonwealth power to enact such laws.135 In Breavington and the 
Incorporation Case Deane had responded to arguments that the framers' 
intentions should restrict the meaning of ss 118 and Sl(xx) by stating that the 
source of the Constitution's legitimacy was 'the people'.136 On this basis, the 
framers' subjective intentions were irrelevant to constitutional interpretation. If 
that analysis had been applied by Deane in Polyukhovich, Deane's answer 
should have been that the framers' reasons for not incorporating an express 
guarantee prohibiting retrospective criminal laws would also be irrelevant to 
constitutional interpretation. This was because the framers could no more speak 
to the intended operation of Ch III than they could to the intended meaning of 
ss Sl(xx) or 118. 
However, Deane did not take this path in Polyukhovich. First, and in striking 
contrast to Breavington and the Incorporation Case, Deane made no reference to 
'the people' in this aspect of his analysis. Instead, somewhat cryptically, Deane 
argued that 'in circumstances where the framers took an altogether different 
approach to the incorporation of rights' the absence of one or other express 
rights should not in itself be treated as a reason to reject their implication.137 
Thus Deane appeared to be suggesting that the framers' intentions remain 
relevant in constitutional interpretation, but had been misinterpreted by those 
who sought to restrict the implication of constitutional rights in this case. 
Deane continued his analysis, citing an extensive passage from Inglis Clark's 
Studies in Australian Constitutional Law.138 Deane argued that Inglis Clark 'clearly 
enough' considered that retrospective criminal laws were contrary to the 
134 Ibid 616-9. 
135 Ibid 720. 
136 See above chapter 1 n 176. 
137 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 617. 
138 Andrew Inglis Clark, Studies in Australian Constitutional Law (1901) 39-41. 
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separation principle.139 However, McHugh J and Rose have drawn attention to 
the significant ellipsis in Deane's quotation from Inglis Clark, who had stated 
that the Constitution 'does not prohibit the Parliament of the Commonwealth 
from making retroactive laws.'140 In this context, Deane's citation from Inglis 
Clark appears to misrepresent Inglis Clark's analysis. Rose argues on this basis 
that Deane's reasoning demonstrated a lack of proper legal reasoning, 141 
compounding the significant limitations of Deane's analysis discussed above. 
In a study of Deane's constitutional philosophy, however, a further question 
arises regarding his quotation from Inglis Clark. In Breavington and the 
Incorporation Case, Deane had introduced his particular arguments by affirming 
that the Convention Debates, or contemporary sources, were inherently capable 
of supporting a range of meanings. In contrast, Deane's citation of Inglis Clark 
in Polyukhovich was extensive, and suggests that Deane's purpose may have 
been to rely on Inglis Clark not simply to rebut the framers' intention argument, 
but rather as support for his interpretation of the effect of Ch III. If this was 
Deane's intention in citing Inglis Clark, Deane's reasoning in Polyukhovich 
appears to have departed from the key principles of his interpretive approach 
established in cases such as Breavington and the Incorporation Case: that it was 
the intentions of 'the people', not the framers, to which the Court gave effect in 
constitutional interpretation. 
Setting aside the richness of Polyukhovich in a study of the strengths and 
weaknesses of Deane's constitutional philosophy, the next section considers 
Deane's vision of the reach of the military justice exception to the separation of 
powers principle. On this topic, Deane returned to his careful and considered 
analysis of principle and precedent to affirm the right of military personnel to, 
ordinarily, be tried for a federal offence by a Ch III Court. 
139 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 619. 
140 Inglis Clark, above n 138, 39 cited in Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 720-1 (McHugh J). Rose 
says that this was a significant ellipsis from Deane's argument: Dennis Rose, 'Judicial 
Reasonings and Responsibilities in Constitutional Cases' (1994) 20 Monash University Law Review 
195, 202-3. See to similar effect Dennis Rose, 'On Criticising "Judicial Adventurism'" (2004) June 
Quadrant 32, 35. 
141 Dennis Rose (1994), above n 140, 202-3. 
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3 The Tracey Trilogy and the military justice 
exception 
This section examines a final illustration of Deane's application of 'fundamental 
concepts' reasoning to strengthen the protection of individual rights through 
Ch III. As some of his most passionate decisions, Deane's trilogy of cases on this 
topic evinced his commitment to Ch III as the Constitution's 'most important'142 
guarantee. 
(i) Background: the Defence Force Discipline Act and the vexed 
question of military tribunals 
The Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) was enacted to establish a unified 
system of military discipline for the Australian Defence Forces.143 Its hierarchy 
of military tribunals, consisting of superior officers, Defence Force Magistrates, 
and Courts Martial, were not established consistently withs 72 of the 
Constitution, as its members were not guaranteed security of tenure until the 
age of 70. Consequently, although exercising federal judicial power, the 
tribunals were not Ch III courts. 
The Discipline Act created offences falling into three categories, each with 
varying degrees of connection to defence service.144 The first category consisted 
of purely military offences, such as absence without leave. The second category 
was quasi-military offences, that is, offences similar to civilian offences but 
relating to military circumstances, such as falsifying a service document. 
Finally, s 61 of the Discipline Act imported the full range of offences from an 
Australian civil jurisdiction into the military system.145 This section exposed 
142 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 521 (emphasis added). 
143 Henceforth the 'Discipline Act'. 
144 The offences under the Discipline Act were summarised in Andrew D Mitchel and Tania 
Voon, 'Defence of the Indefensible? Reassessing the Constitutional Validity of Military Service 
Tribunals in Australia' (2000) 27 Federal Law Review 499, 501. 
145 In Re Tracey and Re Nolan, s 61 of the Discipline Act imported the full range of criminal 
offences as they applied in the Australian Capital Territory. Ass 61 applied in Re Tyler the 
section had been amended to import offences from the Jervis Bay Territory. 
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defence personnel to potential liability for prosecution under both the civilian 
and military justice systems.146 
Re Tracey was the first of three challenges to the validity of the Discipline Act 
that came before Deane.147 Staff Sergeant Ryan of the Australian Army was 
charged with offences of the first two categories: absence without leave and 
falsifying a service document. The Court unanimously held that military 
tribunals established under the Discipline Act could operate as an exception to 
the separation principle established under Ch III, but sharp differences emerged 
between the Justices as to the breadth of the exception. 
Five members of the Court, in two joint judgments, upheld the Defence Force 
Magistrate's power to hear all charges against Ryan. Mason CJ, Wilson and 
Dawson JJ considered thats 5l(vi) granted the Parliament power to establish 
tribunals to try service personnel for offences which were 'sufficiently 
connected' to military discipline; military discipline itself being essential to the 
maintenance of Australian defence.148 They held that it was for Parliament to 
decide what offences were 'necessary and appropriate' to enforce that 
discipline. This could include incorporating wholesale civilian offences under 
s 61.149 
Brennan and Toohey JJ's approach also permitted a broad exception to the 
Constitution's separation of powers principle. Their test asked whether an 
146 In an attempt to prevent dual punishment, the Discipline Act as originally enacted included a 
provision preventing a civil court from trying an offence that had already been tried by a 
service tribunal. The Court held that this aspect of the Discipline Act was invalid: Re Tracey 
(1988) 166 CLR 518, 547 (Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ); 575-6 (Brennan and Toohey JJ); 602-
3 (Gaudron J). As Deane found that the Parliament's legislative power only extended to 
establish military tribunals with jurisdiction over exclusively disciplinary offences it was 
unnecessary for him to decide this issue. 
147 See, after Deane's retirement from the Court, Re Colonel Aird; Ex parte Alpert (2004) 220 CLR 
308 and White v Director of Military Prosecutions (2007) HCA 29 ('White'). 
148 Re Tracey (1988) 166 CLR 518, 540. It is an interesting fact that the two members of the Court 
who had served in the armed forces - Sir Anthony Mason and Sir Ronald Wilson - adopted the 
broadest exception to the separation principle. For discussion of their military service, see 
Kristen Walker, 'Mason, Anthony Frank' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George 
Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (2001) 459, 459 and Peter 
Durack, 'Wilson, Ronald Darling' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George Williams 
(eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (2001) 714, 715. 
149 Re Tracey (1988) 166 CLR 518, 545. Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ considered it difficult to 
draw a clear line between an offence which was of a military character and one which was not: 
ibid 544-5. The challenge of drawing this line was also a topic of concern in White (2007) HCA 
29 at (19)-(21) (Gleeson CJ) and at (73)-(75) (Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ). 
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offence could be 'reasonably regarded as substantially serving the purpose of ... 
service discipline.'150 However, Brennan and Toohey JJ were not willing to defer 
to Parliament to the same degree as Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ. Instead, 
Brennan and Toohey JJ applied their test objectively, assessed by reference to 
factors such as convenience, accessibility, and the appropriateness of civilian 
courts hearing the charges.151 
In contrast, Deane and Gaudron JJ, in a separate judgments, strictly confined 
the military justice exception to only those offences that were disciplinary in 
nature.152 On the facts both judges held that only the charge of absence without 
leave fell within that category, and so the Defence Force Magistrate lacked the 
jurisdiction to hear the charge of falsifying a service document.153 Consistent 
with his approach to the first limb of the separation principle throughout his 
jurisprudence, Deane reached this conclusion by exploring the history and 
purpose of this 'fundamental concept' of the Constitution. 
The Court's reasoning in Re Tracey left military tribunals in the unenviable 
position of having to assess their jurisdiction against a number of different tests. 
The subsequent challenges to the Discipline Act in Re Nolan and Re Tyler did not 
resolve this issue, as only McHugh J, new to the Court by the time of Re Nolan, 
was willing to adopt a compromise position.154 
150 Re Tracey (1988) 166 CLR 518, 570. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Gaudron J considered that offences which were 'substantially the same as civil court 
offences' could not reasonably be considered 'appropriate and adapted' to controlling the 
defence forces: ibid 602. As discussed below, Deane's approach was framed around the purpose 
of the separation principle, and confined the exception to the minimum jurisdiction necessary to 
effect service discipline. 
153 Ibid 591 (Deane J); 604 (Gaudron J). 
154 In Re Nolan, McHugh J had authored a brief judgment concurring with Deane: Re Nolan 
(1991) 172 CLR 460, 499. It seems from his judgment in Re Tyler and statements during oral 
argument in Re Aird; Ex parte Alpert that McHugh J remained convinced of the correctness of 
Deane's approach: Re Tyler (1994) 181CLR18, 39 and Re Aird; Ex parte Alpert Transcript of 
Proceedings, 3 March 2004. Speaking of the Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ position during 
argument in Re Aird, McHugh J said: 'I could never until the day I die accept the reasoning that 
leads them to the conclusion.' 
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(ii) Deane's strict interpretation of Ch III 
Deane signalled his distinctive approach to the military tribunal exception from 
the outset of his judgment in Re Tracey. 155 Like his later decision in Polyukhovich, 
Deane's focus lay in the purpose of the first limb of the separation of powers 
doctrine. In a key passage, conveying the tone of his judgment, Deane said: 
To ignore the significance of the doctrine or to discount the importance of 
safeguarding the true independence of the judicature upon which the doctrine 
is predicated is to run the risk of undermining, or even subverting, the 
Constitution's only general guarantee of due process.156 
It was from this understanding of the purpose of the separation of powers 
doctrine that Deane found the limits of the military justice exception to Ch III. 
Thus he argued: 
The guarantee involved in the vesting of judicial power exclusively in Ch III 
courts is at its most important in relation to criminal matters. It obviously 
requires that this Court carefully scrutinize any claim by a Commonwealth officer 
or instrumentality, other than a court designated by Ch III, to exercise the 
judicial power of trial and punishment of a person charged with an offence.157 
Deane held, consistent with the rights-protective purpose of the separation 
principle, that any deviation from that guarantee required significant 
justification. According to Deane, a 'pragmatic construction1158 of Ch Ill, and the 
separation of powers principle, permitted an exception for military tribunals 
only under two critical limitations. First, their jurisdiction extended only to the 
disciplinary aspects of military service. Second, the jurisdiction of military 
tribunals was supplementary to the civil system.159 Deane's examination of 
common law history led him to conclude that, at least in respect of conduct 
committed in Australia in peacetime, the Discipline Act could validly extend to 
only exclusively disciplinary offences, or offences related to exclusively 
disciplinary offences.160 As Kirby J recently observed, Deane's approach 'limited 
military exceptionalism to the essential needs of discipline in the military 
context.1161Accordingly, on the facts in Re Tracey, Deane held that only a Ch III 
155 Re Tracey (1988) 166 CLR518, 579. 
156 Ibid 580 (emphasis added). Compare Deane's reasoning in Polyukhovich, discussed above 
n24. 
157 Ibid 581 (emphasis added). 
158 Ibid 583 (emphasis added). 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid 591. 
161 White [2007] HCA 29 at [165]. 
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court could hear the charge against Ryan of falsifying the service document, as 
that charge related to non-disciplinary and general community aspects of 
criminal conduct. 
Chapter 1 has explored how Deane employed proportionality analysis as a tool 
in characterisation in the context of s Sl(xxix). In Richardson, for example, Deane 
balanced the rights of a small number of land-owners against the wider 
environmental purposes of Commonwealth legislation, and concluded that 
many of the measures were an unnecessary restriction on individual rights. In 
Re Tracey Deane similarly employed balancing and necessity reasoning to 
confine the exception to Ch III. However, in this context Deane pre-weighted 
his test in favour of the separation of powers over military discipline.162 Thus 
Deane confined the jurisdiction of military tribunals to the minimum extent 
necessary, thereby ensuring that service personnel gained the benefit of the 
Constitution's 'most important'163 guarantee, that is, that federal judicial power 
would be exercised by a court, acting judicially. 
Deane's strict protection of the right of military personnel to be tried for federal 
offences by Ch III courts stood in contrast to the approach of the majority 
judges. Brennan and Toohey JJ, for example, although recognising the 
important purpose of the separation of federal judicial power, assessed whether 
the tribunals were 'reasonably appropriate and adapted' to military discipline. 
This approach permitted a larger jurisdiction for military justice tribunals, and 
in both form and substance prioritised military justice over the separation 
principle. Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ, took this further, by holding that it 
was a question for Parliament, not the Court, whether military justice was 
'appropriate and adapted' to the purpose of military discipline. Even 
Gaudron J, whose dissenting decisions were similar in outcome to Deane, 
embraced a test displaying greater deference to Parliament than Deane. Thus, 
Gaudron J's test was framed by reference to the purpose of the defence power. 
At least rhetorically, Gaudron J's approach could therefore 'ebb and flow' 
162 Compare, in the context of Deane's proportionality test in the free speech cases, the 
discussion of pre-weighted tests in Adrienne Stone, 'The Limits of Constitutional Text and 
Structure: Standards of Review and the Freedom of Political Communication' (1999) 23 
Melbourne University Law Review 668, 694. 
163 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 521. 
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according to the needs of military discipline.164 In contrast, Deane's approach 
was respectful of the language of the Constitution's text (ass 51(vi) was made 
'subject to' the Constitution) and gave 'due weight' to the separation principle, 
and its role as a 'safeguard of individual rights.1165 
Gleeson CJ, and Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ, in White v Director of Military 
Prosecutions, recently observed that Deane's approach required difficult 
distinctions to be drawn regarding the nature of an 'exclusively disciplinary' 
offence.166 They concluded on this basis that Deane' test imposed an 
'unsatisfactory' criterion of validity.167 In contrast, Kirby J, in dissent in White, 
forcefully argued that '[o]ne of the functions of courts ... is to draw lines.'168 
Although not finding favour with a current majority of the Court, Deane's 
approach may be seen as providing a principled approach to finding the limits 
of the military justice exception, tailored to the purpose of the separation 
principle and its purpose as an important guarantee of individual rights. 
Significantly for the purpose of this thesis, Deane's approach to this exception 
also confirmed the recurring themes and trends of his constitutional 
philosophy. In particular, these cases confirmed Deane's reliance on 
'fundamental concepts' reasoning to imply a constitutional guarantee that 
military personnel would be tried by a Ch III court, except for 'exclusively 
disciplinary' offences. The next part of this chapter examines Deane's approach 
to a second exception to the separation of powers doctrine, that is, the 
designated person exception to the second limb of the separation doctrine. 
Ironically, although Deane would not utilise the language of guarantees in this 
context, it was here, in Grollo, that Deane's jurisprudence revealed some of his 
most forceful comments on the importance of judges in the protection of 
individual rights. 
164 See Re Tracey (1988) 166 CLR 518, 600. Deane and Gaudron JJ's approaches are compared in 
Andrew D Mitchel and Tania Voon, 'Defence of the Indefensible? Reassessing the 
Constitutional Validity of Military Service Tribunals in Australia' (2000) 27 Federal Law Review 
499, 518-9. 
165 Mitchel and Voon, above n 164, 519. See also White [2007] HCA 29 at [165] (Kirby J). 
166 [2007] HCA 29 at [75] (Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ). 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid at [198]. 
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B Part 2: Deane and exceptions to the second 
limb of the separation doctrine 
This part examines Deane's attitude towards the second limb of the separation 
doctrine which prevents the vesting of non-judicial functions on a federal court. 
Deane's views on this principle are found in a trilogy of joint judgments on the 
designated person exception to that principle, Drake v Minister for Immigration 
and Ethnic Affairs,169 Hilton v Wells170 and Grollo.171 This part argues that, 
although these decisions lack the fierce commitment to a strict separation of 
judicial power characterising his decisions on the military justice exception to 
the first limb of the separation principle, Deane's designated person decisions, 
particularly Grollo, confirmed his commitment to judges, and judicial reasoning, 
as an important protection of individual liberty. 
1 Deane's Federal Court judgment in Drake 
Deane's first exploration of the scope of the designated person exception was as 
a member of the Federal Court in Drake. Drake challenged a decision of the 
Deputy President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Davies J of the 
Federal Court, on the basis that his appointment infringed the separation of 
federal judicial power required by Ch 111.172 Section 7(1) of the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) provided that a presidential member of the 
Tribunal (including a Deputy President) could not be appointed unless he was 
a Federal Court judge or had certain other specified qualifications. Drake 
argued that Davies J's appointment was invalid as the Act conferred non-
169 (1979) 24 ALR 577 ('Drake'). 
170 (1985) 157 CLR 57 ('Hilton'). 
171 Note that in Re Tracey Deane observed that one consequence of the vesting of judicial power 
in courts consistent with the separation principle was that the judicature and the executive 
could not be merged 'by the conferral of non-judicial functions' on the judiciary: Re Tracey 
(1988) 166 CLR 518, 580. However, this statement is not itself a resounding endorsement of the 
second limb of the separation doctrine. It may reflect an endorsement of the requirement of an 
'independent judiciary'; an interpretation that is more consonant with the subject matter of the 
case in which it was issued. 
172 Justice Davies had confirmed a decision of the Minister to cancel Drake's permanent 
residency visa under s 12 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Section 12 permitted the Minister to 
cancel such a visa if the alien had been convicted of offences carrying a specified minimum jail 
term. 
judicial functions on a federal court contrary to the second limb of the 
separation of powers principle.173 
161 
The Federal Court, consisting of Bowen CJ, Smithers and Deane JJ, rejected this 
argument.174 Bowen CJ and Deane's approach to the designated person 
exception was contained entirely in the following passage from their joint 
judgment: 
There is nothing in the Constitution which precludes a justice of the High Court 
or a judge of this or any other court created by the Parliament under Ch III of 
the Constitution from, in his personal capacity, being appointed to an office 
involving the performance of administrative or executive functions including 
functions which are quasi judicial in their nature. Such an appointment does 
not involve any impermissible attempt to confer upon a Ch III court functions 
which are antithetical to the exercise of judicial power. Indeed, it does not 
involve the conferring of any functions at all on such a court.175 
Missing from this passage was any direct reference to the Boilermakers' Case or 
to any general reference to the aims of the separation of powers doctrine under 
the Constitution.176 However, what little was said, referring to an 
'impermissible attempt' to confer an 'antithetical' function on a Ch III court, 
was an appropriate endorsement of the underlying principle from Federal 
Court judges not at liberty to question the High Court's decision in the 
Boilermakers' Case. 
Also missing from Bowen CJ and Deane's decision was any justification for 
their very broad and formalistic exception to the second limb of the separation 
doctrine.177 Under Bowen CJ and Deane's approach, the question of the Act's 
validity was determined by ascertaining, as a matter of statutory interpretation, 
whether Parliament sought to confer functions on the judge as an individual or 
on the Court. In this case they concluded that Davies J had been appointed to 
the Tribunal in his personal capacity, although they did not elaborate on that 
conclusion. However, as Zines and Lindell have argued, the very rationale of 
173 Drake also argued that the Act infringed Ch III because it conferred judicial power on the 
Tribunal. The court also rejected this argument: Drake (1979) 24 ALR 577, 584-5 (Bowen CJ and 
Deane J), 592 (Smithers J concurring). 
174 Smithers J concurred with Bowen CJ and Deane on this ground of appeal: ibid 592. 
175 Ibid 584. 
176 Admittedly Deane's discussion of the first limb of the separation principle in BLF and 
Hammond was also extremely limited. Compare above n 43. 
177 Fiona Wheeler, 'Federal Judges as Holders of Non-Judicial Office' in Brian Opeskin and 
Fiona Wheeler (eds), The Australian Federal Judicial System (2000) 442, 457. 
162 
the second limb of the separation of powers - the protection of the reputation of 
the federal judiciary - was equally placed at risk by the approach of Bowen CJ 
and Deane, by permitting a wide scope for the performance of non-judicial 
activities by judges in a quasi-judicial capacity.178 
The absence of such reasoning, and the recognition of a broad exception to the 
second limb of the separation doctrine, appears inconsistent with Deane's later 
High Court decisions on the separation of powers principle. As discussed in 
this chapter, Deane's High Court judgments were replete with references to the 
purpose of the first limb of the separation of powers principle. In Re Tracey, for 
example, it was in recognition of this purpose that Deane strictly confined the 
jurisdiction of military tribunals as an exception to Ch III. It is possible that 
these differences were the result of the fact that Drake was a joint judgment. A 
further explanation for Deane's apparently formalistic approach to the content 
and application of the designated person exception in Drake may flow from 
Deane's respect for the strength of High Court precedent on this question. After 
his retirement from the High Court, Deane reflected that it was the task of a 
Federal Court judge to 'try to ascertain what the law is' and consequently to try 
'to guess what the High Court would hold the law to be.'179 In 1979, it may have 
seemed likely that the High Court would uphold the Act, given the range of 
non-judicial activities performed by High Court judges such as Sir Owen 
Dixon180 and Sir John Latham181 in their personal capacities.182 
178 Leslie Zines and Geoffrey Lindell, Sawer's Constitutional Cases Wh ed, 1982) 613. See further 
discussion: Wheeler n 177, 454-5. 
179 Deane, quoted in Tony Stephens, Sir William Deane: The Things that Matter (2002) 46. See 
further above introduction n 92. 
180 Sir Owen's extensive non-judicial duties are outlined in Kenneth Hayne, 'Dixon, Owen' in 
Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High 
Court of Australia (2001) 218, 219. Chapters 7, 8 and 10 of the Ayres' biography shed further light 
on Dixon's activities in the positions. Philip Ayres, Owen Dixon (2003). 
181 Sir John Latham had accepted a posting as Australian ambassador to Japan in 1940. Zelman 
Cowen, 'Latham, John Greig' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), 
The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (2001) 419. 
182 Brown discusses further illustrations of the non-judicial duties performed by High Court 
judges in A. J. Brown, 'The Wig or the Sword? Separation of Powers and the Plight of the 
Australian Judge' (1992) 21 Federal Law Review 48. Deane may also have been influenced by his 
personal experience. Throughout his time on the Federal Court, Deane also served as President 
of the Trade Practices Tribunal. See Rosalind Atherton, Tony Blackshield, Bruce Kercher and 
Cameron Stewart, 'Deane, William Patrick' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George 
Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (2001) 195, 195. 
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2 A view from the High Court: Hilton v Wells 
In 1985, Deane sat on the five-member bench in Hilton. This case concerned the 
validity of a telephone tap under the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 
( Cth) and the use of information obtained via the tap as evidence in criminal 
proceedings.183 Under the Interception Act, judges of the Federal Court were 
assigned the controversial task of issuing telephone tap warrants.184 Gibbs CJ, 
Wilson and Dawson JJ, in a joint judgment, held that the Interception Act was 
valid, as it conferred this power on the judges in their personal capacity. Mason 
and Deane JJ, also in a joint judgment, strongly dissented, holding that the 
legislation purported to confer non-judicial powers on the Federal Court and so 
was contrary to Ch III. 
(a) The majority approach 
The majority joint judgment began by affirming the principle in the 
Boilermakers' Case. Thus they reasoned that if a non-judicial power was to be 
conferred on a judge consistently with the second limb of the separation 
doctrine, that power must be exercised in the judge's personal capacity.185 The 
key question was therefore one of statutory construction: did the reference to 
'judge' rather than to the 'court' mean that Parliament intended to describe a 
person by reference to the qualifications essential for the exercise of the power 
rather than the institution?186 
Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ held that Parliament had made its intention 
sufficiently clear that the power under the Interception Act was conferred on the 
judges as individuals.187 The fact that the power was purely administrative and 
not incidental to the exercise of judicial power was, in their view, a significant 
183 Henceforth the 'Interception Act'. 
184 Sir Anthony Mason has described the authorisation of tap warrants by judges in their 
personal capacity as the most controversial of non-judicial functions performed by Federal 
Court judges. Sir Anthony Mason,' A New Perspective on Separation of Powers' (1996) 82 
Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration 1, 1. 
185 Hilton (1985) 157 CLR 57, 72. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ noted that even if there was a prima fade presumption that 
the power was conferred on the institution, such a presumption was rebutted in this case. Ibid 
72-3. 
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indicator of Parliament's intention.188 This analysis suggested that Gibbs CJ, 
Wilson and Dawson JJ were willing to defer considerably to Parliament in this 
area. Under their approach, the Court's role was to facilitate, rather than to 
strictly scrutinise, Parliament's objectives. However, the majority recognised 
that the designated person exception did not allow Parliament to confer 
unlimited power on a federal judge, holding that non-judicial functions could 
not be conferred if they 'were such as to prejudice their independence or to 
conflict with the proper performance of their judicial functions'.189 Gibbs CJ, 
Wilson and Dawson JJ held that the Interception Act was not such a law.190 
(b) The dissent of Mason and Deane JJ: policing the 
boundaries 
In 'a vigorous dissent',191 Mason and Deane JJ held that Parliament had not 
evinced an intention that the power to issue tap warrants was conferred on the 
judges in their personal capacity. Accordingly, the Interception Act was invalid. 
The High Court in Jones v Commonwealth characterised the difference between 
the majority and minority judgments as purely one of statutory construction.192 
Certainly both the minority and majority judgments in Hilton framed the issue 
in the case as one of statutory interpretation.193 However, as Zines has argued, 
Mason and Deane JJ' s examination of the basis and purpose of the exception, 
and consequent interpretation of the legislation, suggests that they proceeded 
from a different understanding of the permissible scope of the designated 
person exception.194 It is this difference that sheds further light on Deane's 
vision of the Constitution's separation of powers principle. 
188 Ibid 72. This was an interesting conclusion, suggesting that the majority assumed that 
Parliament was aware of the separation of powers issue, and that the conferral of an 
administrative power on the judge showed that Parliament intended the Interception Act to fall 
within the exception. 
189 Hilton (1985) 157 CLR 57, 73-4. 
190 Ibid 74. 
191 Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, Federal Constitutional Law: A Contemporary View (2nd ed, 
2006) 181. 
192 Jones v Commonwealth (1987) 71ALR497, 498-9 (Mason CJ, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ). 
Gaudron J was of a different view, believing that Hilton left open significant questions of the 
ogeration of the separation of powers principle: ibid 499. 
1 Hilton (1985) 157 CLR 57, 72 (Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ) 78 (Mason and Deane JJ). 
194 Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4lh ed, 1997) 216. 
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In the following passage, Mason and Deane JJ explained their approach to the 
designated person principle: 
the independence of the federal judiciary which is protected by the Boilermakers' 
Case will be preserved in a substantial way if, ... we continue to acknowledge 
that Parliament may confer non-judicial functions on a federal judge only where 
there is a clear expression of legislative intention that the functions are to be 
exercised by him in his personal capacity, detached from the court of which he 
is a member.195 
Mason and Deane JJ recognised that Parliament's ability to confer non-judicial 
power on judges as designated persons was bounded by reference to the 
purpose of the second limb of the separation principle and, as they indicated in 
a later passage, the broader purpose of the separation principle as a 'safeguard 
of individual liberty.'196 In this way, Deane's reasoning in Hilton mirrored his 
derivation of the judicial process guarantee in Polyukhovich as both decisions 
defined the limits of the implication flowing from Ch III from the purpose of 
that doctrine. 
In Hilton Mason and Deane JJ recognised that the designated person principle 
was an exception to the second limb of the separation doctrine, and so 
commented: 
One may ask: what is the point of our insisting, in conformity with the dictates 
of the Boilermakers' Case, that non-judicial functions shall not be given to a Ch III 
court, if it is legitimate for Parliament to adopt the expedient of entrusting these 
functions to judges personally in lieu of pursuing the proscribed alternative of 
giving the functions to the court to which the judges belong?197 
Accordingly, Mason and Deane JJ narrowed the designated person exception by 
requiring that Parliament clearly express its intention to confer non-judicial 
power on judges as individuals. On this approach, in contrast to the majority 
judges, Mason and Deane JJ considered it the Court's role to strictly enforce the 
boundaries of legitimate parliamentary action under the Constitution's 
separation of powers. 
Mason and Deane JJ insisted in Hilton that the scope of the designated person 
exception was restricted in two further ways. First, a federal judge could not be 
195 Hilton (1985) 157 CLR 57, 82 (emphasis added). 
196 Ibid. 
197 Ibid. 
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compelled to undertake the non-judicial function; rather, their consent must be 
given.198 Second, they recognised: 
the general qualification that what is entrusted to a judge in his individual 
capacity is not inconsistent with the essence of the judicial function and the 
proper performance by the judiciary of its responsibilities for the exercise of 
judicial power.199 
This second qualification was similar to that of the majority.200 The requirement 
of consent, however, was unique to Mason and Deane JJ. The lack of consent by 
Federal Court judges on the facts of this case (particularly compared with 
provisions requiring consent by State judges) was critical to Mason and 
Deane JJ' s conclusion that the Interception Act conferred the powers on the 
court, not the judges as designated persons.201 Without the consent of the 
judges, the power to issue tap warrants was conferred as part of the 
responsibilities of judicial office, and was therefore inseparable from that 
office.202 Indeed, Mason and Deane JJ suggested that the imposition of non-
judicial functions on a judge without their consent might be invalid as an 
infringement of the 'underlying concept of the separation of powers.'203 
(c) The lessons o/Hilton v Wells 
In contrast to the broad and formalistic approach of Bowen CJ and Deane in 
Drake, Mason and Deane JJ in Hilton imposed significant limitations on the 
exception by reference to the purpose of the second limb of the separation of 
powers principle.204 This change in Deane's approach may reflect an altered 
perception of the role of the exception or a recognition by Deane that as a 
member of Australia's highest court he was at liberty to confine the scope of the 
exception as saw fit. With these two cases, apparently indicating different 
approaches to the scope of the exception, what can be said of Deane's attitude 
198 Ibid 83. 
199 Ibid. 
20° Compare ibid 73-4. 
201 Ibid 85-6. 
202 Ibid 85. 
203 Ibid 82 (emphasis added). 
204 The difference between Deane's approaches in Drake and Hilton was underscored by the 
treatment of Drake by members of the Court in Hilton. In Hilton it was Gibbs CJ, Wilson and 
Dawson JJ - not Mason and Deane JJ - that cited the key passage from Drake with apparent 
approval. In contrast, Mason and Deane JJ in Hilton referred to the case merely as an example of 
legislation validly conferring non-judicial functions on a judge in their personal capacity, and 
their judicial role as a necessary qualification for appointment to that function. Ibid 69 
(Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ); 83 (Mason and Deane JJ). 
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towards the second limb of the separation doctrine? Two interpretations appear 
possible. 
(i) What is the significance of Mason J's role in Hilton? 
The consequence of Mason and Deane JJ's definition of the scope of the 
designated person exception was that they upheld the conferral of some non-
judicial functions on judges as designated persons. To be validly conferred, 
these powers must not be contrary to the incompatibility principle, that is, not 
inconsistent with the proper exercise of judicial power by the Court. Although 
Mason and Deane JJ set out the incompatibility test as a limitation to the 
designated person exception, it is not a great step to suggest that they must 
have formed the opinion that not all non-judicial functions conferred on judges 
were of their nature likely to violate the separation of powers principle. 
Accordingly, Mason and Deane JJ's judgment in Hilton might reflect an attempt 
to introduce a principle designed to replace the second limb of the separation 
doctrine, and its designated person exception. That Sir Anthony Mason desired 
to clear away the designated person exception and replace it with the 
incompatibility principle was made clear by his paper' A New Perspective on 
the Separation of Powers', delivered in 1996 after his retirement as Chief 
Justice.205 On this interpretation, when in Hilton Mason and Deane JJ framed 
their judgment around the central question- 'what is the point' of attempting to 
enforce strict separation and a broad exception to it - they may not have been 
simply attempting to claw back the scope of the designated person exception. 
Instead, Mason and Deane JJ might have been suggesting a possible line of 
argument to counsel should the Court decide to reconsider the Boilermakers' 
Case. 206 
205 Sir Anthony Mason commented that the designated person exception 'has little to comment 
it. Rationality would be advanced if the concept were jettisoned and replaced by the incompatibility test.' 
Sir Anthony Mason, 'A New Perspective on Separation of Powers' (1996) 82 Canberra Bulletin of 
Public Administration 1, 5 (emphasis added). 
206 Mason and Deane JJ observed that the Commonwealth Solicitor-General had submitted that 
the Court should reconsider the Boilermakers' Case. However, they noted that argument had not 
been made on this question, and so they refrained from 'giving an answer': Hilton (1985) 157 
CLR57, 86. 
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This interpretation of Hilton, however, hinges on an assumption that Deane 
shared Mason J's doubts regarding the second limb of the separation principle. 
Prior to Hilton, Deane had not previously expressed such concerns. Previous 
chapters have indicated that Deane was a judge willing both to adhere to his 
understanding of 'fundamental constitutional truth' in the face of precedent, 207 
and to strongly criticise the existing state of authority.208 In this context, it 
would seem likely that, if Deane felt that the Boilermakers' Case was wrongly 
decided, or that it unnecessarily complicated the separation of powers 
principle, he would have indicated that he entertained those doubts. 
(ii) What is the significance of Deane's pattern of a strict and 
purposive interpretation of the separation principle? 
A second interpretation of the minority judgment in Hilton is that, for his part, 
Deane did not share Mason J's concerns over the correctness of the designated 
person exception. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that it was 
open to Deane to join the majority judgment if he believed that the Boilermakers' 
Case required too strict a quarantine of judicial and non-judicial power. The 
majority judgment, although upholding the second limb of the separation 
doctrine, allowed Parliament a wider scope to confer non-judicial powers on 
judges. Certainly the majority's approach lacked the additional hurdles (of 
legislative clarity and consent) imposed by Mason and Deane JJ. Deane did not, 
however, choose this course. Instead he joined with Mason J and adopted a 
narrow construction of Parliament's power to confer non-judicial powers on 
Ch III judges. 
Deane's confining of the designated person exception in Hilton, compared to his 
approach in Drake, may therefore demonstrate Deane's consistency across his 
207 Compare, for example, Deane's commitment to 'fundamental constitutional truth' over 
rarecedent in the context of s 118 discussed above chapter 2 n 186. 
08 Note, for example, Deane's forceful criticism of the Court's s 92 jurisprudence (before Cole) as 
demonstrating that: 
the ordinary processes of legal reasoning have had but a small part to play and ... 
judicial exegesis has tended to confuse rather than elucidate. Indeed, it is as if many 
voices of authority have been speaking differently at the same time with the result that, 
putting to one side some basic propositions, it is all but impossible to comprehend 
precisely what it is that authority has said. 
Miller v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1986) 161CLR556, 616. 
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separation of powers jurisprudence. In Hilton, as he had in Re Tracey, Deane 
imposed restrictions on Parliament's powers in order to keep the exception 
within its proper limits. Further, as Wheeler has argued, the adoption of 
consent and incompatibility limitations may reflect the Court's trend towards a 
purposive interpretation of the Constitution over formalistic interpretations.209 
Deane's final (joint) judgment on the designated person exception, in Grollo, 
suggests that his framing of the exception was influenced by a purposive 
analysis of the separation of powers doctrine.210 In particular, Grollo reflected 
assumptions regarding the importance of judicial process that were pervasive 
across Deane's jurisprudence, and reinforced the consistency of his reasons in 
Hilton and Grollo with the wider body of his constitutional decision-making. 
3 Grollo v Palmer 
Of the judges who sat in Grollo only Deane and Dawson JJ were also members 
of the Court in Hilton.211 Like Hilton, Grollo raised the issue of the validity of a 
tap warrant issued under the Interception Act. In the intervening period, the Act 
had been amended to require the consent of the judges to the assumption of the 
non-judicial role in their personal capacity.212 On the facts, the Court, with 
McHugh J dissenting, concluded that the conferral of these powers on judges of 
the Federal Court in their personal capacity was not incompatible with the 
separation of federal judicial power enshrined in Ch III. 
The principal judgment was that of Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson and 
Toohey JJ.213 They reformulated the two limiting conditions imposed by Mason 
and Deane JJ in Hilton. Accordingly, they required: first, that a judge consent to 
the conferral of the non-judicial power; and second, that the non-judicial 
209 Wheeler's comments were made in relation to the Court's embrace of these limitations in 
Grollo, but arguably Mason and Deane JJ's reasoning in Hilton could stand as an earlier 
illustration of this tendency. Fiona Wheeler, 'Federal Judges as Holders of Non-Judicial Office' 
in Brian Opeskin and Fiona Wheeler (eds), The Australian Federal Judicial System (2000) 442, 465. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Brennan J, although a member of the Court in 1985, did not sit in Hilton. 
212 Thus Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ comment that the Act provided 'even 
clearer indicia showing that the power to issue interception warrants is conferred on judges as 
designated persons and not on the courts of which eligible judges are members.' Grollo (1995) 
184 CLR 348, 362. 
213 Gummow J wrote a separate majority judgment and McHugh J dissented. Gaudron J did not 
sit in this case. 
function must not be 'incompatible' with the performance of the judge's 
'judicial functions' or with the proper discharge by the Court of its 
responsibilities.214 
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Grollo was the second occasion when Deane, as a High Court judge, did not 
express disapproval of the second limb of the separation of powers principle or 
follow Sir Anthony Mason's extra-curial urgings to abandon the designated 
person principle in favour of an overarching incompatibility test. In other areas 
of public and private law, Deane had been at the forefront of simplifying 
complex doctrine under umbrella principles.215 However, there was no 
suggestion in the joint judgment in Grollo, nor indeed in Deane's comments 
during argument in either Hilton or Grollo, that he wished to undertake such a 
simplification. Thus it may be concluded that Deane approved the validity of 
the second limb of the separation doctrine. 
In the course of reformulating the Hilton limiting conditions on the designated 
person exception, the joint judgment in Grollo recognised that the Court must 
assess whether the appointment undermined the integrity of the judiciary.216 
This touchstone revealed two important elements of the Grollo approach. First, 
it effected a tightening of the exception. Second, it secured this effect by means 
of a purposive interpretation of the separation of powers principle.217 At the 
doctrinal level, therefore, Deane's participation in the joint judgment in Grollo 
confirmed his previous restrictions on the exception in Hilton and was 
consistent with his restriction of the scope of the military justice exception by 
reference to a purposive interpretation of the separation of powers principle in 
Re Tracey. 
There were, however, two significant points of difference between Deane's joint 
judgment in Grollo and Deane's analysis in other Ch III cases. First, as in Hilton, 
214 Grollo (1995) 184 CLR 348, 364-5. 
215 See, for example, Deane's approach to the doctrine of proximity in tort summarised in 
Rosalind Atherton, Tony Blackshield, Bruce Kercher and Cameron Stewart, 'Deane, William 
Patrick' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion 
to the High Court of Australia (2001) 195. 
216 Grollo (1995) 184 CLR 348, 365. 
217 See, on the role of purposive analysis in Grollo: Fiona Wheeler, 'Federal Judges as Holders of 
Non-Judicial Office' in Brian Opeskin and Fiona Wheeler (eds), The Australian Federal Judicial 
System (2000) 442, 465. 
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the joint judgment in Grollo did not explain the continued recognition by the 
Court of the designated person exception to the separation of powers principle. 
There is no apparent reason for this omission in Grollo, except perhaps the 
compromise flowing from a joint judgment of four members of the Court; 
judges who had at various times expressed quite divergent views on Ch III 
issues. 218 The second difference related to the decision on the facts of Grollo. 
That decision highlighted that, despite the restrictions on the exception, 
Parliament could still confer controversial powers on federal judges in their 
personal capacity. The joint judges recognised that the issuing of tap warrants 
was 'no business for a judge to be involved in.'219 Nevertheless, the joint 
judgment upheld the legislation in Grollo. In reaching that conclusion on the 
facts, the members of the joint judgment, including Deane, balanced the threat 
to the separation of powers against other interests served by the legislation, 
including the perceived advantages of the participation of judicial officers in the 
executive process.220 The following section examines how the joint judgment's 
approach to that balancing process confirmed Deane's understanding of the 
role of judicial reasoning as a significant guarantee of individual rights. 
(a) The independence of judges: the protection of rights 
through the judge's personal qualities 
Like Hilton, the issue in Grollo surrounded legislation authorising the issue of 
'intrusive and clandestine' tap warrants.221 According to the joint judgment, the 
primary factor weighing in favour of compatibility was the vital function 
performed by the judges in scrutinising applications for the warrants. Thus, the 
joint judgment argued that in the face of legislation designed to combat 'serious 
crime': 
some impartial authority, accustomed to the dispassionate assessment of 
evidence and sensitive to the common law's protection of privacy and property 
(both real and personal), be authorised to control the official interception of 
communications.222 
218 Compare, for example, the different approaches of members of the Court in Re Tracey. 
Wheeler observes that 'certain passages in the joint judgment suggest that the finding of 
compatibility was a borderline one', perhaps suggesting the melding of varied approaches by 
the members of the joint judgment to Ch III issues: ibid 462. 
219 Grollo (1995) 184 CLR 348, 367. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid (emphasis added). 
Thus the use of judges, according to the joint judgment, provided: 
a desirable guarantee that the appropriate balance will be kept between the law 
enforcement agencies on the one hand and criminal suspects or suspected 
sources of information about crime on the other.223 
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At the heart of the joint judgment in Grollo was therefore a concern that the 
power to issue tap-warrants under the Interception Act was a grave threat to 
individual rights protected under the common law. In their view, the necessity 
of a level of impartial control over the powers of the Executive justified the use 
of judges as designated persons in this role, despite the risks they had identified 
to judicial integrity and public confidence in the judiciary.224 Rather, the 
guarantee, and the fact that the judges decided 'independently of the applicant 
agency', was sufficient to preserve public confidence in the judiciary despite 
their participation in the tap warrant system.225 
As the dissenting judgment of McHugh J forcefully highlighted, however, the 
joint judgment rested on a number of critical assumptions. For example, it was 
assumed that the judges could exercise the power independently of the 
executive even though, by definition, they were deprived of the institutional 
independence provided by their court. In addition, the joint judgment admitted 
that the 'judicial method' utilised in the grant of the interception warrant was 
not identical to the ordinary adversarial process, as the proceedings were 
clandestine, and ex parte.226 The independence to which the joint judges 
referred must therefore be the ability of the judges to decide the issue 
independently, that is, to decide with independence of mind. Accordingly, the key 
protection offered to individuals by having serving federal judges issue tap 
warrants was that the Ch III judges would bring to this task, in their personal 
capacity, their 'professional experience and cast of mind. 1227 Implicit in this 
statement, and the reasoning of the joint judgment generally, was the 
assumption that the Ch III judges would utilise elements of the judicial process, 
particularly judicial reasoning, in deciding whether to grant a tap warrant. The 
judicial methodology was therefore regarded as itself providing an important 
protection for individual liberty. 
223 Ibid (emphasis added). 
224 Ibid. 
225 Ibid. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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This emphasis on judicial method by the joint judgment was evocative of the 
extra-curial writings of one of its member, Sir Gerard Brennan. In his paper 
'Courts For The People: Not People's Courts', delivered two months prior to the 
decision in Grollo, Sir Gerard remarked on the significance of judicial integrity, 
and judicial impartiality, in maintaining public confidence in the judiciary.228 
Sir Gerard added that judicial impartiality was not a quality that was assumed, 
along with the judicial robes, on appointment to the bench. Rather: 
It is a cast of mind that is a feature of personal character honed ... by exposure to 
those judicial officers and professional colleagues ... This indefinable quality 
governs the conduct of the proceedings, the evaluation of evidence, the 
conclusion of facts and the analysis and application of legal rules.229 
It was in this 'cast of mind', a phrase utilised in Grollo,230 that the joint judgment 
placed its trust. Thus it was because of these qualities that the joint judgment 
appeared satisfied that the vital protection of rights provided by judges in this 
context outweighed the risks to judicial integrity and independence. 
In Grollo McHugh J was not convinced by this line of argument. He questioned 
whether the role of the judges in protecting individual liberties under the 
Interception Act would be regarded as an adequate counterbalance to the threat 
posed by their involvement in the issue of tap warrants to the public perception 
of the independence of the judiciary. There is much that is persuasive in 
McHugh J's analysis. In particular, the joint judgment provided no answer to 
McHugh J's suggestion that retired judges rather than serving federal judges, in 
their personal capacity, could instead be called upon to issue tap warrants.231 
Such an appointment would surely provide the benefits of a judicial cast of 
mind, while retaining a strict separation between the federal judiciary and the 
Executive. In addition, the joint judgment proceeded on the assumption that 
judges were best qualified to resolve disputes, and protect rights. This 
228 Sir Gerard Brennan, 'Courts For The People: Not People's Courts' (1995) 2 Deakin Law 
Review l. This paper was presented as the Inaugural Deakin Law School Oration, 26 July 1995. 
See also Sir Gerard's swearing-in speech as Chief Justice, at (1995) 183 CLR ix, x, and Sir Gerard 
Brennan, 'Why be a Judge?' (1996) 14 Australian Bar Review 89. 
229 Brennan, above n 228, 6 (emphasis added). 
230 Grollo (1995) 184 CLR 348, 367. 
231 Ibid 384. See further, Joseph and Castan, who observed that although the majority decision 
was 'well-founded', particularly in light of comparable overseas precedent, the majority 
judgment failed to 'adequately address McHugh J's criticisms.' Sarah Joseph and Melissa 
Castan, Federal Constitutional Law: A Contemporary View (2nd ed, 2006) 184-5. 
paternalistic assumption was not, and arguably cannot reasonably be, 
substantiated. 
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The principle that a Court performed a vital role in the protection of human 
rights was a constant thread in Deane's jurisprudence. In Grollo the joint 
judgment clarified and extended this concept significantly by recognising the 
role of a judge's personal capacities and attributes as a counterbalance to the 
intrusive powers of the Executive under the Interception Act. Although a joint 
judgment, Grollo therefore advances an understanding of Deane's constitutional 
philosophy in two ways. First, his belief in the qualities and function of a judge 
explained Deane's continued acceptance of the designated person exception: as 
ultimately serving the purpose of the separation of powers, that is, the 
protection of individual liberty. Second, Grollo clarified Deane's preference for 
the judicial protection of individual rights, over action by the Executive or 
Parliament. Thus for Deane it was the integrity, independence, impartiality, 
rationality and the commitment to the protection of common law rights 
intrinsic in the judicial process, 232 and the judicial 'cast of mind'233 that effected 
the greatest guarantee to 'the people' and their rights. 
Conclusion 
It is one of the interesting features of Deane's High Court jurisprudence that it 
began and came to a close with decisions exploring the separation of powers 
doctrine. Less than two weeks after his swearing-in as a Justice of the Court, in 
his first High Court decision, Deane indicated in Hammond that the separation 
of powers ensured that federal judicial proceedings were immunised from 
legislative and executive interference amounting to contempt of court. In 
subsequent cases, Deane affirmed his belief that Ch III protected aspects of the 
judicial process from interference, and implied a range of procedural and 
substantive rights from the first limb of the separation principle, using his 
'fundamental concepts' reasoning. Although Deane derived his most 
innovative, distinctive and controversial Ch III rights in iconic cases delivered 
232 Grollo (1995) 184 CLR 348, 367. 
233 Ibid. 
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in the 1990s, Hammond confirmed that Deane's Mason Court cases built on his 
well-established understanding of the role of the separation principle as a 
source of constitutional rights. 
Thirteen years later, in his final months on the High Court, Deane (in a joint 
judgment) in Grollo defined the limits of the designated person exception to the 
second limb of the separation doctrine. Grollo too built on a pattern of earlier 
decisions. Perhaps because these decisions were each joint judgments, Deane's 
cases on the second limb of the separation principle seemed to lack the 
trademark elements of his 'fundamental concepts' reasoning, and the 
passionate declarations of the Court's role to protect the rights of 'the people'. 
Nevertheless, the core of Deane's designated person jurisprudence confirmed 
his understanding of judicial reasoning as an important guarantee of individual 
liberties. 
The next chapter examines Deane's interpretation of the Constitution's express 
rights. In this context also, Deane sought to extend the reach of the judicial 
protection of individual rights, by interpreting the text consistently with his 
vision of the purpose of the Constitution, as 'ultimately concerned with the 
governance and protection of the people' .234 
234 Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447, 477. 
Chapter 4 EXPRESS RIGHTS AND THEIR ROLE 
IN THE CONSTITUTION 
Introduction 
In Street Deane commenced his reasons with his famous rights 'manifesto.'1 
This passage is so significant in Deane's constitutional jurisprudence that it 
bears repeating in full: 
It is often said that the Australian Constitution contains no bill of rights. 
Statements to that effect, while literally true, are superficial and potentially 
misleading. The Constitution contains a significant number of express or implied 
guarantees of rights and immunities. The most important of them is the guarantee 
that the citizen can be subjected to the exercise of Commonwealth judicial 
power only by the 'courts' designated by Ch III (s 71). Others include: the 
guarantee that the trial on indictment of any offence against any law of the 
Commonwealth shall be by jury (s 80); the guarantees against discrimination 
between persons in different parts of the country in relation to custom and 
excise duties, and other Commonwealth taxes and bounties (ss Sl(ii), Sl(iii), 86, 
88 and 90); the guarantee of freedom of interstate trade, commerce and 
intercourse (s 92); the guarantee of direct suffrage and of equality of voting 
rights among those qualified to vote (ss 24 and 25); the guarantees of the free 
exercise of religion (s 116); and the guarantee against being subject to 
inconsistent demands of contemporaneously valid laws (ss 109 and 118). 
All of those guarantees of rights or immunities are of fundamental importance 
in that they serve the function of advancing or protecting the liberty, the 
dignity of the equality of the citizen under the Constitution.2 
Deane's decision in Street was delivered a year after a failed referendum to 
increase the guarantees of individual liberty in the Constitution. In dramatic 
fashion, in this passage Deane affirmed his vision of the Constitution, in its 
unamended form, as a significant source of constitutional rights. These rights 
included implications (such as the separation of powers) and rights-sensitive 
interpretations of a variety of provisions in the constitutional text. This passage, 
and Deane's observations on the absence of a formal 'bill of rights', had 
particular relevance for his approach to the judicial implication of constitutional 
1 Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary 
and Materials (3rd ed, 2002) 1100. 
2 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 521-2 (emphasis added). 
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rights. Part 2 of this chapter explores the significance of Deane's 'manifesto' in 
that context. 
Part 1 examines Deane's understanding of ss 80, 51(xxxi), and 117; a more 
conventional list of the Constitution's express rights than that offered by Deane 
in Street.3 Across these provisions, Deane was a fierce proponent of the 
principle that, consistent with their importance for the liberty, dignity and 
equality of 'the people', these provisions must be given a robust interpretation, 
and applied by reference to 'substance'. Thus the guarantees must not operate 
at the whim of Parliament, turning on the 'form' of legislation. However, Deane 
also acknowledged that ss Sl(xxxi) and 117 were not absolute constitutional 
guarantees. Thus his decisions recognised that if the protection offered by these 
sections was taken too far it could undermine the ability of the Commonwealth, 
or the States, to exercise the functions of government. 
Section 80 stood apart from ss 51(xxxi) and 117 in Deane's jurisprudence. In his 
three decisions on s 80, Deane exhibited an uncompromising commitment to 
broadening the rights-protection offered by the section; a commitment leading 
him in Kingswell v The Queen to dissent passionately on the meaning of 'trial on 
indictment'.4 This approach to s 80 turned on Deane's vision of jury trials as a 
significant guarantee of individual liberty and an important component of fair 
judicial process. This chapter commences with a discussion of Deane's vision of 
s 80. 
A Part 1: Deane and three express rights 
1 Section 80 
Section 80 provides that the 'trial on indictment of any offence against a law of 
the Commonwealth shall be by jury'. While on the Court, Deane addressed 
3 Deane did not decide any cases on s 116. For Deane's understanding of the concept of 
'religion', in the context of Victorian taxation legislation, see his joint judgment (with Wilson J) 
in Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax (Vic) (1982) 154 CLR 120. 
4 (1985) 159 CLR 264 ('Kingswell'). 
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three questions relevant to the scope of s 80: the meaning of 'on indictment' 
(Kingswell); whether an accused could waive the guarantee of a jury trial (Brown 
v The Queen);5 and the composition of a jury (Cheatle v The Queen).6 
One of the enduring questions raised by Deane's jurisprudence was whether his 
vision of s 80 as a substantive individual right in Kingswell, and his conclusion 
in Brown that an accused cannot waive that right, were compatible. This chapter 
demonstrates that Deane's consistent message was that s 80 was more than a 
'mere procedural provision';7 it was a fundamental guarantee of the fair 
administration of justice in serious federal offences. For Deane this guarantee 
was of importance to the rights of dignity, liberty and equality of the individual 
accused and to the community. It was also of equal importance to 'the people' 
as a whole, by securing the integrity and independence of the judicial process in 
the federal justice system. 
This part examines Deane's decisions on s 80 in reverse chronological order. 
This approach has two key benefits. First, in Cheatle and Brown Deane presented 
a clear picture of the multiple rights dimensions of s 80 and its role in protecting 
the interests of the individual and 'the people' as a whole. Unfortunately, that 
message was less clearly developed in Deane's first case on s 80, Kingswell. 
Second, examining Deane's decisions in this order brings into focus those 
aspects of his vision of s 80 that he shared with other judges, before turning to 
his forceful dissenting reasons in Kingswell. 
(a) Cheatle v The Queen 
In Cheatle, in 1993, the Court explored the 'essential features' of a jury trial for 
the purposes of s 80. Section 57 A of the Juries Act 1927 (SA) provided that a 
majority verdict could be substituted if a unanimous verdict had not been 
reached after a specified minimum period. The Court, in a fittingly unanimous 
joint judgment, held that 'history, principle and authority'8 compelled the 
5 (1986) 160 CLR 171 ('Brown'). 
6 (1993) 177 CLR 541 ('Cheatle'). 
7 Compare Spratt v Hermes (1965) 114 CLR 226, 244 (Barwick CJ). 
8 Cheatle (1993) 177 CLR 541, 562. 
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conclusion thats 80 precluded a guilty verdict in a trial upon indictment of a 
federal offence otherwise than by unanimous verdict. For present purposes, 
two features of the decision in Cheatle are of significance: its description of the 
purpose of s 80, and the interpretive principles applied by the Court to extract 
the mandatory minimum content of the guarantee. 
(i) The purpose of s 80 
The joint reasons in Cheatle identified the core function and 'essential features' 
of s 80 before turning to three 'arguments against unanimity'9 at the final stages 
of the decision. This structure mirrored the structure of Deane's reasons in 
Polyukhovich and Breavington and may indicate that Deane had a significant 
hand in writing the Cheatle joint judgment. 
One of the three 'arguments against unanimity' addressed in Cheatle was that of 
convenience, that is, the argument that 'powerful practical considerations' 
favoured the use of majority verdicts in contemporary jury trials.10 As discussed 
in chapter 1, Deane had responded to an argument of 'convenience' in the 
Incorporation Case, specifically that 'it would be productive of difficulty and 
inconvenience' to construes Sl(xx) as including the power of incorporation but 
limited to 'trading and financial' corporations.11 Deane forcefully rejected this 
argument in the Incorporation Case on both general and particular grounds. In 
that case Deane had argued that the convenience or practicality of the 
Commonwealth's law were issues exclusively for the consideration of 
Parliament.12 The Court's task in constitutional interpretation was rather to give 
effect to the 'words' of the Constitution, as the compact of 'the people'.13 In 
addition, in the Incorporation Case Deane had challenged the accuracy of the 
conclusion that a national corporations law was 'productive of inconvenience', 
arguing that the 'benefits' of a national uniform corporations law would 
'outweigh' any inconvenience.14 
9 Ibid 560. 
10 Ibid 561. 
11 Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR482, 511. 
12 Ibid 512. 
13 Ibid 504. 
14 Ibid 512. 
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The Court in Cheatle offered similar general and particular responses to the 
argument that 'practical' considerations favoured a construction of s 80 
permitting a majority verdict in a trial of an indictable federal offence.15 Thus, in 
Cheatle, the joint judgment argued that: 
the abandonment, for reasons of contemporary convenience or practical utility, 
of an essential feature of the criminal trial by jury which is guaranteed bys 80 of 
the Constitution is not a matter for this Court. It is a matter for the people of 
Australia [fn 'See Constitution 128']for whose protection the guarantee, including 
the requirement of unanimity, was adopted.16 
Like Deane in the Incorporation Case, the Court in Cheatle affirmed in this 
passage that issues of convenience or practicality were not themselves a basis 
for abandoning the clear meaning of the text. This was because the Court's task 
was to interpret the Constitution, and s 80 in particular, as an instrument for the 
benefit of 'the people'.17 Continuing their analysis of the 'convenience' 
argument, the Court then addressed its substance, arguing that, 
it is not, in any event, apparent that considerations of contemporary 
convenience or practical utility favour an abandonment of the requirement of 
unanimity in the case of a criminal jury. To the contrary, one can point to strong 
support for the view that the requirement of unanimity of a criminal jury is, on 
balance, in the public interest in this country.18 
The effect of these two passages in Cheatle was to endorse a significant rights-
purpose for s 80. That a joint judgment, reflecting the views of judges with 
disparate views on constitutional rights and s 80, would affirm such a purpose 
for the section is particularly striking. Thus, Cheatle displayed unanimity 
amongst the Court as to the position that when enlivened s 80 functioned as a 
fundamental constitutional guarantee, serving the interests of the 'people of 
Australia'. 
The reference to 'the people' by the Court in Cheatle was also of significance. 
This thesis has demonstrated that reliance on 'the people' was a constant thread 
in Deane's constitutional jurisprudence. In the above passage, the Court, 
including Deane, declared that the restriction of constitutional guarantees must 
15 Cheatle (1993) 177 CLR 541, 561-2. 
16 Ibid 561-2 (emphasis added). 
17 The significance of the Court's reference to the 'essential features' of a jury trial for the Court's 
interpretive approach is examined further below. 
18 Cheatle (1993) 177 CLR 541, 562 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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be effected by 'the people' through s 128. This sentiment was consistent with 
Deane's commitment, displayed throughout his jurisprudence, to strengthen of 
Constitution's protection of 'the people'. Thus Deane regarded it as the Court's 
duty to interpret the Constitution consistently with its status as an instrument 
designed for the 'governance and protection of the people'.19 This entailed, for 
Deane, the extension of the judicial protection of rights, whether through 
implication, the reinterpretation of express provisions or the use of 
proportionality analysis. 
However, the above passage from Cheatle demonstrated the different layers of 
meaning available to the concept of 'the people' in constitutional interpretation. 
In Cheatle, the Court turned to 'the people', and their power under s 128, to 
support judicial reticence and restraint in constitutional interpretation.20 It was 
therefore for 'the people', not the Court to alter the meaning of s 80, particularly 
where alteration would affect the extent of the constitutional right guaranteed 
by that provision. Until 'the people' spoke, through s 128, the Court in Cheatle 
considered that its duty was to faithfully apply the text, according to the 
'essential features' of a jury trial. 
On the facts in Cheatle these different roles of 'the people' each supported the 
strict enforcement of the terms of the guarantee of s 80. However, across much 
of Deane's jurisprudence (including the interpretation of ss 51(xxxi) and 117 
explored later in this chapter) different visions of the role of 'the people' 
supported conflicting meanings of the Constitution. Thus, through these 
passages, Cheatle reinforced the flexibility of the concept as a tool in 
constitutional interpretation, and raised the question of whether this concept 
can be regarded as a useful or legitimate tool in constitutional interpretation. 
19 Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447, 477. 
2° Compare Sir Daryl Dawson's argument that the choice of 'the people' in 1900 to adopt a 
federal system, and their power under s 128 to amend the Constitution, should encourage 
judicial reticence to 'alter' the federal division of legislative power under the Constitution: Sir 
Daryl Dawson, 'The Constitution- Major Overhaul or Simple Tune-up?' (1984) 14 Melbourne 
University Law Review 353, 365. 
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(ii) Evolutionary interpretation ands 80 
The Court in Cheatle applied a form of evolutionary constitutional 
interpretation, whereby both history and contemporary circumstances played 
an important part in ascertaining the content of the guarantee.21 Recognising 
that the phrase 'trial by jury' had an identifiable meaning in the common law 
when the Constitution was drafted, the starting point for the Court was the 
elements of that institution in 1900.22 Unanimity was one such feature, as was 
representativeness. However, in 1900 representativeness was wedded with 
'some undesirable characteristics', specifically, the exclusion of women and 
unpropertied jurors.23 Would these features also carry forward to 1993? 
The Court's unanimous conclusion was that these discriminatory elements 
were not essential features of the institution of 'trial by jury'. They argued 
instead that the discriminatory elements of trial by jury in the common law in 
fact reflected a deeper value or purpose, or underlying 'essential feature' - that 
of ensuring representativeness in the jury.24 It was by adopting this level of 
abstraction to the features of the 1900 jury trial that the Court in Cheatle was 
able to allow the institution to 'conform with contemporary standards'.25 
Cheatle's interpretive approach has evident strengths and weaknesses. On the 
one hand, the Court has long recognised, through the use of the connotation 
and denotation distinction, that the meaning of the Constitution may adapt, 
within limits, to contemporary circumstances.26 By identifying the 'essential 
features' of a common law institution of 'trial by jury', the Court in Cheatle 
likewise identified the unchanging elements of the institution - unanimity and 
representativeness - but allowed those concepts to mould to their 
contemporary meaning. On the other hand, the choice of essential features from 
21 For a discussion of evolutionary forms of constitutional interpretation, see Sir Anthony 
Mason, 'The Interpretation of a Constitution in a Modem Liberal Democracy' in Charles 
Sampford and Kim Preston (eds), Interpreting Constitutions: Theories, Principles and Institutions 
(1996) 13, 16-23. For a different 'taxonomy', see John Dyson Heydon, 'Theories of Constitutional 
Interpretation: A Taxonomy' (2007) Winter Bar News 12. 
22 Cheatle (1993) 177 CLR 541, 550-2. 
23 Ibid 560. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid (emphasis added). 
26 Goldsworthy argued that Cheatle was a compelling application of connotation I denotation 
reasoning: Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 'Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation' (1997) 25 Federal 
Law Review 1, 31-3. 
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a rich historical source permitted the Court considerable flexibility to identify 
those essential features. This flexibility enabled the Court to excise the 
undesirable elements of the historical record and ensure that those elements of 
the institution that did not accord to contemporary (moral) values, did not bind 
the Constitution's meaning in 1993. 
This interpretive methodology was exhibited in a range of Deane decisions. The 
most obvious illustration of Deane's focus on contemporary meaning can be 
found in his invocation of the 'living force' theory of interpretation in 
Theophanous. 27 As chapter 6 later demonstrates, Deane's 'living force' theory 
allowed him to fuse traditional and contemporary meaning. However, another 
decision on the meaning of Ch III also illustrates Deane's use of an evolutionary 
interpretive approach. In Mickelberg v The Queen, decided five years earlier than 
Theophanous, in 1989, Deane examined the nature of the Court's appellate 
jurisdiction under s 73. Deane alone in that case held that the Court had the 
power to receive new evidence. In adamant tones, Deane refused to allow that 
the traditional practice and procedure of the Court could prevent the Court from 
reconsidering the issue. In language strikingly similar to his later endorsement 
of a 'living force' theory of interpretation in Theophanous, Deane remarked in 
Mickelberg: 
there is ... no justification for the approach that ancient procedures should be 
allowed to reach from the past to fetter with their inadequacies the ability of this 
Court to do justice in the exercise of its general appellate jurisdiction under the 
Constitution.28 
In Cheatle, the Court was not as bold as Deane in Mickelberg. The Court in 
Cheatle did not suggest that the institution of jury trials should be recast, that is, 
it did not urge the rejection of the discriminatory features of the 'past' in order 
to apply new procedures and traditions. Instead, but to the same effect, the 
Court in Cheat le endorsed the 'essential feature' of jury trials, that were said to 
underlie the discriminatory practices of the past. In this way, the Court led s 80 
beyond the past meaning of the institution of 'trial by jury' into a meaning 
consistent with contemporary concepts of equality. 
27 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171. 
28 Mickelberg v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259, 280 (emphasis added). 
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In contrast to Cheatle, in his earlier decisions in Brown and Kingswell Deane was 
not faced with the need to 'renovate' the institution of trial by jury. Instead, the 
recurring issue in these cases was the purpose of s 80. 
(b) Brown v The Queen 
In Brown a majority of the Court (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ, Gibbs CJ and 
Wilson J dissenting) held that s 80 prevented an accused from electing to be 
tried by judge alone for an indictable Commonwealth offence. Deane's 
reasoning in Brown articulated a dual purpose for s 80. First, in language similar 
to the joint judgment in Cheatle, Deane stated that: 
the general prescription of trial by jury as the method of trial on indictment of 
any offence against any law of the Commonwealth constitutes an element of the 
structure of government and distribution of judicial power.29 
Thus Deane regarded s 80 as an important feature of the structure of 
government 'adopted by, and for the benefit o,t the people of the Federation as a 
whole.'30 Significantly, Deane also indicated that by prescribing the trial by jury 
for specified offences, s 80 served the community as a whole as it 'fosters the 
ideal of equality in a democratic community'.31 This was because the institution of 
trial by jury ensured that 'neither the powerful nor the weak should expect or fear 
special or discriminatory treatment.'32 In this way, Brown confirmed Deane's 
continuing interest in equality as a constitutional value, and substantially 
mirrored the language of his swearing-in speech.33 
Deane's vision of the purpose of s 80, as serving the interests of 'the people' as a 
whole, coupled with the language of the section (trial 'shall be' by jury), led him 
to conclude that the requirements of s 80 could not be waived by an accused.34 
This vision for s 80 was consistent with Deane's wider understanding of the 
nature and purpose of the Constitution. As Deane explained in his swearing-in 
29 Brown (1986) 160 CLR 171, 202. 
30 Ibid (emphasis added). 
31 Ibid (emphasis added). Note Stellios' critique that the Court insufficiently distinguished 
between the role of s 80 and the institution of jury trials: James Stellios, 'The Constitutional Jury 
- "A Bulwark of Liberty?"' (2005) 27 Sydney Law Review 113, 131. 
32 Brown (1986) 160 CLR 171, 202 (emphasis added). 
33 The role of the jury in fostering equality was not a feature of the Constitution mentioned by 
Deane and Toohey JJ in Leeth in their implication of a general guarantee of legal equality. 
34 Brown (1986) 160 CLR 171, 201. 
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speech, the source of the Constitution's legitimacy lay with 'the people' - the 
'strong and the weak, the rich and the poor: 'all manner of people."35 In Brown 
this meant that the significance of the institution of the jury trial for the 
community, particularly ensuring the equality of people before the law, 
matched with the mandatory language of the section, required that the 
guarantee could not be waived. 
This view did not mean, however, that Deane did not regard s 80 as an 
important individual right. Instead, Deane's focus on 'the people' meant that a 
provision such as s 80 was not activated, or denied, at the whim of Parliament, 
but operated as a substantive guarantee of individual liberty. In Kingswell 
Deane secured this rights-purpose for s 80 by deriving a substantive meaning of 
the phrase 'trial on indictment'. 
(c) Kingswell v The Queen 
(i) A substantive guarantee 
In Kingswell the Court examined the validity of a Commonwealth indictable 
offence that differentiated between the elements of the principal offence, which 
were matters for the jury, and aggravating features, which were determined by 
the judge sitting alone. Kingswell argued that by removing the aggravating 
features from the jury his trial was conducted contrary to s 80. Gibbs CJ, Mason, 
Wilson and Dawson JJ held that whether an offence was 'indictable', and the 
distinction between elements of the offence and aggravating features, were 
matters entirely for Parliament.36 Brennan and Deane JJ rejected this 
conclusion.37 For Brennan and Deane JJ, the term 'offence' had an objective 
meaning, which could not be subverted by creative legislative drafting. In this 
case, the aggravating features were in fact important components of the 
35 Transcript of the Ceremonial Sitting of the Occasion of the Swearing-in of the Honourable 
Mr Justice Deane as a Justice of the High Court of Australia at Canberra, Tuesday 27 July 
1982, 17. 
36 Kingswell (1985) 159 CLR 264, 276-7 (Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ); 285 (Mason J). 
37 Brennan J's reasoning, and the particular issues associated with the identification of elements 
of an' offence' was examined further in James Stellios, 'The Constitutional Jury - "A Bulwark of 
Liberty?"' (2005) 27 Sydney Law Review 113, 117-8. 
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conduct that was criminalised, and so were required to be put to the jury under 
s 80.38 
In Kingswell Deane explained his vision of s 80 in the following passage: 
The guarantee of s 80 of the Constitution was not the mere expression of some 
casual preference for one form of trial. It reflected a deep-seated conviction of 
free men and women about the way in which justice should be administered in 
criminal cases. That conviction finds a solid basis in an understanding of the 
history and functionin& of the common law as a bulwark against the tyranny of 
arbitrary punishment.3 
In later passages Deane expanded on s 80's role in protecting individual rights, 
describing 'the rationale and essential function' of s 80 as 'the protection of the 
citizen' from the arbitrary exercise of power by legislators, administrators or 
judges.40 In addition, a jury trial ensured that the criminal justice system was 
consistent with the principle of a fair go' and 'ordinary notions of fair play. 141 It 
was because of this understanding of the purpose of s 80 and jury trials that 
Deane concluded that the section provided a substantive guarantee.42 
Accordingly, Deane reasoned that 'the settled principles of legal interpretation' 
required it to be 'broadly interpreted and applied'43 and its operation not confined 
by 'narrow technicality' or 'devious drafting.'44 Thus, ass 80 was a provision of 
importance in the Constitution, the phrase 'trial on indictment' must be given a 
substantive interpretation. 
As in Re Tracey and Cheatle, Deane sought the meaning of 'indictable offences' 
in common law history.45 In his view, a survey of the history of jury trials 
supported the conclusion that 'trial on indictment', at the time of drafting the 
Constitution, bore the meaning of a trial of a 'serious offence', that is, an offence 
not capable of being dealt with summarily.46 Although unnecessary to 
determine conclusively on the facts in Kingswell, Deane expressed the 'tentative 
38 Kingswell (1985) 159 CLR 264, 294-5 (Brennan J); 321 (Deane J). 
39 Ibid 298. Deane continued to describes 80 as a significant constitutional guarantee whilst 
Governor-General. See, for example, his interview with the ABC, 16August1999, quoted in Sir 
William Deane, Directions: A Vision for Australia (2002) 18. 
4° Kingswell (1985) 159 CLR 264, 300 (emphasis added). 
41 Ibid 301 (emphasis added). 
42 Ibid 307. 
43 Ibid 299 (emphasis added). 
44 Ibid citing Commonwealth and Commonwealth Oil Refineries Ltd v South Australia (1926) 38 CLR 
408, 423 and Gosford (1985) 155 CLR 368, 383-4. 
45 Compare Re Tracey (1988) 166 CLR 518, 582-6 and Cheatle (1993) 177 CLR 541, 550-2. 
46 Kingswell (1985) 159 CLR 264, 319. 
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view' that the line between 'serious' and 'summary' offences was whether the 
offence was punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment for more than 
one year.47 
Deane's interpretation of the meaning of 'trial on indictment' has been strongly 
criticised on various grounds. For example, McHugh J in Cheng v The Queen 
argued that Deane's interpretation could only be reached by 'disregarding the 
plain meaning of s 80, its drafting history and its purpose.'48 Further, McHugh J 
questioned the persuasiveness of an interpretation of 'trial on indictment' as 
meaning a 'serious' offence, given that Dixon and Evatt JJ in R v Federal Court of 
Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein49 and Deane in Kingswell had reached different 
conclusions on the meaning of that expression. However, Simpson and Wood 
have argued that many aspects of constitutional interpretation require 
boundaries to be drawn by the Court and accordingly an interpretation of s 80 
which allows the phrase 'trial on indictment' a meaning other than the 
procedure chosen by Parliament, is preferable.50 Simpson and Wood's analysis 
appears to accord with the Court's commitment to the interpretation of the 
Constitution to give effect to 'substance' over 'form'.51 
(ii) Precedent and the framers' intentions 
In Kingswell, Deane only considered it 'necessary' to examine precedent after he 
had determined that s 80 was a significant constitutional guarantee, and hence 
requiring an interpretation that ensured that its protection could not be avoided 
by a drafting device of Parliament.52 This approach, whereby the persuasive 
onus rested on precedent to displace his conclusion on the meaning of s 80, was 
47 Ibid. 
48 (2000) 203 CLR 248, 295. Meagher also argued that Deane's interpretation of 'trial on 
indictment' in Kingswell 'smuggles the word "serious" into the text of s 80 and permits the court 
to define what offences fit this category' under the guise of an ambiguity in the language which 
does not in fact exist. Dan Meagher, 'New Day Rising? Non-Originalism, Justice Kirby and 
Section 80 of the Constitution' (2002) 24 Sydney Law Review 141, 167. 
49 (1938) 59 CLR 556, 583-4 ('Lowenstein'). 
50 Amelia Simpson and Mary Wood, '"A Puny Thing Indeed" - Cheng v The Queen and the 
Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury' (2001) 29 Federal Law Review 95, 111. 
51 Although note Stellios' interpretation of s 80 as serving a significant federal purpose, as an 
alternative to a rights-based vision of the section: James Stellios, 'The Constitutional Jury- "A 
Bulwark of Liberty?'" (2005) 27 Sydney Law Review 113. 
52 Kingswell (1985) 159 CLR 264, 311. 
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a style of argument Deane later employed in his decisions in Breavington and 
Polyukhovich.53 While Deane intimated in Kingswell that direct authority on the 
meaning of s 80 could displace his interpretation of the section,54 his deference 
to precedent was not tested in Kingswell because of his conclusion that no 
compelling authority controlled the section's meaning. 
Deane's critique of the s 80 cases in Kingswell was one of his most extensive, and 
persuasive, reviews of precedent in the constitutional context. The key decision 
of the Court on this topic was R v Archdall and Roskruge; Ex parte Corrigan and 
Brown. 55 In Kingswell Deane emphasised that the Court in Archdall had 
inadequately justified the rejection of a substantive interpretation of s 80.56 On 
this foundation, Deane reasoned, the longevity of Archdall could not be decisive 
on the meaning of s 80. Instead, Deane concluded that the status of s 80 as a 
constitutional guarantee demanded that precedent should only be applied to 
render the protection of s 80 'illusory' if the Court's decision was supported by 
'cogent reasoning' .57 Deane believed that this burden was not satisfied by 
Archdall, nor were the subsequent cases directly on the point at hand. 
As part of his analysis of precedent, and specifically Latham CJ' s decision in 
Lowenstein, Deane reflected in Kingswell on the relevance of the framers' 
intentions to the interpretation of s 80. Deane noted that Latham CJ in 
Lowenstein had relied on the 'unlikely views' expressed by Isaacs at the 1898 
Convention: that Parliament could decide that murder was not an indictable 
offence.58 Deane then remarked: 
53 Compare Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 130 and Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 614. 
54 Deane remarked that 'one would need to identify convincing legal reasoning or direct 
authority' to construes 80 as meaning only that the trial must not proceed by way of 'summary 
proceedings.' Kingswell (1985) 159 CLR 264, 308. Deane also remarked that '[t]he weight which · 
one would otherwise give to [the] predominant tendency' of authority was greatly reduced by the 
lack of a coherent line of reasoning in these cases. Ibid 318 (emphasis added). 
55 (1928) 41 CLR 128 (Archdall'). 
56 Kingswell (1985) 159 CLR 264, 311-2. Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ did not respond to 
Deane's critique: ibid 276-277. 
57 Ibid 312. 
58 Ibid 313 citing Record of Convention Debates, Third Session (1898) 352. On the insights of the 
Debates for the meaning of s 80 see: Amelia Simpson and Mary Wood,'" A Puny Thing Indeed" 
- Cheng v The Queen and the Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury' (2001) 29 Federal Law Review 
95, 107-11. 
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Even if regard could properly be had to such views expressed by a delegate in 
the course of debate however, it could scarcely be assumed that they were 
shared by the majority of the Convention which adopted the section.59 
Although clearly less defined than his later references to the framers' intentions 
in Breavington or the Incorporation Case, 60 this passage signalled Deane's view 
that opinions of the framers expressed in the Debates could not control the 
interpretation of s 80. 
In the course of his analysis in Kingswell, Deane made another significant 
reference to the framers. 61 Deane said: 
It would also seem plain enough that the framers of the Constitution used the 
words 'on indictment' in s 80 to ensure that the guarantee of trial by jury was 
not applicable to the type or class of less serious offences which were generally 
seen, in the last decade of the nineteenth century, as appropriate to be dealt 
with by justices or magistrates.62 
Taken by itself, this passage may suggest, as Meagher has argued, that Deane 
relied on what the framers 'subjectively intended for its efficacy' in support of 
his reasoning on s 80.63 However, this statement by Deane occurred in the midst 
of his examination of the institution of trial by jury at 1900. By highlighting that 
'trial on indictment' had a meaning independent of Parliament's decision to 
proceed summarily, Deane used this history to demonstrate the weaknesses of 
the orthodox interpretation of s 80. Construed in context, Deane's reference to 
the framers in Kingswell was arguably intended to highlight the errors in the 
prevailing interpretation of s 80. It was not evidence that Deane had adopted an 
intentionalist approach to constitutional interpretation.64 
59 Kingswell (1985) 159 CLR 264, 313 (emphasis added). In both Kingswell and Breavington, Deane 
referred to the framers as 'delegates', language reinforcing Deane's vision of the framers as the 
representatives of 'the people'. See Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 133. On the significance of the 
choice of designation, between, for example, delegate, framer, founder, see Paul Schoff, 'The 
High Court and History: It Still Hasn't Found(ed) What It's Looking For' (1994) 5 Public Law 
Review 253, 256-9. 
6° Compare Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 132-3 and Incorporation Case (1990) 169 CLR 482, 511. 
61 Deane in Kingswell made four references to the framers: at Kingswell (1985) 159 CLR 264, 303, 
306, 309 and 313. 
62 Ibid 309. 
63 Dan Meagher, 'New Day Rising? Non-Originalism, Justice Kirby and Section 80 of the 
Constitution' (2002) 24 Sydney Law Review 141, 167. 
64 This conclusion does not affect the correctness of Meagher's conclusion that Kirby J was not 
consistent in his radical non-originalism in interpreting s 80. Kirby J's theory required that the 
meaning of the section be fixed by the understanding of the current generation. As Deane had 
relied heavily on an analysis of the common law history of the institution of trial by jury, the 
paradox of Kirby J's reliance on Deane remains, even if, properly viewed, Deane's reasoning in 
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These aspects of Deane's reasoning in respect of s 80 build a consistent picture 
of his vision of the section, and the principles guiding its interpretation. Thus 
Deane displayed a commitment to strengthening one of the Constitution's 
express guarantees of individual rights, by rejecting formalism in favour of a 
purposive analysis of the section. Deane's decisions on s 51(xxxi), examined in 
the next section of this chapter, display a similar conviction that the 
Constitution's express rights must be interpreted in a manner consistent with 
the Constitution's ultimate purpose as an instrument designed for the 
'governance and protection of the people' .65 
2 Section 51 (xxxi) 
Section 51(xxxi) provides that the Parliament shall have power with respect to 
'the acquisition of property on just terms.' The section functions as both an 
express grant of legislative power to the Commonwealth and as an important 
constitutional guarantee of 'just terms'.66 Throughout the Court's history, 
s 51(xxxi) stood apart as an illustration of a constitutional guarantee which has 
been interpreted in broad fashion.67 
Deane's most controversial reference to s 51(xxxi) occurred in 1992, in 
Mabo (No 2). There Deane and Gaudron JJ indicated that a federal law 
purporting to extinguish or diminish common law native title would constitute 
an 'acquisition of property' for the purposes of s 51(xxxi), and so activate the 
'just terms' guarantee.68 By this reference, Deane and Gaudron JJ affirmed that 
Kingswell did not rely on the subjective intentions of the framers as Meagher claimed. See ibid 
166-7. 
65 Metwally (1984) 158 CLR447, 477. 
66 See, for example, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ' s statement that 
s 51(xxxi) 'has assumed the status of a constitutional guarantee of just terms ... and is to be given 
the liberal construction appropriate to such a constitutional provision.' Clunies-Ross v 
Commonwealth (1984) 155 CLR 193, 201-2 (emphasis added). 
67 For a detailed examination of the Court's theory of s 51(xxxi) and its interpretation, including 
the work of the Gleeson Court on this topic, see Simon Evans, 'Constitutional Property Rights in 
Australia: Reconciling Individual Rights and the Common Good' in Tom Campbell, Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy and Adrienne Stone (eds), Protecting Rights Without A Bill of Rights: Institutional 
Performance and Reform in Australia (2006) 197. 
68 Mabo (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 111. 
native title was a valuable property right and ascribed a prominent place to 
s Sl(xxxi) in the protection of the rights of Indigenous Australians. 
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Leaving Mabo (No 2) to one side, however, Deane participated in seven 
significant cases that examined the scope of s Sl(xxxi).69 Two features pervade 
Deane's reasoning in these cases. First, Deane consistently adopted an 
expansive definition of 'acquisition of property', reflecting his understanding of 
the contemporary realities of property ownership in Australia and the 
importance of interpreting the constitutional guarantee by reference to 
'substance' over 'form'. Second, Deane used proportionality analysis to define 
the boundaries between regulation and acquisition, and to weave a path 
between the governance and rights purposes of s Sl(xxxi). Both features of 
Deane's approach were consistent with the broad characteristics of Deane's 
constitutional jurisprudence seen in this and preceding chapters. Deane's 
decision in the Tasmanian Dam Case, his first and only single judgment on this 
topic, most clearly evinced these two features of his approach to s Sl(xxxi). 
(a) The Tasmanian Dam Case ands 51(xxxi) 
In the Tasmanian Dam Case Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane JJ, in separate 
judgments, addressed the argument that parts of the Commonwealth legislative 
scheme infringed s Sl(xxxi).70 Deane alone held that some of the scheme 
effected an acquisition of property by the Commonwealth,71 and that it did not 
provide 'just terms' to the property owner.72 This finding by Deane was 
important for the result of the case, as it meant that a majority of the Court 
(Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ) founds 11 of the World Heritage 
69 These cases are listed in Appendix B. 
70 The relevant provisions were the World Heritage (Western Tasmania Wilderness) Regulations 
1983 (Cth), enacted under s 69 of the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1975 (Cth), and 
ss 9, 10 and 11 of the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983 (Cth). 
71 Deane concluded thats 11 of the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983 (Cth) and 
World Heritage (Western Tasmania Wilderness) Regulations 1983 (Cth) contravened s Sl(xxxi). 
72 Deane's conclusion that some of the legislation, in substance, constituted an 'acquisition of 
property' by the Commonwealth compelled him to assess whether the scheme provided 'just 
terms' to the land-owner. He concluded that it did not, because the procedure was 'intrinsically 
unfair', by virtue of the time delay between acquisition and compensation and the absence of an 
interest component. See Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 291. 
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Properties Conservation Act 1983 (Cth) and the World Heritage (Western Tasmania 
Wilderness) Regulations 1983 (Cth) to be invalid.73 
(i) The 'acquisition' of property 
Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane JJ in the Tasmanian Dam Case endorsed a 
broad definition of 'property' ins Sl(xxxi).74 However, the key point of 
difference between Deane and the other judges lay in the definition of an 
'acquisition'. As Evans observed, for Mason, Murphy and Brennan JJ s 51 (xxxi) 
reflected an important distinction between laws that 'merely deprive an owner 
of property' and those that result in a 'corresponding acquisition by the 
Commonwealth.'75 For these judges, all that had occurred in the Tasmanian Dam 
Case was a deprivation of property. In their view, the land-owner lost the right 
to development and control of the land, but the Commonwealth gained no 
corresponding benefit.76 Rather, the Commonwealth gained only a power to 
control, and veto, any development on the land.77 
One reason advanced for a narrow definition of the concept of an 'acquisition' 
is the dual purpose of s Sl(xxxi) as a guarantee and a grant of power. If the 'just 
terms' guarantee attached whenever an individual's property rights were 
subject to adverse interference by the Commonwealth, how can governance 
proceed? In 1983 Deane recognised the tension inherent ins Sl(xxxi). However, 
he turned to the purpose of s Sl(xxxi) as a constitutional guarantee to expand 
73 The fact that Murphy and Deane JJ reached different conclusions on the operation of 
s 51{xxxi) in this case is itself worthy of note. Some commentators have regarded Deane as 
continuing, and extending, Murphy J's legacy of constitutional rights' expansion. In the 
Tasmanian Dam Case, however, one of the few rights cases in which Murphy and Deane JJ sat 
together, Murphy and Deane JJ did not share a common vision of the reach of s 51(xxxi). On 
Murphy's legacy on rights-protection see: John Williams, 'Revitalising the Republic: Lionel 
Murphy and the Protection of Individual Rights' (1997) 8 Public Law Review 27. 
74 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 145 (Mason J); 247 (Brennan J); 282-3 (Deane J) citing 
Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, 349. In contrast, Murphy J stated 
simply that '[p]roperty is a concept of very wide scope' and cited instead his own judgment in 
Dorman v Rogers (1982) 148 CLR 365: Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 181. 
75 Simon Evans, 'Constitutional Property Rights in Australia: Reconciling Individual Rights and 
the Common Good' in Tom Campbell, Jeffrey Goldsworthy and Adrienne Stone (eds), 
Protecting Rights Without A Bill of Rights: Institutional Performance and Reform in Australia (2006) 
197, 199. 
76 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 145-6 (Mason J); 181 (Murphy J); 247-8 (Brennan J). 
77 Mason J described the Commonwealth as obtaining 'merely a power of veto' with respect to 
the land: ibid 146. 
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the meaning of the concept of 'acquisition', and chose to balance the regulatory 
and rights purposes of the guarantee through proportionality analysis. 
On the meaning of an 'acquisition' of property, Deane explained in the 
Tasmanian Dam Case that if legislation conferred on the Commonwealth: 
an identifiable and measurable advantage or is akin to applying the property, either 
totally or partially, for a purpose of the Commonwealth, it is possible that an 
acquisition for the purposes of s Sl(xxxi) is involved. The benefit of land can, in 
certain circumstances, be enjoyed without any active right in relation to the 
land being acquired or exercised.78 
In this way, Deane held that an acquisition extended beyond the transfer of 
possessory and positive rights in land to the Commonwealth. Deane illustrated 
his concept of an 'acquisition' in the Tasmanian Dam Case by reference to a law 
creating a one kilometre buffer zone around a Commonwealth military 
installation.79 Deane argued that the buffer zone constituted 'an effective 
confiscation or acquisition of the benefit of the use of the land in its unoccupied 
state.'80 In his example, the land-owner was deprived of a valuable aspect of 
their right in the property. Further, the buffer zone also served the 'purposes of 
the Commonwealth', that is the Defence Forces, by increasing the utility of the 
Commonwealth defence facility, as effectively as a transfer of an interest in the 
land. Thus the effect of the buffer zone was to put private property to a public 
use, without compensation. 
In the Tasmanian Dam Case, Deane held that the more extensive elements of the 
legislative scheme satisfied his definition of an 'acquisition' of property.81 These 
provisions prevented development of the property, and ensured, as effectively 
as a transfer of title, that the land was used according to Commonwealth design 
as an area of World Heritage. Thus, Deane looked beyond the form of the 
legislation, to its effect on both the land-owner and the Commonwealth. As the 
law put private property to a public use, it effected an 'acquisition of property'. 
78 Ibid 283 (emphasis added). 
79 Ibid 283-4. Note the similarities between Deane's example and the hypothetical posed by 
Hamilton regarding a restriction on the build up of property located near an airport: 
R.L. Hamilton, 'Some Aspects of the Acquisition Power of the Commonwealth' (1973) 5 Federal 
Law Review 265, 290. Deane cited Hamilton's article for its discussion of the history of s 51(xxxi) 
at Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158CLR1, 282. 
80 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 284. 
81 Ibid 287-8. 
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Deane's liberal interpretation of the 'acquisition' of property, particularly 
through his buffer zone illustration, has much to recommend it.82 Prior to the 
Tasmanian Dam Case the rights-purpose of s 51(xxxi) had been implemented by 
the Court through its broad interpretation of 'property' under the section. 
Deane took the further step of applying a rights-purpose to the concept of 
'acquisition'. As Evans has observed 'a law that merely prohibits use of 
property by the owner ... may produce the same effect on the individual and 
their property as a law that acquires title for the Commonwealth.'83 By 
extending the definition of an acquisition to the gaining of a benefit or 
advantage by the Commonwealth, Deane continued the expansive tradition in 
relation to s 51(xxxi), and approached the guarantee in a manner consistent 
with the 'substance over form' approach that he adopted in Hematite.84 
(ii) Limiting the guarantee: the boundary between acquisition and 
regulation 
Deane continued to expand the reach of the guarantee through his 'benefit' or 
'advantage' test in cases after the Tasmanian Dam Case. 85 However, Deane also 
recognised that the guarantee was not absolute. The challenge, Deane (and 
Gaudron J) argued, was to balance rights against the reality that: 
If every such law which incidentally altered, modified or extinguished 
proprietary rights or interests in a way which constituted such an' acquisition 
of property' were invalid unless it provided a quid pro quo of just terms, the 
legislative powers of the Commonwealth would be reduced to an extent which 
could not have been intended by those who framed and adopted the Australian 
Constitution. 86 
Deane limited the scope of the guarantee through a series of overlapping 
limitations to s 51(xxxi). First, s 51(xxxi) did not apply where the acquisition 
was of property 'of a kind that does not permit of just terms', such as fines or 
82 In 1973 Hamilton had written of the need to adopt a liberal interpretation of this concept 
consistent with the section's role in protecting individual interests: Hamilton, above n 79, 270. 
83 Simon Evans, 'Constitutional Property Rights in Australia: Reconciling Individual Rights and 
the Common Good' in Tom Campbell, Jeffrey Goldsworthy and Adrienne Stone (eds), 
Protecting Rights Without A Bill of Rights: Institutional Performance and Reform in Australia (2006) 
197, 199. 
84 Hematite (1983) 151 CLR 599, 662. 
85 See, for example, Mutual Pools and Staff Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1994) 179 CLR 155, 185 
('Mutual Pools'). 
86 Ibid 189 (emphasis added). 
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forfeiture of property.87 Second, acquisitions 'necessarily'88 or 'clearly' 89 falling 
within some other head of legislative power,90 such as the taxation, bankruptcy 
or intellectual property powers, fell outsides Sl(xxxi).91 
Third, and most significant for present purposes, Deane held that laws fell 
outsides Sl(xxxi) unless they could be 'fairly characterized' as with respect to 
the acquisition of property. Deane applied this approach in decisions such as 
Mutual Pools and Staff Pty Ltd v Commonwealth92 and Georgiadis v Australian and 
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation.93 However it was Deane's reasoning in 
the Tasmanian Dam Case that most clearly revealed the role for proportionality 
reasoning in this aspect of Deane's approach to s Sl(xxxi). 
In the Tasmanian Dam Case, having determined that a 'benefit' or 'advantage' 
flowing to the Commonwealth could constitute an acquisition of property, 
Deane remarked that: 
Where the benefit involved represents no more than the adjustment of 
competing claims between citizens in a field which needs to be regulated in the 
common interest, such as zoning under a local government statute, it will be 
apparent that no question of acquisition of property for a purpose of the 
Commonwealth is involved.94 
In the next paragraph of his analysis, Deane endorsed an extract from the 
United States Corpus Juris Secundum, regarding the concept of eminent domain 
under the Fifth Amendment. This extract had been quoted as being of 'some 
guidance in the Australian context' by Stephen J in Trade Practices Commission v 
Tooth & Co Ltd.95 The passage stated: 
There is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins; 
so the question depends on the particular facts and necessities of each case and 
87 For example, laws imposing penalties and fines, forfeiture of property, and seizure of enemy 
property fall outside the scope of the just terms guarantee on this basis. See Georgiadis v 
Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (1994) 179 CLR 297, 306 (Mason CJ, 
Deane and Gaudron JJ) and Re Director of Public Prosecutions; Ex parte Lawler (1994) 179 CLR 270, 
275-6 (Mason CJ); 285-6 (Deane and Gaudron JJ). 
88 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 282. 
89 Georgiadis (1994) 179 CLR 297, 306 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ) citing Mutual Pools 
(1994) 179 CLR 155, 169-72 (Mason CJ); 186-8 (Deane and Gaudron JJ). 
90 Nintendo Co Ltd v Centronics Systems (1994) 181CLR134, 160 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, 
Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
91 Ibid 160-l(Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
92 (1994) 174 CLR 155, 188 (Deane and Gaudron JJ). 
93 (1994) 179 CLR 297, 306-7 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ). 
94 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 283. 
95 (1979) 142 CLR 397, 414-5 citing '29A Corpus Juris Secundum "Eminent Domain", par 6.' 
the Court must consider the extent of the public interest to be protected and the 
extent of regulation essential to protect that interest.96 
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Through this statement, Deane located the boundary between regulation and 
acquisition, and hence the limits of the just terms guarantee, by scrutinising the 
relationship between legislative means and ends. If Parliament's means were 
necessary and appropriate to a regulatory purpose, the law fell outside the 
scope of s Sl(xxxi). This inquiry was satisfied on a case-by-case basis, by 
weighing the particular circumstances. Accordingly, Deane's approach in the 
Tasmanian Dam Case ensured a significant role for the Court in determining the 
operation and effect of the constitutional guarantee. 
In the Tasmanian Dam Case, Deane held that ss 9 and 10 of the World Heritage 
Properties Conservation Act 1983 (Cth) were regulatory laws.97 These laws were 
designed to prohibit certain specified conduct in relation to the relevant land in 
Tasmania. As he had in the context of s Sl(xxix), Deane held thats 9(1)(h) did 
not infringe the just terms guarantee as it 'only' prohibited acts done without 
the consent of the Minister involving damage associated with the construction 
of a dam.98 Thus it could be regarded as no more than a necessary regulation of 
property in the public interest. Deane similarly held thats 10 was a valid 
regulatory law because it was of a 'limited nature' as 'a prohibition addressed 
only to corporations.'99 Consequently, the just terms guarantee was not activated 
by these provisions. 
In contrast, Deane held thats 11 of the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 
1983 (Cth) and the World Heritage (Western Tasmania Wilderness) Regulations 1983 
(Cth) were acquisitionary laws, as they froze development of the land.100 These 
provisions operated without reference to the nature of the threat to the land 
(and protective measures), were indefinite in duration, and applied to a large 
96 Quoted by Deane in Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 284 (emphasis added). 
97 As discussed in chapter 1, s 9(1)(h) had already survived Deane's proportionality test in the 
context of s 51(xxix). For convenience, this chapter describes laws fairly characterised as with 
respect to the acquisition of property as 'acquisitionary laws' and laws 'concerned with the 
adjustment of the competing rights, claims or obligations of persons in a particular relationship 
or area of activity' as 'regulatory' laws. This is the classification adopted in Simon Evans, 'When 
Is An Acquisition of Property Not an Acquisition of Property?' (2000) 11 Public Law Review 183, 
191. 
98 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 285. 
99 Ibid (emphasis added). 
lOO Ibid 285-7. 
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area.101 Deane concluded that the size and scope of the legislative freeze 
produced by these provisions meant that they could not be characterised as 
mere regulation. Accordingly, they effected an acquisition of property for the 
purpose of s Sl(xxxi).102 
Deane's reasoning demonstrated the similarities between his tests in relation to 
ss 51(xxix) and (xxxi). In both contexts Deane inquired whether the law was a 
'drastic or peculiar means' of achieving the end, paying particular attention to 
the degree of its impact on private property rights.103 In both contexts, Deane 
was also willing to scrutinise strictly Parliament's measures. Deane's 
application of proportionality reasoning in the Tasmanian Dam Case suggests 
that the operation of the just terms guarantee may be fixed by reference to 
whether a judge perceives Parliament as effecting a regulatory goal with 
sufficient sensitivity to the competing social interests. Thus, as in chapter 1, the 
question may be asked whether Deane's approach moved beyond the realm of 
legitimate judicial review and through the level of scrutiny imposed constituted 
a 'judicial trespass on the sovereignty of Parliament.'104 In this context, however 
it is arguable that the text of the 'just terms' guarantee, as both a constitutional 
guarantee and head of power, presupposes that the Court must balance these 
two purposes when determining the reach of the guarantee. One way of 
balancing these purposes is by imposing definitional limits on the guarantee 
through the concept of 'property' or 'acquisition'. However, an advantage of 
Deane's approach was that it avoided complex definitions of this nature, and 
openly engaged in balancing reasoning to find the limits of the constitutional 
guarantee. Further, a strict application of proportionality reasoning, sensitive to 
the impact on individual rights, may be seen as consistent with the Court's 
'democratic mandate' to give full effect to the express guarantees of the 
Constitution.105 
101 Ibid 285-6. 
102 Ibid. 
103 For discussion of proportionality in the context of s 51(xxix), see ibid 259-68. 
104 HP Lee, 'Proportionality in Australian Constitutional Adjudication' in Geoffrey Lindell (ed) 
Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (1994) 126, 149. 
105 Although not speaking specifically to Deane's application of proportionality reasoning in this 
context, see G.J. Lindell, 'Recent Developments in the Judicial Interpretation of the Australian 
Constitution' in Geoffrey Lindell (ed) Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (1994) 1, 
27. 
Moving from Deane's s Sl(xxxi) jurisprudence to his understanding of s 117, 
Deane's reasoning in Street revealed a more opaque, and less persuasive, 
approach to defining the limits of the latter section. 
3 Section 117 
Section 117 provides that: 
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A subject of the Queen, resident in any State, shall not be subject in any other 
State to any disability or discrimination which would not be equally applicable 
to him if he were a subject of the Queen resident in such other State. 
Prior to 1989, and the Court's decision in Street, s 117 had been interpreted 
narrowly.106 In Henry v Boehm,107 a majority of the Court had limited the section 
to discrimination on the basis of permanent residence and had assessed the 
existence of 'discrimination' from the perspective of the formal operation of the 
law. Decided two years after the Court's decision in Cole had revolutionised the 
interpretation of s 92, s 117 stood ready in Street to be freed from this formalistic 
interpretation and given its place as a real guarantee of individual liberty. 
The facts of Street could have provided no better vehicle for the Court to 
consider a challenge to Henry. Both cases concerned applications by barristers 
for admission to practice in a State in which they did not reside. Street, a 
resident of New South Wales, challenged the admission rules of the 
Queensland Bar Association, which required him to practice in Queensland, or, 
following amendment to the Rules, to swear his intention to practice principally 
in Queensland. Street argued that the Rules discriminated against him as an 
out-of-State resident contrary to s 117.108 
106 See discussion in Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) 405-7. 
107 (1973) 128 CLR 482 ('Henry'). 
108 Section 117 is not a limitation on State legislative power. Rather the guarantee operates to 
confer an immunity on the individual. This operation of s 117 was discussed by Brennan J: 
Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 502-3. 
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In seven separate reasons, the Court in Street unanimously overturned Henry, 
and the formalism inherent in its approach to s 117.109 Deane described the 
guarantee of s 117 as follows: 
[Section] 117 protects a non-resident from being subjected to disability or 
discrimination of the type to which it refers regardless of whether the disability 
or discrimination is directly imposed or is the indirect result of the operation of the 
relevant legislative provisions ... If the substance of what is involved is disability 
or discrimination of the type referred to in s 117, mere differences in the form of 
the relevant legislation will not be effective to take it beyond the reach of the 
constitutional guarantee.110 
All members of the Court agreed that the existence of out-of-State 
discrimination was assessed for the purposes of s 117 according to the 
substantive effect, and not the form, of the legislation.111 Returning to the 
language of s 117, the Court emphasised that the section required a comparison 
between the hypothetical position of the plaintiff (assuming he or she was a 
resident of the State) against the plaintiff's actual situation under the law.112 The 
section precluded the differential treatment of citizens on the ground of 
residence. Deane observed that differential treatment meant 'some superimposed 
incapacity or disadvantage' whether 'direct or indirect'.113 Applying these 
principles to the facts of Street, the Court unanimously held that the imposition 
of residence requirements in the Queensland admission rules was contrary to 
s 117, and could not be excused as falling within one of the exceptions to the 
provision. 
There are three significant elements of Deane's reasoning in Street that speak to 
his vision of the role of the Court in the interpretation of constitutional 
guarantees. As foreshadowed, the first was Deane's rights 'manifesto',114 and 
his understanding of the rights-rich nature of the Australian Constitution. The 
significance of that passage for Deane's jurisprudence beyonds 117 is examined 
109 Ibid 485 (Mason CJ); 516-7 (Brennan J); 527-8 (Deane J); 543-4 (Dawson J); 560-1 (Toohey J); 
568-70 (Gaudron J); and 586-7 (McHugh J). 
110 Ibid 528 (emphasis added). 
111 Ibid 487-8 (Mason CJ); 508 (Brennan J); 545 (Dawson J); 559 (Toohey J); 569 (Gaudron J); 582 
(McHughJ). 
112 Ibid 489 (Mason CJ); 506 (Brennan J); 525 (Deane); 545 (Dawson J); 558 (Toohey J); 566-7 
(Gaudron J); 582 (McHugh J). This approach had been adopted by Stephen Jin his dissenting 
reasons in Henry (1973) 128 CLR 482, 501-2. On the legacy of Stephen J in constitutional 
interpretation, including ins 117, see Sir Anthony Mason, 'Justice of the High Court' in Timothy 
L. H. McCormack and Cheryl Saunders (eds), Sir Ninian Stephen: A Tribute (2007) 3, 17-24. 
113 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 528 (emphasis added). 
114 Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary 
and Materials (3rd ed, 2002) 1100. 
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in part 2 of this chapter. The second distinctive feature of Deane's reasoning in 
Street was his reliance on 'general' interpretive principles as the basis of 
recasting the section as a significant constitutional guarantee. Third was 
Deane's method of limiting the operation of the guarantee to exclude from its 
protection certain State measures protective of their residents. Deane's 
approach to this question, although substantially similar to a majority of the 
Court, sat uncomfortably with much of his jurisprudence, particularly his 
earlier decisions on the respective importance of individual and State rights in 
constitutional interpretation. 
(a) Principle and precedent in Deane's reasoning in Street 
Deane's distinctive approach to his reasoning in Street was framed by his 
observations in his rights 'manifesto'115 on the nature of the Constitution as a 
document rich in rights and fundamental guarantees. It was from this 
perspective that Deane reflected on the 'tendency in some judgments' of the 
Court to 'distort the content of some ... constitutional guarantees by restrictive 
legalism or by recourse to artificial formalism.m 6 The Court's decisions on s 117, 
Deane argued, followed the trend of legalism and formalism: substituting 'yet 
another formularised formal criterion of operation for the words of the 
Constitution.'117 Such formalism was inconsistent with the importance of a 
number of the Constitution's provisions as vital protections of the liberty, 
dignity and equality of 'the people'. Thus, rejecting formalism, Deane turned to 
the: 
long-settled general principle of construction that the provisions of a national 
constitution must be broadly interpreted and applied: their substance should 
not be confounded by narrow technicality or legalism.118 
Deane's emphasis on this 'long-settled general principle' of construction in 
Street displayed two points of connection with his jurisprudence outsides 117. 
First, it confirmed Deane's commitment to the rejection of formalism in 
constitutional interpretation. Deane's preference for this principle of 
115 Ibid. 
116 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 522 (emphasis added). 
117 Ibid 524. 
118 Ibid 527. 
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interpretation in Street was therefore consistent with his earlier decisions in 
Hematite, Kingswell and his recognition in Polyukhovich that Ch III was not 
concerned merely with 'labels'. As he confirmed in Street, a substantive 
interpretation of constitutional guarantees was necessary lest formalism deny 
'the people' the protections intended for their benefit. 
Second, Deane's priority on general interpretive principles was matched by a 
minimalist treatment of authority. In Polyukhovich and Kingswell Deane's 
reasons had been structured so as to examine first the 'fundamental concepts' of 
the Constitution, or the significant rights-purpose of s 80, before assessing 
whether precedent stood in the way of the interpretation he preferred. In Street, 
Deane's analysis also exhibited this trend, considering the relevance of Henry 
very briefly as one of 'four additional matters' at the conclusion of his 
judgment.119 Although the Court in Street unanimously overruled Henry,120 
Deane's treatment of the decision distinguished his reasons from the rest of the 
Court. In contrast to Mason CJ121 and Brennan J, 122 in particular, Deane 
displayed no reticence in departing from a long-standing decision of the 
Court.123 Nor did Deane refer to the Court's contemporary decision in John v 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation124 as a basis for overruling such a decisionY5 
Instead, after emphasising at the commencement of his decision that Henry 
constituted 'a triumph of form over substance',126 Deane saw no reason at the 
conclusion of his reasons to provide more than a single sentence explanation of 
his rejection of that decision. 
119 Ibid 532. 
120 Ibid 489 (Mason CJ); 519 (Brennan J); 532 (Deane); 549 (Dawson J); 560 (Toohey J); 569-70 
(Gaudron J); 588 (McHugh J). 
121 Mason CJ stated that '[n]eedless to say I am reluctant to depart from an earlier decision of 
this Court.' Ibid 489. Dawson J observed that reopening authority 'is not to be done lightly.' Ibid 
549. 
122 Brennan J expresses his deference to precedent as follows: 
Giving the majority judgments in Henry v Boehm the great respect which they command 
both as a considered authority of this Court and as the writing of some of its most 
distinguished jurists, I am unable to accommodate their Honours' approach to s 117 to 
its text and purpose. I am unable to regard Henry v Boehm as an authority which ought 
to be maintained. 
Ibid 519. 
123 Ibid 532. Aside from Deane, Gaudron J's language is the least deferential, although her 
discussion of the reasons for departing from authority is extensive: ibid 566-70. 
124 (1989) 166 CLR 417, 438-40. 
125 Compare Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 489 (Mason CJ); 549 (Dawson J); 560 (Toohey J); 569-70 
(Gaudron J); 588 (McHugh J). 
126 Ibid 523. 
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Another distinctive element of Deane's reasons in Street was his attitude 
towards American jurisprudence on the 'privileges and immunities clause' in 
Article IV 2 of the United States Constitution. The Court was divided in the 
warmth of its reception to American law, with Mason CJ being the most 
enthusiastic in his acceptance of American law.127 Brennan and Toohey JJ, 
although disagreeing on the relevance of the Privileges and Immunities clause, 
were also of the opinion that American law (with respect to the Fourteenth 
Amendment) could be useful to the High Court in framing the test for s 117.128 
In contrast, McHugh J expressed caution in allowing the American model to 
inform the interpretation of s 117.129 For McHugh J, the Privileges and 
Immunities clause could only be used for the limited purpose of identifying 
categories of discrimination that fall withins 117.130 McHugh therefore rejected 
the relevance of the American model to framing exceptions or limitations to the 
Australian guarantee.131 However, Deane stood apart from both approaches, by 
simply not responding to the relevance of American law to the interpretation of 
s 117. This aspect of Deane's reasoning in Street was particularly striking given 
that his opening gambit had implied a comparison between the Australian 
Constitution and United States constitutional system and its 'Bill of Rights'. 
However, Deane's failure to engage with the example of American 
constitutional law may reflect his preference for finding the meaning of 
constitutional provisions in their purpose, consistent with the 'long-established 
principles' of its interpretation, rather than in the insights of case law, be it 
Australian or foreign. 
(b) Federal concessions to the scope of s 117 
As he had in relation to s 51(xxxi), Deane recognised thats 117 did not provide 
an absolute guarantee from State-based discrimination. Deane defined the 
limits of s 117 in the following terms: 
127 Ibid 491-3. 
128 Ibid 514 (Brennan J); 552 (Toohey J). 
129 Ibid 584-5. 
130 Ibid 585. 
131 Ibid. The differences between McHugh J's approach and the other members of the Court 
were examined in Transport Accident Commission v Sweedman (2004) 10 VR 31, 60 (Nettle JA). 
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The words of s 117 must, of course, be construed in their context in a 
constitution which is founded upon the existence of the various States as distinct 
entities under the federation ... Those words ['disability or discrimination'], 
construed in their constitutional context, convey the notion of some 
superimposed incapacity or disadvantage in the sense that the incapacity or 
disadvantage, regardless of whether it be direct or indirect, does not flow 
naturally from the structure of the particular State, the limited scope of its 
legislative powers or the nature of the particular right, privilege, immunity or 
other advantage or power to which it relates.132 
The first point of interest emerging from this passage was that Deane's 
approach, although not unambiguous, appeared to frame these limitations as 
components of the definition of' discrimination' in s 117, rather than as clearly 
identifiable exceptions to the guarantee.133 Simpson has described this as a 
'more holistic view' .134 This approach, at least in form, distinguished Deane 
from the majority of the Court in Street. 
Mason CJ, for instance, adopted a two-phased approach to s 117.135 Thus, 
Mason CJ asked whether the resident had been subject to a disadvantage, and 
only then considered whether an exception applied. These limitations were 
derived from the 'purpose' of the section, to promote national unity, and 
prevented the guarantee from 'extending beyond the object which it was 
designed to serve.1136 All the members of the Court, except Deane and 
Gaudron JJ, adopted this two-step approach.137 
Deane's application of his test to the facts in Street, more so than the above 
passage, evinced his preference for a 'holistic view.'138 Deane inquired as to 
whether the Queensland Bar Association Rules imposed a disadvantage on 
Street that was not of a kind that flowed naturally from the public interest in 
ensuring professional standards in the Queensland Bar. Deane's analysis was 
132 Street (1989) 168 CLR461, 528 (emphasis added). 
133 Simpson argued that Deane's approach is not unambiguous. However, she interpreted 
Deane's approach as favouring the discrimination, rather than exception, path. See Amelia 
Simpson, 'Sweedman v Transport Accident Commission: State Residence Discrimination and the 
High Court's Retreat into Characterisation' (2006) 34 Federal Law Review 363, 373. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 491-3. Mason CJ's approach is examined in Simpson, above n 133, 
373. 
136 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 491. 
137 Ibid 491-3 (Mason CJ); 512-4 (Brennan J); 548 (Dawson J); 559-60 (Toohey J); 583-4 
(McHughJ). 
138 Amelia Simpson, 'Sweedman v Transport Accident Commission: State Residence Discrimination 
and the High Court's Retreat into Characterisation' (2006) 34 Federal Law Review 363, 373. 
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broadly similar to that of Gaudron J,139 an agreement in approach reinforced by 
their later joint judgment in Goryl. 
It is unclear whether approaching s 117 from a holistic perspective will 
ultimately produce different results from a two-step analysis.140 In Street it did 
not. Importantly, as Simpson observes, both approaches 
clearly involve judicial evaluation of the policy objectives underlying a State 
law and the reasonableness with which the law pursues those objectives.141 
Deane's s Sl(xxxi) jurisprudence, as well as his approach to s Sl(xxix), 
displayed his level of comfort with the flexibility and value judgment involved 
in this process. What was distinctive about Street, however, was the degree to 
which Deane was willing to protect State interests in this evaluation process. In 
this way, Deane's approach in Street sat uncomfortably with elements of his 
reasoning in earlier decisions. This part concludes with a discussion of this 
aspect of Deane's reasoning in Street. 
(i) Deane's three broad illustrations of exceptions to s 117 
In Street Deane offered three illustrations of State laws and initiatives which 
disadvantaged out-of-State residents but would not infringes 117. First, Deane 
accepted that a residence requirement in a franchise law for either the State 
legislature or federal senators would not violates 117.142 All members of the 
Court, except Mason CJ, confirmed the exclusion of franchise laws from the 
operation of s 117. As residence requirements are logical preconditions for 
franchise laws, themselves essential to the organization of State legislatures, 
these laws must be valid exclusions from the operation of s 117.143 
139 Gaudron J has been recognised as a leader in discrimination law. See, for example, Henrik 
Kalowski, 'Gaudron, Mary Genevieve' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George 
Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (2001) 293, 294 and Jenny 
Morgan, 'Equality and Discrimination: Understanding Context' (2004) 15 Public Law Review 314. 
140 In Goryl, Dawson and Toohey JJ noted the existence of two streams of thought on the 
limitations to s 117, but suggested that this was 'probably a difference in approach rather than 
in principle.' Goryl (1994) 179 CLR 463, 485. 
141 Amelia Simpson, 'Sweedman v Transport Accident Commission: State Residence Discrimination 
and the High Court's Retreat into Characterisation' (2006) 34 Federal Law Review 363, 374. 
142 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 528. 
143 Michael Mathieson, 'Section 117 of the Constitution: Unfinished Rehabilitation' (1999) 27 
Federal Law Review 393, 417-8. 
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Second, Deane exempted from s 117 some kinds of competency standards for 
medical or legal practitioners.144 In Deane's view, such State laws were valid 
because of 'the obvious need to protect the public from unqualified and 
incompetent practitioners.' 145 These standards were limited to those 
competency requirements that imposed 'no more than regulation of a kind 
necessary to protect the public'.146 Thus in Street, Deane recognised the legitimate 
interest of the State in the competency of members of the Bar, but considered 
the residence requirement to be incapable of guaranteeing that standard. 
Accordingly, the Queensland Bar could not demonstrate that the Rules were 
necessary, and so the 'superimposed disadvantage' on out-of-State barristers 
was contrary to s 117.147 This exclusion mirrored Deane's assessment of the 
distinction between regulatory and acquisitionary laws under s 51(xxxi).148 In 
the context of both guarantees, Deane admitted an exception to the 
constitutional guarantee only to the extent that the parliamentary regulation 
was necessary.149 Both tests therefore confirmed Deane's willingness to strictly 
scrutinise the manner in which the Australian Parliament implemented its 
policy objectives. In Street, however, it was Brennan J, not Deane, who expressly 
acknowledged the relevance of proportionality reasoning to defining the limits 
of s 117.150 
Deane's most controversial exception to s 117 was that of State rental subsidies 
and other residence-based welfare benefits.151 Deane stated that these benefits 
flowed from 'the scope of State powers and responsibility under the 
constitutional division of governmental authority.'152 Mason CJ and Gaudron J 
also held that some kinds of State welfare benefits would be exempt from 
144 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 528-9. 
145 Ibid 529 (emphasis added). 
146 Ibid (emphasis added). 
147 See, to like effect, Mason CJ's conclusion that an exception to s 117 for professional standards 
could be 'justified as a proper and necessary discharge of the State's responsibility to the people 
of that State, which includes its responsibility to protect the interests of the public.' Street (1989) 168 
CLR 461, 492 (emphasis added). 
148 See above text accompanying n 94. 
149 See the discussion of 'necessity' as a level of proportionality analysis in Jeremy Kirk, 
'Constitutional Guarantees, Characterisation and the Concept of Proportionality' (1997) 21 
Melbourne University Law Review l, 7-8. 
150 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 512-3. 
151 Ibid 529. See, for example, commentary in: Michael Mathieson, 'Section 117 of the 
Constitution: Unfinished Rehabilitation' (1999) 27 Federal Law Review 393, 420. 
152 Street (1989) 168 CLR461, 529. 
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s 117.153 In contrast, Brennan and McHugh JJ were not willing to extend their 
exceptions this far: Brennan J stating thats 117 required that 'the doors of State 
universities, hospitals and other institutions' be open to non-residents.154 
Deane's broad exception for welfare benefits appears at first to be inconsistent 
with other elements of his jurisprudence. For exam.pie, this thesis has 
demonstrated Deane's vision of equality as an important constitutional 
principle in various contexts.155 However, it was Brennan J, not Deane, who 
utilised the concept of equality as a basis for framing the exclusions from. 
s 117.156 Thus Brennan J argued in Street that: 
the guarantee of equality of treatment is qualified only by necessary implication 
from the Constitution itself .... Nothing less than the need to preserve the 
institutions of government and their ability to function can justify the erection 
by a government of a barrier to the legal need and social unity of the Australian 
people.157 
Given the prominence of equality in Deane's jurisprudence, and his later claim. 
that equality was one of 'two constant them.es1158 pervading his jurisprudence, it 
was surprising that Deane did not craft his limitation to s 117 through that 
concept, and that he subordinated the equality guarantee to the protection of 
State welfare benefits. In this way, Deane's exclusion also appeared to 
subordinate the interests of 'the people of Australia' to the interests of 'the 
people of the States', and preferenced State identity, in contrast to Deane's 
passionate decisions in Breavington, McKain and Stevens.159 
The degree to which Deane protected State welfare benefits also appeared to 
stand at odds with Deane's attitude in QEC to the protection of the States from. 
153 Mason CJ exempted schemes assisting the 'indigent, the aged or the ill.' Dawson J, discussing 
Stephen J's dissent in Henry, noted that State schemes financed by State taxes might be exempt 
where a residential qualification was reasonable, but noted that this question had to be left for 
another day. Gaudron J exempted special benefits, 'especially if that benefit is funded by taxes 
levied against its members': ibid 492 (Mason CJ); 546-8 (Dawson J); 572 (Gaudron J). Mathieson 
critiques the 'labour-desert theory' implicit in Dawson and Gaudron JJ' s analysis: Mathieson, 
above n 151, 418-20. 
154 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 521. 
155 See for example, Deane's description of his list of rights in Street as protecting the 'liberty, the 
dignity or the equality of the citizen under the Constitution.' Ibid 522 (emphasis added). 
156 As discussed in chapter 5 below, Leeth demonstrated that Brennan, Deane and Toohey JJ 
shared a strong commitment to equality as a constitutional principle. 
157 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 512-3 (emphasis added). 
158 Deane, quoted in Tony Stephens, Sir William Deane: The Things that Matter (2002) 94 
(emphasis added). 
159 See above chapter 2 n 186. 
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discriminatory Commonwealth laws.160 In QEC the Court recognised a narrow 
implication restricting the Commonwealth's power to discriminate against the 
States because 'the continued existence of the States as viable political entities' 
was an essential precondition of a federal system of government and the nature 
of the Constitution.161 In QEC, however, the Court was adamant that this 
principle was not directed towards the identity and extent of particular powers 
preserved to the States (the reserved powers doctrine) but merely preserved the 
'independent' existence of the States.162 
As Mathieson suggests, Deane's exclusion of State welfare laws from the 
protection of s 117 appeared to go beyond what was necessary to preserve the 
continued existence of the States as viable entities.163 The question may be 
asked, why do the States receive greater protection from the operation of an 
express constitutional guarantee than under an implied limitation on 
Commonwealth legislative power? The apparent inconsistency in Deane's 
reasoning between these aspects of his jurisprudence was particularly striking 
given that in Street Deane emphasised that the same principles must govern the 
interpretation of both constitutional guarantees and heads of power.164 
It is possible that Deane's protection of State rights in the context of ss 117 was a 
consequence of Deane's subtle understanding of the Court's ultimate duty to 
protect 'the people'. In both Street and hiss 51(xxxi) jurisprudence, Deane was 
willing to protect welfare schemes at federal and state levels. For example, in 
Mutual Pools, Deane explained thats 51(xxxi) operated only in respect of laws 
fairly characterised as with respect to the 'acquisition of property.165 Deane (and 
Gaudron J) continued, excluding from the scope of the just terms guarantee: 
laws defining and altering rights and liabilities under a [Commonwealth] 
government scheme involving the expenditure of government funds to provide 
social security benefits or for other public purposes.166 
160 Michael Mathieson, 'Section 117 of the Constitution: Unfinished Rehabilitation' (1999) 27 
Federal Law Review 393, 413-4. 
161 QEC (1985) 159CLR192, 245-6. 
162 See discussion above chapter 2, text accompanying n 134. 
163 Michael Mathieson, above n 160, 411. 
164 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 527. 
165 (1993) 179 CLR 155, 188 (Deane and Gaudron JJ). 
166 Mutual Pools (1994) 179 CLR 155, 189-90. 
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As any application of s 5l(xxxi) would have crippled the Commonwealth's 
welfare schemes, Deane's exclusion struck a balance in favour of the continuing 
viability of the welfare system at the Commonwealth level over the property 
rights of the individual. It is possible that, in the context of s 117, similar 
concerns lay at the heart of Deane's exemption for welfare benefits. Certainly 
the viability of State-based hospital or other welfare schemes could have been 
equally threatened if a State was unable to restrict the demand for such services 
on the basis of residence. Seen in this light, these exclusions to the 
Constitution's express rights in ss 51(xxxi) and 117 may reflect Deane's social 
justice concerns, and his commitment to the protection of 'the people', 
particularly, as he attested in his swearing-in speech, 'the poor' and the 
'weak'.167 
If Deane's understanding of 'the people' did lie behind his broad exemption for 
State welfare benefits from s 117, it may resolve the apparent consistency issue 
between his approaches to the protection of the States across different 
components of his jurisprudence. However, this explanation of Deane's 
approach may then raise larger issues regarding the legitimacy of his 
interpretative philosophy. If the concept of 'the people' may, in some contexts, 
strengthen the constitutional guarantees, and in other contexts, support an 
exclusion from, or limitation to, those rights, can such a concept provide a 
principled foundation for constitutional interpretation? These are questions for 
consideration in chapter 5 where Deane's most forthright reliance on 'the 
people', in Leeth, is explored. It remains for this chapter to consider one of the 
consequences of Deane's reasoning in Street. That is, the significance of his 
rights 'manifesto' as an indicator of his understanding of the fundamental 
nature of the Constitution and its influence on the implication of constitutional 
rights. 
167 Transcript of the Ceremonial Sitting of the Occasion of the Swearing-in of the Honourable Mr 
Justice Deane as a Justice of the High Court of Australia at Canberra, Tuesday 27 July 1982, 17. 
B Part 2 The wider significance of express 
rights 
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This chapter commenced with Deane's bold opening passage of his reasons in 
Street. There Deane affirmed that individual rights were protected under the 
Constitution by 'a significant number of express and implied guarantees.'168 In 
Street this vision of the Constitution reinforced his commitment to interpret 
those guarantees broadly, consistent with their importance for the protection of 
the liberty, equality and dignity of 'the people' of Australia. However, Deane's 
sentiments in this passage in Street spoke beyond the confines of the Court's 
decision on s 117. Deane's 'manifesto'169 was a response to arguments that the 
Australian Constitution was not concerned with the individual. These were 
arguments that became of increasing significance in the debate over the 
legitimacy of the Court's implication of constitutional rights. 
The balance of this chapter examines Deane's understanding of the presence of 
this 'significant number' of express guarantees in the Constitution as a 
foundation for his implication of constitutional guarantees. Chapter 5 then 
explores how Deane utilised the content of the Constitution's express 
guarantees, particularly s 117 in Leeth, in support of constitutional rights 
implications. 
(a) The significance of silence on rights 
As foreshadowed in the introduction to this thesis, the lack of a formal Bill of 
Rights in the Australian Constitution has traditionally been regarded as a 
critical indicator of the Constitution's fundamental nature and purpose. It was 
on this basis, therefore, that Sir Owen Dixon famously remarked extra-curially 
that the lack of a Bill of Rights in the Australian context went 'deep in legal 
thinking.1170 In 2000, the Court's Chief Justice, Gleeson CJ, continued this 
analysis, reflecting extra-curially that: 
168 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 521. 
169 Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary 
and Materials (3rd ed, 2002) 1100. 
170 Sir Owen Dixon, 'Concerning Judicial Method' (1956) 29 Australian Law Journal 468, 469. 
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all Australians are controlled, not only by what the founders said in their 
written document, but also, and perhaps even more comprehensively, by what 
they did not say ... Silence, whether deliberate or not, binds us conclusively. 
Concern about how much importance attaches to what the founders meant to 
say may be trivial compared to the importance of the subjects that they left 
untouched.171 
This understanding of the nature of the Constitution, the significance of the 
framers' intentions, and the Court's role in constitutional interpretation, infused 
the reasoning of members of the Court in the key cases of Deane's era. For 
example, in Polyukhovich, McHugh J drew on the framers' failure to incorporate 
a guarantee against retrospective criminal laws as a factor precluding the 
implication of such a guarantee from Ch 111.172 More generally, Mason CJ 
remarked on the significance of the framers' decision not to incorporate a Bill of 
Rights in ACTV, stating: 
In light of this well recognised background it is difficult if not impossible to 
establish a foundation for the implication of general guarantees of fundamental 
rights and freedoms. To make such an implication would run counter to the 
prevailing sentiment of the framers that there was no need to incorporate a 
comprehensive Bill of Rights in order to protect the rights and freedoms of 
citizens. That sentiment was one of the unexpressed assumptions on which the 
Constitution was drafted.173 
It was in anticipation of statements such as these that in 1989 Deane offered his 
views in Street on the inappropriateness of drawing negative inferences from 
the absence of a 'Bill of Rights' in the Australian Constitution. 
In Theophanous, in 1994, Deane systematically engaged with the argument that 
the framers' decision not to incorporate certain rights expressly in the 
Constitution must prevent the Court from implying broad constitutional 
guarantees from the 'fundamental concepts' of the Constitution.174 Following 
the pattern of Deane's responses to arguments based on the framers' intentions 
in Breavington and Incorporation Case, in Theophanous Deane offered two key 
answers to this 'no Bill of Rights' argument. First, he advanced his 'living force' 
theory of constitutional interpretation: a 'general' answer to why the framers' 
intentions regarding a 'Bill of Rights' could not influence the interpretation of 
the Constitution. This aspect of Deane's reasoning in Theophanous is examined 
171 Murray Gleeson, The Rule of Law and the Constitution (2000) 56. 
172 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 720 (McHugh J). 
173 ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 136. 
174 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 166-74. 
in chapter 6. Second, Deane offered a 'particular' answer. It is this that holds 
present interest. 
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Amongst his guarantees in Street and Theophanous were provisions traditionally 
perceived as rights, such as ss 80, 116 and 117.175 However, Deane extended his 
catalogue to incorporate ss 90, 109 and 118, provisions which Deane had 
proclaimed as incorporating guarantees of equality and the rule of law. The 
reason Deane could claim this extensive list of guarantees in Street was 
articulated Theophanous, that is: 
in a constitutional context, the word 'rights' is commonly used as referring not 
only to rights in the sense of expressly conferred free standing rights 
enforceable against either the world or particular persons who are under a 
corresponding duty but also to privileges and immunities which are inherent in, or 
flow from, constitutional restrictions upon legislative, executive or judicial power. 176 
On Deane's interpretation, in number - if not in substance - the Australian 
Constitution demonstrated a greater interest in, and level of commitment to, the 
protection of rights than that of the American Bill of Rights. On this basis, 
Deane reasoned that it was 'misleading' to draw adverse comparisons between 
the Australian and American Constitutions. 
Deane's vision of the Australian Constitution's collection of 'rights' in Street and 
Theophanous is easy to criticise. It cannot be said that any of the 'rights' collected 
were rhetorically or substantively as strong as those contained in the American 
constitutional documents. Scattered throughout the Australian Constitution, 
and expressed as limitations flowing from the division and organization of 
governmental power, the rights of the Australian Constitution lack the 
unequivocal commitment to the protection of individual liberty- and its 
enforcement by the judiciary against executive and legislative interference -
which is the essence of the American Bill of Rights. 177 
175 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 521-2. In Theophanous Deane said that: 
the Australian Constitution ... contains a very large number of provisions confining the 
legislative and executive powers of the Commonwealth and/ or the States whose obvious 
effect is to confer privileges and immunities upon the citizen.' 
In his footnote to this statement Deane observed that '[s]ome obvious examples are ss 41, 80, 92, 
116 and 117.' Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 168 (emphasis added). 
176 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 168 (emphasis added). 
177 See generally Adrienne Stone,' Australia's Constitutional Rights and the Problem of 
Interpretive Disagreement' in Tom Campbell, Jeffrey Goldsworthy and Adrienne Stone (eds), 
Protecting Rights Without a Bill of Rights: Institutional Performance and Reform in Australia (2006) 
137. 
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Further, to accept Deane's entire catalogue of rights in Street requires an 
acceptance of his view of the underlying concept of the Constitution. Deane's 
vision involved the following three assumptions: that the source of the 
Constitution's legitimacy was 'the people', that the text must be interpreted for 
their 'benefit', and that 'the people' benefit from judicially-enforceable limits on 
legislative and executive power. In this way, Deane's statements in Street and 
Theophanous regarding the extent of rights-protection in the Constitution appear 
to beg the key question-what is the nature of the Australian Constitution? 
However, Deane's core 'Bill of Rights' argument does not require agreement 
with the content of Deane's collection of rights in its entirety. Deane's list 
reinforces that the Constitution does not speak exclusively to the 'power' of the 
institutions of government. Thus, as Williams observed, at the 'heart' of 
Australian constitutionalism 'is the notion of the expression and limitation of 
power', a fact potentially demonstrated by Deane's list of 'rights' in Street.178 
Particularly significant was Deane's affirmation of the separation of powers 
principle as the 'most important', guarantee of individual liberty. The long 
recognition by the Court of the separation principle as a constitutional 
implication, as well as implications of a federal character in the Melbourne 
Corporation Case, affirmed that implications limiting parliamentary supremacy 
could be drawn from the text and structure of the Constitution. Thus, as Kirk 
argues, the existence of constitutional implications limiting parliamentary 
supremacy undermines a textual presumption against rights implications.179 
Seen in this light, Deane was correct to suggest that adverse conclusions drawn 
from the mere absence of a 'Bill of Rights' in the Australian Constitution were 
'misleading'. Thus, the absence of a 'Bill of Rights' should not be regarded as 
imposing a general textual prohibition on the implication of constitutional 
rights. Chapters 5 and 6 explore the next step in Deane's analysis, that is, how 
he employed 'the people' to support his constitutional implications, and 
178 John Williams, 'The Emergence of the Commonwealth Constitution' in HP Lee and George 
Winterton (eds), Australian Constitutional Landmarks (2003) 1, 27. Williams argues that although 
the framers were concerned with 'finding practical means' to establish the union between the 
colonies, 'it does not mean that the Constitution is free from 'rights provisions': ibid. 
179 Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Implications (II): Doctrines of Equality and Democracy' (2001) 
25 Melbourne University Law Review 24, 29. 
whether his answer offered a principled and compelling approach to the 
interpretation of the Constitution. 
Conclusion 
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Deane's vision of the Constitution's express rights was of provisions providing 
real protection to the individual. Consistent with this vision, Deane extended 
the reach of ss 80, 51(xxxi) and 117 through a substantive approach to their 
operation. Under this approach, mere drafting devices of the Commonwealth or 
State Parliaments could not defeat the operation of these provisions. In this way 
Deane confirmed his understanding of the Court's role, expressed through his 
s 51 jurisprudence, to give effect to the 'words' of the Constitution, free from 
artificial formalism. In addition to this 'settled' principle of interpretation, 
however, Deane's approach in this area was consistent with his underlying 
belief that the Constitution must be interpreted for the benefit of 'the people', 
and that the people were best protected through judicially-enforceable rights. 
However, Deane's decisions on ss 5l(xxxi) and 117 also recognised that these 
guarantees were not absolute. Accordingly, Deane applied proportionality 
reasoning in the context of s 5l(xxxi) to distinguish between genuinely 
regulatory laws, and those laws effecting an acquisition of property. In Street, 
Deane also limited the guarantee of s 117, by reference to the concept of 
'discrimination', and the limitations flowing from the 'context' of s 117 within 
the federal compact. These techniques secured a significant role for the Court in 
determining the reach of these guarantees. In the Tasmanian Dam Case, Deane 
evinced his willingness to apply strict necessity analysis, demonstrating limited 
judicial deference to the pursuit of regulatory purposes by Parliament. In Street, 
however, Deane's exemption of State social welfare schemes from the guarantee 
of s 117 raised the question of whether his jurisprudence offered a principled 
approach to the protection of 'the people' under the Constitution, or instead 
was infused with Deane's conception of the weight to be attached to rights (of 
equality or social welfare) in contemporary Australian society. The ability of 
'the people' to provide a secure and principled foundation for the implication of 
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constitutional rights was a question attaching with greater force to Deane and 
Toohey JJ's equality guarantee in Leeth. 
Chapter 5 'Two CONSTANT THEMES': 
LEETH AND THE IMPLIED GUARANTEE OF 
LEGAL EQUALITY 
Introduction 
This is the first of two chapters which consider the implied rights recognised by 
Deane, and other members of the Court, in 1992. These rights were the implied 
guarantee of legal equality, applied by Deane and Toohey JJ in a joint judgment 
in Leeth, and the implied freedom of political communication, developed by 
Deane in joint judgments with Toohey in 1992 in Nationwide News and ACTV, 
and expanded by Deane in his three single judgments in 1994 in Theophanous, 
Stephens and Cunliffe. As outlined in the introduction to this thesis, these cases 
sparked strong and diverse responses within the legal community on the 
legitimacy of the Deane's reasoning to derive and apply these broad 
constitutional rights.1 
In Nationwide News, Deane and Toohey JJ outlined the interpretive principles 
they applied to derive each of these implied constitutional rights.2 They 
explained that the Court may derive implications from two main sources in the 
Constitution.3 First, Deane and Toohey JJ maintained that implications, 
including constitutional rights, may be derived from: 
three main general doctrines of government which underlie the Constitution 
and are implemented by its provisions.4 
These doctrines were federalism, the separation of powers principle and 
representative government.5 In their joint judgments in Nationwide News and 
1 See above introduction n 55. 
2 Nationwide News (1992) 177CLR1, 69. Deane and Toohey JJ did not suggest that these were the 
exclusive sources of constitutional implications. However, these categories did capture the 
implications that Deane derived throughout his jurisprudence. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid 69-70. 
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ACTV, Deane and Toohey JJ derived the implied freedom of political 
communication from the Constitution's doctrine of representative government. 
Deane's understanding of this constitutional guarantee in these two cases and 
his later extension of the implied freedom in his trilogy of cases in 1994 is 
explored in chapter 6. 
Second, Deane and Toohey JJ indicated in Nationwide News that guarantees 
could be derived from 'the fundamental rights and principles recognized by the 
common law at the time the Constitution was adopted as the compact of the 
Federation.'6 Three months prior to Nationwide News, in Leeth, Deane and 
Toohey JJ had applied this approach to hold that the Constitution contained an 
implied guarantee of legal equality. This chapter examines the significance of 
Leeth, although a joint judgment, as an expression of Deane's constitutional 
philosophy. 
Part 1 of this chapter explores the three stages of Deane and Toohey JJ's 
reasoning in this case. It highlights the connections between, and departures 
from, Deane and Toohey JJ's analysis in Leeth and Deane's earlier decisions. It 
also examines the logical and doctrinal hurdles facing Deane and Toohey JJ's 
implied guarantee of legal equality. Ironically it is another of Deane's iconic 
decisions - Deane's joint judgment with Gaudron Jin Mabo (No 2) - that 
underscores some of the key limitations of Deane and Toohey JJ' s reasoning in 
Leeth. 
Part 2 of this chapter considers the broader issues attending Deane and 
Toohey JJ's interpretive methodology in Leeth. It focuses on the ability of 'the 
people' to serve as a concept through which to import extensive limitations on 
the Commonwealth Parliament of the nature proposed by Deane and Toohey JJ 
in Leeth. Given that Leeth most clearly embodied what Deane described as the 
'two constant themes'7 pervading his jurisprudence, a lingering question arising 
from Leeth was whether the limitations of Deane and Toohey JJ's reasoning in 
5 Deane and Toohey JJ indicated that responsible government may be a possible fourth 'main 
general doctrine' underlying the Constitution or an aspect of the Constitution's observance of 
representative government. See ibid 71 fn 25. 
6 Ibid 69. 
7 Deane, quoted in Tony Stephens, Sir William Deane: The Things that Matter (2002) 94. 
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that case affects the persuasiveness of Deane's constitutional philosophy as a 
whole. However, before turning to the detail of Deane and Toohey JJ's 
reasoning in Leeth, it is necessary to outline briefly the nature of the dispute in 
that case. 
A Leeth: An overview 
Leeth concerned a challenge to s 4 of the Commonwealth Prisoners Act 1967 (Cth).8 
That section required that a court sentencing a federal offender have regard to 
the non-parole periods prescribed by the laws of the State or Territory where 
the offender was convicted. The provision was enacted in recognition of the fact 
that Commonwealth offenders, pursuant to s 120 of the Constitution, are 
housed in State or Territory prisons. However, although designed to reduce the 
. administrative load on State and Territory prison facilities, a consequence of 
this provision was that offenders convicted of the same federal offence could 
serve different minimum terms depending upon where the offender was 
convicted. Leeth argued that s 4 of the Prisoners Act was invalid on one of two 
bases. First, that the Act violated the separation of powers principle as it 
required a court to treat federal offenders unequally and thereby required the 
court to act contrary to judicial process. Second, that the Act infringed an 
implied guarantee of the equality of the people of the Commonwealth. 
Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and McHugh JJ upheld s 4. However, the majority 
judges responded differently to Leeth's second argument. Mason CJ, Dawson 
and McHugh JJ, in a joint judgment, strongly rejected the existence of an 
implied guarantee of legal equality.9 Brennan J, in contrast, remarked fleetingly 
I 
that there would be 'much force' to Leeth's argument that the Act infringed an 
implied equality guarantee had the legislation required the Court to impose 
different maximum sentences.10 Such a law, according to Brennan J, would be: 
offensive to the constitutional unity of the Australian people 'in one indissoluble 
Federal Commonwealth', recited in the first preamble to the Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act 1900.11 
8 Henceforth the 'Prisoners Act'. 
9 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 467. 
10 Ibid 475. 
11 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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However, Brennan J found that the Prisoners Act ensured that federal offenders 
were eligible for parole 'under the same laws.'12 The point of distinction under 
the Prisoners Act was therefore the 'rational' and 'necessary' ground that federal 
offenders were incarcerated in facilities shared by State and Territory 
offenders.13 Thus Brennan J, like Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ, found the 
section valid. 
Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ dissented. Gaudron J found thats 4 infringed 
the Constitution's guarantee that Ch III courts must exercise judicial power 
consistent with judicial process.14 This was because judicial process required 
'the like treatment of like persons in like circumstances' and that 'genuine 
differences be treated as such'.15 Gaudron J founds 4 invalid on the basis that 
differentiating between Commonwealth prisoners according to the location of 
their conviction was not a 'genuine difference'. Although she found it 
unnecessary to decide Leeth's argument that the Constitution contained a 
general guarantee of legal equality,16 in Kruger Gaudron J would later remark 
that there was 'no room for any implication of a constitutional right of equality 
beyond that deriving from Ch 111.'17 
Deane and Toohey JJ, in contrast, accepted that the Constitution contained an 
implied guarantee of legal equality.18 The doctrine of legal equality had two 
components: first, the recognition that all persons were subject to the law, and 
second, the recognition of 'the underlying or inherent theoretical equality of all 
persons under the law and before the Courts.119 In their view, the location of a 
prisoner's conviction was an arbitrary basis upon which to distinguish between 
federal offenders. Thus s 4 was inconsistent with the Constitution's guarantee 
of legal equality.20 
12 Ibid 479. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid 502-3. 
15 Ibid 502. 
16 Ibid 501. 
17 Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 113 ('Kruger'). 
18 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 486. 
19 Ibid 485. 
20 Ibid 491-2. 
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Deane and Toohey JJ' s reasoning in Leeth was in three stages. First, they argued 
that the Constitution incorporated common law rights and guarantees by 
implication. According to Deane and Toohey JJ, one such common law right 
was the guarantee of legal equality. Next, they identified aspects of the 
Constitution's text which manifested the common law right to legal equality. 
This included guarantees such as s 117, the preamble, and implications derived 
from the separation of powers and the nature of the federal system. Finally, 
they assessed whether s 4 violated the constitutional guarantee. 
Leeth squarely raised the degree to which a joint judgment can be regarded as a 
true reflection of Deane's constitutional vision, rather than as· an expression of a 
compromise between Deane and Toohey JJ's approaches. At each stage of their 
analysis, Deane and Toohey JJ's reasoning illustrated important similarities in 
style and substance with Deane's earlier jurisprudence. However, each stage of 
their reasoning also reflected important points of departure from the patterns of 
Deane's jurisprudence. The extent to which these differences reflected the 
natural extension of Deane's own constitutional vision, or a departure from that 
vision, is considered in this part, as is the persuasiveness of Deane and 
Toohey JJ's analysis in Leeth. 
B Part 1: Recurring themes and 
inconsistencies in Deane's reasoning in Leeth 
1 Step 1: 'Fundamental concepts' reasoning and 
the common law 
Deane and Toohey embraced an interpretive approach in Leeth which 
substantially mirrored Deane's 'fundamental concepts' reasoning. Thus Deane 
and Toohey JJ held that constitutional implications may be derived from 
underlying doctrines or principles, principles themselves incorporated: 
by implication drawn both from the nature of the Federation and from any 
particular express provisions of the Constitution which reflect or implement 
those doctrines or principles. In the context of that approach, specific provisions 
of the Constitution which reflect or implement some underlying doctrine or 
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principle are properly to be seen as a manifestation of it and not as a basis for 
denying its existence by invoking the inappropriate rule of expressio unius.21 
Chapters 2 and 3 have explored Deane's commitment to 'fundamental concepts' 
reasoning in the context of implications derived from his understanding of 
federalism and the separation of powers. For example, in Breavington, Deane 
derived the principle that Australia was a unitary legal system, and his choice 
of law rule, from the 'general context' of the Constitution as an instrument 
designed to establish a 'new system of law.' 22 In Breavington it was only after 
Deane examined this general context, and the Constitution's underlying 
principles, that he turned to consider particular provisions of the text,23 
concluding thats 118 served only to make 'plain'24 what was 'manifest' from the 
'general nature'25 of the Constitution. 
In the above passage from Leeth, both Deane and Toohey JJ clearly advanced a 
similar interpretive principle, holding that implications, including implications 
of broad constitutional rights, could be drawn from general doctrines 
manifested by aspects of the constitutional text and its general frame. In two 
respects, however, Deane and Toohey JJ's reasoning in Leeth was distinct from 
the 'fundamental concepts' reasoning Deane had applied in earlier cases. These 
distinctions were: first, Deane and Toohey JJ's reliance on the framers, and 
second, the role of the common law as a source of constitutional rights 
implications. 
(a) The framers and 'fundamental concepts' reasoning 
Prior to Leeth Deane had said little to explain the legitimacy of his 'fundamental 
concepts' reasoning as a tool in constitutional interpretation. In QEC, for 
example, Deane had been careful to acknowledge that his interpretive approach 
was not precluded by the Engineers' Case.26 However, in light of the pattern of 
21 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 484-5 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Part of Deane and 
Toohey JJ's citation following this passage is extracted below n 28. 
22 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 120 (emphasis added). 
23 Ibid 121-2. 
24 Ibid 129. 
25 Ibid 121 (emphasis added). 
26 QEC (1985) 159CLR192, 245. 
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his jurisprudence prior to 1992, Leeth represented what was an unusual step for 
Deane in justifying his interpretive approach. That step was arguing that 
'fundamental concepts' reasoning followed the 'general approach of the framers.' 27 
Deane and Toohey JJ then significantly extended their reference to the framers 
in Leeth with the following footnote to their judgment, where they remarked: 
note the many statements in the Convention Debates by the opponents of 
express guarantees of fundamental rights to the effect that such guarantees 
were 'unnecessary' (see, e.g., Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian 
Federal Convention, Melbourne, 1898, vol.1, pp 667, 687, 688) or dealt with matters 
which were covered by 'the true spirit of federation ... infused into this 
Constitution' (ibid., p 679) or were effected by 'the ordinary operation of the 
common law' and 'embodied in the Constitution as a part of the unwritten law' 
(ibid., vol 2, p.1776).28 
Goldsworthy has observed that by referring to the framers in Leeth Deane and 
Toohey JJ attempted to locate their interpretive approach within the 
'conventional', originalist, approaches to constitutional interpretation.29 
However, Deane and Toohey JJ's reference to the framers raised two significant 
issues for their analysis. The first was the accuracy of their assessment of the 
framers' intentions towards the constitutional protection of 'fundamental 
rights.' The second was the consistency of this aspect of Deane and Toohey JJ's 
reasoning in Leeth with Deane's approach to relevance of the framers' intentions 
throughout his jurisprudence. 
(i) The accuracy of Deane and Toohey ]J's reliance on the 
framers' intentions 
The accuracy of Deane and Toohey JJ's invocation of the framers to support 
their implication has been widely questioned.30 Accordingly, it requires only 
brief mention in this chapter. 
27 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 484 (emphasis added). 
28 Ibid 485 fn 57. 
29 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 'Implications in Language, Law and the Constitution' in Geoffrey 
Lindell (ed) Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (1994) 150, 179. 
30 See, for example, ibid 176; Dennis Rose, 'Judicial Reasonings and Responsibilities in 
Constitutional Cases' (1994) 20 Monash University Law Review 195, 209; George Winterton, 'The 
Separation of Judicial Power as an Implied Bill of Rights' in G Lindell (ed) Future Directions in 
Australian Constitutional Law (1994) 185, 205; Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution Wh 
ed, 1997) 420 citing with approval Lindell n 32, 34 fn 129. 
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As discussed in chapter 4, the conventional understanding of the Australian 
Constitution was that it was drafted with 'faith in the democratic process to 
protect Australian citizens against unwarranted incursions upon the freedoms 
which they enjoy.'31 As Lindell has argued, a more compelling interpretation of 
the statements by the framers cited by Deane and Toohey JJ to the effect that 
constitutional rights protection was 'unnecessary' was therefore that the 
extracts from the Convention Debates reflected the 'faith' of the framers that the 
democratic process provided sufficient protection for individual liberties.32 
Deane and Toohey JJ's interpretation of the framers' intentions was particularly 
ironic given that, as Zines has observed, 'we do know for certain' that the 
framers considered and rejected a proposal to insert an Australian equivalent of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.33 
In this light, Deane and Toohey }J's reference to the Convention Debates in their 
footnote in Leeth undermined their reliance on the 'general approach of the 
framers' was to allow fundamental rights to be protected by implication from 
the Constitution. As a result, Deane and Toohey JJ's reliance on the framers' 
intentions in support of their interpretive approach was unpersuasive.34 The 
question of the coherence and consistency of this aspect of Leeth within Deane's 
jurisprudence requires more detailed examination of the pattern of Deane's 
decision-making on this topic. 
(ii) The consistency of Deane's reliance on the framers' intentions 
in Leeth and his wider jurisprudence 
Chapter 1 has demonstrated that a theme of Deane's constitutional 
jurisprudence was his belief that the framers' subjective intentions were 
31 ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 182 (Mason CJ). 
32 G.J. Lindell, 'Recent Developments in the Judicial Interpretation of the Australian 
Constitution' in Geoffrey Lindell (ed) Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (1994) l, 
34, fn 129. See similarly, Goldsworthy, above n 29, 176. 
33 Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) 419 citing J.A. La Nauze, The 
Making of the Australian Constitution (1972) 229-32. See also John Williams, 'The Emergence of 
the Commonwealth Constitution' in HP Lee and George Winterton (eds), Australian 
Constitutional Landmarks (2003) 1, 25-7. 
34 On this basis Rose refers to Deane and Toohey JJ' s judgment in Leeth as displaying a lack of 
'judicial reasoning.' Dennis Rose, 'Judicial Reasonings and Responsibilities in Constitutional 
Cases' (1994) 20 Monash University Law Review 195, 209. Compare Rose's critique of Deane's 
citation from Inglis Clark in Polyukhovich as displaying a similarly misleading selectivity in the 
use of sources. Ibid 202-3. 
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irrelevant to constitutional interpretation. With language of increasing intensity 
in cases such as Breavington and the Incorporation Case, (and later emphatically 
described as his 'living force' theory in Theophanous), Deane affirmed that the 
Constitution must be interpreted consistently with the intentions of 'the 
people'. On this basis, the intentions of the 'framers', expressed through the 
'passing comments'35 of delegates at the Constitutional Conventions, could not 
control the meaning of the Constitution. 
Deane and Toohey JJ's explicit reference to the 'general approach of the 
framers' to support their implication in Leeth appears to be inconsistent with 
this approach. If the Court may not look to the framers' intentions regarding the 
meaning of the constitutional text, why may the Court consider the 'general 
approach of the framers' to the implication of constitutional rights? If the people 
are the basis of Deane's 'living force' theory of interpretation, as his decisions in 
Breavington, the Incorporation Case and Theophanous attest, surely it should have 
been the 'general approach of the people' that Deane invoked in support of his 
interpretive principle in Leeth. 
There may be three explanations for Deane's choice to refer to the framers in 
this way in Leeth. First, Deane and Toohey JJ's footnote to the Convention 
Debates in Leeth may reflect an attempt to rebut the argument that the framers 
were not interested in the protection of rights in the Constitution. This thesis 
has examined a number of instances of Deane marshalling statements from 
historical commentaries or the Convention Debates to rebut the reliance by 
other members of the Court on statements made by the framers during the 
Convention Debates. For example, in Breavington, Deane reflected that the 
'passing comments' of the framers could not support the view thats 118 was a 
mere procedural provision, and that that interpretation was inconsistent with 
the understanding of prominent framers such as Inglis Clark.36 However, Deane 
and Toohey JJ's footnote in Leeth cannot be taken in isolation from their remarks 
in the text of their judgment, particularly Deane and Toohey JJ's reference to the 
'general approach of the framers' in support of their reasoning. In this context it is 
difficult to regard Deane and Toohey JJ's footnote as merely their attempt to 
35 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 133. 
36 Ibid. 
rebut the inference that the framers' intentions precluded the implication of 
constitutional rights, such as a guarantee of legal equality. 
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A second interpretation of this aspect of Deane and Toohey JJ's analysis in Leeth 
is that it reflected a concession by Deane to Toohey J's views on the relevance of 
the framers' intentions in constitutional interpretation. Previous chapters have 
indicated that Toohey J had not previously endorsed Deane's passionate 
rejection of reliance on the framers' intentions. Even if it is assumed that Deane 
wrote the judgment in Leeth, some concession to Toohey J's approach may be 
expected in a joint judgment. 
A final interpretation is also possible. As discussed in chapter 3, in Polyukhovich 
Deane rejected an analysis that a guarantee prohibiting federal retrospective 
criminal laws should not be implied from the separation principle because such 
an implication was contrary to the intention of the framers. In Polyukhovich 
Deane had referred to the fact that 'the framers took an altogether different 
approach to the incorporation of rights', and therefore their intentions could not 
preclude the implication of the guarantee from Ch III in that case.37 Given that 
Polyukhovich and Leeth were handed down a mere ten months apart, it is 
possible that Deane and Toohey JJ's reference to the 'general approach of the 
framers' amplified Deane's earlier statements in Polyukhovich. 
If Leeth indicated that Deane was open to the relevance of the framers' 
intentions in constitutional interpretation, Deane's single judgment in 
Theophanous in 1994 emphatically repositioned his approach. Chapter 6 argues 
that Theophanous demonstrated Deane's reliance on the intentions of 'the 
people' as the platform for both his 'fundamental concepts' reasoning, as well 
as his adoption of the 'living force' theory of interpretation.38 In light of 
Theophanous, Leeth arguably represented, at most, a notable aberration in what 
was Deane's generally consistent vision of 'the people' (and not the framers' 
intentions) as the foundation of his interpretive philosophy. 
37 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR501, 617. 
38 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 166-74. 
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(b) The role of the common law in Deane's jurisprudence 
Deane and Toohey JJ' s reliance on common law rights in their 'fundamental 
concepts' reasoning in Leeth was a remarkable feature of their decision. The 
richness and flexibility of the common law provided the Court with a 
mechanism to incorporate an extensive array of constitutional guarantees, an 
'implied bill of rights.'39 Leeth itself demonstrated the potential reach of Deane 
and Toohey JJ's interpretive approach, as their legal equality guarantee was 
broad enough to allow the Court to assess the reasonableness of federal 
legislation.40 As such, Deane and Toohey JJ's reasoning in Leeth signalled a 
significant change to the relationship between the legislature and the Court, 
effected not by s 128 but by judicial reasoning. 
Despite the commitment to the constitutional protection of the rights of 'the 
people' that pervades Deane's jurisprudence, the reliance on the common law 
in Leeth broke from the pattern of Deane's jurisprudence in two ways. First, 
Leeth extended Deane's 'fundamental concepts' approach beyond the 'general 
doctrines' of government that had, prior to 1992, been the source of his 
reasoning. Second, Leeth represented a departure from the tenor of Deane's 
earlier remarks in Mabo (No 2) regarding the commitment to equality in the 
common law, and Australian society. 
(i) The common law and 'fundamental concepts' reasoning 
Prior to Leeth, Deane had derived his rights implications from his 
understanding of the two general doctrines of government - federalism and 
separation of powers.41 Both doctrines had long pedigrees as fundamental 
principles from which constitutional implications could be derived. In 
Breavington, for example, Deane applied 'fundamental concepts' reasoning to 
39 Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) 419-20. Compare, in support of 
an interpretive principle providing constitutional protection for common law rights: John 
Toohey,' A Government of Laws, and Not of Men?' (1993) 4 Public Law Review 158, 170. 
4° Kirk argued that '[f]ew conceivable constitutional guarantees accord a greater role to judges 
than a general guarantee of legal equality.' Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Implications (II): 
Doctrines of Equality and Democracy' (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 24, 34. 
41 Three months after Leeth Deane and Toohey JJ recognised rights implied from the third 
doctrine of government, representative government, in Nationwide News and ACTV. For the 
timing of Deane's decisions in these cases see Appendix A. 
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resolve an aspect of federal dynamics. Deane's reasoning in that case had rested 
heavily on his understanding of the intention of 'the people of Australia,' as 
articulated in the preamble to the Constitution.42 Deane reasoned in Breavington 
that the intention of 'the people' was manifested in a variety of features of the 
text and structure of the Constitution. However, the unifying theme of his 
unusual collection of provisions was what Deane believed to be the 
'fundamental concept', or 'fundamental constitutional truth,' underlying the 
Australian Constitution, that Australians were one people, and the Constitution 
established a unitary system of law. 
Deane's reasoning in Breavington provided an interesting point of comparison 
to Leeth. In Leeth Deane and Toohey JJ also relied on the preamble of the 
Constitution.43 They argued that the commitment to legal equality expressed in 
the preamble was also manifest through varied elements of the text and from 
structural implications such as the separation of powers principle. Given 
Deane's previous commitment to the principle of equality as a constitutional 
value, his existing methodology (as applied in Breavington) would seem to 
provide him with ample scope to recognise an equality guarantee. The 
judgments of both Brennan and Gaudron JJ also provided two different 
illustrations of a guarantee of legal equality (of some form) derived from the 
text and structure of the Constitution. In this context, why did Deane extend his 
'fundamental concepts' reasoning in Leeth to encompass common law rights? 
The extension of Deane's 'fundamental concepts' reasoning to incorporate 
common law rights may reflect the influence of Toohey Jon the joint judgment 
in Leeth. Chapter 3 discussed Toohey J's enigmatic reference to fundamental 
rights as a limitation on legislature power in Polyukhovich.44 More pointedly, his 
extra-curial paper,' A Government of Laws, and Not of Men,' presented at a 
conference in Darwin a few months after Leeth, examined the role of the 
common law as a foundation for constitutional implications and an 'implied bill 
of rights.'45 In this context, Leeth may highlight a topic on which Toohey J 
influenced Deane's constitutional thought. This influence was permanent, 
42 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 120. 
43 See further below text accompanying n 96. 
44 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 687. 
45 John Toohey,' A Government of Laws, and Not of Men?' (1993) 4 Public Law Review 158, 170. 
stretching beyond the derivation of the equality guarantee in Leeth, as Deane 
later endorsed the role of the common law as a source of constitutional 
implications in both Nationwide News46 and Theophanous.47 
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(ii) Questions raised by Mabo (No 2): the historical insensitivity 
of Deane and Toohey /J's common law equality guarantee in Leeth 
A frequent criticism of Deane and Toohey JJ's reasoning in Leeth relates to their 
claim that the doctrine of legal equality was recognised in the common law as a 
fundamental right.48 To the extent that Deane and Toohey JJ address these 
concerns in Leeth, their response was contained in the following passage: 
putting to one side the position of the Crown and some past anomalies, notably, 
discriminatory treatment of women, the essential or underlying theoretical 
equality of all persons under the law and before the courts is and has been a 
fundamental and generally beneficial doctrine of the common law and a basic 
prescript of the administration of justice under our system of government.49 
Given the breathtaking scale of their legal equality guarantee, commentators 
have questioned whether this brief discussion by Deane and Toohey, 
particularly their reference to 'past anomalies' in common law history, provides 
a sufficient explanation of the nature of the common law's commitment to the 
principle of legal equality.50 
Deane and Toohey JJ's dismissive reference to discrimination against women as 
an anomaly of common law history is all the more striking when compared 
against Deane's reasoning in Mabo (No 2), and its sensitivity to the history of 
discrimination faced by Indigenous Australians. The significance of Mabo (No 2) 
as an event in Australian legal history, its further synergies with Deane's 
reliance on 'the people' throughout his jurisprudence, and the temporal 
46 Nationwide News (1992) 177 CLR 1, 69-70 (Deane and Toohey JJ). 
47 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171. 
48 See, for example, Doyle's reflection that 'discerning a thorough-going doctrine of legal 
equality in the common law at 1900 requires some judicial athleticism, if not a certain degree of 
gymnastic ability.' John Doyle (1995) 'Courts Unmaking the Laws' in Australian Institute of 
Judicial Administration (ed) Courts in a Representative Democracy, Australian Institute of Judicial 
Administration, 148 quoted in George Winterton, 'Constitutionally Entrenched Common Law 
Rights: Sacrificing Means to Ends?' in Charles Sampford and Kim Preston (eds), Interpreting 
Constitutions (1996) 121, 132. 
49 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 486 (emphasis added). 
so Kirk argued that Deane and Toohey JJ's treatment of the 'past anomalies' in Leeth was 'less 
than convincing.' Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Implications (II): Doctrines of Equality and 
Democracy' (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 24, 38. 
coincidence of Leeth and Mabo (No 2), mean that Deane and Gaudron JJ' s 
reasoning in that case warrants further attention in this chapter. 
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As is well known, a majority of the Court in Mabo (No 2) held that common law 
native title survived the original acquisition of sovereignty by the Crown.51 The 
careful craftsmanship of Deane and Gaudron JJ' s decision in Mabo (No 2) has 
been examined by Berns.52 Berns explained that Deane and Gaudron JJ's 
reasons traced a rhetorical arc from 'formal legal language' to the emotive 
account of the 'past acts of barbarism' perpetrated on Indigenous Australians. 
At the height of this arc, Deane and Gaudron JJ famously observed that: 
The acts and events by which that dispossession in legal theory was carried into 
practical effect constitute the darkest aspect of the history of this nation. The nation 
as a whole must remain diminished unless and until there is an acknowledgement 
of, and retreat from, those past injustices.53 
For present purposes, three aspects of this passage from Deane and 
Gaudron JJ' s reasons in Mabo (No 2) are significant. 
First, the passage underscored, in both form and substance, the strength of 
Deane's commitment to the protection of disadvantaged groups in Australian 
society and his willingness for the Court to engage with highly politicised 
issues. This aspect of Deane and Gaudron JJ' s decision in Mabo (No 2) confirmed 
a well-established pattern in Deane's constitutional jurisprudence prior to June 
1992.54 Second, as Deane and Gaudron JJ themselves acknowledged, this 
passage from Mabo (No 2), and their characterisation of the 'conflict and 
oppression' of the past century as a 'national legacy of unutterable shame', 55 was 
'unusually emotive'56 language for a judgment of the High Court. Deane and 
Gaudron JJ argued that it was necessary to set out 'the full facts' of the acts of 
disposition because '[l]ong acceptance of legal propositions ... can of itself 
51 Much has been written on Court's reasoning in Mabo (No 2) and its legal and political 
significance. See, by way of introduction, Garth Nettheim, 'Mabo' in Tony Blackshield, Michael 
Coper and George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (2001) 466. 
52 Sandra S Berns, 'Constituting a Nation: Adjudication as Constitutive Rhetoric' in Charles 
Sampford and Kim Preston (eds), Interpreting Constitutions: Theories, Principles and Institutions 
(1996) 84, 105-9. 
53 Mabo (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 109 (emphasis added). 
54 See, for example, Deane's analysis in Dietrich discussed above chapter 3 part 1. 
55 Mabo (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 104 (emphasis added). 
56 Ibid 120. 
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impart legitimacy and preclude challenge.157 In this way, Deane's decision in 
Mabo (No 2) spoke to Deane's understanding of the nature of the Court's role in 
rectifying injustice, both by confessing past wrongs and by ensuring that 
contemporary legal principle and legal practice manifested the inherent 
equality of the Australian people. 
Finally, the above passage from Mabo (No 2) was significant because of the 
echoes of Deane's earlier decisions. A decade before Mabo (No 2), Deane had 
explored the Commonwealth's power under s Sl(xxvi) in the Tasmanian Dam 
Case. Discussing the 1967 referendum, Deane observed that it had become clear 
that the exclusion of the people of the Aboriginal race from s Sl(xxvi) restricted 
the Commonwealth's power to enact laws for the benefit of Indigenous 
Australians. That power, Deane argued, was significant because it had become 
'increasingly clear that Australia, as a nation, must be diminished until acceptable 
laws be enacted to mitigate the effects of past barbarism.'58 The similarity in 
language and tone between these extracts from Deane's decisions in the 
Tasmanian Dam Case and Mabo (No 2) suggests that Deane played a significant 
role in crafting the language of the latter decision, or at least that of its most 
controversial passage.59 
Deane and Gaudron JJ's reasons in Mabo (No 2) established their sensitivity to 
the practical effects of past injustice on Indigenous Australians. Consistent with 
the 'theory and practice, form and substance'60 dichotomy pervading Deane and 
Gaudron JJ's reasons, they acknowledge that '[i]n theory' Indigenous 
Australians could have sought the protection of the common law in respect of 
57 Ibid. 
58 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 272-3 (emphasis added). See also, Gerhady v Brown 
(1985) 159 CLR 70, 149. 
59 See also the similarity between the language of Mabo (No 2) and Deane's later speeches as 
Governor-General. For example in 1996 Deane said: 
It should, I think, be apparent to all well-meaning people, that true reconciliation 
between the Australian nation and its indigenous peoples, is not achievable in the 
absence of acknowledgment by the nation of the wrongfulness of the past dispossession, 
oppression and degradation of the Aboriginal peoples . ... Where there is no room for national 
pride, or national shame, about the past, there can be no national soul.' 
Sir William Deane, 'Some Signposts from Daguragu' (1997) 8 Public Law Review 15, 21 (emphasis 
added). 
60 Sandra S Berns, 'Constituting a Nation: Adjudication as Constitutive Rhetoric' in Charles 
Sampford and Kim Preston (eds), Interpreting Constitutions: Theories, Principles and Institutions 
(1996) 84, 105-9. 
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the abuses perpetrated against them.61 However, they emphasised that '[i]n 
practice there is an element of the absurd about the suggestion'62 that their land 
rights could have been vindicated in a common law court. It was this 
acknowledgment of the practical obstacles facing Indigenous Australians in 
achieving equality, and the sensitivity of Deane and Gaudron JJ to that history 
of inequality and injustice, that stood in contrast to the tenor of Deane and 
Toohey JJ's remarks in Leeth, a decision handed down only three weeks later. 
In this context, what is to be made of Deane and Toohey JJ's claim of the 
existence of a fundamental common law doctrine of legal equality? Chapter 4 
has demonstrated that in Cheatle, Deane, as part of the unanimous joint 
judgment, employed an evolutionary interpretive approach to define the 
meaning of 'trial by jury' ins 80. In Cheatle the Court recognised that an 
'essential feature' of the common law institution of trial by jury, its 
'representative' nature, could adapt to reflect contemporary social standards, 
including contemporary standards of equality. 
In Leeth, however, use of an evolutionary interpretive method in order to move 
beyond the 'past anomalies' in the discriminatory treatment of women to 
recognise a guarantee of legal equality faces a particular challenge. While the 
phrase 'trial by jury' held an identifiable historical meaning, (albeit one 
unpalatable by contemporary standards), the scale of the 'past anomalies' in the 
common law may be regarded as calling into question the existence and extent 
of the common law's commitment to equality. Thus in Kruger v Commonwealth, 
when rejecting the existence of a general equality guarantee, Dawson J 
emphasised that 'to dismiss the discriminatory treatment of women at common 
law ... as "past anomalies" ... is to treat the doctrines of the common law with 
selectivity.'63 Without an identifiable and core commitment to a right of legal 
equality in the common law, in 1900, the Cheatle analysis cannot enable the 
Court to adapt that right to reflect contemporary social standards. Accordingly, 
Deane and Toohey JJ did not establish the necessary common law foundation 
for the implication of their constitutional guarantee according to their 
'fundamental concepts' reasoning. 
61 Mabo (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR l, 93 (emphasis added). 
62 Ibid (emphasis added). 
63 Kruger (1997) 190 CLR 1, 66 (emphasis added). 
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2 Step 2: Constitutional manifestations of the 
equality guarantee 
Consistent with Deane's use of 'fundamental concepts' reasoning across his 
jurisprudence, the next stage in Deane and Toohey JJ's analysis in Leeth was to 
marshal a collection of 'particular provisions' and elements of the nature of the 
Constitution which manifested the equality principle. 
(a) 'Particular provisions' 
Chapter 4 has examined Deane's list of thirteen provisions in the Constitution 
that he claimed embody fundamental constitutional guarantees protecting the 
liberty, dignity and equality of 'the people' .64 In Leeth Deane and Toohey JJ listed 
eleven provisions as manifesting the doctrine of legal equality in the 
Constitution.65 
Included amongst Deane and Toohey JJ's list in Leeth are ss 116 and 117. By 
recognising that an express constitutional right can support a wider implied 
right, Deane and Toohey JJ's 'fundamental concepts' reasoning in Leeth 
provided a vehicle for significantly extending the Constitution's protection of 
individual rights.66 For example, if the doctrine of legal equality was manifested 
through a section precluding residence-based discrimination (s 117), could s 116 
establish a robust constitutional implication precluding any form of 
discrimination on the grounds of religion? Could s 80 support a range of 
substantive guarantees of elements of a fair trial and fair judicial process? 
Could expanded rule of law guarantees be drawn from ss 109 and 118, and 
substantive voting rights from ss 24, and 41? Clearly, the potential of Deane and 
64 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 521-2. 
65 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 487. These were ss 24, 25, 5l(ii), 51(iii), 86, 88, 90, 92, 99, 116 and 117. 
Sections 86 and 90 were cited twice by Deane and Toohey JJ. Saunders commenced her analysis 
of concepts of equality in the Constitution by stating that '[i]n a variety of different guises, 
equality is a familiar theme of the Australian Constitution.' Cheryl Saunders, 'Concepts of 
Equality in the Australian Constitution' in Geoffrey Lindell (ed) Future Directions in Australian 
Constitutional Law (1994) 209, 209. 
66 Particularly when building on Deane's list of rights in the Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 521-2 and 
Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 168 fn 10. 
Toohey JJ's fundamental concepts reasoning was not exhausted by their 
implication of a guarantee of legal equality. 
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In Leeth, however, the number and variety of the provisions listed by Deane and 
Toohey JJ as manifesting the equality guarantee undermined the persuasiveness 
of their implication in that case. As Kirk observed, Deane and Toohey JJ's 
analysis required that the eleven constitutional provisions touching on aspects 
of equality in the Federation were inserted in the text 'out of excessive 
caution.'67 However the range and number of these provisions suggests that, on 
the question of equality and discrimination, the framers departed from their 
'general approach' towards implications and determined to protect this right 
expressly rather than by implication.68 
Deane and Toohey JJ's reliance on s 117 illustrated a further source of criticism 
of their application of 'fundamental concepts' reasoning in Leeth. Section 117 
serves multiple purposes in the Constitution, only one of which is the 
protection of the individual from discrimination.69 In Street, for example, Deane 
recognised that some discriminatory laws were exempt from s 117.70 Does this 
mean that the federal principles and issues of State sovereignty that provided 
the basis for exclusions to s 117 could also be the source of constitutional 
implications? How was the Court to balance the principles and purpose of that 
section and the limitations flowing from the constitutional purpose and 
structure? As Claus remarked, the essence of Deane and Toohey JJ's reasoning 
in Leeth was that the text was a 'signpost' of wider doctrines and concepts 
underlying the text.71 However, as 'signposts can point in more than one 
direction',72 Deane and Toohey JJ's approach conferred a considerable 
discretion on the Court to frame the nature and scope of implications limiting 
legislative power. These were not issues considered by Deane and Toohey JJ in 
Leeth. 
67 Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Implications (II): Doctrines of Equality and Democracy' (2001) 25 
Melbourne University Law Review 24, 41. Although compare Deane's argument in Breavington 
that ss 106, 107 and 108 confirmed that Australia was a unitary system of law, and '[t]he 
fsresence of s 118 serves to make that position plain': Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 129. 
8 Kirk, above n 67, 41. 
69 Street (1989) 168 CLR461, 528-9. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Laurence Claus, 'Implication and the Concept of a Constitution' (1995) 69 Australian Law 
Journal 887, 904. 
72 Ibid. 
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Statements from Deane and Gaudron JJ's reasons in Mabo (No 2) further 
reinforce the selectivity in Deane and Toohey JJ's examination of their analysis 
of provisions manifesting their equality guarantee. In Mabo (No 2), in the midst 
of their description of the history of violence and injustice faced by Indigenous 
Australians, Deane and Gaudron JJ drew attention to the two references to 
Indigenous Australians in the original text of Constitution: ss 51(xxvi) and 127.73 
Section 51(xxvi) was mentioned by Deane and Toohey JJ in Leeth as a head of 
power 'necessarily' authorising discrimination, to the extent that the 
discrimination is 'reasonable capable of being seen as appropriate and adapted 
to the circumstance of that membership.'74 However the original purpose of 
s Sl(xxvi),75 and the inclusion of s 127 in the Constitution in 1901, were not 
mentioned by Deane and Toohey JJ in Leeth. Given that Leeth and Mabo (No 2) 
were decided only three weeks apart, the absence of such discussion in Deane 
and Toohey JJ's reasons in Leeth is particularly striking. The original form of 
these provisions was surely more relevant to the issue of the Constitution's 
commitment to the principle of legal equality, as assessed in 1901, than in 
identifying a common law right of native title in Mabo (No 2). Indeed, in Kruger, 
Dawson J turned to ss 51(xxvi) and 127 as illustrations of aspects of the 
Constitution that 'do not support the suggested doctrine of equality.'76 
For these reasons, Deane and Toohey JJ's references to the constitutional text as 
manifesting the equality guarantee in Leeth were unconvincing, and reinforced 
the degree of discretion that their 'fundamental concepts' reasoning could 
confer on the Court in identifying the nature of the underlying doctrine and the 
reach of the constitutional implication. This criticism of Deane and Toohey JJ's 
reasoning in Leeth applies with equal force to the other manifestations of the 
guarantee marshalled in their reasons. 
73 Mabo (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1,106 (Deane and Gaudron JJ). See also Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 
158 CLR 1, 272 (Deane J). 
74 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 489. Justice French remarked on Deane and Toohey JJ's recognition 
of the race power as an exception to the equality guarantee in his examination of the Court's 
engagement with the meaning of the race's power in Robert French, 'The Race Power: A 
Constitutional Chimera' in HP Lee and George Winterton (eds), Australian Constitutional 
Landmarks (2003) 180, 196. 
75 See generally French, above n 74, 196. 
76 Kruger (1997) 190 CLR l, 64. 
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(b) The separation of powers principle 
Deane and Toohey JJ also rely on implications derived from two underlying 
doctrines of government as manifesting the Constitution's commitment to 
equality: federalism and the separation of powers principle. As Deane and 
Toohey JJ's reference to federalism was intimately connected to their reliance on 
'the people' in Leeth, this aspect of their reasons is discussed in that context 
below. 
Deane and Toohey JJ's reliance on the separation principle in Leeth illustrated 
the points of connection between Leeth and Deane's earlier decisions and 
reinforced the flexibility available to the Court under Deane and Toohey JJ's 
'fundamental concepts' reasoning to frame the nature and scope of 
constitutional implications. In a manner evocative of Deane's reasons in 
Polyukhovich,77 Deane and Toohey JJ stated that the provisions of Ch III: 
not only identify the possible repositories of Commonwealth judicial power. 
They also dictate and control the manner of its exercise. They are not concerned 
with mere labels or superficialities. They are concerned with matters of 
substance. 78 
Deane and Toohey JJ continued, observing that Ch III required that 'courts' 
exercise judicial power consistent with the 'essential attributes of a court' and 
'judicial process.'79 Mirroring Deane's reasoning in Polyukhovich, Deane and 
Toohey JJ continued that 'at the heart of that obligation', was: 
the duty of a court to extend to the parties before it equal justice, that is to say, to 
treat them fairly and impartially as equals before the law and to refrain from 
discrimination on irrelevant or irrational grounds.80 
In this passage, Deane and Toohey JJ made a persuasive case that the 
Constitution included a guarantee of procedural equality in the exercise of 
federal judicial power by Ch III courts. However, as Rose has argued, Deane 
and Toohey JJ's reasoning stops well short of embodying a constitutional 
guarantee of substantive equality.81 This may have been Deane and Toohey JJ's 
meaning when they asserted in Leeth that Ch III incorporated the equality 
77 Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 607. 
78 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 486-7. 
79 Ibid 487. 
80 Ibid (emphasis added). 
81 Dennis Rose, 'Judicial Reasonings and Responsibilities in Constitutional Cases' (1994) 20 
Monash University Law Review 195, 208. 
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guarantee 'to a significant extent'.82 However, Deane and Toohey JJ's reliance 
on a procedural guarantee flowing from Ch III as a manifestation of the general 
doctrine of equality in the Constitution mirrored their use of s 117 as a 
'signpost'83 for the existence of the broader guarantee of legal equality of the 
people of the Commonwealth. 
Deane and Toohey JJ's reliance on the separation principle in Leeth also raised 
interesting comparisons with Deane's Ch III jurisprudence. Deane displayed a 
consistent interest in rights flowing from Ch III throughout his High Court 
decisions, signalled as early as his swearing-in speech. Leeth provided Deane 
with an opportunity to extend the reach of Ch III guarantees. However, in 
contrast to Gaudron J, Deane and Toohey declined to decide the Ch III 
argument in Leeth, indicating, without deciding, that the argument may have 
faced 'difficulty.'84 It is possible that Deane and Toohey ]J's failure to determine 
this argument may have reflected differences between these judges regarding 
the scope of Ch III rights.85 Whatever the reason, Leeth resulted in Deane 
pursuing a general equality guarantee, in preference to a guarantee derived 
from Ch III. In this way, Leeth may signal the weight Deane attached to these 
different themes in his constitutional philosophy. 
(c) The nature of the Federation and 'the people' 
The final aspect of the Constitution cited by Deane and Toohey JJ in Leeth as 
manifesting the equality guarantee was the nature of the Federation as a 
compact of 'the people'. Deane and Toohey JJ's reliance on 'the people' in Leeth 
took two forms. 
82 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 486. 
83 Laurence Claus, 'Implication and the Concept of a Constitution' (1995) 69 Australian Law 
Journal 887, 904. 
84 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 493. 
85 See, for example, the discussion in chapter 3 of the differences between Deane and Toohey JJ's 
understanding of consequences of the separation of powers principle Ch III in Re Tracey and the 
constitutional protection from retrospective criminal law inPolyukhovich. 
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(i) QEC, federal implications and 'the people' 
First, as mentioned in chapter 2, Deane and Toohey JJ referred to the principle 
in the Melbourne Corporation Case. They argued that the recognition of an 
implication protecting the capacity of the States to function, and, as recognised 
in QEC, restricting the Commonwealth's power to discriminate against the 
States, exemplified the 'general approach of the framers' to incorporate 
important principles and guarantees by implication.s6 In a much criticised 
passage in their judgment, s7 Deane and Toohey JJ argued in Leeth that: 
The States themselves, are, of course, artificial entities . ... it would be somewhat 
surprising if the Constitution, which is concerned with matters of substance, 
embodied a general principle which protected the States and their 
instrumentalities from being singled out by Commonwealth laws for 
discriminatory treatment but provided no similar protection of the people who 
constitute the Commonwealth and the States.ss 
This description of the States as 'artificial entities', and the Constitution's 
concern with 'matters of substance', echoed Deane's language in earlier 
decisions, such as Metwally.s9 Some seven years prior to Leeth, in QEC, Deane 
had also intimated that there may be a 'general guarantee' protecting the 
equality of 'the people', which could provide a foundation for the narrower 
guarantee protecting the States from discriminatory treatment by the 
Commonwealth.90 In Leeth, Deane and Toohey JJ asserted the inverse 
proposition, that is, that the framers' willingness to protect the States from 
discriminatory treatment by constitutional implication was a factor favouring a 
'similar protection' for 'the people'.91 
This aspect of Deane and Toohey JJ's reasoning in Leeth faces a number of 
challenges. First, an issue of coherence flows from Deane's earlier statements in 
QEC. Reading Deane's judgments together, his analysis suggests a self-
reinforcing implication: the equality of 'the people' may provide a platform for 
an implication protecting the States from discriminatory treatment (QEC), 
86 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 484. 
87 See, for example, Kruger (1997) 190 CLR l, 64 (Dawson J). See also, Jeremy Kirk, 
'Constitutional Implications (II): Doctrines of Equality and Democracy' (2001) 25 Melbourne 
University Law Review 24, 39 and Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution 
W" ed, 1997) 416. 
88 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 484 (emphasis added). 
89 Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447, 476-7. 
90 QEC (1985) 159 CLR 192, 247-8. 
91 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 484. 
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which in turn is the basis for (or reinforces the existence of) an implication 
guaranteeing the equality of the people (Leeth). Second, commentators have also 
drawn attention to the different status of the Commonwealth and the States, 
and 'the people', in the Constitution.92 The limitation on Commonwealth 
legislative power to protect the continued existence of the States as political 
entities is a limitation based firmly on the text and structure of the Constitution, 
as Deane recognised in QEC. 93 Thus, as Zines argued, whether 'artificial' or not, 
the existence of the States was a matter on which the Constitution is 
predicated.94 In contrast, the Constitution's reference to 'the people' is limited. 
Before the text of the Constitution can be said even to reflect the role of 'the 
people' to a degree approximating the textual manifestation of the federal 
system (for example, by endorsing Deane's thirteen guarantees in Street) it is 
first necessary to accept Deane's premise that the Constitution is designed to 
protect 'the people' through express and implied constitutional rights. As the 
discussion of the 'particular provisions' rallied by Deane and Toohey JJ in Leeth 
indicated, however, the text itself does not provide a clear indication that the 
Constitution was intended to protect the individual from discriminatory laws of 
the Commonwealth. This is particularly so given that, as Deane and Toohey JJ 
recognised, 'almost all laws discriminate.'95 Without greater textual support, 
therefore, any comparison between a federal implication for the benefit of the 
States, and a general equality guarantee protective of 'the people', appears to 
beg the question in issue in Leeth. 
(ii) Preamble and 'the people' 
The second way in which Deane and Toohey JJ employed the concept of 'the 
people' to support the equality guarantee in Leeth was through the reference to 
92 See above n 87. 
93 Deane described the Constitution as 'predicated upon ... an assumption of the continued 
existence of the States as viable political entities': QEC (1985) 159 CLR 192, 245 (emphasis 
added). 
94 Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) 416. Note likewise, Leslie Zines, 
'The Sovereignty of the People' in Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), Power, Parliament 
and the People (1997) 91, 103-4. 
95 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 488-9. 
the preamble to the Constitution.96 Deane and Toohey JJ argued that the 
preamble made 'plain'97 that the Constitution's 
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conceptual basis was the free agreement of 'the people' - all the people - of the 
federating Colonies to unite in the Commonwealth under the Constitution. 
Implicit in that free agreement was the notion of the inherent equality of the people 
as the parties to the compact. 98 
This passage was again evocative of Deane's earlier jurisprudence. In Hematite 
and Breavington, for example, Deane had relied on the conceptual basis of the 
Constitution to support his interpretation of the Constitution as an instrument 
designed for the protection of 'the people of Australia' and the creation of a 
new nation.99 As discussed in chapter 2, however, Gummow J's analysis in 
McGinty highlighted the tension in the text between concepts of 'the people of 
Australia' and 'the people of the States.'100 Deane did not recognise the 
possibility that the conceptual basis of the Constitution contained a federal 
dimension in Leeth, or in any other decision. Thus Deane consistently 
interpreted the Constitution as manifesting the 'fundamental constitutional truth' 
he recognised in Stevens v Head, that is, that 'the people' in 1900 had agreed to 
form one single nation, free from the discriminatory and divisive remnants of 
colonial (now State) boundaries.101 
In Leeth, Deane and Toohey JJ extended this thread of Deane's reasoning in two 
ways. First, in the above passage, Deane and Toohey JJ indicated that the 
people's agreement carried with it a recognition of, and commitment to, the 
constitutional protection of their 'inherent equality'. Part 2 of this chapter 
examines further the persuasiveness of Deane's vision of popular sovereignty 
as a foundation for constitutional guarantees, and its consequences for Deane's 
wider constitutional philosophy. 
96 Ibid 486. Brennan J also supported his equality guarantee by reference to the preamble. Leeth 
(1992) 174 CLR 455, 475. However, Brennan J's conclusion thats 4 of the Prisoners Act 
distinguished between federal offenders on a rational and necessary ground made it 
unnecessary for him to explore the existence of an equality guarantee in detail. Thus, in contrast 
to Deane and Toohey JJ, Brennan J referred only to the preamble in his reasons in Leeth. 
97 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 486. 
98 Ibid 486 (emphasis added). 
99 See Hematite (1983) 151CLR599, 660 and Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 120. See also Deane's 
statement in Duncan (1983) 158 CLR 535, 589. 
100 McGinty (1996) 186 CLR 140, 275. See above chapter 2 n 210. 
101 Stevens v Head (1993) 176 CLR 433, 461 (emphasis added). 
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A second innovation in Leeth was Deane and Toohey JJ's reference to the 
preamble as evincing the assent of 'all the people' to the Constitution. In Leeth, 
Deane and Toohey JJ appeared to rely on the extent of public participation in 
the constitutional referenda of the 1890s in a manner not exhibited by Deane in 
his earlier decisions. Deane and Gaudron JJ' s reasoning in Mabo (No 2) again 
drew attention to the limitations of his aspect of Deane and Toohey JJ's 
reasoning in Leeth. 
In Mabo (No 2) Deane and Gaudron JJ stated that, 
the Australian Aborigines were, at least as a matter of legal theory, included 
among the people who, 'relying on the blessing of Almighty God', agreed to 
unite in an indissoluble Commonwealth of Australia.102 
On its face, this remark was not inconsistent with Deane and Toohey JJ's 
suggestion in Leeth that 'all the people' agreed, equally, to the terms of the 
Australian Constitution. However, in a judgment that was replete with allusion 
to the dichotomy between legal theory and practice, 103 Deane and Gaudron JJ' s 
statement that the 'Australian Aborigines' united to form the Commonwealth 
'at least as a matter of legal theory' invited the question of whether this statement 
was true as a matter of practice.104 In this way, Deane and Gaudron JJ's 
statement in Mabo (No 2) drew attention to the accuracy of Deane and 
Toohey JJ's claim that in 1900 the Constitution effected the free agreement of 'all 
the people'. This was an issue pursued by Dawson J in Kruger, who observed 
that: 
a degree of equality was lacking in the free agreement of which their Honours 
spoke, in that the referendum expressing that agreement excluded most women 
and many Aboriginals.105 
Like Deane and Toohey JJ's willingness to pass over 'past anomalies' in order to 
recognise the existence of a common law commitment to legal equality in 1900, 
Deane and Toohey JJ's failure to acknowledge the historical inequalities in 
102 Mabo (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 106 (Deane and Gaudron JJ) (emphasis added). 
103 Sandra S Berns, 'Constituting a Nation: Adjudication as Constitutive Rhetoric' in Charles 
Sampford and Kim Preston (eds), Interpreting Constitutions: Theories, Principles and Institutions 
(1996) 84, 105-9. 
104 See also Deane's acknowledgment, while Governor-General, of the restrictions on 
qualification to be a delegate at a Constitutional Convention, and the significance of those 
qualifications on a sense of 'belonging' to the new nation. See, for example, 'Opening of the 
Exhibition, "Belonging: A Century Celebrated" State Library of New South Wales' Sydney, 3 
January 2001, quoted in Sir William Deane, Directions: A Vision for Australia (2002) 16. 
105 Kruger (1997) 190 CLR l, 67. 
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participation in the movement towards federation suggests a selective reliance 
on the historical record. 
Had Deane and Toohey JJ recognised in Leeth that eligibility to vote at the 
constitutional referenda was an evolving concept, just as the Court conceived 
eligibility for jury service in Cheatle, Deane and Toohey JJ could have deflected 
some of the criticism associated with their reliance on the Preamble. Two years 
after Leeth, in Theophanous, Deane emphasised the significant changes to 
electoral laws in the Federation since 1901, which removed restrictions on the 
franchise of women and Indigenous Australians. Deane described these 
changes in Theophanous as responding to 'the increasing appreciation and 
assertion of the intrinsic equality of all human beings.1106 Eligibility to vote at 
contemporary referenda, and the Australian system of compulsory voting, may 
provide potent symbols that the Australian Constitution now reflects the voice 
of 'all of the people', at least on questions of constitutional change. However, 
Deane and Toohey JJ did not explicitly pursue an evolutionary interpretive 
approach in Leeth; a somewhat surprising approach in light of their later 
endorsement of a 'living force' interpretation in decisions such as Theophanous 
and McGinty.107 
3 Step 3: applying the equality guarantee 
Deane and Toohey JJ applied their equality guarantee by asking two 
questions.108 First, did the law discriminate between federal offenders? In Leeth, 
Deane and Toohey JJ concluded that the Prisoners Act did differentiate between 
Commonwealth prisoners on the basis of the location of their conviction.109 
Second, was the discrimination justified? Deane and Toohey JJ recognised that 
two classes of discriminatory laws would stand outside the equality 
guarantee.110 The first exception was for laws enacted under a head of power 
that authorised discrimination. This exclusion mirrored Deane's earlier 
106 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 174 (emphasis added). 
107 Deane's 'living force' theory is discussed further in chapter 6. For Toohey J's endorsement of 
a 'living force' theory, see McGinty (1996) 186 CLR 140, 200. 
108 See discussion in Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Implications (II): Doctrines of Equality and 
Democracy' (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 24, 34. 
109 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 491. 
llO Ibid 488-90. 
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reasoning in QEC. In that case Deane had found thats Sl(xxxv) authorised the 
Commonwealth to isolate particular industrial disputes for expedited 
settlement.111 On this basis, some laws discriminating against the State did not 
violate the Melbourne Corporation principle. In Leeth, however, Deane and 
Toohey JJ did not believe that the Prisoners Act was enacted under a head of 
power that authorised discriminatory treatment of Commonwealth prisoners.112 
Also excluded from the ambit of their equality guarantee, was a law that 
'discriminates between people on grounds which are reasonably capable of being 
seen as providing a rational and relevant basis for the discriminatory treatment'.113 
Deane and Toohey JJ concluded, however, that the Prisoners Act imposed 'an 
extraordinary degree of disproportionality' in the length of non-parole periods 
fixed for federal offenders.114 This aspect of their analysis offered important 
insights into the constitutional values informing Deane and Toohey }J's 
interpretive approach. 
Deane and Toohey JJ's application of the proportionality test in Leeth displayed 
a preference for national over federal considerations. In Leeth, Deane and 
Toohey JJ argued that, by requiring a Court to consider location as the sole 
factor in determining non-parole periods, the Prisoners Act 'operated 
arbitrarily.'115 This conclusion was in contrast to that of Brennan J, who, 
mirroring the language of Deane and Toohey JJ, regarded discrimination on the 
basis of location to be both rational and 'necessary.'116 For Deane and Toohey JJ, 
however, such discrimination was inconsistent with the recognition that 
Australia was 'one country and the criminal laws of the Commonwealth are 
part of one system of law to which all within the Commonwealth are equally 
subject.'117 
111 QEC (1985) 159 CLR 192, 251-2. 
112 Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 490. 
113 Ibid 488 (emphasis added). 
114 Ibid 490 (emphasis added). 
115 Ibid 491. 
116 Ibid 479. Similarly, although strongly resisting the legitimacy of the equality guarantee, 
Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ argued that it was 'hardly surprising' that Parliament 
would seek uniformity of minimum terms. This goal was consistent, in their view, with 'good 
prison administration.' Ibid 466. These descriptions of the law suggest that Mason CJ, Dawson 
and McHugh JJ may have regarded the Commonwealth Prisoners Act as satisfying a 'rational and 
relevant' discrimination test, had they accepted the existence of a general equality guarantee. 
117 Ibid 492. 
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The diametrically opposed conclusions of Deane and Toohey JJ on the one 
hand, and Brennan J on the other, underlined the extent of the discretionary 
jurisdiction conferred on the Court under an equality guarantee. Deane and 
Toohey JJ's legal equality guarantee required the Court to balance issues such 
as prison administration, federalism, national unity and the degree of discretion 
afforded to the Executive under the Prisoners Act against a prisoner's rights in 
order to assess the rationality, or proportionality, of the Commonwealth law. In 
such a task, a judge's vision of the constitutional importance of such factors 
(and other values) would inevitably play a significant role in an assessment of 
the validity of the Commonwealth law. That Deane and Brennan JJ reached 
opposite conclusions on the validity of the Prisoners Act further demonstrated 
the different approaches of these judges to the degree of deference due to 
Parliament by the Court under proportionality analysis. Recognising that 
innovation in constitutional interpretation should be matched by an 
'appropriate' degree of deference to the legislature, Deane and Toohey JJ's 
reasoning fails to meet this standard.U8 
The next part assesses the issues attending Deane and Toohey JJ's reliance on 
the concept of popular sovereignty in Leeth as the foundation of implied 
constitutional rights of this scale. 
C Part 2: 'The people' and rights implications 
A few short months after Leeth, John Toohey presented a paper titled' A 
Government of Laws, and Not of Men' at a conference in Darwin.119 In that 
much criticised extra-curial paper, he argued that the assumption that 
Parliaments are capable of protecting fundamental human rights does not 
accord to contemporary Australian practice. In this environment he queried 
whether a court should be empowered to 'imply limits upon the powers with 
respect to subject matter granted by the Constitution so as to protect core 
118 See Allan's criteria: TRS Allan, 'The Common Law as Constitution: Fundamental Rights and 
First Principles' in Cheryl Saunders (ed) Courts of Final Jurisdiction: The Mason Court in Australia 
(1996) 146, 166. 
119 John Toohey,' A Government of Laws, and Not of Men?' (1993) 4 Public Law Review 158. This 
was strongly criticised by Rose: Dennis Rose, 'Judicial Reasonings and Responsibilities in 
Constitutional Cases' (1994) 20 Monash University Law Review 195, 210-2. 
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liberal-democratic values.'120 As foreshadowed in the introduction to this thesis, 
Toohey continued: 
If such an approach to constitutional adjudication were adopted, the courts 
would over time articulate the content of the limits on power arising from 
fundamental common law liberties. It would then be a matter for the Australian 
people whether they wished to amend their Constitution to modify these limits. 
In that sense, an implied 'bill of rights' might be constructed.121 
Clearly this analysis resonated with the approach to rights-implications Deane 
and Toohey JJ adopted in Leeth.122 Similarly, Toohey J's paper mirrored the 
strength of the commitment to judicial rights-protection and the sovereignty of 
the people that was a key theme in Leeth. However, Toohey J's analysis openly 
extended the Leeth approach. Under Toohey's interpretive principle, the 
people's role was to limit the development of implied rights protection by the 
Court by referenda. In neither Leeth, nor in Deane's earlier jurisprudence, was 
the role for 'the people' expressed in this way. 
Deane's later decisions, particularly Theophanous, suggested that he shared the 
essence of Toohey's approach. As will be explained in chapter 6, in Theophanous 
Deane connected his 'fundamental concepts' reasoning to the intentions of 'the 
people'. In Theophanous Deane argued that the people intended that 
fundamental common law rights would be protected by implication, except 
where counteracted by the text.123 Similarly, in Leeth, Deane and Toohey JJ 
turned to the concept of sovereignty as the foundation of the equality 
guarantee, arguing that it was the implicit understanding of 'the people' that 
'all the people' were equal. 
Leeth, and its extension by Toohey in his conference paper, reflected a paradigm 
shift in the concept of what it meant to have a Constitution, and the role for the 
judge as its interpreter.124 As Kirby J would later explain, a 'modest 
conception1125 of the role of the Court had prevailed in Australian legal history 
prior to Leeth. This conception was founded on the premise that those limiting 
and declaring the rights of the Australian community should be answerable to 
120 Toohey, above n 119, 169. 
121 lbid 170. See also discussion above introduction n 52. 
122 Note also Toohey J's earlier remarks in Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 687. See discussion 
in chapter 3 above n 132. 
123 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171. 
124 See generally M.J. Detmold, 'The New Constitutional Law' (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 228. 
125 Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399, 427. 
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'the people', and the values of that community, through the democratic process. 
This normative claim carries particular strength when, as in Leeth, the Court 
purported to imply fundamental rights of such flexibility to allow the Court to 
incorporate its 'own notions of fundamental rights.1126 
To the extent that Deane's constitutional philosophy rested on concepts of 
popular sovereignty, Deane's jurisprudence continually faced challenges on the 
grounds of historical accuracy and doctrinal indeterminacy. This thesis has 
argued that although there are historical challenges to the suggestion that 'all 
the people' assented to the Constitution, the level of popular involvement, and 
the contemporary requirement of popular vote at referenda, establishes a solid 
foundation for Deane's statement that 'the people' provide the source of legal 
authority of the Constitution. While it is true that 'the people' do not wield 
exclusive power to amend the Constitution (as referenda must be initiated by 
Parliament),127 it has become widely accepted that 'the people' are (at least part 
of) the source of the Constitution's legal authority. 
The greater challenge of concepts of 'the people' therefore lies in determining 
what, if any, influence that concept should have on the interpretation of the 
Constitution.128 In the context of the discussion of the implication of 
fundamental constitutional rights in this chapter, three main interpretations of 
the influence of popular sovereignty on constitutional interpretation are 
possible.129 Each has vastly different consequences for the derivation of implied 
constitutional rights. 
First, as in Leeth, Deane and Toohey JJ endorsed a vision of judicially-
enforceable rights as flowing from 'the people'. As Deane had explained in 
Metwally, his vision was that the Constitution was designed for the 'governance 
126 Ibid. Winterton has questioned whether fundamental rights reasoning intrudes into Kirby's 
'Coda' in Durham: George Winterton, 'Justice Kirby's Coda in Durham' (2002) 13 Public Law 
Review 165. 
127 Note Winterton's exploration of the meaning of sovereignty in the sense of the power to 
amend and the authority of the Constitution. George Winterton, 'Popular Sovereignty and 
Constitutional Continuity' (1998) 26 Federal Law Review 1. Compare Simon Evans, 'Why is the 
Constitution Binding? Authority, Obligation and the Role of the People' (2004) 25 Adelaide Law 
Review 103. 
128 George Winterton, 'Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Continuity' (1998) 26 Federal Law 
Review l, 135-42. 
129 The role of 'the people' in Deane's 'living force' theory of constitutional interpretation 
discussed below part 2 of chapter 6. 
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and protection' of 'the people', a protection secured not through parliamentary 
supremacy, but through constitutional limitations on legislative power.13° For 
Deane, it was therefore the judicial process, by virtue of its independence, and 
the characteristics of judicial reasoning, which assured that the interests of 'all 
the people' were protected.131 Deane's vision of the connection between 'the 
people' and the Constitution, particularly as manifested in Leeth, clearly 
effected a substantial swing in power from the Parliament to the judiciary.132 As 
foreshadowed in the introduction to this thesis, questions were raised regarding 
the democratic legitimacy of this vision of 'the people' and its influence on 
constitutional interpretation. The essence of Deane's answer to that challenge 
was contained in two propositions, apparent with varying degrees of specificity 
throughout his jurisprudence. First, Deane believed that Australian democracy 
encompassed more than simple majoritarianism. The sovereignty of 'the 
people' as reflected in the Constitution therefore recognised that judicial review 
was necessary to protect minority interests in the community.133 Second, Deane 
believed that it was the intention of 'the people' that the Constitution must be 
interpreted according to its status as an instrument of 'the people', and 
consistent with its 'fundamental concepts'. As Deane's decisions indicated, 
however, his concept of 'the people' was also infused with his belief about the 
importance of the protection of the disadvantaged in the Australian community 
and the benefits of judicial, over political, processes.134 
A second way in which concepts of popular sovereignty can influence 
constitutional interpretation is to reinforce the paradigm of majoritarian 
democracy and the principle of parliamentary supremacy. This vision of the 
relationship between 'the people' and the Constitution underpinned the 
reasoning of the Engineers' Case, and Sir Owen Dixon's rhetoric of 'strict and 
130 Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447, 477. 
131 Deane's vision of the judicial process as the key protection for individual liberty was 
portrayed most clearly through his decisions on Ch III and the separation principle, discussed 
above, chapter 3. 
132 See, for example, discussion in John Gava, 'The Rise of the Hero Judge' (2001) University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 747, 747 and Leslie Zines, 'The Sovereignty of the People' in 
Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), Power, Parliament and the People (1997) 91, 104. 
133 As Wright has observed, however, the argument that democracy is more than 'unmitigated 
majoritarianism', and judicial review is essential to democracy is both 'simple but circular.' 
Harley G.A. Wright, 'Sovereignty of the People -The New Constitutional Grundnorm?' (1998) 
26 Federal Law Review 165, 181. 
134 These choices were forcefully apparent in Deane's free speech cases, discussed in chapter 6 
below. 
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complete legalism.'135 Under this vision of the relationship between 'the people' 
and the Constitution, the Court's role was to enforce the division of power 
effected by the Constitution.136 This role was reflected in the guarantee of s 128, 
that constitutional change would occur through the voice of 'the people', 
expressed through referenda. During Deane's time on the Court, this vision of 
the role of 'the people' was pointedly reflected in, for example, Mason J's 
affirmation of parliamentary supremacy in the interpretation of s 109 in 
Metwally .137 
Finally, lying between these approaches, the concept of 'the people' may 
support the judicial protection of the integrity of the democracy process. Under 
this model, advanced prominently in the work of Ely,138 the Court may imply 
limitations on legislative power which protect the representative nature of the 
democratic process.139 Kirk has similarly suggested a link between popular 
sovereignty and the protection of citizenship rights.140 With this vision of the 
relationship between 'the people' and the Constitution, the Court continues in 
its traditional role of policing the limits of parliamentary power, recognising 
that judicial intervention may be necessary to ensure the integrity of that 
process to enable 'the people' to exercise their democratic power. 
As Zines has observed, the challenge with linking an interpretive principle to 
the concept of popular sovereignty is that the concept itself tells us very little.141 
The choice of a particular vision of popular sovereignty, like the choice of an 
interpretive theory, cannot be supplied by the text of the Constitution itself.142 
135 See further discussion in introduction above n 18. 
136 Compare Sir Daryl Dawson, 'The Constitution- Major Overhaul or Simple Tune-up?' (1984) 
14 Melbourne University Law Review 353, 365. 
137 Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447, 462-3. 
138 Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980). 
139 On the link between Ely's representative-reinforcing approach, and the constitutional 
protection of equality rights, see Cheryl Saunders, 'Concepts of Equality in the Australian 
Constitution' in Geoffrey Lindell (ed) Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (1994) 
209, 230-1. 
140 Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Interpretation and a Theory of Evolutionary Originalism' (1999) 
27 Federal Law Review 323, 345. 
141 Leslie Zines, 'The Sovereignty of the People' in Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), 
Power, Parliament and the People (1997) 91, 107 (emphasis added). 
142 See McHugh J's statement in McGinty that: 
The Constitution contains no injunction as to how it is to be interpreted. Any theory of 
constitutional interpretation must be a matter of conviction based on some theory 
external to the Constitution itself. 
McGinty (1996) 186 CLR 140, 230. 
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Because of the inherent flexibility, and uncertainty, of the concept of 
sovereignty, however, the greater the reliance on 'the people' in support of a 
particular answer to the meaning of the Constitution, the greater the scope for 
criticism of the Court's reasoning. 
As has been seen, the strongest and most repeated criticism of Deane's 
constitutional jurisprudence was that it preferred flexible standards, derived 
from broad doctrines of government, through which to impose strict scrutiny 
on Parliament. This criticism also attached with particular force to Deane and 
Toohey JJ's reasoning in Leeth. For these reasons, Deane and Toohey JJ's reliance 
on the preamble, and the principle of popular sovereignty it adopted, was an 
insufficient foundation for their equality guarantee. Accordingly, their 
guarantee effects a substantial transfer of power from the legislative to the 
judicial arm, without clear historical, textual, or democratic foundation. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that even though a joint judgment, Leeth represented 
the clearest expression by Deane of the 'two constant themes' of his 
jurisprudence- equality and 'the people'.143 The expansive nature of the 
equality guarantee in Leeth, and Deane's overt reliance on the intrinsic equality 
of 'the people' as the foundation of the guarantee, marks Leeth out as the 
pinnacle of these themes in Deane's jurisprudence. 
However, Deane and Toohey JJ's reasoning leaves unaddressed significant 
textual, historical and doctrinal obstacles to their implication of a guarantee of 
legal equality. The concept of 'the people', a particularly important plank in 
Deane and Toohey JJ's reasoning, is itself too fluid a concept to provide a secure 
foundation for such a guarantee. Further, the guarantee imposes a 'rationality' 
limitation on legislative power of unparalleled scope, enabling the Court to 
'censor' the Parliament.144 As it applied in Leeth, Deane and Toohey JJ utilised 
the guarantee to preference the formal equality of Commonwealth prisoners 
143 Deane, quoted in Tony Stephens, Sir William Deane: The Things that Matter (2002) 93-4. See 
also Malcolm Farr, 'Last Past the Post', Daily Telegraph-Mirror (Sydney), 23August1995, 11. 
144 Leslie Zines, 'A Judicially Created Bill of Rights?' (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 166, 182. 
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over significant federal and administrative considerations. As a consequence, 
the decision may be likely to remain 'on cold storage' for some time.145 
Given that Deane and Toohey JJ's reasons in Leeth utilised interpretive 
principles, and manifested a commitment to constitutional values, that are 
evident throughout Deane's jurisprudence, the question arises whether Leeth, 
with all its limitations, casts doubt on the persuasiveness and legitimacy of 
Deane's constitutional vision in its entirety? If Deane's vision of 'the people' 
leads to the implication of a guarantee which grants the Court extraordinary 
supervisory power over the Commonwealth Parliament, can 'the people' be 
considered a legitimate and 'untainted' interpretive tool in constitutional 
interpretation in a post-Deane Court? 
These questions remain to be addressed in the final chapter of this thesis. 
Chapter 6 explores Deane's reasoning in the free speech cases. Like Leeth, these 
cases were notable moments in Deane's time on the High Court. As in Leeth, in 
both principle and substance these cases also built on themes well established 
in Deane's constitutional jurisprudence prior to September 1992. Through these 
cases it is possible to reflect on both the broad themes and pervasive principles 
of his interpretive approach, and the symbolic and substantive role of 'the 
people' in his constitutional philosophy. 
145 G. J. Lindell, 'Expansion or Contraction? Some Reflections about the Recent Judicial 
Developments on Representative Democracy' (1998) 20 Adelaide Law Review 111, 128. 
Chapter 6 THE FREE SPEECH CASES: 
CONSOLIDATING DEANE'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
PHILOSOPHY 
Introduction 
Three months after Leeth, in September 1992, the Court handed down ACTV and 
Nationwide News. The recognition in these cases of an implied constitutional 
freedom of political communication has been described as a 'seismic shift'1 in 
the Court's constitutional jurisprudence. In 1994, the trilogy of Theophanous, 
Stephens and Cunliffe effected the aftershock. The intense and varied reaction to 
these cases has been foreshadowed in the introduction to this thesis. 
This chapter argues that Deane's understanding of the implied freedom of 
political communication (like his reasoning in Leeth) rested on principles of 
constitutional interpretation, and reflected a commitment to the judicial 
protection of key constitutional values, well-established in Deane's 
constitutional jurisprudence in 1992. Thus, Deane's free speech cases cannot be 
regarded as a 'seismic shift' in his jurisprudence. Rather they represented a 
consolidation and clarification of his existing constitutional philosophy; a 
philosophy Deane, in the free speech cases, explicitly linked to the concept of 
popular sovereignty. 
Theophanous itself exemplifies this role of the free speech cases in Deane's 
constitutional philosophy. It was in Theophanous that Deane outlined his 
comprehensive 'living force' theory of interpretation.2 Theophanous, Stephens and 
Cunliffe were decisions which history revealed as his final single judgments on 
constitutional law.3 Deane's 'living force' theory, and his analysis in 
1 HP Lee, 'The Implied Freedom of Political Communication' in HP Lee and George Winterton 
(eds), Australian Constitutional Landmarks (2003) 383, 383. 
2 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171-3. 
3 Watson's observations on the schedule of then Prime Minister Paul Keating suggest that 
Deane was not approached regarding the vice-regal post until June 1995. It is therefore 
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Theophanous, did more than explain Deane's concept of the role of the framers' 
intentions in constitutional interpretation. It integrated Deane's focus on 
contemporary meaning with his commitment to 'fundamental concepts' 
reasoning and proportionality analysis and explained how each of these aspects 
of his interpretive approach flowed from his concept of the sovereignty of 'the 
people'. As Deane utilised the free speech cases, and Theophanous, to draw 
together the key threads in his interpretive approach, these cases provide a 
significant platform from which to examine the coherence and consistency of 
his constitutional philosophy. 
Part 1 of this chapter considers Deane's 'fundamental concepts' reasoning and 
the interaction between his vision of federalism and representative government 
as fundamental doctrines of the Constitution. This part also examines how 
Deane related his interpretive principle, and its content, to his understanding of 
the concept of 'the people'. It was the flexibility of this concept that exposed 
Deane's interpretive approach in these cases to criticism. In some of his free 
speech cases, Deane's analysis lacked both the sufficient independent support 
for his definition of the concept of 'representative government', and 
appropriate deference to legislative policy to support an extensive 
constitutional right of the form he advanced. These limitations in Deane's 
reasoning extended beyond his 'fundamental concepts' analysis in these cases, 
to his application of 'living force' and proportionality analysis. These aspects of 
Deane's reasoning are explored in parts 2 and 3 of this chapter. 
Part 2 argues that Deane's reliance on the agreement of 'the people' to the 
Constitution, both through referenda in the 1890s and through contemporary 
acquiescence to the constitutional system,4 offered a persuasive foundation for 
evolutionary theories of constitutional interpretation. Consequently, Deane's 
'living force' theory stands both as a unifying theory for Deane's own 
constitutional jurisprudence, and as a valuable and innovative contribution to 
Australian constitutional theory. Tempering this positive development, 
however, Deane's application of that theory in Theophanous demonstrated the 
extremely unlikely that when writing his judgment in Theophanous, in late 1994, Deane could 
have had in mind that this case would represent his last, single, constitutional decision. See Don 
Watson, Recollections of a Bleeding Heart (2002) 597. 
4 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171. 
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potential for the personal values of judges to infuse constitutional interpretation 
when Deane's 'living force' theory was applied without analysis of credible 
sources of the contemporary meaning and intentions of 'the people'. 
Part 3 of this chapter examines Deane's application of proportionality reasoning 
in his free speech cases. Deane's approach in this area was broadly consistent 
with his wider jurisprudence, as he employed the test to strengthen the 
Constitution's protection of 'the people'. More clearly than in other contexts, 
however, the free speech cases revealed Deane's belief that 'the people' must be 
protected from the power of the majority, as exercised through Parliament and 
their elected representatives. Thus Deane's free speech cases confirmed his 
vision of the Court's role in strengthening the constitutional protection of 
disadvantaged, and disenfranchised, groups in Australian society. Before 
turning to these aspects of Deane's decisions, however, a brief overview of 
Deane's reasoning across his free speech cases is appropriate in order to locate 
the detail of Deane's analysis in its broader context. 
A Deane's implied freedom of political 
communication: An overview 
As is well known, Deane saw the implied freedom of political communication 
as an expansive and robust guarantee of individual liberty. Deane derived the 
implied freedom from the doctrine of 'representative government', one of the 
three 'general doctrines of government' upon which the Constitution was 
structured.5 In Nationwide News Deane and Toohey JJ explained that: 
the doctrine of representative government ... is ... of government by 
representatives directly or indirectly elected or appointed by, and ultimately 
responsible to, the people of the Commonwealth. The rational basis of that 
doctrine is the thesis that all powers of government ultimately belong to, and are 
derived from, the governed.6 
Deane argued that the flow of information regarding 'the exercise and 
discharge of governmental powers and functions' was essential to the doctrine 
5 Nationwide News (1992) 177 CLR l, 69-70 (Deane and Toohey JJ). 
6 Ibid 70 (emphasis added). See also Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 180. 
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of representative government and its underlying thesis of popular sovereignty.7 
Accordingly, the Constitution contained, by implication, a constitutional 
guarantee that 'the people' may communicate on such subjects, between 
themselves and with their representatives.8 
Deane's definition of the subjects of political communication covered by the 
constitutional freedom was extremely broad. It included criticism of the fitness 
for public office of members of Commonwealth9 and State Parliaments,1° and 
members of federal administrative tribunals, 11 as well as the broadcasting of 
political advertising.12 In addition, Deane extended the guarantee to protect 
discussion related to the 'interests of the nation as a whole or of particular 
localities, communities or individuals.'13 Thus in Cunliffe Deane's freedom also 
protected the discussion of Commonwealth immigration policy, and the 
provision of assistance to persons seeking immigration or refugee status.14 
Deane's implied freedom operated as a limitation on federal legislative power, 15 
and the legislative power of the States.16 However, the guarantee was not 
absolute. Thus Deane held that laws burdening political speech may be valid 
provided that the burden was proportionate to the pursuit of a valid public 
interest, with a stricter standard imposed on laws targeting communication by 
virtue of its political content.17 In addition, the guarantee conferred a 
constitutional defence to defamation actions. Thus, in Theophanous, Deane 
reasoned that the implied freedom precluded the liability in defamation for the 
author or a publisher of defamatory statements made regarding the 
7 Nationwide News (1992) 177CLR1, 72 (Deane and Toohey JJ). 
8 ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 174 (Deane and Toohey JJ). 
9 See, particularly, Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 179. 
10 Stephens (1994) 182 CLR 211, 257. 
11 Nationwide News (1992) 177 CLR 1, 78-9 (Deane and Toohey JJ). 
12 ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 171 (Deane and Toohey JJ). 
13 Nationwide News (1992) 177 CLR 1, 72 (Deane and Toohey JJ). Deane applied this concept of 
the implied freedom in Stephens: Stephens (1994) 182 CLR 211, 257. 
14 Cunliffe (1994) 182 CLR 272, 336-41. For commentary on the extension of the implied freedom 
to communication relating to executive action, and the attending 'difficult problems of line 
drawing' see further Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) 388-89. 
15 In Cunliffe Deane described this as the implied freedom's 'primary operation': Cunliffe (1994) 
182 CLR 272, 336. 
16 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 166. Affirmed in Stephens (1994) 182 CLR 211, 257. Deane also 
expressed the 'tentative view' that the implication limited the power of the Territory 
legislatures. See Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 164. 
17 Nationwide News (1992) 177 CLR l, 76-7. Affirmed by Deane in Cunliffe (1994) 182 CLR 272, 
337. The details of Deane's proportionality test are examined below at n 104. 
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performance of official functions by 'parliamentarians, judges or other holders 
of high office.'18 In framing his defence, Deane went further than any other 
member of the Court in Theophanous, although he resiled from his position in 
order to form a clear majority in favour of a constitutional defence.19 
B Part 1: 'Fundamental concepts' reasoning 
in Deane's free speech cases 
1 Constitutional implications from 
'representative government': recurring themes 
Deane and Toohey JJ's decision in Nationwide News stood as a clear 
endorsement of Deane's 'fundamental concepts' reasoning. As discussed in 
chapter 5, in Nationwide News Deane and Toohey JJ observed that implications 
could be drawn from federalism, the separation of powers principle and 
representative government, as the 'three main general doctrines of government' 
underlying the Constitution.20 Although ironically a joint judgment, Nationwide 
News was the first acknowledgment by Deane of his consistent adherence to 
'fundamental concepts' reasoning in these three areas of his constitutional 
jurisprudence. Chapters 2 and 3 have indicated that although Toohey J often 
shared Deane's vision regarding the nature of implications that could be drawn 
from federalism and the separation of powers principle, this was not uniformly 
the case.21 In Nationwide News, however, in their joint judgment, both Deane and 
Toohey JJ clearly endorsed this defining feature of Deane's interpretive 
philosophy. 
Deane and Toohey JJ argued in Nationwide News that the doctrine of 
representative government 'presupposes an ability of represented and 
representatives to communicate information, needs, views, explanations and 
advice,' as well as the ability of the people to communicate amongst themselves 
18 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 185-7. 
19 Ibid 187-8. 
20 Nationwide News (1992) 177 CLR 1, 69. 
21 Compare, for example, Deane and Toohey JJ's different approaches in their decisions in 
Breavington and Polyukhovich discussed above in chapters 2 and 3. 
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on matters concerning the exercise of governmental powers 'on their behalf.122. 
In this way, a constitutional guarantee of the exchange of information between 
the people and their representatives, and amongst the people themselves, was 
seen by Deane and Toohey JJ as a necessary requirement for the health and 
integrity of Australia's system of representative govemment.23 This content and 
derivation of the implied freedom of political communication by Deane and 
Toohey JJ in Nationwide News was later endorsed by Deane in Theophanous as 
accurately expressing his constitutional vision.24 
Deane and Toohey JJ's reasoning in Nationwide News recognised that 
constitutional text played an important but not decisive role in defining the 
existence, coverage and operation of the implied freedom.25 Thus in Nationwide 
News, Deane and Toohey JJ pointed to those sections of the Constitution that 
required or presumed the exercise of 'ultimate power of governmental control' 
by the people: ss 7 and 24ands128.26 However, as was the case in Deane's 
reasoning in Breavington, and Polyukhovich, in his free speech cases Deane did 
not confine the content of the implied freedom by reference to these provisions 
of the text alone. Rather, as Deane explained in Theophanous, ss 7, 24 and 128 
were manifestations of the wider doctrine of 'representative government' and 
its 'central thesis' of popular sovereignty.27 
Deane's vision of the intersection between federalism and representative 
government confirmed the coherence of Deane's interpretive approach 
throughout his jurisprudence. The 1994 decisions of Stephens and Theophanous 
concerned actions in defamation brought by politicians against newspapers 
over allegations that they had misused their public office.28 One question for the 
Court in these cases was whether the implied freedom operated to limit the 
ability of State legislatures to restrict political speech. In Stephens a further 
22 Nationwide News (1992) 177 CLR 1, 72. 
23 Ibid 72-4. 
24 Theophanous (1994) 182CLR104, 163-4. 
25 Comparing the role of the text in the reasoning of Deane and Toohey JJ and other members of 
the Court, see Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4f11 ed, 1997) 379. 
26 Nationwide News (1992) 177CLR1, 71-2. 
27 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 180. 
28 Stephens concerned a defamation action commenced over allegations that an overseas trip 
taken by members of the Legislative Council of Western Australia in their official capacity was 
a 'mammoth junket.' Extracts from the articles are set out in the judgment of Mason CJ, Toohey 
and Gaudron JJ at Stephens (1994) 182 CLR 211, 228-9. The facts of Theophanous are outlined 
belown 75. 
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question was whether the implied freedom derived from the Commonwealth 
Constitution extended to protect the discussion of subjects touching on the 
'governmental and political matters' of a State.29 
On this second question, the extension of the implied freedom derived from the 
Commonwealth Constitution to cover the discussion of State political matters, 
Deane's reasoning turned to the nature of the modern Australian Federation. In 
Nationwide News Deane and Toohey JJ explained the connection between 
federalism and representative government as follows: 
Under the Australian federal system, ... it is unrealistic to see the three levels of 
government - Commonwealth, State and Local - as isolated from one another 
or as operating otherwise than inan overall national context.30 
'As a practical matter', they observed, moneys employed for public purposes at 
all levels of government were levied by the Commonwealth, and political 
parties were integrated across the levels of government.31 In Stephens, Deane 
confirmed the approach he had adopted in his earlier joint judgment with 
Toohey Jin Nationwide News.32 Thus in Stephens Deane reasoned that in order to 
ensure the proper functioning of the system of representative government at 
the Commonwealth level, it was necessary to extend the protection flowing 
from the Commonwealth Constitution to political discussion of State matters.33 
As was the essence of Deane's 'fundamental concepts' reasoning, Deane 
followed his consideration of the nature of Australian federalism with an 
examination of the constitutional text. In Nationwide News, Deane and Toohey JJ 
cited a range of constitutional provisions as evincing the extension of the 
implied freedom to cover State political subjects. For example, they argued that 
ss 10, 30 and 31 demonstrated that the Constitution was 'structured upon an 
assumption of representative government within the States.'34 Further, ss 12, 15 
29 A further question in Stephens was whether an implied freedom could be derived from the 
Western Australian Constitution. This question is not examined in this thesis. 
30 Nationwide News (1992) 177 CLR 1, 75 (emphasis added). 
31 Ibid. Likewise, Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ emphasised that the 'interaction between 
the various tiers of government' made it 'unrealistic' to confine the operation of the freedom to 
matters relating solely to the Commonwealth government. Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 122 
(emphasis added). See also ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 142 (Mason CJ). 
32 Stephens (1994) 182 CLR 211, 257. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Nationwide News (1992) 177 CLR 1, 75. 
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and 29 evinced the assumption of a degree of 'co-operation of the governments 
and Parliaments of the States in the electoral process.'35 
Deane's extension of the implied freedom of political communication to State 
political discussion, blending text and policy in his reasoning, has much to 
recommend it. For example, as Lindell has argued, to exclude State political 
speech from the coverage of the implied freedom protected by the 
Commonwealth Constitution 'encourages arid exercises in line drawing' by the 
Court.36 As the Tasmanian Dam Case itself illustrated, issues can quickly move 
from the State to the national political arena and from State election issues to 
become federal election issues. 37 
Deane's reasoning on the first question, whether the implied freedom operated 
as a limitation on State legislative power as it related to political speech on 
federal matters, also started from his understanding of the nature of Australian 
federalism. Thus, in Theophanous Deane explained that 'common sense'38 required 
the extension of the implied freedom to limit State legislative power. He argued 
that, 'it would border on the absurd' if State laws, themselves ultimately deriving 
their authority from the Constitution, could undermine the operation of the 
guarantee which rested on a fundamental doctrine of that instrument.39 
Deane's analysis then turned from logic and policy to the constitutional text, 
and the effect of Federation on the legal status of the States. Deane argued that 
upon the commencement of the Constitution, the Colonies were 'transformed' 
into States; their functioning continued by virtue of the Constitution under 
ss 106 and 108.40 These provisions, Deane argued, presupposed that State laws 
were restricted by fundamental implications of the Constitution.41 The joint 
judgment of Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ reached a similar conclusion in 
35 Ibid. 
36 G. J. Lindell, 'Expansion or Contraction? Some Reflections about the Recent Judicial 
Developments on Representative Democracy' (1998) 20 Adelaide Law Review 111, 139. 
37 Zines has reflected on the election issues surrounding the Tasmanian Dam Case in Leslie Zines, 
'The Tasmanian Dam Case' in H.P. Lee and George Winterton (eds), Australian Constitutional 
Landmarks (2003) 262, 265. 
38 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 166 (emphasis added). 
39 Ibid (emphasis added). 
40 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 164-5. However, s 106 is expressed to be 'subject to the 
Constitution.' The significance of these words in s 106 for this line of reasoning is discussed in 
Nicholas Aroney, Freedom of Speech in the Constitution (1998) 165. 
41 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 165. 
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Theophanous. However, as was the case in Duncan, it was an interesting feature 
of Theophanous that it was Deane's reasoning on this question that, amongst the 
majority judges, placed greatest emphasis on the text of the Constitution.42 
These two aspects of Deane's free speech cases, relating to the connections 
between representative government and federalism, reinforce the consistency of 
Deane's application of 'fundamental concepts' reasoning in the different aspects 
of his jurisprudence. However, the next section explores aspects of Deane's 
interpretive methodology in the free speech cases that demonstrated 
innovations unique to his analysis in the his free speech cases. These points of 
departure relate to Deane's explicit reliance on 'the people' in the free speech 
cases, and to the level of criticism this reliance elicited from other members of 
the Court. 
2 Innovations in Deane's 'fundamental concepts' 
reasoning in the free speech cases: questions of 
legitimacy 
(a) The intentions of 'the people' and 'fundamental 
concepts' reasoning 
A distinctive feature of Deane's use of 'fundamental concepts' reasoning in the 
free speech cases, and specifically his decision in Theophanous, related to his 
explanation of the role of 'the people' in his jurisprudence. That Deane's most 
detailed exposition of the concept of 'the people' would arise in the free speech 
cases was to be expected. Under Deane's interpretive approach, the content of 
the implied freedom was to be found directly in the doctrine of 'representative 
government', and, consequently, its 'central thesis' of the sovereignty of 'the 
people'. In Theophanous, Deane significantly extended his explanation of the 
connection between 'the people' and his 'fundamental concepts' reasoning in 
two ways. First, Deane tied the legitimacy of his approach to the people's 
42 Ibid. 
intentions, and the role of 'the people' as legal sovereign.43 Second, Deane 
turned to his concept of 'the people' to define the scope and operation of the 
implied freedom of political communication. 
(i) 'Fundamental Concepts' and the intentions of 'the people' 
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As foreshadowed, Deane's analysis in Theophanous contained an extensive 
rebuttal of the relevance of the framers' intentions in constitutional 
interpretation. Within that section of his reasons, Deane explained the 
connection between his 'fundamental concepts' reasoning and 'the people' as 
follows: 
There is absolutely nothing in the provisions of the Constitution which suggests 
an intention on the part of the people either that the ordinary rules of construction 
should be ignored or that the failure to include a detailed list of their 
constitutional 'rights' should be treated as somehow precluding or impeding 
the implication of rights, privileges and immunities from either the 
Constitution's express terms or the fundamental doctrines upon which it was 
structured and which it incorporated as part of its very fabric. 44 
This passage marked an important shift in Deane's jurisprudence, alluded to in 
chapter 5.45 Prior to Theophanous, the only instances of Deane exploring the 
legitimacy of his approach to deriving constitutional implications from 
'fundamental concepts' came in 1985 in QEC, and, in 1992 in Leeth.46 These 
statements had linked the legitimacy of Deane's 'fundamental concepts' 
reasoning to the Engineers' Case and the 'general approach of the framers'. 
However, in the above passage from Theophanous, Deane implicitly affirmed the 
central importance of his statement during argument in Capital Duplicators 
(No 2), a year prior to Theophanous, that the Court's role in constitutional 
interpretation was to determine 'what the people meant'47 when they adopted 
the Constitution. Thus, in Theophanous Deane explained that it was 'the duty of 
the courts' to give effect to the intentions of the people, as expressed in the 
43 Of course, it was also in Theophanous that Deane explained why the people are legal 
sovereigns: ibid 171. The unique consequences of this explanation for Deane's 'living force' 
theory of interpretation are examined below n 75. 
44 Ibid 171 (emphasis added). 
45 See above chapter 5 n 27. 
46 QEC (1985) 159 CLR 192, 245 and Leeth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 484-5. 
47 Capital Duplicators Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory (No 2), Transcript of Argument, 
21April1993, 158. 
• 
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provisions of the text, and to those implications 'legitimately to be drawn' from 
its terms and the fundamental doctrines it incorporated.48 
It was also in Theophanous that Deane provided his clearest explanation of why 
the people's intentions represented the foundation of all aspects of his 
interpretive approach, including his 'fundamental concepts' reasoning. As 
foreshadowed, Deane explained: 
The present legitimacy of the Constitution as the compact and highest law of 
our nation lies exclusively in the original adoption (by referenda) and the 
subsequent maintenance (by acquiescence) of its provisions by the people.49 
It was therefore the agreement of 'the people' that gave the Constitution its 
legitimacy, and demanded that the Constitution be interpreted consistently 
with their intentions. 
This explanation by Deane in Theophanous of the legitimacy of the Constitution 
has been criticised. For example, as discussed in chapter 5, the participation of 
'the people' at referenda was not truly representative by contemporary 
standards.50 Studies have also indicated that the knowledge of the Australian 
people regarding the existence and content of the Constitution is limited.51 In 
these circumstances, can the original assent or current acquiescence of the 
people provide a complete explanation for the legal force of the Constitution? 
These questions may continue to surround attempts to provide a purely 
national explanation for the legal force of the Constitution.52 However, even if it 
is accepted that the original assent and contemporary acquiescence of 'the 
people' are incomplete explanations of the legal force of the Constitution, the 
people are at least part of this explanation. Once importance is placed on the 
48 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171 (emphasis added). Deane's explicit reference to the 
legitimacy of constitutional implications in this passage anticipates, or acknowledges, the 
increasing controversy surrounding his interpretive approach. 
49 Ibid (emphasis added). Compare this brief explanation with Mason CJ's detailed exposition in 
ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 137-8. 
50 See, for example, Deborah Cass and Kim Rubenstein, 'Representation/ s of Women in the 
Australian Constitutional System' (1995) 17 Adelaide Law Review 3, 27-30. 
51 For example, Williams explored the limited knowledge of the Australian community 
regarding the Constitution in George Williams, 'The High Court and the People' in Hugh Selby 
(ed) Tomorrow's Law (1995) 271. However, contrast Meagher's observation that the 'great 
majority do accept and respect' the system of constitutional government established by the 
Constitution: Dan Meagher, 'New Day Rising? Non-Originalism, Justice Kirby and Section 80 of 
the Constitution' (2002) 24 Sydney Law Review 141, 146-7. 
52 See, for example, the recent examination by Simon Evans, 'Why is the Constitution Binding? 
Authority, Obligation and the Role of the People' (2004) 25 Adelaide Law Review 103. 
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agreement of the people in an explanation of the legal force of the Constitution, 
it follows that it is to the people's intentions, rather than the intentions of 'the 
framers' or the Imperial Parliament, that the Court must turn to interpret the 
Constitution. It is for this reason, discussed in part 2 of this chapter, that 
Deane's 'living force' theory offered a secure and principled foundation for 
interpreting the Constitution in a manner that takes account of changes in 
meaning of the Constitution over time. 
It is difficult to imagine, however, how the Court could credibly ascertain the 
intentions of 'the people', past and present, regarding the principles that should 
guide the Court in its interpretation. As the Court has itself disagreed regarding 
the 'ordinary principles' guiding its interpretation, Deane's claim that his 
approach was consistent with popular intentions appears to be an exercise in 
'public rhetoric.'53 In this context, Deane's reliance on 'the people' to support his 
'fundamental concepts' reasoning appeared, somewhat circularly, to be an 
attempt to locate his interpretive approach within the 'ordinary rules of 
construction' intended by 'the people'. 
(ii) 'The people', popular sovereignty and the content of the 
'fundamental concepts' of the Constitution 
Deane's explanation of the role of 'the people' in his constitutional philosophy, 
and his 'fundamental concepts' reasoning in particular, took a further step in 
Theophanous. Affirming his analysis with Toohey Jin Nationwide News, Deane 
observed that the implied freedom of political communication was derived 
from the doctrine of representative government, a doctrine forming 'part of the 
fabric of the Constitution.'54 Evoking his earlier reasoning in Nationwide News, 
Deane observed in Theophanous that the doctrine of representative government: 
reflects both the central thesis and the theoretical foundation of our 
Constitution and the nation which it established, namely, that all powers of 
government ultimately belong to, and are derived from the governed or in Madison's 
words, that '[t]he people, not the government, possess the absolute 
sovereignty .'55 
53 Brian Galligan, 'The Australian High Court's Role in Institutional Maintenance and 
Development' in Charles Sampford and Kim Preston (eds), Interpreting Constitutions (1996) 184, 
201. 
54 Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182CLR104, 180. 
55 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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In Theophanous, and throughout his free speech cases, Deane employed this 
understanding of the concept of popular sovereignty to inform the meaning of 
the Constitution, including the content of its 'fundamental concepts.' This 
principle pervaded Deane's jurisprudence, but, in his last single constitutional 
judgment, he displayed with particular force the role of his vision of 'the 
people' in shaping the content of his implied freedom of political 
communication. 
In Theophanous the question was whether the implied freedom operated as a 
defence to actions in defamation. Brennan J, in dissent, emphasised that the 
Constitution was not an instrument of rights, but defined the limitations on 
executive and legislative action.56 For Deane, and a majority of the Court, 
however, the Constitution's protection of political speech extended into the 
realm of private rights. Deane's analysis in Theophanous drew heavily on his 
understanding of the concept of popular sovereignty. Thus Deane argued that: 
It is not unreasonable that those who undertake the exercise of those powers, 
ordinarily from remuneration from the public purse, should be required to bear 
the burden of whatever is necessary to ensure full accountability to, and oren 
scrutiny by, those whom they represent and whose powers they exercise.5 
It was therefore because politicians, and persons of high public office, exercised 
public power that their private reputation 'must be subordinated to the need for 
open and effective scrutiny and discussion of their official conduct and suitability.' 58 
Only by ensuring that such discussion was free from the 'chilling effect' 
imposed by the threat of defamation proceedings, did Deane consider that the 
constitutional commitment to 'representative government' could be assured. 
This thesis has demonstrated that the essence of Deane's reasoning was the 
concept that public power is derived from 'the people' and, as he stated in 
Metwally, must be exercised for the 'benefit' of the governed.59 For example, in 
his ASIS Secrets Case Statement, Deane emphasised the importance of the 
principle of open justice as a vital guarantee of 'public trust' in the 
independence of the judiciary. It was to vindicate that trust that Deane issued 
56 Ibid 153. 
57 Ibid 183. 
58 Ibid (emphasis added). 
59 See, for example Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447, 476-7. 
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such a statement, affirming the independence of the Court from executive 
interference in the strongest terms. In Theophanous, Deane was equally 
concerned that the Court cast the freedom of political communication as a vital 
guarantee of 'public trust' in the exercise of power by elected members of 
federal Parliament. It was this imperative of accountability, and the obligations 
of public service, that pervaded Deane's reasoning in Theophanous and 
controlled the boundaries of the implied freedom.60 It was only in Theophanous, 
however, that Deane explicitly tied his reasoning to his understanding of 
popular sovereignty. However, chapter 5 has indicated that Deane's vision of 
'the people' was not mandated by the constitutional text. The role of the text 
and concepts of 'representative government' and popular sovereignty under 
Deane's 'fundamental concepts' reasoning was the framework for the forceful 
critique of Deane's reasoning by McHugh J. 
(iii) McHugh J's critique of Deane's 'top-down reasoning' 
As foreshadowed, McHugh J in McGinty famously criticised Deane and 
Toohey JJ in Nationwide News as adopting illegitimate 'top-down' reasoning, 
inconsistent with the principle of the Engineers' Case. 61 McHugh J argued that 
under Deane and Toohey JJ's methodology, the Court introduced an 
'overarching and freestanding provision equivalent to a hypothetical s 129', to 
the effect that: 
Subject to this Constitution, representative democracy is the law of Australia, 
notwithstanding any law to the contrary.62 
The essence of McHugh J's critique of Deane's approach in the free speech cases 
was therefore the degree to which Deane's reasoning relied on fundamental 
principles. Thus, in the free speech cases it was the extent of Deane's reliance on 
popular sovereignty, as the 'central thesis' of representative government, that 
sparked McHugh' s critique. 
60 Deane's reasoning in Cunliffe also reinforced concepts of public service, in the wider sense of a 
s.p irit of volunteerism. This aspect of Deane's reasoning is explored in part 3 of this chapter. 
6 McGinty (1996) 186 CLR 140, 231-2. 
62 Ibid 234. 
263 
As previous chapters have demonstrated, when Deane's reasoning relied on 
popular sovereignty extensively, or exclusively, to derive constitutional 
guarantees, his reasoning lacked compelling doctrinal foundation. This was 
because, as addressed in chapter 5, the concept of popular sovereignty may 
support a variety of interpretive principles and concepts of democracy. In this 
context, McHugh J's concern regarding the indeterminacy of the key 
underlying principle of Deane's free speech cases has force. By turning 
principally to the concept of 'the people' to frame his implied freedom of 
political communication, Deane's approach may be criticised as relying on an 
inherently 'vague' and political assumption in the interpretation of the 
Constitution.63 
However, McHugh J's critique that Deane engaged in illegitimate 'top-down' 
reasoning may ultimately prove unhelpful in assessing the persuasiveness of 
Deane analysis in the free speech cases, for two reasons. First, McHugh's 
statement in McGinty was a prominent illustration of the 'labelling' of the 
jurisprudence of High Court judges.64 As Justice Keith Mason observed extra-
curially, the phrase 'top-down' reasoning is not a term of art, but 'a term of 
abuse.'65 Labelling Deane's reasoning in the free speech cases in this way has 
the potential to attach a global stigma to Deane's jurisprudence, because of the 
pervasive role of 'fundamental concepts' reasoning throughout Deane's 
decision-making. However, the label of 'top-down reasoning' can mask the real 
degree of difference between Deane and McHugh JJ's process of implication in 
the free speech cases. Thus, as Aroney and Kirk have observed, McHugh J's 
derivation of the implied freedom of political communication also turned to 
underlying concepts of representative government to give meaning to the 'text 
and structure' of the Constitution.66 It was Deane and McHugh JJ's 
understanding of the constitutional significance of 'the people', and Deane's 
63 As Stone has observed, for example, the degree of scepticism towards Parliament and the 
political process that was inherent in Deane's (and Toohey J's) decision in ACTV does not 
necessarily flow from the concept of 'representative government' itself. Adrienne Stone, 
'Freedom of Political Communication, the Constitution and the Common Law' (1998) 26 Federal 
Law Review 219, 235. 
64 Cheryl Saunders, 'Interpreting the Constitution' (2004) 15 Public Law Review 289, 291. 
65 Keith Mason, 'What is Wrong with Top-Down Legal Reasoning?' (2004) 78 Australian Law 
Journal 574, 574. 
66 Nicholas Aroney, 'Justice McHugh, Representative Government and the Elimination of 
Balancing' (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 505, 509 and Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Implications 
(II): Doctrines of Equality and Democracy' (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 24, 51-2. 
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explicit reliance on that concept, rather than role of 'fundamental concepts' in 
constitutional interpretation that distinguished their approaches. 
The second reason that McHughJ's critique of Deane's 'top-down' reasoning in 
the free speech cases is unhelpful is that it diverts attention from an assessment 
of the detail of Deane's application of 'fundamental concepts' reasoning in 
particular cases. Deane's reasoning in Cunliffe, for example, illustrates that 
significant legitimacy issues can arise from Deane's use of 'fundamental 
concepts' reasoning, considered on its own merits, in the free speech cases. This 
was because of Deane's failure to provide a detailed examination of history, 
principle or policy sufficient to support the derivation of an implied freedom of 
the scope and effect he advanced. This part concludes with an examination of 
Deane's reasoning in Cunliffe, particularly, its insights into his vision of 'the 
people', and the weaknesses of Deane's application of 'fundamental concepts' 
reasoning in that case.67 
The Court in Cunliffe considered the validity of Pt 2A of the Migration Act 
1958 (Cth), provisions that established a registration scheme for persons giving 
advice to aliens seeking visas, entry permits or refugee status in Australia.68 The 
scheme was designed to protect aliens from incompetent or unscrupulous 
advisers.69 Persons not registered as migration agents who gave immigration 
advice or assistance, whether for a fee or voluntarily, were liable to penalties 
under the Act. The first question for the Court was whether the provision of 
immigration advice and assistance was communication on 'governmental and 
political' matters for the purpose of the implied freedom. 
According to Deane, discussion of immigration policy, and the provision of 
immigration advice were 'among the most important of all political 
communications and political discussions in this country.'70 The thrust of Deane's 
argument appeared to be that immigration had been central to establishing 
Australian identity, and those people who constituted 'the people of Australia'. 
To this end Deane cited the Year Book of Australia, to demonstrate that the 
67 Deane's application of proportionality reasoning is examined below n 141. 
68 Henceforth 'Migration Act'. 
69 Cunliffe (1994) 182 CLR 272, 333. 
70 Ibid 341 (emphasis added). 
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'modern history and development of Australia have been largely based on 
immigration from other places'.71 With this understanding of the nature of 
modern Australian society,72 Deane concluded that advice regarding entry to 
Australia was a central concern to the nation, and so a 'governmental and 
political matter' covered by the Constitution's implied freedom. In this way, 
Deane's extension of the guarantee in Cunliffe was consistent with his approach 
to the constitutional protection of the individual and his concern regarding the 
rights of the disadvantaged and vulnerable in society. 
However, Deane did not support his extension of the concept of 'representative 
government' in Cunliffe with compelling analysis. It is possible that Deane was 
correct to regard immigration assistance as a significant component and 
contributor to the nature and composition of the Australian body politic (past 
and present). Even so, that does not appear to bring the provision of advice to 
an individual applicant for entry into the Australian body politic within the 
concept of political speech, as a necessary ingredient of the concept of 
'representative government'. In this way, Deane's reasoning in Cunliffe stands 
in contrast with the application of 'fundamental concepts' analysis by Deane 
and Toohey JJ in ACTV. In their 1992 decision, and its twin decision in 
Nationwide News, Deane and Toohey JJ recognised that the provisions of ss 7, 24 
and 128 manifested the Constitution's 'general doctrine' of 'representative 
government.' Although it may not be universally agreed that judges should 
reason from underlying concepts and principles of the Constitution, as Zines 
has argued, Deane and Toohey JJ's recognition of the 'representative 
government' in those cases, and its use to imply the constitutional protection of 
speech criticising public officers, was reasonably open on a construction of the 
text and history of the Constitution.73 In Cunliffe, in contrast, it was Deane's 
vision of the nature of Australian society itself that formed the basis of his 
extension of the guarantee, unsupported by an analysis of the history or 
purpose of the concept of 'representative government'. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Deane's use of 'living force' analysis in his free speech cases is discussed below in part 2 of 
this chapter. 
73 Compare Zines' discussion that the recognition of a doctrine of 'representative government', 
and an implication derived from that principle, was a reasonable conclusion, consistent with the 
Court's approach to federal implications and the separation of powers principle. Leslie Zines, 
The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) 391. 
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The criticism that Deane's decisions in the free speech cases exhibited the 
application of individualised standards was not limited to his use of 
'fundamental concepts' reasoning in that context. Rather than temper his 
reliance on the flexible concept of representative government in these cases 
with greater deference to Parliament, Deane adopted a stringent scrutiny of the 
legislative interference with political speech. Before turning to Deane's 
application of proportionality analysis, it is necessary to consider Deane's use of 
'living force' methodology in Theophanous to attempt to support his broad 
constitutional defence to defamation proceedings from the contemporary 
understanding of 'the people'. Although Deane's theory of 'living force' 
interpretation has much to offer, its application in Theophanous was 
unpersuasive. 
C Part 2: 'Living force' methodology and 
Theophanous 
Two months after the Court delivered judgment in ACTV and Nationwide News 
a Melbourne newspaper published a letter to the editor imputing 
that Theophanous, then a member of the House of Representatives and 
Chairperson of a legislative committee on immigration, was unfit to hold public 
office. In February 1993, Theophanous commenced defamation proceedings 
against the author of the letter, and the newspaper. The newspaper argued that 
the Constitution guaranteed a freedom to comment on the official conduct and 
capacity of political figures. 
One of the arguments raised against the existence of a constitutional defence 
before the Court was that such a defence was contrary to the framers' 
intentions. It was argued that by declining to follow the example of the United 
States Bill of Rights, the framers intended to leave the question of political 
speech and defamation to the common law and Parliament. As part of his 
detailed and adamant rejection of this argument, Deane advanced his 'living 
force' theory. Relying heavily on Inglis Clark's Studies in Australian 
Constitutional Law,74 Deane explained his 'living force' theory as follows: 
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the Constitution must be construed as 'a living force' representing the will and 
intentions of all contemporary Australians, both women and men, and not as a 
lifeless 'declaration of the will and intentions of men long since dead.'75 
This part assesses whether Deane's 'living force' theory provides a persuasive 
theory of constitutional interpretation. It proceeds in three stages. 
First, it examines Theophanous as an illustration of Deane's understanding of the 
operation of his theory. Consistent with his earlier jurisprudence, Deane 
conceived the Constitution as bearing directly on private rights and cast the 
constitutional defence in the broadest possible terms. In this way, Theophanous 
illustrated an ambitious application of his methodology, but one arguably 
displaying insufficient foundation for the implication of a constitutional right of 
the magnitude envisaged by Deane. 
Next, this part clarifies a continuing controversy regarding the role of historical 
meaning in Deane's 'living force' theory. It argues that Deane's reliance on 'the 
people' confirmed the relevance of history in his interpretive theory. Finally, 
this part argues that because of Deane's unique concept of 'the people' as the 
legal force of the Constitution in Theophanous, his 'living force' theory offers a 
principled explanation for progressive theories of constitutional interpretation. 
For this reason, Deane's 'living force' theory in Theophanous (as distinct from its 
application) represented a significant contribution to Australian constitutional 
thought. 
(a) Deane's application of 'Living force' reasoning in 
Theophanous 
Deane applied his 'living force' theory in Theophanous to identify the 
contemporary content of the doctrine of 'representative government.' Deane 
began by acknowledging that when the Constitution came into force, the 
operation of State defamation laws may not have been regarded as inconsistent 
74 Andrew Inglis Clark, Studies in Australian Constitutional Law (1901) 21-2. 
75 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 173. 
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with the Constitution's commitment to 'representative government.'76 
Accordingly, the implied freedom of political communication may not have 
operated at that time as a constitutional right to limit liability in defamation for 
political speech. However, applying 'living force' reasoning, Deane next 
examined possible changes to the meaning of the doctrine of 'representative 
government' in the years since Federation. 
Deane began by outlining the 'dramatic changes' that had occurred in Australian 
society since 1901.77 He listed amongst these changes the introduction of 
universal adult franchise, improvements in education, and the development of 
the mass media. Importantly, in light of the themes of Deane's jurisprudence, 
he also referred to 'the increasing appreciation and assertion of the intrinsic 
equality of all human beings,'78 as a significant change in Australian society since 
the commencement of the Constitution. Other members of the Court have 
acknowledged the importance of ensuring that the implied freedom of political 
communication is applied in a manner consonant with contemporary values, 
including contemporary standards of 'equality.'79 'These developments' Deane 
contended, underlined the 'manifest wisdom'80 of Inglis Clark's 'living force' 
theory. 
The most pointed illustration offered by Deane of social change as it pertained 
to concepts of political communication was that of contemporary jargon.81 
Deane noted the entry of phrase 'stop writ' into Australian language, evincing, 
he argued: 
a widespread public perception that such proceedings represent a valued source of 
tax-free profit for the holder of high public office who is defamed and an 
effective way to 'stop' political criticism, particularly at election times.82 
Although conceding that this public perception might be 'exaggerated or 
unjustified,' Deane argued that this term evinced the 'chilling effect' that 
76 Ibid. 
77 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 174 (emphasis added). 
78 Ibid (emphasis added). 
79 For example, Toohey J observed that it was 'the current perception' of representative 
government' that was 'embodied in the Australian Constitution': McGinty (1996) 186 CLR 140, 
201. McHugh J also observed that the content of phrase 'chosen by the people' will 'change from 
time to time': Langer v Commonwealth (1996) 186 CLR 302, 342 (emphasis added). 
80 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 174. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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defamation proceedings had on political speech.83 It was on this basis that 
Deane held that the contemporary concept of 'representative government' 
required 'unrestricted public access to political information and to all political 
points of view.'84 Accordingly, Deane recognised that the concept of 
'representative government' extended to confer a broad constitutional defence 
to defamation proceedings. 
That Deane turned to popular jargon to identify the meaning of the 
contemporary concept of 'representative government' is telling of his 
understanding of the judicial role in applying 'living force' interpretation. It 
was not the expressions of the people's representatives that held the meaning of 
the implied freedom; an approach consistent with Deane's rejection of the 
relevance of the framers' subjective intentions to constitutional interpretation. 
However, in Theophanous Deane appears to stretch his aversion to the people's 
representatives too far. In the search for the intentions of 'the people', the 
statements of part of the people, their representatives, would appear relevant 
(albeit not determinative) to this inquiry. Alternatively, Deane could have 
turned to the reports of the various Australian Law Reform Commissions in 
support of his identification of the contemporary meaning of 'representative 
government'. Without extending his search for the meaning of 'representative 
government' as understood by contemporary Australians beyond the term 
'stop writ', Deane's analysis in Theophanous was unpersuasive in its assessment 
of contemporary Australian constitutional principles.85 In this way, Deane's 
approach exposes his analysis to the criticism that it rested not on external 
standards but on his vision of the nature of 'representative government.' 
However, recognising that theories may be applied well, or badly, can lessons 
be learned from Deane's 'living force' theory? One issue that must first be 
resolved is the uncertainty surrounding the role of historical meaning in 
Deane's theory. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid (emphasis added). 
85 See, in that regard, Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ's citation to the New South Wales Law 
Reform Commission: Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 131fn94. 
270 
(b) The role of history in Deane's 'living force' theory 
In 1997, Goldsworthy offered a detailed defence of moderate originalism in 
constitutional interpretation.86 As part of his analysis, Goldsworthy critiqued 
Deane's 'living force' theory, observing that although Deane 'argued at length' 
in favour of a 'non-originalist' approach,87 Deane's remarks in Theophanous were 
'far from straightforward.'88 
The tension Goldsworthy perceived in Deane's theory flowed from Deane's 
reliance on an extensive quotation from Inglis Clark's Studies in Australian 
Constitutional Law.89 According to Inglis Clark, a 'living force' approach 
required that the Constitution be interpreted not according to 'the commands of 
men who have ceased to exist' but rather as a declaration of 'the will and 
intentions of the present inheritors and possessors of sovereign power.'90 As 
Goldsworthy notes, this contention is entirely inconsistent with an approach to 
constitutional interpretation which derives the meaning of the Constitution 
from the framers.91 However, Deane's quotation from Inglis Clark continued: 
so long as the present possessors of sovereignty convey their commands in the 
language of their predecessors that language must be interpreted by the 
judiciary consistently with a proper use of it as an intelligible vehicle of the 
conceptions and intentions of the human mind, and consistently with the historical 
associations from which particular words and phrases derive the whole of their 
meaning in juxtaposition with their context.92 
Certainly Inglis Clark's reference to the 'historical associations' of the language 
of the text raised the possibility that historical meaning remained a component 
in Inglis Clark's, and accordingly Deane's, understanding of 'living force' 
interpretation. According to Goldsworthy, the Inglis Clark passage 
86 See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 'Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation' (1997) 25 Federal Law 
Review 1. 
87 As defined by Goldsworthy, non-originalism 'holds that the meaning of statutory or 
constitutional provisions at any particular time depends entirely on the concepts, values and 
fsurposes of that time, rather than those of the law-makers.' Ibid 35. 
8 Ibid 16 (emphasis added). 
89 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171-2 citing Andrew Inglis Clark, Studies in Australian 
Constitutional Law (1901) 21-2. 
90 Andrew Inglis Clark, Studies in Australian Constitutional Law (1901) 21-2. 
91 Goldsworthy, above n 86, 17. 
92 Inglis Clark, above n 90, 21-2 quoted in Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 172 (emphasis 
added). 
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reintroduced the principle of 'original, intended meaning'93 into Deane's 'living 
force' theory.94 However, Goldsworthy's analysis suggests that history intruded 
indirectly into Deane's 'living force' theory. Another explanation for the 
continued relevance of historical meaning (but not the framers' subjective 
intentions) in Deane's 'living force' theory is preferable and based on his 
concept of the sovereignty of 'the people'. 
(i) Retaining a role for history: Deane's reliance on 'the people' 
As discussed above, Deane explained in Theophanous that the legitimacy of the 
Constitution stemmed from the people's acceptance of the Constitution, by 
their 'original adoption (by referenda)' and 'subsequent maintenance (by 
acquiescence)' of its terms.95 Thus, Deane argued that the original act of 
adopting the Constitution was a necessary but not sufficient explanation of the 
legitimacy of the Constitution. Rather, the Constitution's legitimacy, according 
to Deane, stemmed from its acceptance by both original and contemporary 
Australians. 
In this way, Deane's 'living force' theory recognised that history was not 
irrelevant in his interpretive approach. Historical meaning was instead the 
starting point, but not the end point, for constitutional interpretation.96 Deane's 
application of 'living force' theory in Theophanous underlined this 
understanding of his theory. In Theophanous, Deane confirmed his reasoning in 
Nationwide News, that the implied freedom of political communication was 
sourced from the doctrine of representative government, a doctrine 
incorporated in the Constitution at its commencement.97 Thus Deane's 
93 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 'Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation' (1997) 25 Federal Law 
Review l, 17 (emphasis added). 
94 See also Kirk, who argued that this passage revealed Inglis Clark as an originalist: Jeremy 
Kirk, 'Constitutional Interpretation and a Theory of Evolutionary Originalism' (1999) 27 Federal 
Law Review 323, 333 fn 76. 
95 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171. 
96 See Sir Anthony Mason, 'The Interpretation of a Constitution in a Modern Liberal Democracy' 
in Charles Sampford and Kim Preston (eds), Interpreting Constitutions: Theories, Principles and 
Institutions (1996) 13, 19. Note also Goldsworthy who says that original, intended meaning is 
not 'irrelevant to its current interpretation. An attempt to ascertain that meaning must be, at the 
very least, the starting point for interpretation.' See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 'Interpreting the 
Constitution in its Second Century' (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 677, 710. 
97 Nationwide News (1992) 177 CLR l, 69 (Deane and Toohey JJ). 
examination of representative government in Theophanous recognised the 
original understanding of 'the people' in 1900, but demonstrated that that 
concept did not necessarily continue to bind contemporary Australians. 
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Turning to Deane's concept of 'the people' to explain the role of historical and 
contemporary meaning in his interpretive theory offers two important 
advantages for both the consistency and persuasiveness of this aspect of 
Deane's interpretive philosophy. 
(ii) Consistency benefits of interpreting Deane's 'living force' 
theory through his concept of 'the people' 
Interpreting Deane's 'living force' through the prism of his concept of 
sovereignty explained his regular reliance on historical meaning in his decisions 
prior to Theophanous. For example, in Kingswell Deane had explored the 
historical meaning of 'trial by jury' and the significance of that institution for 
the protection of individual liberties. Likewise, in the Incorporation Case Deane's 
analysis considered the historical meanings of the categories of trading and 
financial corporations, as well as contemporary issues to interprets 51(xx). In 
these, and many other cases, Deane's reasoning prior to Theophanous evinced 
both a commitment to contemporary context, and a recognition that historical 
meaning was an important component of, and tool in, constitutional 
interpretation. 
In addition, turning to 'the people' rather than Inglis Clark to explain the 
continued relevance of historical meaning in Deane's 'living force' theory is 
consistent with Deane's attitude towards the framers, and 'the people', in his 
constitutional jurisprudence. If Goldsworthy' s interpretation of Deane's 'living 
force' theory is accepted, the intentions of one framer hijacked Deane's 
interpretive approach. However, previous chapters have illustrated Deane's 
strong rejection of the relevance of the framers' intentions to constitutional 
interpretation. In Theophanous, Deane insisted that the framers' intentions were 
irrelevant to the question of whether rights could be implied from the general 
doctrines of government underlying the Constitution.98 Turning to Deane's 
concept of popular sovereignty as the touchstone of his 'living force' theory 
therefore puts beyond doubt that historical sources could be utilised in 
constitutional interpretation for the purpose of determining the intentions of 
'the people', rather than to give effect to the intention of the framers.99 
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(c) Deane's 'living force' theory as a persuasive theory of 
progressive interpretation 
In all but the most extreme version of originalist theories, it is recognised that 
constitutional meaning may evolve, consistent with the purpose of constitutions 
to serve as a blueprint of government for future generations.100 Under Deane's 
theory such movement in meaning is not regarded as a concession to the 
functionality of constitutions. Rather, movement from historical to 
contemporary meaning under Deane's 'living force' theory is a consequence of 
the legal basis of the Constitution. Further, Deane's concept of sovereignty 
provides a mechanism to limit the degree of change effected through 
progressive interpretive theories. Thus, consistent with the dual sovereignty of 
the people, past and present, the Court when applying 'living force' theory 
must explain how the people's intentions have changed over time.101 The ability 
of the Court to establish the change in meaning therefore provides an important 
'outer limit' to the flexibility inherent in a progressive interpretative 
approach. 102 
As discussed above, Theophanous was an unsatisfactory illustration of Deane's 
'living force' theory because Deane did not adequately explain the existence of 
a contemporary meaning of 'representative government' sufficient to support 
his broad understanding of the implied freedom of political communication as 
98 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171. 
99 Compare with Capital Duplicators Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory (No 2), Transcript of 
Argument, 21April1993, 158. 
100 See discussion in Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Interpretation and a Theory of Evolutionary 
Originalism' (1999) 27 Federal Law Review 323, 366. 
101 Note Meagher's observation that any modern theory which accepts movement in meaning 
must require the articulation of what those changes were. Dan Meagher, 'New Day Rising? 
Non-Originalism, Justice Kirby and Section 80 of the Constitution' (2002) 24 Sydney Law Review 
141, 150. 
102 Ibid. 
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a constitutional defence to defamation proceedings. However, by recognising 
the sovereignty of both 'the people' in 1900 and contemporary Australians, 
Deane's theory explained why constitutional meaning may evolve beyond 1900 
to recognise contemporary meaning and values. Deane's theory offered an 
interpretive approach consistent with the acceptance that the people, at least in 
part, play a role in the explanation of the legal force of the Constitution. It was 
for these reasons that Deane's 'living force' theory, as a theory of evolutionary 
interpretation, has much to offer. Whether Deane's theory will gain wide-
spread acceptance will likely depend on whether it can be wrested from the 
perception that it is inherently intertwined with Deane's strongly rights-based 
interpretive approach.103 
D Part 3: Proportionality reasoning in the 
free speech cases 
As is well known, the Court in the free speech cases accepted that the implied 
freedom was not absolute.104 Stone has examined the standard of review 
adopted by members of the Court to limit the implied freedom.105 Her analysis 
located Deane's approach to defining the limits of the freedom against that of 
other members of the Court, and assessed the utility and legitimacy of the 
various approaches. Consistent with the purpose of this thesis, however, the 
focus of this part is on the insights that Deane's proportionality analysis 
provided regarding the coherence of his interpretive approach, the value he 
attached to political speech in the Australian constitutional system, and his 
understanding of the Court's role in constitutional interpretation. 
103 Kirby's acceptance of Deane's 'living force' theory may not assist in separating Deane's 
theory from perceptions of radicalism. 
104 ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 142-4 (Mason CJ); 159 (Brennan J); 169 (Deane and Toohey JJ); 217-
8 (Gaudron J); 234-5 (McHugh J). 
105 See, for example, Adrienne Stone, 'The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure: 
Standards of Review and the Freedom of Political Communication' (1999) 23 Melbourne 
University Law Review 668. 
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1 Deane's two-tiered balancing analysis 
Previous chapters have demonstrated that since 1983, proportionality reasoning 
has been a significant component of Deane's constitutional jurisprudence.106 
When Deane and Toohey JJ recognised the implied freedom of political 
communication in 1992, and conceded that the freedom was not absolute, it was 
therefore not surprising that Deane turned to proportionality reasoning to 
define the limits of the guarantee.107 
Nor was it surprising that Deane imposed a strict standard of review. In the 
free speech cases, Deane adopted a 'two-tiered approach', imposing different 
levels of scrutiny according to the manner in which the law affected speech.108 
Thus, a law imposing 'an incidental and remote' burden on communication 
(such as criminal laws) would not infringe the implied freedom if it was 
'reasonably capable of being seen as necessary or appropriate and adapted to the 
legitimate legislative aim being pursued by Parliament.'109 However, for laws 
targeting the content of communication, Deane imposed a stricter test for 
validity. Such laws would be consistent with the implied freedom 'only if the 
restriction on political communication was 'justified' as either 'conducive to the 
overall availability of the effective means of ... communications .. .in a 
democratic society,'110 or if the restriction: 
does not go beyond what is necessary either for the preservation of an ordered 
society or for the protection or vindication of the legitimate claims of 
individuals to live peacefully and with dignity in such a society.111 
106 On the significance of proportionality reasoning as a tool in constitutional interpretation 
generally, see further: Brad Selway, 'The Rise and Rise of the Reasonable Proportionality Test in 
Public Law' (1996) 7 Public Law Review 212. 
107 What was somewhat 'surprising' however, as Kirk observed, was that Deane did not employ 
the language of proportionality until his judgment in Cunliffe. Cunliffe (1994) 182 CLR 272, 340 
discussed in Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Guarantees, Characterisation and the Concept of 
Proportionality' (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review 1, 17. 
108 See further Stone's discussion of the 'two-tiered review' employed by Mason CJ and 
McHugh J, and the 'slightly different' approach of Deane and Toohey JJ. Adrienne Stone, 'The 
Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure: Standards of Review and the Freedom of Political 
Communication' (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 668, 678-9. Stone identified the 
difference in approach between Mason CJ and McHugh J on the one hand, and Deane and 
Toohey JJ on the other, as turning on the latter's greater interest in the actual operation of the 
law rather than its purpose. Ibid. 
109 Cunliffe (1994) 182 CLR 272, 339 (emphasis added). 
110 Ibid (emphasis added). 
111 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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In both tiers, Deane balanced the interest in free speech against other social 
interests and rights in a free and just society.112 However, where the law 
targeted political communication by its content, Deane's test was 'pre-
weighted' in favour of free speech.113 Although Deane was credited with 
introducing the phrase 'proportionality' into Australian constitutional 
jurisprudence, it was only in Cunliffe that Deane explicitly utilised the language 
of proportionality in this analysis.114 
In contrast to Deane, Brennan J adopted a single proportionality test in the free 
speech cases. Brennan J's test asked whether the burden on political speech was 
reasonably capable of being seen as appropriate and adapted to achieving a 
legitimate end.115 Consistent with Brennan J's approach in other areas, his test, 
in both form and application, displayed an appreciable level of judicial 
deference to Parliament, incorporating a 'margin of appreciation' to 
Parliament.116 
Deane's preference for a 'two-tiered' test in the free speech cases was significant 
for a number of reasons, relating both to Deane's vision of the implied freedom 
and to the intersections between his free speech cases and his wider 
constitutional philosophy. First, as Stone has observed, the two-tiered model of 
Deane and Toohey JJ, and Mason CJ and McHugh Jin the free speech cases was 
'reminiscent' of the American First Amendment law.117 The influence of First 
Amendment jurisprudence on the development of the implied freedom has 
been of interest to commentators.118 Deane's acceptance of features of the First 
Amendment jurisprudence was made all the more striking by his rejection in 
112 On the appropriateness of balancing by the Court in this context see further Adrienne Stone, 
'The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure: Standards of Review and the Freedom of 
Political Communication' (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 668. 
113 Ibid 686. 
114 Cunliffe (1994) 182 CLR 272, 340. 
115 ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 157-9. The single proportionality test of Brennan and Gaudron JJ is 
explored further in Stone, above n 112, 676-8. 
116 ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 157-9. See also Cunliffe (1994) 182 CLR 272, 324-5. 
117 Stone, above n 112, 678. The fact that Deane would consider the United States model stood in 
contrast to Deane's refusal to reflect on the relevance of the 'privilege and immunities' clause to 
the interpretation of s 117 in Street. See discussion above chapter 4 n 127. 
118 See further Gerald N Rosenberg and John M Williams, 'Do Not Go Gently Into That Good 
Right: The First Amendment in the High Court of Australia' (1997) Supreme Court Review 439. 
Stone has explored the dominance of First Amendment concepts of the free-market model of 
political communication and representative democracy in the Australian implied freedom in 
Adrienne Stone, 'Incomplete Theorizing in the High Court - Review Essay: Cass R Sunstein, 
Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict' (1998) 26 Federal Law Review 195, 202-3. 
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Theophanous of the balance between free speech and individual reputation 
struck by the United States Supreme Court inNew York Times Co v Sullivan,119 as 
providing insufficient protection to free speech in the Australian context.120 
Second, Deane's strict and tiered test aligned his approach in the free speech 
cases with that of McHugh J.121 In this area, Deane and McHugh JJ both 
favoured a strict test protecting political speech, in preference to the flexibility 
of the single proportionality test.122 Given McHugh J's extensive critique of 
Deane's derivation of the implied freedom from fundamental concepts of 
'representative government,' the similarity between Deane and McHugh JJ in 
this area reinforces that it is possible to over-emphasise the distance between 
the interpretive philosophies of these Justices. 
Finally, Deane's strict scrutiny approach mirrored his balancing approach in 
Re Tracey. In Re Tracey, Deane held that military tribunals could exist as a 
limited exception to the separation of federal judicial power, that is, only to the 
extent that military justice could be justified as necessary.123 In this area, Deane 
started from the proposition that the separation of powers principle must be 
protected, and carved out a narrow exception limited to the minimum 
jurisdiction necessary to maintain military discipline in the defence forces. 
Deane's approach in this context rejected the flexibility of a 'reasonably 
appropriate and adapted' test of other members of the Court. Similarly, Deane's 
two-tiered approach to limiting the implied freedom of political 
communication, and the strict test for laws targeting the content of political 
speech, preferred free speech over other interests. This approach reinforced 
Deane's vision of the underlying concept of representative government, like the 
separation of powers principle, as an important constitutional guarantee of 
individual liberties. 
119 (1964) 376 us 254. 
120 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 185. 
121 ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 234-5. See discussion in Adrienne Stone, 'The Limits of 
Constitutional Text and Structure: Standards of Review and the Freedom of Political 
Communication' (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 668, 678-9. McHugh J's approach to 
proportionality analysis in this context has been examined extensively in Nicholas Aroney, 
'Justice McHugh, Representative Government and the Elimination of Balancing' (2006) 28 
S]idney Law Review 505, 519-34. 
1 On significance of the preference for rules over flexibility see Stone, above n 121, 681-7. 
123 Re Tracey (1988) 166 CLR 518, 583. See discussion above chapter 3 n 155. 
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The balance of this chapter examines two threads in Deane's application of his 
strict proportionality reasoning in his free speech cases. The first is Deane's 
commitment to protect 'the people', that is, the 'few'/24 the 'weak' and the 
'poor' of society in his application of proportionality analysis. The second is 
Deane's commitment to the spirit of public service. Both principles were 
threads woven throughout his constitutional jurisprudence.125 Deane's free 
speech cases, particularly ACTV and Cunliffe, however, provide clear 
illustrations of these components of Deane's constitutional philosophy and their 
impact on his concept of the judicial role in constitutional interpretation. 
(a) ACTV: 'the people' vs political process and majority 
power 
In ACTV media organisations challenged the validity of Part IIID of the 
Broadcasting Act 1942 (Cth).126 This Part introduced prohibitions on political 
advertising by radio and television during an election period and allocated 'free 
time' to political parties proportionate to their respective voting shares obtained 
at the previous election. The purpose of the legislation was to reduce the threat 
of corruption in the political process, by decreasing the financial burden of 
political campaigning. The Court, by majority, upheld a challenge by the media 
broadcasters who argued that the regulation imposed a disproportionate 
burden on political speech.127 
Because the legislation targeted the content of speech, Deane and Toohey JJ 
applied the stricter proportionality analysis.128 They found that the legislation 
was a disproportionate means of achieving its objective.129 Particularly 
124 Richardson (1988) 164 CLR261, 316. 
125 Public service and the protection of the disadvantaged were also themes taken up by Deane 
while Governor-General. See, for example, Deane's Opening of the National Conference of the 
Council of Homeless Persons, Melbourne, 4 September 1996 in Sir William Deane, Directions: A 
Vision for Australia (2002) 71. 
126 The legislative scheme, and the significance of the case is explored further in HP Lee, 'The 
Implied Freedom of Political Communication' in HP Lee and George Winterton (eds), 
Australian Constitutional Landmarks (2003) 383. 
127 Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ held that Part IIID was invalid in its entirety. In 
contrast Dawson J upheld the part in its entirety. Brennan and McHugh JJ found a middle path. 
McHugh J upheld the Part only in its application to the territories. In contrast, Brennan J found 
only those provisions dealing with State elections to be invalid. 
128 ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 170-1 (Deane and Toohey JJ). 
129 Ibid 174 (Deane and Toohey JJ). 
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significant was the fact that the legislation allocated 'free time' to established 
political parties, and excluded advertising by special interest groups.130 Under 
this system, how could minority voices be heard?131 How could disadvantaged 
groups, those unable to gain representation in Parliament, express their views 
and protect their interests if 'free time' depended on prior success at elections? 
Through this analysis, Deane and Toohey JJ in ACTV clearly conceived the 
implied freedom as protecting minority interests from the exercise of power by 
the majority. Thus, the implied freedom protected the ability of 
parliamentarians, and all candidates for political office (not simply members of 
established political parties) to communicate with the electorate as well as the 
ability of 'the people' to communicate with each other about governmental and 
political matters. In this way, Deane and Toohey JJ's reasoning inACTV 
resonated with Deane's emphasis on the protection of the 'few' Tasmanian 
land-owners from the exercise of majority power by 'Canberra' in Richardson.132 
Deane and Toohey JJ' s application of proportionality reasoning in ACTV has 
been justly criticised as displaying insufficient deference to Parliament. Except 
in relation to the interference with State legislatives, Brennan J concluded that 
'it was open to the Parliament' to determine that the threat posed by electoral 
advertising was sufficiently grave to require a ban of the nature effected by the 
legislation.133 Missing from Deane and Toohey JJ's analysis was an adequate 
explanation of why the intentions and purpose of Parliament, as the 
representatives of 'the people', were not relevant to a consideration of how to 
best preserve the health of the nation's system of representative democracy. 
Affording a level of deference to Parliament's assessment in this context would 
not appear to be inconsistent with Deane's ultimate touchstone in constitutional 
interpretation, that is, the intentions of 'the people'. A greater degree of 
deference than that displayed by Deane and Toohey JJ would not have 
substituted the intentions of the people's representatives for 'the people' but 
rather it would give due weight to what had been significant public 
130 Ibid 175 (Deane and Toohey JJ). 
131 Deane and Toohey JJ observed that under the free time system it was 'at least possible that an 
independent candidate who was not a member of the previous Parliament or legislature would 
be unsuccessful in any application for free time.' Ibid 172. 
132 Richardson (1988) 164 CLR 261, 316. 
133 ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 161. 
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engagement with this issue.134 Such an analysis would have gone some way to 
deflecting the criticism that Deane and Toohey JJ's reasoning displayed an 
inherently 'paternalistic' attitude towards 'the people', and their ability to 
protect their interests and to weigh competing social objectives in a rational and 
considered manner.135 
ACTV highlighted a further dimension of Deane's understanding of the Court's 
role to protect 'the people'. As Fraser has argued, Deane and Toohey JJ's 
analysis did not consider whether their approach 'might diminish the civic 
freedoms available to many' by protecting the freedom of 'the wealthy few. 1136 
'Civic freedom', Fraser argued, was the 'power to participate as an equal in the 
life and governance of a political community.'137 In ACTV, however, Deane and 
Toohey JJ demonstrated a commitment to formal equality-equality of access to 
the media to all seeking to engage in political speech. Accordingly, their 
concern was not with the effects of the concentration of power on the political 
process, nor with the ability, in practice, of minority interests to participate in 
that system.138 Thus it appeared to be the risk posed by the majoritarian political 
process, not the distribution of power and wealth in the Australian community, 
that was of primary concern for Deane and Toohey JJ in this context. Although 
Deane's scepticism of majoritarian democracy as a protection of individual 
liberty in this context was consistent with his vision of the role of 'the people' 
under the Constitution, as discussed previously, that vision was not mandated 
by the language of the constitutional text.139 Accordingly, Deane's 
proportionality reasoning required greater analysis of external sources, whether 
history, principle, precedent or policy, to justify the choices he made in 
applying his proportionality reasoning. 
134 Zines observed that the nature of the ban on political advertising had been extensively 
debated in the community, and the media, as the legislation had progressed through the 
Houses of Parliament. Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4lh ed, 1997) 392. 
135 Andrew Fraser, 'False Hopes: Implied Rights and Popular Sovereignty in the Australian 
Constitution' (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 213, 226. 
136 Ibid 225. 
137 Ibid (emphasis added). 
138 Although, in his speech at the presentation of the 45th Walkley Awards for Excellence in 
Journalism, Sydney, 7 December 2000, when Governor-General, Deane acknowledged that the 
growth in the electronic media has the potential to 'distort and mislead and to undermine the 
integrity and identity of smaller vulnerable societies or communities.' Sir William Deane, 
Directions: A Vision for Australia (2002) 75-6. 
139 See further Adrienne Stone, 'Freedom of Political Communication, the Constitution and the 
Common Law' (1998) 26 Federal Law Review 219, 235. 
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(b) Cunliffe: public service and volunteerism 
As discussed above, Cunliffe concerned the validity of amendments to the 
Migration Act. Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ held that the implied 
freedom covered advice and assistance to immigrants and refugees relating to 
their immigration status. However, Toohey J also held that the registration 
scheme for migration agents was a proportionate restriction on that 
communication. In the result, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ, with 
Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ dissenting, upheld Part 2A of the Migration 
Act in its entirety. 
Deane's application of proportionality reasoning in Cunliffe reflected both his 
concern for the disadvantaged and his commitment to concepts of public 
service. Deane recognised in Cunliffe the 'particular vulnerability1140 of 
immigrants as a significant factor in his application of proportionality 
reasoning. Accordingly, Deane upheld the registration scheme in so far as it 
imposed licensing standards on persons giving immigration advice for a fee. 
Such standards, he argued, were reasonably proportionate to Parliament's 
protective purpose.141 In contrast, Deane found that the registration 
requirements imposed on volunteers were 'arbitrary and extreme.1142 This was 
because the risk posed by unqualified volunteers was outweighed by the 
benefit to immigrants of such advice and assistance. 
Deane's analysis in Cunliffe manifested his belief in the social, and moral, 
benefits of volunteerism in Australian 'democratic society.1143 That belief was 
not shared by all of the other members of the Court. For example, Toohey J 
emphasised the consequences for immigration applicants of poor immigration 
advice, and Parliament's desire to 'protect from exploitation persons applying 
for entry permits.'144 Those consequences were the same irrespective of whether 
the advice was provided for a fee or voluntarily. For Toohey J, the value of 
14° Cunliffe (1994) 182 CLR 272, 343. 
141 Ibid 343-4. 
142 Ibid 344. 
143 Ibid 339 (emphasis added). 
144 Ibid 383. 
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volunteerism was therefore not itself a factor weighing heavily in assessing the 
proportionality of the legislative burden on political speech. 
As chapter 1 has indicated, to the extent that proportionality reasoning 
encompasses a balancing process, it is inevitable that members of the Court will 
reach different conclusions on the validity of a law.145 However, in recognition 
of the innovation of the free speech guarantee, and the inherent flexibility of the 
concept of 'representative government', an appreciable degree of deference to 
legislative decision-making is warranted in the application of proportionality 
reasoning in this context.146 Throughout the free speech cases, members of the 
Court considered the question of the level of deference due to Parliament in this 
context. Brennan J, for instance, argued forcefully that in applying balancing 
reasoning, the Court must allow a 'margin of appreciation' to Parliament.147 
This margin makes explicit that the Court's role is to assess whether a measure 
was 'reasonably' appropriate and adapted, not to assess itself the 
appropriateness of the law. Thus in ACTV, Brennan explained that it was for 
Parliament to assess whether the law 'would tangibly minimise the risk of 
corruption'; the Court's task was to determine whether that assessment 'could 
be reasonably made.'148 
In his free speech cases, as in Richardson, Deane also emphasised the distinction 
between assessing whether a measure was appropriate (a question for 
Parliament) or 'reasonably' appropriate.149 However, the pattern of Deane's 
reasoning in the free speech cases suggests that Deane displayed only limited 
deference to Parliament's choices in this field. Instead, Deane utilised 
proportionality reasoning to strengthen the protection of individual rights and 
freedoms against interference by Parliament. It was in Cunliffe that Deane 
explicitly acknowledged the connection between his understanding of the level 
of deference due to Parliament and his concept of 'the people'. Thus, when 
applying a strict proportionality test, Deane argued that: 
145 Compare HP Lee, 'Proportionality in Australian Constitutional Adjudication' in Geoffrey 
Lindell (ed) Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (1994) 126, 147. 
146 Compare TRS Allan, 'The Common Law as Constitution: Fundamental Rights and First 
Principles' in Cheryl Saunders (ed) Courts of Final Jurisdiction: The Mason Court in Australia 
(1996) 146, 166. 
147 ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 159. 
148 Ibid (emphasis added). 
149 Compare Richardson (1988) 164 CLR 261, 307. 
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the courts do not arrogate to themselves legislative powers. They do no more 
than discharge the judicial function directly or indirectly entrusted to them by 
the Constitution adopted by the people as the compact of our nation.150 
This vision of the relationship between the Court and 'the people' explains 
Deane's application of proportionality reasoning in the free speech cases. 
As previous chapters have discussed, however, the constitutional text does not 
mandate a vision of 'the people' strengthening the protection of individual 
rights from interference by their elected representatives. Without a sustained 
analysis of the foundation, in text, history, or fundamental constitutional 
principles, to support his understanding of the nature of the Court's duty, the 
level of deference afforded by Deane to Parliament in the free speech cases was 
not compelling. 
Conclusion 
Deane's vision for the implied freedom of political communication continues to 
exercise considerable influence on the jurisprudence of the current High Court. 
Deane's role, however, has been as antithesis rather than paragon of the Court's 
current interpretive approach in this area. Indeed, Deane's reasons in 
Theophanous were ostensibly the means by which the Court in Lange could 
recast the implied freedom.151 The nature of Deane's influence in this field 
flowed from his level of comfort with broad and general theories of 
constitutional values and constitutional interpretation, and his understanding 
of concept of 'the people' as a foundation for broad constitutional rights and 
guarantees. 
To a greater extent than any other topic in his constitutional jurisprudence, 
Deane's free speech cases, and Theophanous in particular, embodied the three 
pillars of his interpretive method: 'fundamental concepts', 'living force' and 
proportionality reasoning. In the free speech cases, Deane also explained with 
greatest clarity the manner in which these three interpretive principles were 
15° Cunliffe (1994) 182 CLR 272, 340 (emphasis added). 
151 The Court in Lange observed that although Deane gave his concurrence with the answers of 
the joint judgment in Theophanous, the reasoning only had the direct support of three judges. It 
was on this basis that the Court reconsidered the nature of the implication and its relationship 
to the common law. See Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 555. 
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tied to his concept of 'the people'. As his earlier jurisprudence demonstrated, 
consistent with his vision of the Court's duty to protect minority interests, 
Deane employed each of these techniques to increase the scope of the implied 
freedom and the judicial protection of individual rights. Each principle of 
interpretation conferred considerable discretion on the Court. Thus each may 
also be criticised as being potentially flexible enough to enable the Court to give 
effect in the interpretation of the Constitution to idiosyncratic principles of 
democracy and fairness. 
As understood by Deane, these interpretive principles were tied to his belief in 
the anti-majoritarian commitment of the Constitution to 'the people'. However, 
Deane's interpretive principles can be employed to achieve more moderate 
applications of the implied freedom of political communication. Deane's 'living 
force' theory in particular need not be utilised to extend the protection of 
individual rights by implication in the manner undertaken by Deane. Rather, 
Deane's explanation of legal sovereignty provides a principled foundation for a 
moderate theory of progressive constitutional interpretation. For this potential 
to be realised, however, it may be necessary to demonstrate that this aspect of 
Deane's approach can be excised from his bold, 'activist', rights vision in the 
free speech cases. 
CONCLUSION 
On 16February1996, Deane was sworn in as Australia's twenty-second 
Governor-General. Deane's time as Governor-General coincided with events of 
great national pride and celebration, such as the 2000 Sydney Olympics and the 
Centenary of Federation in 2001. It was also a time of 'national mourning': the 
Port Arthur massacre in 1996; the Thredbo landslide in 1997; and the Interlaken 
canyoning accident in 1999. At these official events Deane conveyed the spirit of 
national optimism or grief with simple and powerful words and gestures. 
One of Deane's first acts as Governor-General was to change the official toast, 
from 'the Queen of Australia' to become: 
To the Queen of Australia and the people of Australia.1 
This was not mere 'nit-picking', nor a purely symbolic gesture.2 For Deane, 
recognition of 'the people' as sovereign was essential to his understanding of 
the Australian nation and its constitutional system. 
Deane's Australia was a vibrant, wealthy, lucky country, with abundant 
potential. It was a safe haven for people of all faiths and cultures, a nation 
strengthened by a commitment to multiculturalism and the distinctly 
Australian values of 'mateship' and a 'sense of fair play.'3 Consistent with this 
vision for Australia, Deane championed the causes of the disadvantaged/ and 
of reconciliation,5 as a means of serving all the people of the nation. For 
1 Tony Stephens, Sir William Deane: The Things that Matter (2002) 6. The Prime Minister (John 
Howard) said that he had 'followed the decision that was taken by the Governor-General' to 
ensure that future visiting heads of State would toast 'the Queen and the people of Australia.' 
Richard McGregor, 'Deane's Changes in Place on Roasted Toast to Queen', The Australian 5 
November 1999, 6. 
2 Michael Kirby, 'Stirring Up the Constitution: Greg Craven's Conversations with the Constitution' 
(2005) Quadrant 58, 60. 
3 See, for example, Australia Day Message, Canberra, 26 January 2000, quoted in Sir William 
Deane, Directions: A Vision for Australia (2002) 13. 
4 For illustrations of Deane's speeches on the treatment of the disadvantaged as a reflection of 
the worth of a democratic nation, see ibid, 79-80, 87, 92-3. 
5 For example, in Deane's opening address to the 1997 Religion and Cultural Diversity 
Conference in Melbourne, where he reflected on the 'shameful acts' of the dispossession of 
Indigenous Australians and the 'forcible removal of their children' as matters 'which must be 
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example, in language evoking his judgment with Gaudron J in Mabo (No 2), 
Deane urged the nation to acknowledge the errors and injustice of the past.6 For 
Deane, the treatment of Indigenous Australians and the disadvantaged was 
therefore a test of the health of the Australian democracy.7 Deane's perception 
of the vice-regal role, as more than merely ceremonial, polarised commentators. 
On the one hand there was support for his voice for the disadvantaged; the 
voiceless in the community. On the other, was a concern that Deane's 
engagement with social issues and criticism of government policy 
inappropriately politicised the vice-regal office.8 
Deane's willingness to be a voice for 'the people' did not emerge suddenly on 
his assumption of vice-regal office on 16 February 1996. Deane's constitutional 
jurisprudence shared his later interest in protecting the disadvantaged from 
interference by the Parliament, and also attracted criticism that Deane had 
illegitimately expanded the judicial role into the political sphere. This thesis has 
demonstrated that central to Deane's constitutional vision, and his 
understanding of the judicial function, was his concept of 'the people'. 
A Deane's 'fundamental constitutional truth' 
and its influence on his interpretive philosophy 
For Deane, 'the people' were the source of the Constitution's legitimacy. In 
Theophanous, Deane explained that the Constitution's authority stemmed from 
the original assent of 'the people', by referenda, and the contemporary 
acquiescence of Australians to their constitutional system.9 Consistent with this 
principle, Deane believed that the Constitution's meaning derived from the 
profoundly regretted by us all as a nation.' Quoted in Sir William Deane, 'Religion and Cultural 
Diversity: Global Challenges and Local Responsibilities' (1997) August Migration Action 3, 4. 
This Conference was held two days prior to the delivery of judgment by the Court in Kruger 
(1997) 190 CLR 1. 
6 Compare, for example, Mabo (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR l, 109 (Deane and Gaudron JJ) and Deane's 
Sydney Peace Prize Lecture, Sydney, 8 November 2001, quoted in Sir William Deane, Directions: 
A Vision for Australia (2002) 30. 
7 See, for example, Sir William Deane, Directions: A Vision for Australia (2002) 79-80, 92-3. 
8 See discussion in George Winterton, 'The Evolving Role of the Governor-General' (Paper 
presented at The Australian Constitution in Troubled Times, Canberra, 7-9 November 2003) 
219. 
9 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171. 
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intentions of 'the people' and that all governmental power must be exercised 
for their benefit. 
The influence of Deane's vision of 'the people' can be seen throughout his 
constitutional jurisprudence in a number of ways. One aspect of Deane's vision 
was his understanding of the identity of 'the people' as 'the people of 
Australia.'10 Deane's High Court decisions thus evince a preference for national 
over federal solutions to contemporary Australian problems, favouring 'the 
people of Australia' over the interests of 'the people' of the several States. For 
example, chapter 1 explored Deane's consistent extension of the 
Commonwealth's legislative power under s Sl(xx), (xxix), and (xxxv). Also, 
chapter 2 explored constitutional implications where Deane rejected a strict 
division of power along federal lines. Thus in Duncan, for example, Deane 
recognised co-operation as the Constitution's 'positive objective', 11 allowing the 
Commonwealth and the States to work together to achieve social objectives. 
Five years later, in Breavington, Deane limited the States' power to determine 
the choice of law rules binding on their courts. Instead, Deane held that the 
Constitution created a unitary legal system, and guaranteed a single choice of 
law rule applying throughout the Federation. Only this approach, Deane 
argued, could guarantee 'the people of Australia' protection from the dilemma 
of the inconsistent legal commands of State laws. This connection between 
Deane's vision of federal relationships and his concept of 'the people' has not 
gained the notoriety that attached to his use of popular sovereignty in Leeth and 
in his free speech cases.12 However, this was a significant aspect of Deane's 
understanding of the role of 'the people' in his constitutional philosophy. 
A further aspect of Deane's vision of 'the people' was his insistence that legal 
sovereignty flowed from 'all the people'. Deane signalled this aspect of his 
understanding of 'the people' most clearly at the beginning and end of his High 
Court career. In his swearing-in speech, in 1982, Deane affirmed that the source 
of law and judicial power in the Australian constitutional system was not the 
10 Stevens v Head (1993) 176 CLR 433, 460 (emphasis added). 
11 Duncan (1983) 158 CLR 535, 589. 
12 Although note the examination of these issues (not limited to Deane's vision) in Graham 
Nicholson, 'The Concept of "One Australia" in Constitutional Law and the Place of Territories' 
(1997) 25 Federal Law Review 281. 
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Parliament, as the representatives of 'the people', but the people themselves: 'all 
manner of people.'13 Twelve years later, in his decision in Theophanous in 1994, 
Deane explained that the source of the Constitution's legitimacy was not 
derived from either the Imperial or Australian Parliaments but the assent of 'the 
people' to the Constitution. This understanding of 'the people' as legal 
sovereigns, as distinct from the acts and intentions of their representatives, had 
two significant consequences for Deane's constitutional jurisprudence. 
The first manifestation of this vision of 'the people' was Deane's 'living force' 
theory of constitutional interpretation. Expressed most completely in 
Theophanous, Deane rejected a role for the framers' subjective intentions in 
constitutional interpretation. This was because the authority of the Constitution 
rested on the adoption of the Constitution by 'the people' themselves, not the 
acts of their representatives at the Constitutional Conventions (the framers). For 
Deane, the Convention Debates could therefore be utilised as a tool in 
constitutional interpretation only to the extent that they elucidated 'what the 
people ... meant when they adopted the Constitution.'14 The Debates could not 
be used to substitute the intentions of one or more of the people's 
representatives for the intentions of the sovereign people themselves. Deane's 
approach was consistent with the rule in Cole and its rejection of the role of the 
framers' subjective intentions in constitutional interpretation. However, 
Deane's approach was uniquely premised on his concept of the sovereignty of 
'the people'. 
Deane's 'living force' approach also endorsed a progressive theory of 
constitutional interpretation. Deane's theory required that the meaning of the 
Constitution was not bound to the past but moulded to contemporary needs 
and circumstances. This theory also reflected Deane's vision of the source of 
legal sovereignty. Thus, under his 'living force' theory, the Court's task was to 
give effect to the intentions of 'the people' in 1900 and the intention of modern 
Australians as expressed through their acquiescence to the Australian 
13 Transcript of the Ceremonial Sitting of the Occasion of the Swearing-in of the Honourable Mr 
Justice Deane as a Justice of the High Court of Australia at Canberra, Tuesday 27 July 1982, 17-
18. 
14 Capital Duplicators Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory (No 2), Transcript of Argument, 
21April1993, 158. 
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constitutional system. Consistent with this vision, Deane demonstrated in 
Theophanous that the contemporary meaning of the Constitution was not to be 
found exclusively in the will and intentions of Parliament, as the current 
representatives of 'the people', but in the broader community values of' all of 
the people' of Australia. 
Deane's concept of 'the people' as 'all the people' was also reflected in his 
commitment to the judicial protection of the disadvantaged and vulnerable. 
More controversial than his 'living force' theory, and more pervasive in his 
jurisprudence, this aspect of Deane's vision of 'the people' was manifested in 
his extension of the constitutional protection of individual rights against 
interference from Parliament or the Executive. This occurred in his 
constitutional jurisprudence in a number of ways. 
For example, Deane extended the rights-function of a number of constitutional 
provisions. Thus, as discussed in chapter 4, in his decisions on the 
Constitution's express rights in ss 5l(xxxi), 80 and 117, Deane adopted broad 
definitions of the text of these provisions. He also applied those guarantees to 
give effect to 'substance over form', ensuring that the protections afforded to 
the individual could not be avoided by drafting techniques of the Parliaments 
of the Commonwealth or the States. Deane also recast a number of provisions 
as constitutional rights, including s 90 as an equality guarantee in Hematite, and 
his limitation on certain retrospective laws flowing from s 109 inMetwally. 
Deane's rights-based interpretation of ss 90 and 109 derived from his 
understanding of the Constitution as more than an instrument dividing power 
between the 'artificial entities' of government, but as 'ultimately concerned with 
the protection and governance of the people.'15 Deane's reinterpretation of these 
provisions, and others, as constitutional rights was confirmed in Street when 
Deane listed his 'significant number' of express and implied rights contained in 
the Australian Constitution, despite the absence of a formal Bill of Rights.16 
Deane further pursued his vision of the Constitution as an instrument 
protective of the rights of 'the people' through his 'fundamental concepts' 
15 Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447, 476-7. 
16 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 521-2 (emphasis added). 
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reasoning. This interpretive principle allowed Deane to derive constitutional 
implications from the doctrines of government underlying the Constitution and 
the common law rights manifested in the Constitution's text. In Deane's hands 
this interpretive approach yielded, among other implications, procedural and 
substantive guarantees of due process and the implied freedom of political 
communication. These implied constitutional rights flowed from Deane's 
conviction that the essential nature of the Constitution, its 'central thesis',17was 
that all power flowed from and for the benefit of all 'the people'. 
Finally, Deane employed 'proportionality' reasoning to strengthen the 
constitutional protection of individual rights. Deane's proportionality concept 
required the Court to evaluate the connection between legislative means and 
ends. Although not always employing the language of 'proportionality', Deane 
utilised the concept extensively as a tool in the characterisation process, and as 
a mechanism for defining the boundaries of a number of express and implied 
constitutional guarantees. Consistent with his belief that the Constitution 
protected 'all manner of people', Deane's application of proportionality 
reasoning strictly scrutinised the necessity of legislative interference with 
individual rights and displayed only limited deference to the policy objectives 
of Parliament. 
These interpretive principles pervaded Deane's High Court constitutional 
jurisprudence and combined to form a cohesive vision of the Constitution and 
the Court's role in its interpretation. That vision was founded on Deane's 
understanding of the 'fundamental constitutional truth,' that the Constitution's 
legitimacy flowed from 'the people'. But how compelling is Deane's vision? 
B Deane's constitutional jurisprudence: a 
final evaluation 
This thesis has utilised Coper's description of propositions commanding 
'common consent' on the nature of judicial reasoning as its starting point for 
17 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 180. 
291 
evaluating Deane's constitutional jurisprudence.18 This framework recognised 
that the text of the Constitution rarely compelled a single answer in 
constitutional interpretation. The Court may therefore legitimately turn to 
precedent and history, as well as policy, to assist in its task, and judges may 
honestly disagree on the 'correct' meaning of the Constitution. This framework 
also recognises that judicial choice in constitutional interpretation is not 
unlimited. Tools used in constitutional interpretation must provide genuinely 
external standards and reference points, and not represent devices to hide the 
personal values of the judge.19 
Within this 'common ground', however, this thesis has imposed two criteria to 
assess the persuasiveness of Deane's constitutional jurisprudence. First, was a 
consideration of the 'rigor' of Deane's analysis. This entailed a scrutiny of the 
nature of Deane's reliance on text, history, precedent and policy in support of 
his interpretation of the Constitution's meaning. Did these factors reasonably 
support the conclusion reached by Deane? Further, did Deane utilise these 
sources in a consistent and principled manner? Second, this thesis assessed the 
relationship Deane struck between the Court and Parliament in his 
constitutional jurisprudence, and the consistency of that approach with the 
division of responsibility under the Constitution between the legislative and 
judicial branches. Assessing this aspect of Deane's reasoning, this thesis looked 
beyond his occasional invocations of legalism, to the practical effect of his 
reasoning. In the context of Deane's considerable innovation and imagination in 
his constitutional jurisprudence, this thesis has endorsed Allan's proposition 
that creativity in judicial reasoning must be matched with both a high standard 
of judicial exposition and analysis and an 'appropriate deference' to 
Parliament.20 
Against this framework, Deane's implied constitutional rights in Metwally, 
Polyukhovich (in respect of retrospective criminal laws), Leeth and Theophanous 
have correctly been subject to extensive criticism. Deane's implied rights in 
18 Michael Coper, 'Concern About Judicial Method' (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 
554, 572. 
19 Ibid 567. 
20 TRS Allan, 'The Common Law as Constitution: Fundamental Rights and First Principles' in 
Cheryl Saunders (ed) Courts of Final Jurisdiction: The Mason Court in Australia (1996) 146, 166. 
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these cases were not supported by compelling analysis of the text, or precedent. 
For example, Deane's extension of constitutional protection to preclude 
retrospective criminal laws in Polyukhovich rested on an unsustainable 
definition of the judicial function and was contrary to the long-standing 
acceptance of the Commonwealth's power to enact retrospective laws. Further, 
in Deane and Toohey JJ's decision in Leeth, Deane attributed views to 'the 
framers' in support of his approach that were unsupported by a fair reading of 
the historical record. In these, and other ways, Deane's decisions in these four 
iconic implied rights cases reflected his pursuit of a rights-protective vision of 
the Constitution that was insufficiently supported by considered analysis of 
text, policy or precedent. 
More significant to an examination of the persuasiveness of Deane's wider 
constitutional vision was his reliance on 'the people' in these decisions. 
Metwally, Polyukhovich, Leeth and Theophanous illustrate that the concept of 'the 
people' was itself incapable of supporting the implication of judicially-
enforceable fundamental rights of the nature proposed by Deane. This was 
because, despite Deane's emphatic endorsement of 'the people' to strengthen 
the judicial protection of fundamental rights, the concept of 'the people' may 
inform a number of visions of democracy, and of judicial review, under the 
Constitution. Thus, when a sole or dominant factor in constitutional 
interpretation, Deane's concept of 'the people' may function as a device capable 
of allowing the Court to interpret what the Constitution should mean. Such an 
interpretive principle oversteps the judicial role in constitutional interpretation 
and justly exposes the Court to criticism. 
However, despite their significance as indicators of Deane's concept of 'the 
people' and its role in his constitutional philosophy, these four cases do not 
fairly represent the valuable insights offered by Deane's constitutional 
jurisprudence. Across his thirteen years of service on the High Court, Deane 
applied his concept of 'the people' to support both traditional interpretive 
principles, and to underpin his distinctive trilogy of interpretative principles: 
'living force', 'fundamental concepts' and proportionality reasoning. In contrast 
to Deane's decisions in Metwally, Leeth, Theophanous and Polyukhovich (regarding 
retrospective criminal laws), in many other cases Deane's reasoning offered 
compelling solutions to contemporary constitutional issues, infused with his 
recognition of the role of the sovereign people. 
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1 Deane's fusion of 'the people' and 'traditional' 
interpretive techniques 
Although Deane's innovative trilogy of interpretive principles has attracted the 
greatest commentary, in many of his decisions Deane blended his vision of 'the 
people' with the application of established principles of interpretation. For 
example, as discussed in chapter 1, Deane's decisions on the scope of 
Commonwealth legislative power explicitly endorsed the Engineers' Case as the 
starting point for his analysis. In the Tasmanian Dam Case, Wooldumpers and the 
Incorporation Case, Deane relied on the Engineers' Case to extend Commonwealth 
legislative power. Deane's reliance on the Engineers' Case in these cases 
coincided with his own preference for national, over federal, solutions, based 
on his understanding of the Court's duty to 'the people of Australia'. It is true 
that the text of the Constitution does not unequivocally compel this preference 
for national over federal interpretations of s 51, or Deane's vision of 'the people 
of Australia' rather than 'the people of the States'. However, Deane's conclusions 
on the reach of s 51 in these cases were reasonably open, and supported by a 
considered analysis of history, precedent, policy and the application of long-
established interpretive principles. 
Deane also fused his people-based approach with established principles of 
constitutional interpretation in his examination of express constitutional rights. 
Across his decisions on ss 51(xxxi), 80 and 117, Deane endorsed a broad 
interpretation of the constitutional text, and the rejection of formalism in its 
application. Both the extension of judicially-enforceable rights, and the 
principle that the meaning of the text must not be frustrated by formalism were 
supported by Deane's commitment to interpret the Constitution in a manner 
consistent with the sovereignty of 'all the people', not simply by reference to the 
intentions of their representatives. Although Deane's decisions in Kingswell and 
the Incorporation Case have not gained the approval of a majority of the Court at 
this time, Deane's reasoning in the areas of s 51 and express rights illustrate the 
blending of his vision of 'the people' with long-established interpretive 
principles to offer compelling answers to a range of constitutional questions. 
2 Deane's three signature interpretive principles 
(a) 'Living force' theory 
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Deane's 'living force' theory represented a significant and positive innovation 
in Australian constitutional theory. Deane's theory explained that the Court's 
role was to interpret the Constitution consistent with the meaning of 'the 
people' as legal sovereign. This approach cut through the complex rule in Cole v 
Whitfield to permit reference to the Convention Debates where it assisted the 
Court in determining 'what the people meant' when they adopted the 
Constitution in 1900. Deane's decision in Wooldumpers offered an illustration of 
this element of his 'living force' theory. There, Deane relied on the Convention 
Debates to determine the historical nature of industrial disputes, and the 
people's intentions when they granted the Commonwealth power with respect 
to the 'prevention and settlement' of interstate industrial disputes under 
s Sl(xxxv).21 The concern expressed in 1900 regarding the escalation of disputes 
was a factor supporting the extension of the 'prevention' limb of s 5l(xxxv). 
Further, Deane's concept of 'the people' provides an explanation of the 
legitimacy of an evolutionary interpretive approach. Under Deane's approach, 
the interpretation of the Constitution must respond to the dual acts of 
sovereignty: the assent of both the original and contemporary people to the 
Constitution. Deane's jurisprudence does not itself display a persuasive 
illustration of the benefits of this approach. Although frequently utilising 
contemporary meaning (for example, in the Tasmanian Dam Case, Wooldumpers 
and Theophanous), Deane did not support his understanding of the intentions of 
contemporary Australians in these cases with compelling analysis of external 
sources. However, in theory, Deane's 'living force' approach required the Court 
to justify its articulation of the Constitution's contemporary meaning, and the 
21 Wooldumpers (1989) 166 CLR 311, 328-30. 
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nature of the evolution in meaning from 1900. As such, Deane's 'living force' 
theory remains a potentially valuable tool in constitutional interpretation. 
Whether Deane's theory can survive its association with his controversial 
decision in Theophanous, and the endorsement of another controversial judicial 
'activist', Kirby J, remains to be seen.22 
(b) 'Fundamental concepts' reasoning 
In Polyukhovich, as part of his derivation of a guarantee precluding retrospective 
criminal laws, Deane explained the source of his judicial process guarantee in 
'fundamental concepts' reasoning. The wide acceptance of the latter guarantee 
is a testament to the persuasive force of Deane's reasoning (and that of 
Gaudron J) in this field. Deane's 'fundamental concepts' analysis turned to the 
underlying principles and doctrines manifested by the text, in this case, by the 
reference to a 'court' ins 71. The strength of Deane's judicial process 
implication therefore derived from his very reliance on 'fundamental concepts' 
reasoning: utilising the history and purpose of that doctrine to frame the limits 
of this guarantee.23 Ironically, Polyukhovich therefore illustrated the extremes of 
Deane's 'fundamental concepts' approach: the modest and compelling 
derivation of a procedural due process guarantee alongside the overreaching 
and unsupported extension of constitutional protection to preclude 
retrospective criminal laws. 
Other illustrations of Deane's 'fundamental concepts' reasoning, if less 
compelling than his judicial process guarantee, remain reasonably open 
interpretations of the Constitution. In Duncan, and in QEC, for instance, Deane 
recognised the importance of construing the text in context, and required the 
Court to engage openly with the underlying principles and values that inform 
the Constitution. Although Deane's decisions in Duncan and Breavington 
inevitably involved a degree of choice in framing the underlying doctrines of 
22 See, for example, Brownlee v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 278, 321-22 (Kirby J). See also Michael 
Kirby,' Andrew Inglis Clark and the High Court of Australia' in Richard Ely and James Warden 
(eds), A Living Force: Andrew Inglis Clark and the Ideal of Commonwealth (2001) 378. 
23 Compare Fiona Wheeler, 'Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the New High 
Court' (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 205, 210-11. 
296 
the Constitution, Deane's choice was informed by fair and considered analysis 
of text, history and principle. 
What then of Deane's use of 'fundamental concepts' reasoning to derive the 
implied freedom of political communication? Certainly, Deane's reliance on 
popular sovereignty in this context provided a platform of sufficient flexibility 
to tempt a judge to extend the implied freedom by reference to their own 
personal standards and principles. However, as has been widely accepted, the 
content of the implied freedom cannot be derived from the text of the 
Constitution alone. Reference to the Constitution's 'fundamental concepts', 
including the doctrine of representative government, and its underlying 
commitment to popular sovereignty, is therefore a necessary step in framing the 
content of the implied freedom. In that context, a modest definition of these 
principles, matched by greater judicial deference to Parliament would have 
provided much needed stability and certainty in Deane's use of 'fundamental 
concepts' reasoning in this field. 
(c) Proportionality analysis 
Deane's proportionality analysis provides a valuable tool in constitutional 
interpretation. For example, in his s 51(xxxi) and military tribunal decisions, 
Deane utilised proportionality reasoning to find the limits of the Constitution's 
guarantees of just terms, and the military exception to Ch III. Deane struck a 
balance in those cases between the Commonwealth's regulatory and defence 
objectives and the rights of 'the people' by limiting Commonwealth power to 
what was necessary to give effect to its purpose. That Deane struck the balance 
in favour of individual rights in this way was a conclusion that this thesis has 
shown was well-supported by the text, as well as history, precedent and policy. 
Deane's use of proportionality reasoning in his free speech cases expressed a 
similar priority to his decisions on the military justice exception. His pre-
weighted test in the free speech cases imposed a strict scrutiny of laws targeting 
political speech. However, Deane's decisions in this area fail to accord sufficient 
deference to Parliament. A greater degree of judicial deference in this context 
would not have been inconsistent with Deane's understanding of the Court's 
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duty to 'the people' in constitutional interpretation. Rather, it would recognise 
that the deliberations of the people's representatives were relevant to a 
consideration of how to best preserve the health of the nation's system of 
representative democracy. As an area of significant judicial innovation, the call 
for a greater degree of judicial deference to legislative policy-making in the 
context of Deane's free speech cases was particularly strong. 
Similar issues attend Deane's use of proportionality reasoning in the 
characterisation context. Questions of degree are inevitably involved when 
assessing the sufficiency of a law's connection to a head of power.24 
Proportionality reasoning brings competing policy interests into the open, and 
exposes the Court's evaluation and assessment of those issues. The fact that 
proportionality analysis invites the Court to consider the impact of a law on 
common law rights and freedoms, rather than purely 'federal' considerations, 
does not render the test illegitimate in this context.25 Once it is recognised that 
sovereign power flows from 'the people', the impact of a law on the interests of 
'the people' becomes a relevant consideration in the assessment of whether the 
law is an extreme means to achieve its ends, and so, whether the law can be 
fairly characterised as being with respect to a head of power. On the other 
hand, as Deane himself affirmed, the Court's ultimate test is whether a law is 
'reasonably' appropriate and adapted to achieving an object within power. That 
assessment requires a degree of deference to Parliament that Deane's decisions 
in the Tasmanian Dam Case, and Richardson, may not have exhibited. 
C Judging Deane: the bigger picture 
Deane's High Court decisions on constitutional law reward a systematic 
analysis. This thesis has argued that Deane's constitutional philosophy was 
based on a rich, people-based, vision of the Constitution. His jurisprudence 
revealed a number of innovative contributions to Australian constitutional 
theory and a wealth of moderate rights-based decisions. A wider perspective 
24 HP Lee, 'Proportionality in Australian Constitutional Adjudication' in Geoffrey Lindell (ed) 
Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (1994) 126, 147. 
25 Compare Leslie Zines, 'Constitutionally Protected Individual Rights' in Paul Finn (ed) Essays 
on Law and Government (1995) 136, 139. 
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deepens an understanding of Deane's jurisprudence beyond his iconic decisions 
in Leeth or the free speech cases, and contextualises his contribution to the 
controversial Mason Court era. 
An examination of Deane's constitutional jurisprudence also speaks more 
broadly to questions of judicial method and the judicial role. Deane reminds us 
that judges can come to the Court with fully-formed visions of the Constitution, 
and of the judicial function. With recent speculation on the views of new, and 
potential, appointees to the Court, studies of the jurisprudence of its past and 
current members are an important step in informing debate on judicial process. 
Such studies may not lead to accurate predictions of the judicial philosophy of 
new members of the Court. Deane himself observed that he had undergone a 
'sea change' on his appointment to the High Court, departing from the mould of 
a 'lawyer's lawyer' to engage with the question of what the law 'should be.'26 
However, examinations of the jurisprudence of prominent judges, like Deane, 
are necessary if public debate is to extend beyond the labelling of judges as 
'activist', or 'conservative', to a deeper engagement with these important 
questions. 
26 Deane, quoted in Tony Stephens, Sir William Deane: The Things that Matter (2002) 45-6 
(emphasis added). 
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